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Summary 
Rather than ponder sovereign wealth funds' (SWFs ') significance for global capital 
markets, this thesis takes a step back and asks the following: why do SWFs exist in 
such numbers across the global political economy? The SWF literature, dominated by 
fmancial economists and neoliberal commentators, has yet to adequately address this 
puzzle. This is significant given the funds embed systematically significant amounts 
of national wealth throughout speculative capital markets, thereby increasing their 
state's vulnerability to recurrent asset bubbles and crises. The thesis consequently 
examines the interest-based politics behind SWFs' domestic origins. It begins its 
analysis with the argument that SWFs are first and foremost domestic strategies of 
governance created to achieve specific short and medium term goals of the 
administrative state. This is despite their international and long-term investment 
orientations. In short, the funds serve to immediately stabilize state actors' 
governance function by reconceptualising problems of uncertainty in the quantitative 
and manageable terms of fmancial risk. This account of SWFs' origins thus contests 
that currently dominating mainstream commentary, which portrays the funds as 
evolutionary features of modem fmance capitalism. The domestic political interests 
SWFs were initially created to serve consequently remain critically unexamined. 
Drawing from the constructivist institutionalism literature, the thesis also seeks to 
demonstrate that SWFs are the institutional embodiment of a specific array of 
prescriptive fmancial ideas. It will be shown this framework offmancial 'knowledge' 
problematically constrains political actors to defer their interests to the demands of 
the speculative fmancial realm. In the face of recurrent crises, such constraint 
highlights how SWFs' immediate impact on domestic socioeconomic spheres 
outweighs their imagined fmancial benefits. The funds' rapid expansion since 2000 
therefore poses significant implications for the nature and exercise of sovereign 
authority in SWF-states. These theoretical arguments are developed in Part I of the 
thesis, and then tested against three case studies in Part II: Norway's Government 
Pension Fund-Global; Alberta's Heritage Savings Trust Fund; and Ireland's National 
Pension Reserve Fund. 
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Introduction 
Background to Research 
While a longstanding presence in global capital markets, sovereign wealth 
funds (SWFs) remain an understudied class of speculative investor. 1 In January of 
2008, for example, The Economist led with a story conspicuously titled: 'Invasion of 
the Sovereign-Wealth Funds'. The cover image depicted a number of military 
helicopters - noticeably branded with the flags of Kuwait, Singapore and South Korea 
- headed on the same bearing, stacks of gold bars in tow. The image was a tongue-in-
cheek reference to the stern protectionist sentiments aired by US Treasury officials 
the previous week. The source of their alarm was the investments recently made by 
the SWFs of these three states: $21 billion in much needed liquidity to support two 
failing US banking giants, Citigroup and Merrill Lynch. 2 The irony that these 
governments, traditionally held to the periphery of modern fmance, had 'flown to the 
rescue of capitalism's fmest' was thus not lost on The Economist (2008). By 2009, a 
range of such peripheral governments would in fact invest over $70 billion in western 
fmancial institutions still reeling from the liquidity crisis. 3 Yet like so much of the 
commentary from media, policymakers, and think tanks that soon followed, The 
Economist article offered no defmitive conclusions as to what SWFs really were, how 
they were structured, or why they existed. The last of these questions has gone 
particularly unaddressed by this growing body of literature. 
1 It suffices to say for now that the tenn 'sovereign wealth fund' refers to a state-linked fiscal vehicle 
that invests public capital in speculative financial assets, primarily public equities. They are thus 
demarcated from other fiscal institutions of the state such as central banks, commodity stabilization 
funds, and public pension funds by the degree of financial risk assumed in their portfolios. A more 
thorough definition of what constitutes an SWF and what does not is developed in Chapter· s One and 
Two. 
2 Unless otherwise noted, monetary figures are expressed in US dollars. 
3 For a review of these investments, see Couturier et aI, 2009: Sections 4-5. 
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In one of international political economy (IPE) scholarship's ftrst offering to 
the SWF literature, Helleiner and Lundblad (2008: 68) ambiguously conclude that 
'the transformation of these states into this kind of market actor is important'. Clearly 
this is so. Yet surprisingly little analysis has been conducted on the transformation 
process itself, or what signiftcance it poses for these states' understanding of, and 
approach to, 'good' domestic governance. This dissertation consequently focuses its 
attentions on the question of why SWFs exist and in such numbers across the 
variegated global political economy (see Appendix 1). It does so by examining the 
motivations behind the funds' domestic political origins, as well as the relationship 
SWFs share with the domestic citizenry to whom they are ultimately accountable. 
To be sure, the SWF literature has yet to provide either a theoretically 
convmcmg or empirically rich account of the funds' domestic origins and 
socioeconomic signiftcance. Discussion has instead remained rooted in fmancial 
regulatory debates that ask whether SWFs should be allowed to aggressively 
speculate with public capital, in what asset-classes, and in what markets. This is given 
the funds' political linkages confuse the orthodox view held by fmancial economists 
that capital markets are self-regulating and generally efftcient. State originated 
investment would only upset this delicate balance, so what category of investor are 
they? Do they follow a 'political' or 'fmancial' logic? To whom are they accountable? 
Are they 'white knights' coming to the rescue of the global fmancial system 
(Couturier et aI, 2009), or are they 'Trojan horses', enabling foreign government to 
insidiously take over strategic industries (Truman, 2007)? The formative role played 
by domestic politics in SWFs' creation and development through time, and thus the 
funds' signiftcant implications for state sovereignty, consequently remain unexamined 
in the IPE literature. 
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The Research Puzzle and Objectives 
In Gatekeepers of Growth: The IPE of Central Banking in Developing 
Countries, Maxfield (1997: 12) asked why 30 states across five continents increased 
the independence of their central banks between 1990 and 1995. Specifically, why 
would government politicians, who are generally assumed in International Relations 
to be motivated by self-interest, cede discretion over monetary policy to an 
independent central bank? Why would they limit their authority in this manner given 
the widespread economic - and therefore political - effects this decision would 
undoubtedly expose them to? The recent and rapid rise of SWFs represents a similar 
puzzle to that of central bank independence. While several funds have existed for 
decades, over half were created post-2000, spanning a diverse range of states 
characterized by unique socio and politico-economic backgrounds (cf Miracky et aI, 
2008: 13-15; Appendix 1). Also similar to central bank independence, SWFs limit a 
government's capacity to manage key areas of economic and fiscal policy. This is due 
to the fact that SWF capital is placed at one remove of government auspices for fear 
of political tampering, thereby limiting their capacity to set short and medium-term 
expenditure frameworks for this wealth (Davis et aI, 2001). Hence if it can be 
assumed government actors are strategic and motivated to action by their individually 
formulated policy preferences (cf. Hay, 2001), how to explain the global diffusion of 
the SWF policy path witnessed over the past two decades?4 
4 The tenn 'diffusion' here refers to the process whereby institutional principles or practices are spread 
'with little modification through a population of actors' (Campbell, 2007: 77). Miracky et al (2009: 14-
20) detail the various waves of SWFs' emergence. Although the Kuwait Investment Authority was 
established in 1950, the first two waves did not occur until the 1970s and 1980s. This followed from 
the increased price for energy assets, primarily oil, as well as the rise of the' Asian Tiger' economies. 
Over half of today's SWFs were then formed after 2000 due primarily to an increase in the price of oil 
as well as the expansion in global foreign exchange reserve levels. 
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To be sure, SWFs are not one-off fiscal institutions created, but then left 
critically unobserved, by political authorities. Rather, the funds are the institutional 
embodiment of politically constituted and highly contested fiscal policies, whose 
legitimacy must be actively maintained by governments through time. Many domestic 
commentators have been quick to argue SWFs expose their national wealth to 
excessive amounts of fmancial risk. This wealth could instead be directed to achieve 
more fruitful socioeconomic goals. 5 SWFs global emergence is thus puzzling given 
they limit these governments' access to a systematically significant amount of public 
capital, as well as expose them to unpredictable fmancial volatility and crises. Why 
would these actors wish to limit their realizable policy preferences by foregoing their 
access to SWF capital, instead opting to invest this wealth throughout speculative 
fmancial markets? What impact, moreover, does this fiscal management strategy have 
on these states' approach to domestic governance, and thus state sovereignty in 
general? 
These questions are indeed necessary to examme from the perspective of 
critical IPE scholarship given the significant fmancial risks to which SWFs - and by 
extension, their government overseers and domestic beneficiaries - are ultimately 
exposed. In 2008, for example, SWFs' total assets under management were reduced 
by approximately 25 percent - or $700 billion - in the wake of the fmancial crisis that 
began in August 2007 (Financial Times, 2008). The crisis also prompted a majority of 
SWF-states to redirect their investment focuses inwards so as to stabilize their own 
fragile economies reeling from volatile property and fmancial markets (Couturier et 
aI, 2009: Section 4). SWFs' public capital was thus directed towards stabilizing the 
fragile fmancial system while non-fmancial actors and sectors were left reeling. This 
5 The Chinese Investment Corporation, for example, has been subject to much heated criticism 
following the poor performance of several of its investments in western fmancial institutions (Cheng, 
2008). 
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is to say that while these bailouts were made in the name of protecting the greater 
good - i.e. the 'too big to fail' mantra - they nonetheless reflect what Connolly (1995: 
85) refers to as 'fonns of discipline, regulation, and surveillance ... [that] control or 
neutralize those populations excluded from [their] benefits'. To be sure, global equity 
markets recovered much of their losses in 2009. But again, this recovery was 
predicated on the interventionist hand of governments, many of whom had substantial 
amounts of national wealth invested in the very system they were bailing out. 
This experience of domestic crisis and SWF-directed intervention in 2007 and 
2008 held for each of this dissertation's three case studies: the SWFs of Norway, 
Ireland, and Alberta, Canada. Being so heavily invested throughout the speculative 
fmancial realm in the midst of this crisis also took a political toll on these three 
governments. Each of the political parties that had held a parliamentary majority prior 
to the crisis lost a significant share of their political support, due in large part to their 
SWFs' poor perfonnances. It is thus surprising that each of these governments' 
resounding and unequivocal response to the crisis was not to critically examine 
whether the SWF policy path was in their best interests. Instead, these governments 
opted to more aggressively support and promote their funds' speculative fmancial 
identities throughout domestic society. Why did these governments decide to not only 
maintain the SWF policy path in the face of the crisis's globally reverberating 
ramifications, but also more aggressively promote its legitimacy? This question 
speaks to a second piece of the SWF puzzle examined in this dissertation. 
To this end, this dissertation's research objectives are two-fold. The first is to 
provide an alternative explanation for the global diffusion of the SWF policy path 
than that currently offered in the SWF literature. These analyses begin with the 
assumption that SWFs were created to enable states to capitalise on 'rationally 
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desirable' investment opportunities afforded by modem fmance capitalism. The funds 
are thus portrayed as fundamentally necessary macroeconomic tools of the state. 
SWFs' highly contested domestic political origins, as well as how they came to be 
perceived as meeting the interests of state actors whose authority over this capital 
would be severely limited, consequently remain unaddressed. The reasons why 
fmancial speculation was specifically pursued by these governments over alternative 
and competing fiscal management strategies remains theoretically unquestioned and 
empirically unsubstantiated. 
The dissertation's second research objective is to investigate the impact that 
SWFs have on the realizable policy preferences of the government actors to whom 
they are ultimately accountable. This is to emphasize that SWFs' primary significance 
for states - as well as domestic society - is not what they are formally mandated or 
informally intended to achieve. Indeed, the funds speculative fmancial futures are 
entirely unknowable. Rather, SWFs domestic significance lies in how they prevent 
governments from using this public capital to pursue any short-term goals other than 
fmancial maximization through speculative investment. How does this impact these 
governments' political agency through time, and to what ends? This dissertation 
consequently adopts an 'inside-out' versus 'outside-in' understanding of SWFs (cf. 
Deeg and O'Sullivan, 2009). This is to emphasize the funds are not the product of 
external constraints imposed on them by global fmancial market realities or fmance 
capital itself as suggested in mainstream analyses. Rather, the funds have been 
voluntarily established by governments who view the speculative investment of 
national wealth into the long-term as benefiting their immediate political interests. 
This dissertation therefore seeks to identify what has driven this inside-out 
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phenomenon, and thus from where the SWF policy path derives its legitimacy for 
such a diverse range of state actors. 
The Argument 
How to explain the global diffusion of the SWF policy path witnessed over the 
past two decades? In regards to this fIrst research objective, it is hypothesized that 
SWFs are best understood as strategies of governance fIrst created, and then 
maintained, to meet the interests of government actors in the short-term. This is 
opposed to commonly held assumptions in the SWF literature, which portray the 
funds' global emergence as an evolutionary development of modem fmance 
capitalism. These analyses argue the funds' lack of short-term fmancialliabilities and 
thus atypically long-term investment horizons provide states with a means to harvest 
speculative investment opportunities into the indefmite future. Thus rather than be 
limited to the thankless task of fmancial market regulator, governments can become 
powerful market participants to the benefIt of future generations of domestic society. 
Under such assumptions, the interests and policy preferences of SWF -state actors are 
incorrectly assumed to be both uniform and fIxed through time. 
The argument that political agency is a prerequisite for SWFs' global 
emergence is not, however, a bold claim in itself Indeed, SWFs' public source of 
funding leads to the logical conclusion the funds were created to meet one interest of 
government or another. What this dissertation fmds worthy of note, however, is the 
specific process through which the SWF policy path is fIrst championed and then 
sustained through time over alternative fIscal management strategies. Indeed, the 
institutional legitimacy of SWFs largely stems from their possessing a long-term 
investment outlook. This supposedly enables them to ride the volatile ups and downs 
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of capital markets in the short-term, but on the expectation these markets will 
eventually 'float all boats' in the unspecified future. What cannot be accounted for 
under such analyses is why so many government actors of diverse and often 
competing policy preferences, spanning a variegated array of socio and politico-
economic landscapes, have perceived this long-term policy path as benefiting their 
short-term interests. 
This dissertation contends that a government will create an SWF only when 
faced with a specific problem of uncertainty they believe they must address. These 
problems of uncertainty may be strictly fiscal in nature, such as how to manage the 
unexpected accruement of windfall petroleum revenues, as was the case in Norway. 
However, SWFs have also been created to solve a budgetary crisis as in Alberta, as 
well as to ensure the sustainability of a state pension system as in Ireland. 6 It is 
moreover argued that SWFs appeal as strategies of governance as they enable states to 
reconceptualise such problems of uncertainty in the quantitative and thus manageable 
terms of fmancial risk. Undefmed and highly uncertain socioeconomic futures can 
instead be defmed in terms of their SWFs' expected fmancial return. This 
consequently defers a government's responsibility to actually solve these problems of 
uncertainty to their political successors, thereby stabilizing their governance function 
and supporting their political legitimacy in the short-term. 
It will be demonstrated, moreover, that SWFs possess this stabilizing capacity 
due to their being founded upon an identifiable epistemology of speculative fmance. 
6 In more authoritarian political systems such as Abu Dhabi, for example, the problem of uncertainty 
was how to govern a nation with vast reserves of petroleum wealth owned by an elite ruling family. 
Indeed, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority was established in 1976 by Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al 
Nahyan. The SWF policy path thus represented a compromise between three factors: the state's 
uncertainty of how to develop their emerging market economy with this petroleum wealth, their desire 
to maintain this wealth's purchasing power parity into the future, and their desire to do so in a 
centralized and easy to monitor fashion. To this end, this dissertation seeks to explain why the SWF 
policy path, and the speculative financial risks assumed therein, was specifically pursued over 
alternative competing fiscal management strategies. 
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This authoritative knowledge framework both informs and legitimates the forward-
looking fmancial expectations promoted by SWFs to state managers and 'everyday' 
citizens. As such, a key task of this dissertation is to deconstruct the specific ideas and 
key assumptions from which this speculative fmancial epistemology derives its 
authority to be believed by state actors. Only then can it be demonstrated why SWFs 
should be understood as the institutional embodiment of this speculative 
epistemology, and thus why the funds serve government interests in the short-term. 
Yet how to gauge the impact SWFs have on the governments who create and 
maintain them? Deconstructing the fmancial epistemology from which SWFs derive 
their legitimacy also serves to support this second research objective. It is argued that 
SWFs constrain state agency not just by placing government actors at one remove of 
their systematically significant public capital bases. Rather, SWF -state actors are also 
constrained to act within the expectations of what constitutes legitimate versus 
illegitimate action prescribed by modern fmancial epistemology. This argument is 
premised on the assumption that the fmancial realm in which SWF capital is 
embedded is not just a structurally bounded system of competing rules and 
regulations as held in much orthodox IPE scholarship (cf. Helleiner, 1994; Germain, 
1997: 13-14, 24; Langley, 2008: 6-7; Froud et aI, 2006; Cohen, 1997). Such 
characterizations obscure the political struggle and ideational contestation that occur 
on a daily basis to substantiate what is commonly considered 'normal' fmance. The 
fmancial market realm is instead conceptualised here as a 'discursive domain made 
possible through performative practices, which have to be articulated and rearticulated 
on a daily basis' (de Goede, 2005: 7). Hence 'knowledge' about what speculative 
finance is and how one should engage with it is a crucial but nonetheless elusive 
variable the IPE literature on global fmance must continuously deconstruct. Financial 
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knowledge is the primary mechanism through which speculative investment practices 
materialize on a daily basis, and not just how they are informed (ibid. 7).7 This 
dissertation contends that creating an SWF represents the moment state actors are 
committing themselves to adhere to this prescriptive knowledge framework that 
makes fmancial speculation possible. 
This dissertation views such S WF constraint in a critical light. Indeed it has 
tangible effects on the trajectory of socioeconomic development within a polity. 
These governments are prevented from investing substantial pots of national wealth in 
domestic diversification or socioeconomic development projects. While such projects 
may raise the quality of life for current and future generations of society - whether 
through improving infrastructure or stimulating economic growth outside of the 
resource sector - they do not represent legitimate investment opportunities as 
prescribed by the epistemology of speculative finance. Such investments would be 
deemed too interventionist and threatening to fmancial market equilibrium, as well as 
detrimental to the long-term interests of domestic constituents. It is moreover 
contended this constraint becomes problematic in the face of recurrent and globally 
reverberating fmancial crises. Indeed, the ramifications of recent crises, such as the 
Asian Financial Crisis, the Dot Com Crisis, and the so-called Credit Crunch, have 
come to increasingly transcend the borders of the fmancial economy to the detriment 
of global socioeconomic stability. In short, this dissertation maintains that SWFs 
theoretical long-term fmancial benefits do not outweigh the short-term socioeconomic 
costs they impose on the domestic citizens whom they are ultimately meant to serve. 
7 For example, government actors and the SWFs they monitor must imagine speCUlative profit before it 
can be realized. That is, believing that an SWF will profit through financial speculation performatively 
constitutes real financial outcomes when government actors' direct public capital to pursue these 
imagined profits (cf. de Goede, 2005: 7-8). 
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The Approach 
In its analysis of sovereign wealth funds, this dissertation seeks to demonstrate 
how an authoritative form of modern fmancial knowledge - or epistemology - has at 
once both informed and constrained the policy preferences of a wide variety of 
government actors. It therefore employs a constructivist approach that sees ideas as 
important explanatory variables of institutional change (cf Blyth, 2002; Cameron and 
Palan, 2004; Hay, 2007; Seabrooke, 2006; Schmidt, 2009). To be sure, the puzzle 
presented by the diffusion of the SWF policy path across a diverse range of socio and 
politico-economic backdrops is, at base, a matter of institutional change and global 
convergence. Only a critical IPE approach grounded in an ideational approach can 
sufficiently explain - as well as problematize - the fmancial epistemology 
underpinning SWFs' global emergence. Indeed other attempts to challenge dominant 
fmancial orthodoxies, such as those conducted by behavioural economists, remain 
anchored in positivist explanations of markets and fmance (cf Shiller, 2001; Shefrin, 
2005). These approaches consequently suffer from the same ontological fallacies they 
seek to problematize and ultimately correct (c£ Maki, 2001). While critical of the 
view that markets are efficient and composed of utility-maximising individuals, for 
example, behavioural economists continue to portray investors as constrained to act 
within a bounded rationality driven primarily by self-interest. This dissertation's 
constructivist approach will be expanded upon in Chapter One. 
To substantiate these theoretical arguments, the dissertation examines three 
SWFs in particular: Norway's Government Pension Fund-Global (established in 
1990), Alberta's Heritage Savings Trust Fund (established in 1976), and Ireland's 
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National Pension Reserve Fund (established in 2001).8 These funds were selected for 
three reasons. First, they come from three countries of unique political, economic, and 
cultural heritages. This enables us to investigate the problems of uncertainty that 
instigated each government to create an SWF. Why their political successors opted to 
maintain support of this constraining policy path can also be examined. Second, each 
fund was created by a democratic and open government whose members are 
accountable to the popular opinions of domestic society. This allows us to examine 
how SWFs and their speculative investment of public capital have been legitimated 
not only to government, but also the citizens whom they were created to serve. Third, 
there is an abundance of available information concerning the political origins and 
government reasoning behind each of these funds' creation. This is opposed to some 
of the more opaque SWFs that have yet to disclose much information to outsiders, 
such as the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, the China Investment Corporation, and 
the Government Investment Corporation of Singapore. 
The empirical resources used throughout this dissertation therefore include: 
official and unofficial memos sent between government branches, such as between 
the Legislature and Ministry of Finance; Hansard transcripts of legislative debates and 
specialist committee hearings; research interviews with SWF managers, government 
representatives, and externally-hired fmancial consultants; press releases; annual 
reports; opposition party and externally-conducted consultancy reports; and fmally 
newspaper articles and online forums. 
8 This comparative approach is th~refo~e, gro~ded in i\1ill's '~ethod of a~re~m~n.t' (2002), where 
comparing similar cases helps us to ldentIty the tactors that gaw nse to those slmllarities. 
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Thesis Structure 
The dissertation is divided into two Parts and includes a total of eight 
Chapters. Part I comprises three chapters that construct an alternative theory for 
SWFs global emergence than that currently offered in the SWF literature. First, 
Chapter One elaborates upon why the global diffusion of the SWF policy path 
represents a noteworthy puzzle for IPE scholarship. It does so by clarifying several 
key defmitions and concepts that substantiate this puzzle, such as what is referred to 
by the term 'state', what is 'governance', and what is 'speculative [mance'. It then 
outlines the constructivist approach used to investigate this puzzle by reviewing the 
IPE literature on ideas and institutional change. 
Chapter Two then demonstrates how the current literature on SWFs -
dominated primarily by fmancial economists - has yet to provide either a theoretically 
convincing or empirically rich explanation of the SWF puzzle detailed in Chapter 
One. It does so by drawing attention to three features that distinguish SWFs from 
other government-linked fiscal institutions such as central banks, public pension 
funds, and commodity stabilization funds. It shows how mainstream analyses have yet 
to adequately account for the central role played by government agency and domestic 
politics when explaining why each of SWFs' three distinguishing features exists. 
Indeed, such analyses portray the government interests served by SWFs as globally 
uniform and fixed through time. 
Finally, Chapter Three constructs an alternative explanation for the global 
diffusion of the SWF policy path than that offered in existing analyses. It argues that 
each of SWFs' three distinguishing features collectively represent a strategy of 
governance that benefits government interests in the short-term. It will be shown that 
this is due to the stabilizing effects engendered by the modem financial epistemology 
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that both informs and legitimates SWFs speculative fmancial identities. SWFs' 
grounding in this epistemology enables states to render uncertain socioeconomic 
futures into the calculable and manageable terms of fmancial risk. To illustrate this, 
this framework of fmancial knowledge is deconstructed into three simple, but 
nonetheless authoritative, ideas. First is that fmancial speculation is inherently 
profitable; second, that fmancial speculation is calculable' and third that fmancial , , 
speculation requires a specific form offinancial expertise to be successfully engaged 
with. Chapter Three concludes by theorizing how SWFs' grounding in this fmancial 
epistemology can constrain government agency. This is by its prescribing what 
governments can consider legitimate versus illegitimate action in regards to SWF 
capital once institutionalised into the state apparatus. It is argued such constraint is 
highly problematic, especially in the context of recurrent and globally reverberating 
fmancial crises witnessed since 'Black Monday' in October 1987. Indeed as their 
SWFs continue to grow in size and fmancial breadth, government actors and their 
political successors have been increasingly pressured to defer their po licy preferences 
to the contradictions and crisis tendencies of the speculative fmancial realm. 
Part II of the dissertation comprises five empirical Chapters against which the 
theoretical arguments developed in Part I are tested. Chapters Four and Five examine 
the case of Norway's Government Pension Fund-Global since 1990, Chapters Six and 
Seven that of Alberta's Heritage Savings Trust Fund since 1976, and Chapter Eight 
Ireland's National Pension Reserve Fund since 2001. The case studies demonstrate 
how these three sets of government actors internalized the SWF policy path only after 
it came to be framed as benefiting their short-term interests. That is, only after each of 
these governments was faced with a problem of great uncertainty they were led to 
believe the SWF policy path could solve. The case studies moreover draw attention to 
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specific instances - such as recurrent fmancial crises - where the SWF policy path 
constrained the agency of these governments. This constraint is not, however, solely 
attributable to the fact that authority for these SWFs' management was placed at one 
remove of government auspices. Rather, it was also constrained due to the authority 
exerted by modern fmancial epistemology to prescribe what these actors' policy 
preferences should be in the face of political opposition and fmancial crisis. 
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Chapter One 
Clarifying the Sovereign Wealth Fund 'Puzzle' 
A number of IPE scholars have recently drawn attention to sovereign wealth 
funds as an important yet critically unexamined field of study (cf Helleiner, 2009; 
Datz, 2009; Monk, 2009). The funds also remain black-boxes in the literatures of 
fmancial economics (cf Couturier et aL 2009; Bortolotti et aL 2009; Fernandes, 
2009), international law (cf de Meester, 2008; Keller, 2008; Rose, 2008), and 
fmancial policymaking (cf Truman, 2007; Mason, 2008). This is surprising 
considering their recent rise is only the 'intensification' of a pre-existing phenomenon 
that dates back to the 1950's (Helleiner and Lundblad, 2008: 73).9 Such a lack of 
engagement may be because SWFs' political ties and public sources of funding 
confuse the state-versus-market paradigm preferred by orthodox IPE scholarship (cf 
Zysman, 1983; Shonfield, 1965; Katzenstein, 1978; Weiss, 1998). Indeed, SWFs 
render such simplistic binary distinctions empirically untenable. As Helleiner and 
Lundblad aptly describe: 'The state is neither regulating capital mobility nor 
responding to its externally imposed imperatives'. Instead, it has 'become part of the 
very structure of capital mobility from which it was analytically distinguished in 
earlier analyses' (2008: 68). 
The recent, rapid and truly global emergence of SWFs therefore poses a 
significant challenge to traditional approaches to IPE scholarship. The funds 
epitomize the argument that 'neither states nor global markets are "ontologically 
distinct'" rather each exists and evolves in various forms, and is entwined within and , 
around the other' (Helleiner and Lundblad, 2008: 68, quoting Wendt, 1987: 360). As 
9 The first SWF - the Kuwait Investment Authority - was established in 1953. It did not start investing 
in equities until 1961. Over half of the funds that exist in 2009 were since established post-2000 
(Miracky et aI, 2007; see Appendix 1 for a complete list ofS\VFs). 
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such, analyses of SWFs cannot be situated on one side of a linear divide that narrowly 
pits public politics against private market actors, spheres, or systems. For Helleiner 
and Lundblad, these classic state-market debates merely 'foster a theoretical 
oscillation between classical liberal, neoliberal and "embedded liberal" epistemes that 
governed ages past' (2009: 74). To analyze SWFs and their significance for IPE 
scholarship thus requires us to step outside the bounds of this binary state-market 
debate. In order to do so, this dissertation deconstructs the specific ideas upon which 
SWFs' institutional legitimacy is strategically constructed by fmancial and political 
actors alike. 
The literature on sovereign wealth funds is moreover incomplete in that the 
vast majority of analyses exclusively focus on the funds' significance for fmancial 
markets and fmancial market participants. This singularity in focus is especially 
pronounced in the fmancial economics and international law disciplines, which see 
the state and politics as threatening the general efficiency of the market mechanism. 
They are therefore preoccupied with trumpeting the potentially dislocating effects 
SWFs and their political ties pose for more or less efficient capital markets. This 
literature nonetheless remains incomplete as the data required to perform these 
analyzes is not readily available, if at all. As Caner and Grennes indicate in their 
econometric study of Norway's Government Pension Fund-Global, such mainstream 
SWF analyses remain 'inconclusive and full of conjecture' (Caner and Grennes, 20 I 0: 
2). Indeed, few SWFs publish readily available fmancial statements or annual reports, 
a fact that has received much critical attention throughout OECD policymaking 
circles in recent years (Gordon, 2008; Bernstein et aI, 2009; Carson and Litmann, 
2009). 
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To fill one gap in the IPE and fmancial economic literatures, this dissertation 
examines SWFs' domestic political origins. It seeks to explain why so many 
variegated state actors, influenced by diverse and often competing policy preferences, 
have all endeavoured to establish sovereign wealth funds. In so doing, it also seeks to 
account for how the funds impact these state actors' capacity to govern once 
established. Indeed, SWFs universally embed public capital throughout the 
speculative fmancial realm, thereby limiting government's capacity to determine how 
this wealth can support socioeconomic development and growth. How to explain why 
so many state managers have been willing to forego their access to such 
systematically significant amounts of public wealth in the short to medium-terms? 
What significance does this development pose for these states considering the high-
risk and volatile nature ofSWFs' speculative fmancial portfolios? 
As witnessed by the scale of government bailouts necessitated by the latest 
global fmancial crisis, the authority of the nation state is being increasingly 
constrained by the expectations and demands of speculative fmance capitalism. 
Within this context, the rapid emergence and continued growth of SWFs represents a 
global movement that could see governments' embed tens of trillions of dollars 
throughout the crisis prone fmancial realm over the following decades (cf Bortolotti 
et aI, 2010). While this dissertation's first task is to deconstruct SWFs' political 
origins, it also seeks to problematize this global movement. Through their SWFs, state 
actors are not just generating and enforcing formal fmancial regulations to which 
market participants must adhere. They are also voluntarily ceding much of their 
sovereign authority over public capital management to short-termist fmancial experts. 
The global diffusion of the SWF policy path thus represents a process whereby state 
sovereignty is being voluntarily transformed from the 'inside out' in key areas of 
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economic policymaking. 1o It represents a changing perception of what the relationship 
between the state, citizen, and global fmance can and should be. And while the 
'fiction' of the nation state as ultimate authority over this development is maintained 
by SWF and non SWF-states alike, this authority is ultimately situated within a set of 
traditionally 'non-political' fmancial boundaries (cf. Cameron and Palan, 2004: 8). To 
understand why SWFs have been created - i.e. from where this policy path derives its 
domestic appeal and legitimacy - is thus a critical puzzle to examine if we are to 
gauge the significance this global movement poses for the future development of the 
nation state. This puzzle is also necessary to deconstruct if equally legitimate 
alternative public capital management strategies are to be developed. 
To this end, the dissertation also traces the ways through which SWFs 
constrain the realizable policy preferences of governments in their approach to public 
capital management. It seeks to demonstrate this constraint is not just by SWF 
management being placed at one remove of government auspices, as would be 
understood in traditional approaches to 'depoliticization' (Burnham, 2001: 128). Thus 
whether authority for SWF management is delegated to a specialized division within 
an independent central bank as in Norway, an independent crown corporation as in 
Alberta, or externally hired professional investors as in Ireland is but one source of 
constraint on political agency. Rather, this dissertation emphasizes that constraint also 
emerges from an authoritative epistemology of speculative fmance that informs these 
fmancial experts. It is the authority exerted by this specific understanding of what 
10 Campbell describes diffusion as the process whereby institutional principles or practices are spread 
'with little modification through a population of actors' (2004: 77). The institutional convergence of 
SWFs and their three distinguishing features on a global scale represent such a process of diffusion. 
Yet how these outside or new principles are internalised and put to use across politico-economic 
contexts must also be identified. To this end, new institutional principles or ideas are first internalized 
by specific actors within the state, translated into local practices, and then enacted as concrete policy 
outputs such as SWFs (Campbell, 2004: 77-80). Chapters Four through Eight identify these processes 
and how they materialized in three SWF -states, whereas Chapter Three identifies the specific ideas that 
were ultimately translated, acted and diffused by these governments. 
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speculative fmance is and how to engage it that dictates what constitutes legitimate 
and desirable action in regards to SWF management. The dissertation will also 
demonstrate it is these ideas upon which SWFs' domestic legitimacy is strategically 
built and maintained through time by SWF managers and government actors alike. 
In order to develop this understanding of SWFs as governance strategies and 
their significance for the global political economy, the dissertation employs a 
constructivist institutionalist approach. Here, ideas and self-perceptions of identity 
compliment material or structural factors as explanatory variables of agency and 
institutional change (cf. Palan, 2000: ch. 14). To be sure, SWF's global emergence is 
at base a matter of institutional change and diffusion. Why have so many state actors 
with variegated and competing interests all endeavoured to institutionalize the SWF 
policy path into the state apparatus? Structural factors alone - such as high levels of 
foreign exchange reserves, the prevalence of developed capital markets, or the 
increased mobility of transnational [mance capital- cannot account for why this fiscal 
management strategy was specifically pursued over traditional or alternative wealth 
management strategies. Before this SWF puzzle can be more thoroughly addressed, 
however, a clarification of terms is in order. This will help contextualise how the 
puzzle presented by SWFs' global emergence fits - or perhaps does not fit - into 
orthodox IPE scholarship. The Chapter then outlines the constructivist approach 
through which this puzzle will be analyzed by examining the IPE literature on ideas 
and institutional change. 
1.1 Key Definitions and Concepts: The SWF Puzzle 
First, the term 'sovereign wealth fund' refers to the government-linked 
investment vehicles that purchase speculative financial assets with public capital. 
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They are demarcated from other types of government linked or private institutional 
funds - such as commodity stabilization, public pension and mutual funds - by their 
lack of short-term liabilities. As such, SWFs are believed to have long-term 
investment horizons. They can thus theoretically withstand higher degrees of fmancial 
volatility in the short-term than other government-linked fiscal entities, such as 
central banks. It is this unique time horizon that is believed to enable SWFs to adopt 
high degrees of fmancial risk, and hence potentially more profitable forms of 
speculative assets. SWFs are also distinguishable by the authority relationship they 
share with their overseers in government. A more in-depth analysis of what 
constitutes an SWF, what does not, and the nature of the funds' relationship with their 
state owners is presented in Chapter Two. 
Second, the term 'state' reflects that used in the constructivist institutionalism 
literature (Hay, Lister, and Marsh, 2006; Schmidt, 2009; 2010). This understanding of 
the state and how it changes through time is in contrast to historical and rational 
institutionalist accounts. While the former tends to reduce the state and its 
development to path-dependent rules and regularities, the latter sees the state as 
singularly guided by incentive structures that constrain political actors' so-called 
'rational' choice-sets (Schmidt, 2009: 516).11 For constructivist understandings such 
as that offered by Hay, Lister, and Marsh (2006: 4), however, the state is not a 
material object but a 'conceptual abstraction' whose utility must be demonstrated. 
This is achieved through state actors' proactive engagement with policy reforms that 
are framed as seeking to improve socioeconomic well-being and development. A 
state's power does not therefore derive solely from its vaunted position of authority in 
an objective sense of power. This is because 'ideas and values infuse the exercise of 
11 For a review of rational and historical institutional approaches, see Schmidt, 2009; Seabrook, 2006: 
ch. 2. For examples of historical institutionalist approaches in particular, see Hall, 1993; Finnemore, 
1996; March and Olsen, 1989; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991. 
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power and ( subjective) perceptions of position' (Lukes, 2004 referenced in Schmidt, 
2009: 519). Indeed state actors' power also derives from their capacity to wield 
'purpose', or in other words, how capable they are in ensuring their policy preferences 
are regarded as legitimate by domestic society through narrative construction. This is 
to emphasize the fact that state authority is based on 'consent rather than domination' 
(Overbeek, 2000: 171), but also that this consent can be influenced by narratives 
'constructed historically in a way that generates plausibility' (emphasis in original, 
Cameron and Palan, 2004: 4). 
To understand the state and its role as governor must therefore account for the 
crucial role played by domestic society, who provides input and feedback that 
ultimately shapes state manager's policy preferences (Seabrooke, 2006: 28). This is 
not to discount the significant role of external influences or broader structural factors 
that can constrain or enable state agency. For example, numerous IPE scholars have 
demonstrated the structuring influence of the neoliberal policy paradigm on 
predominantly OECD-state development since the 1980s (cf Harvey, 2005; Hay, 
2007: 96-102; Cerny, 1993; Roy, Denzau, and Willet, 2007). This dissertation 
nonetheless maintains the state is a distinct form of authority 'independent of those 
who give effect to its power' (Hay, Lister, and Marsh: 2006: 7), but that the specific 
ways in which this power is exercised is largely contingent on domestic social inputs. 
Indeed Seabrooke has demonstrated that the way in which states align themselves 
with international fmancial orders - such as the neoliberal policy regime - can be 
greatly influenced by the role of non-elite social groups (2006: 173). This is through 
the capacity of these 'everyday' actors to confer legitimacy onto government's 
regulation of credit issuance, property ownership, and taxation, thereby 'deepening 
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the domestic pool of capital, which then bolsters the state's influence m the 
international financial order' (ibid. 173). 
Hence the modern state is conceptualised here as 'an institutional complex 
claiming sovereignty for itself as the supreme political authority within a defmed 
territory for whose governance it is responsible' (Hay, Lister, and Marsh: 2006: 5). At 
the same time, these political institutions only have 'legitimacy' to the extent to which 
the members of society regard those institutions as reflecting, embodying, or 
promoting their shared beliefs (Friedman, 1990: 58). In this sense, state authority is 
both a bottom up as well as top down process. Those in power can claim their actions 
are just and legal, but still require the conferral of legitimacy through expressed 
consent upon such actions from those who are subordinate to them in the power 
relationship (Seabrooke, 2006: 12; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Conceptualising 
the state and political authority in this way thus leads to the question: how have 
sovereign wealth funds come to be regarded as legitimate fiscal institutions from the 
top down perspective of state actors, as well as the bottom up side of domestic 
constituents? In short, from where do they derive their legitimacy as strategies of 
governance in a domestic socio-political context? Before these questions can be 
answered, however, it is necessary to outline what this term 'governance' refers to. 
Governance as it is understood here refers to 'the pursuit of collective interests 
and the steering and coordination of society' - or the process of social coordination 
with a public purpose (Pierre and Peters, 2006: 209). Given states must be mindful of 
whether their actions are perceived as legitimate by domestic constituents, state actors 
are strategic in pursuing their role as governors but are not necessarily dominant in 
this pursuit. Overbeek contends that state actors play 'a facilitating rather than a 
leading role' in governing social and economic life (2000: 171). They are susceptible 
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to a variety of influences - whether formal organizations and rules or informal values, 
norms and ideas - that both guide and constrain the substance of their policy 
preferences, as well as how these preferences are presented to the discerning public. 
Indeed for Kjaer, state governance is about managing the 'rules of the game' in a way 
that enhances the legitimacy of the public realm (2004: 15). State governance thus 
primarily manifests itself as a coordinative mechanism, through its 'setting the rules 
of overall coordination among a plurality of organizational forms' (ibid. 132). As 
argued throughout this dissertation, sovereign wealth funds represent one such 
coordinative strategy of governance through which state actors can demonstrate their 
utility, thereby preserving or even enhancing their domestic political legitimacy. But 
again, from where does speculative investment of public capital derive this 
legitimacy? Given SWFs' long-term investment horizons, moreover, how is this 
legitimacy maintained through time? 
The fourth term to be contextualized within IPE literature is that of 
'speculative fmance'. This refers to the system through which money is created, 
bought and sold, and which determines how this capital is used by both fIrms and 
other speculators (Langley, 2002: 8). However, the speculative fmancial realm is not 
just composed of value-neutral capital 'flows' as understood in orthodox economics 
(cf Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995; Rodseth, 2000; Ugur, 2001). Nor is it a 'coherent, 
powerful and clearly bounded system (or agent)' that undermines the national 
sovereignty and domestic policy autonomy of states (de Goede, 2006: 3). These 
orthodox approaches to IPE scholarship - such as those speaking of the 'global 
fmancial architecture (cf Eichengreen, 1999; Cerny, 2005; Soederberg, Menz, and 
Cerny, 2005; Langley, 2004) - are based on too stark a divide separating the state and 
market realms. They generally assume the form and function of capital markets to be 
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susceptible to, and contained by, changes in formal and informal regulations, 
guarantees, and contracts. Such analyses subsequently obscure the political struggle 
and ideational contestation that ultimately shape the day-to-day practices of fmancial 
speculators. 
In contrast, speculative fmance is conceptualized here as a 'discursive and 
ideological constitution' only made possible by practices that have to be iteratively 
performed on a daily basis (de Goede, 2005: 3). That is, the fmancial realm derives its 
structure from a 'complex architecture' of socially embedded and constituted 
performances, or 'transactions' (Sassen, 2005: 19). These performances are in turn 
based on specific ideas that seek to explain how speculative fmance works, and thus 
how investors should orient themselves strategically towards it. Thus fmancial 
'knowledge' and the ideas that substantiate it is a crucial means through which 
speculative capital markets materialize, and not just how they are informed (de 
Goede, 2005: 7). Yet despite their importance, the way these ideas about fmance have 
been formalized into regulatory and institutional frameworks by states remains 
empirically unaddressed in much orthodox IPE scholarship. This is with some 
exception to an emerging group of scholars - such as Watson (2007), Langley (2008), 
de Goede (2005), and Preda (2007) - who have begun to critically examine the highly 
contested origins of what we 'know' about modem fmance, how we know it, and 
whose interests this knowledge serves. This dissertation seeks to add to these studies 
by examining how a particularly dominant form of modem fmancial knowledge has 
become a blueprint for action by a diverse range of states. To this end, SWFs provide 
a number of case studies that demonstrate how a broad array of governments have 
internalized this dominant understanding of what fmancial speculation is, and how it 
can be strategically used, in their approach to domestic governance. 
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It is also necessary to note that the modem speculative fmancial realm can be 
demarcated from previous conjunctural orders primarily by its excess (Langley, 2002: 
11). This is to draw attention to the gap that separates the theory of speculative 
fmance and its contemporary realities, as well as the ever-growing divide between 
synchronic and diachronic forms of investment (cf. Sinclair, 2005: 58-59).12 Indeed, 
speculative fmancial markets are argued by economists to be the most efficient means 
of allocating footloose capital to the most deserving firms (cf. World Bank, 2002; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001; Allen and Gale, 2000). This dissertation instead 
asserts that speculative investment has problematically become an end in itself, with 
global fmancial markets more closely embodying the bubble-inducing synchronic 
investment form. This is evidenced in the global trade in speculative assets far 
exceeding the funding needs of the so-called 'real' economy. Since 1980, for 
example, the stock of fmancial assets has increased three times faster than the 
aggregate GDP of OECD member states, and the volume in trade of fmancial assets -
including stocks, bonds and currencies - has increased five times faster. By 1998, the 
value of cross-border bond and equity transactions as a percentage of GDP had 
reached 230 per cent in the US, 334 per cent in Germany, and 415 per cent in France 
(Bank for International Settlements, 2000 quoted in Sassen, 2005: 19-20). As Langley 
indicates, such an expansion in credit has propelled speculative accumulation to 
become a dominating structural feature of modern fmance capitalism (2002: 30). As 
the empirical Chapters more closely examine, SWF -states' dependence on such 
speculative accumulation is inherently problematic. It exposes systematically 
12 Noted by Sinclair (2005: 59), the synchronic form of investment is oriented on the short-term 
realization of profits that can be accumulated through fmancial speculation. Synchronic investment is 
typically associated with the so-called 'financial' economy. The diachronic investment form, on the 
other hand, links fmancial practices 'directly to investment in productive assets that improve the social 
stock of material capabilities'. The diachronic investment form is thus commonly associated with the 
so-called 'real' economy. 
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significant amounts of public capital to recurrent - and increasingly destabilizing -
asset bubbles and fmancial crises that demand government intervention to correct (cf 
Wright, 2010; Shiller, 2001; Kindleberger, 2005). It problematically subjects a 
portion of sovereign state authority to the uncontrollable and unpredictable demands 
of the 'supraterritorial' fmancial market realm (Scholte, 2000). 
The preceding discussion sought to contextualize the terms sovereign wealth 
fund, the state, governance, and speculative fmance in the constructivist 
institutionalism literature. This endeavour has, however, produced more questions 
than it has answered. Taken cumulatively, these questions represent the SWF puzzle 
to be examined in this dissertation. First, state actors must be strategic in formulating 
their policy preferences so as to maintain domestic political legitimacy. How, then, to 
account for the global diffusion of the SWF policy path in states as politically and 
socioeconomically diverse as Norway, Canada, and Ireland? Second, from where does 
this fiscal management strategy derive its legitimacy? Legitimacy in this regard is 
important for government actors who are ultimately prevented from accessing SWF 
capitaL However, it is also important for current and future generations of domestic 
constituents given the great fmancial risks this wealth is exposed to. Finally, how has 
the adoption of the SWF policy path affected state actors' ability to formulate 
alternative policy preferences in regards to public capital management? In other 
words, how have SWFs affected the nature of state authority, and thus the power 
relationship that exists between government, the citizenry, and the speculative 
financial market realm? This is given the fact that SWFs appear to prevent 
governments from using this wealth to pursue any goal other than profit 
maximization. The following section now outlines the constructivist approach through 
which these questions will be analyzed. 
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1.2 Approach: Institutional Change, Ideas, and Constraint 
The constructivist approach used to investigate the puzzle presented by 
sovereign wealth funds' global emergence begins with the concept of uncertainty. 13 
That is, when presented with problems of governance that entail uncertain or 
unknowable futures, state actors are unaware of their interests let alone how to realize 
them (cf. Blyth, 2002; 2007: 71; see also Schmidt, 2009; Knight, 1921). Examples of 
such problems of uncertainty could be how to address a mounting future liability in 
the present such as expected public pension expenditures, or how to best manage 
windfall government revenues. State actors must fIrst interpret the specifIc context of 
uncertainty in which they fmd themselves so as to orient themselves strategically 
towards it. When analyzing institutional change, then, accounting for the presence of 
uncertainty opens a gap between structure and agency through which ideas can be 
seen to inform actors of what 'rational' actions they should pursue and which 
'irrational' actions to avoid (cf. Hay, 2001: 209-11). 
This is to address an undeveloped issue in the historical institutionalist literature 
on 'punctuated equilibrium', which would argue that periods of heightened 
uncertainty represent necessary moments for SWFs' institutional development (cf. 
Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Campbell, 2004: 34-36; Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 1). 
That is, unexpected structural factors such as fmancial crises or political 
assassinations are crucial for instigating large-scale institutional change. Thus for 
SWFs, only when in crisis could the ideas, principles and values supporting pre-
existing approaches to sovereign wealth management be undermined and overtaken 
by the alternative ideas pushed by 'po !icy entrepreneurs'. At the same time, however, 
13 Uncertainty here is defined as 'the character of situations in which agents cannot anticipate outcomes 
ofa decision and cannot assign probabilities to the outcome' (Beckert, 1996: 80'+). 
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ideas are necessary 'constructions that allow agents to defme a crisis as a crisis' 
(emphasis in original, Blyth, 2002: 10; see also Blyth, 2007: 71; Konings, 2009: 78). 
As Hay posits, 'the mobilization of perceptions of crisis .... involves the formation and 
triumph of a simplifying ideology which must fmd and construct points of resonance 
with a multitude of individuated experiences' (Hay, 1999: 321). Thus the ideas that 
constitute such catalytic 'simplifying ideologies' do not just reflect the world that 
precedes them else little institutional change would occur. Strategically drawing from 
various authoritative ideas subsequently enables actors 'to order and intervene in the 
world by bringing their beliefs, desires, and goals into alignment.' It is only once this 
consensus is reached that they can 'diagnose, and thus collectively act upon, the 
"crisis" [of uncertainty] they are facing' (Denzau and North, 1994: 12,22-23). 
This role played by ideas to first mobilize and then inform agency is especially 
important for state managers in democratic states. A primary objective for these actors 
when faced with problems of great uncertainty is to maintain political legitimacy in 
the eyes of the domestic electorate. This is to ensure they remain a functioning 
member of the administrative state (cf Seabrooke, 2006: 3-4; Burnham, 2001: 127-8; 
Kjaer, 2004). State actors must thus construct and pursue governance strategies they 
believe will address these problems, thereby reducing uncertainty and stabilizing 
socioeconomic expectations in the immediate term. This is achieved by their 
strategically drawing from various ideas to construct authoritative interpretations of 
socioeconomic reality that dictate how they should act within it. Which ideas are 
turned to and which are not subsequently legitimates certain policy preferences and 
institutional development strategies over competing alternatives. Ideas subsequently 
provide an important explanatory device linking the realization of interests with 
institutions in periods of uncertainty. For Blyth, ideas can consequently be understood 
39 
as the 'predicates of institutional construction, while institutions ... are the products 
that promote long-term stability by coordinating agents' expectations' (2002: 37). 
At the same time, the ideas that government actors draw from to inform 
themselves of what policy preferences are 'rational' or 'legitimate' are neither value-
neutral nor objective reflections of socioeconomic reality. These ideas are instead 
constantly interpreted and 'framed' by a diverse range of political and non-political 
actors competing for control of the understanding of the 'real' world, and how they 
should act within it (Abolafia, 2005: 208). For SWF-state actors in particular, ideas 
about what the speculative fmancial realm is and how to operate within it are 
consequently constructed rather than revealed - that is, 'made up with an interest in 
mind, rather than discovered .. .latent in reality' (Peet, 2007: 53). The guiding role of 
ideas and how they are framed to direct the trajectory of institutional change is thus a 
fundamentally political act. For Denzau, North, and Roy (2007: 16), framing involves 
drawing from a distinct set of ideas to interpret an uncertain environment in which 
actors may fmd themselves, thereby highlighting certain features of this environment 
while ignoring others. For state managers, using ideas in such a manner is a strategic 
means through which they can 'enframe the world in such a way as to make 
intervention within it meaningful'; for the more people that accept these ideas, the 
more 'true' they become (Blyth, 2007: 76). 
Emphasizing the role of ideas as explanatory variables for institutional change 
and convergence is useful here as pursuing the SWF policy path is a forward-looking 
condition replete with uncertainty. As further examined in Chapters Two and Three, 
this is despite the vociferous assertions made by actors attempting to legitimate their 
SWFs ' risk-laden identities over more conservative fiscal management strategies. 
Indeed, the outcomes the SWF policy path will produce in the short, medium and 
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long-terms remain entirely unknowable. Ideas about what fmance is, how investors 
should operate within it, and what they should expect from doing so therefore 
represent powerful communicative tools that render such uncertain futures into 
seemingly calculable and predictable forms. Actors can only rely on the 'certainty of 
the convention' - in the case of SWFs, that future profits will meet state actors' 
expectations (Pixley, 2004: 41). Ideas about finance subsequently enable SWF-
government actors to make 'reverse projections of the present into the future' 
(Barbalet, 2001: 96 quoted in Pixley, 2004: 34), thereby reducing the uncertainty 
posed by various socioeconomic problems these actors may face. 
Financial ideas do not therefore objectively reflect the world that precedes 
them, but actively construct or 'perform' fmancial reality (cf. Mackenzie, 2004; 
Canon 1998). Ideas about fmance construct expected futures in the present, thus 
enabling state actors to 'plan and politic' their way forward in the presence of 
uncertainty (Blyth, 2002: 10; cf. Abolafia, 1997: 36)). This notion of the facilitative 
role of ideas to guide agency compliments similar advances made in the 
neurosciences. Several studies in this field have demonstrated the human brain is 
unable to imagine any future or choose to act decisively without the physical (read: 
chemical) stimulation provided by anticipatory emotions derived from the cognitive 
realm of ideas (cf. Damasio, 1994). In summary, there is nothing that can guarantee 
certainty of future events, especially in the speculative fmancial realm. Instead, actors 
must rely on their ideas of what fmance is, and how they should engage with it, to 
inform them why, when, and how to act in the present. 
Despite their capacity to inform action in the face of uncertainty, however, 
ideas about fmance can also be significant agential constraints. Kirshner posits such 
constraint emerges when ideas contribute to 'normative understandings about 
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"appropriate behaviour'" (2003: 15; cf. Sinclair and Thomas, 2001; 103; Scholte, 
2000: 93; McNamara, 1999). SWFs' institutionalization ofa specific array of value-
laden fmancia1 ideas can thus be demonstrated to constrain state actors' policy 
preferences to remain within the expectations of 'legitimate' action promoted therein. 
Such ideational constraint is in contrast to global material constraints imposed by 
regional fmancial orders on states' domestic behaviour - such as those encapsulated 
within the capital mobility hypothesis (Andrews, 1994; cf. Gilpin, 2001: ch. 10; 
Eichengreen and Leblang, 2003; Eatwell and Taylor, 2000: 111).14 The literature on 
global material constraints has also sought to explain why some states are more bank 
versus capital-market oriented, as well as why globalization has brought about 
institutional divergence rather than convergence in many elements of economic 
policymaking (cf. Hall and Soskice, 2001; Underhill, 1997). What this literature 
cannot explain, however, is how or why state actors' policy preferences change or 
remain fixed through time, as they have a 'thin conception of how economic relations 
are socially constructed' (Seabrooke, 2006: 6). To this end, identifying which 
fmancial ideas both substantiate and legitimate SWF -state actors' policy preferences -
as well as how they do so - can help fill this gap that pervades the IPE literature on 
institutional change, ideas, and constraint. 
That being said, this dissertation's focus on ideas is not to discount the 
significant role played by material or structural influences to guide and constrain 
institutional change. Indeed, SWFs' speculative financial practices would most likely 
not be possible if it weren't for the deregulation of fmancial borders engendered by 
global material constraints - such as international agreements and organizations -
since the 1980s (cf Cerny, 1993; Helleiner, 1994; Weiss, 2003: 8). As such, it is 
14 The capital mobility hypothesis posits that 'when capital is highly mobile across interna~ional 
borders the sustainable macroeconomic policy options available to states are systematically 
, 
circumscribed' (Andrews, 1994: 193). 
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necessary to be mindful of the unique politico-economic contexts through which 
transformative ideas gain the 'difference' that defmes them in relation to prevailing 
ideas and institutions. It is only by being mindful of these politico-economic contexts 
that the way in which the authoritative fmancial ideas substantiating SWFs are 
mediated through state actors' pre-existing interests. Any analysis of SWFs must 
therefore be mindful of the mediating and guiding role played by domestic politics, 
which is currently lacking in existing analyses. 
Considering the 'newness' - or perhaps abnormality - of SWFs, however, 
structural factors alone cannot account for why SWFs were created over competing 
alternative policy preferences. Indeed, the global emergence of SWFs redefmes IPE 
scholarship's understanding of the relationship binding the administrative state with 
their governance of domestic society as well as the fmancial realm. Simply put, both 
structural as well as ideational factors must be taken into account to explain why so 
many variegated state actors all interpreted high-risk speculative investment as a 
desirable strategy of governance. This is a significant puzzle to be examined given (i) 
the growth SWFs' are projected to experience as global foreign exchange reserve 
levels continue to expand, and (ii) the constraining nature of the fmancial ideas that 
inform government actors of how to act in regards to SWF management. Chapter Two 
now examines the explanation of SWFs' global emergence purported by fmancial 
economists, who have left both fmancial ideas and domestic political contexts 
unexamined variables. Chapter Three then offers an alternative explanation for SWFs' 
global emergence to that offered by such mainstream analyses. It does so by 
identifying and deconstructing the specific array of authoritative fmancial ideas that 
substantiate and legitimate the SWF policy path to \state actors as well as domestic 
society. 
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Chapter Two: 
The Sovereign Wealth Fund Literature (Thus Far) 
If state actors are strategic and motivated to action by dynamic and diffuse 
policy preferences (cf Hay, 2001: 131), how to explain the global diffusion of 
sovereign wealth funds witnessed over the past two decades? How to account for the 
global popularity of this policy preference given it places systematically significant 
amounts of public capital at one remove of government auspices? What impact, 
moreover, has this global movement had on the nature of SWF -state authority? The 
existing SWF literature has been largely contained within fmancial economics, and 
has yet to provide an adequate account of SWFs' contested political origins when 
examining these questions. Its focus on quantitative evaluations of the funds' impact 
on fmancial markets remains 'almost exclusively descriptive and anecdotal' (Caner 
and Grennes, 2009: 1). Financial economists assume the desirability of SWFs to be 
implicit, instead focusing their attentions on transnational regulatory debates where 
the funds' political origins are framed as anomalous and threatening (cf Truman, 
2007). As such, the roles of the state and political agency in the SWF literature have 
thus far been reduced to latent and unimportant variables. The necessary domestic 
political and social sources of support upon which SWFs' institutional legitimacy is 
based have therefore been left unexamined. This gap in the SWF literature is 
significant considering the funds are pools of public capital ultimately accountable to 
domestic social versus international fmancial interests. Yet before such analysis of the 
fund's domestic political origins can occur, it is first necessary to distinguish SWFs as 
a unique albeit institutionally cohesive group of like-minded fmancial entities. The 
following Chapter consequently draws attention to three features that distinguish 
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SWFs from other seemingly similar fmancial institutions of the state, such as central 
banks, commodity stabilization funds, and public pension funds. These common 
features allow us to classify the funds as a distinct albeit diverse class of state-
sponsored fmancial speculator that can be treated as a collective whole. 
The Chapter then highlights the deficiencies inherent to existing analyses of 
the puzzle presented by SWFs' global emergence. Focus is placed on fmancial 
economic and neoliberal policymakers' analyses in particular. Such accounts can be 
considered 'mainstream' as they have dominated the academic and policymaking 
debate in regards to SWF governance and best practice since 2007. To be sure, the 
funds came to the fore of intellectual debate in November of that year following a 
string of SWF capital injections into failing western investment banks reeling from 
the so-called credit-crunch (Couturier, 2007).15 The following discussion examines 
each of SWFs' three distinguishing features from the perspective of these mainstream 
analyses. This is intended to highlight how such analyzes prevent a critical reading of 
the funds to be had by taking their desirability as fiscal management strategies as 
implicit. 16 The state and political agency are consequently rendered latent and 
unimportant variables in explaining SWFs institutional diffusion on a global scale. In 
so doing, existing analyses merely explain why so many political actors of variegated 
backgrounds and interests should establish SWFs under dominant fmancial economic 
epistemes. That is, they base their analyses on several ontological presuppositions that 
substantiate their pre-existing and fmancially-oriented worldview. As such, they do 
15 For an introduction to SWFs' investment patterns between 1975 and 2008, see Miracky et aI, 2008: 
35-49. 
16 Both 10hnson-Calari and Rietveld (2008) and Rietveld (2008) provide a broad cross-section of 
'mainstream' SWF analyses - i.e. those offered by financial economists and neoliberal policymakers. 
These analyzes and the questions they leave unanswered are more closely examined in Sections 2.1-
2.3. 
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not adequately account for how or why state actors overcame competing and equally 
plausible policy preferences in regards to sovereign wealth management. 
2.0 Sovereign Wealth Funds' Three Distinguishing Features 
Given their 'newness', or perhaps abnormality, fmancial economists and 
neoliberal policymakers have yet to provide a universally agreed upon defmition of 
what constitutes a sovereign wealth fund and what does not. Some commentators 
have argued SWFs are any pool of government owned or controlled fmancial capital. 
This would include public pension funds - such as the California Public Employees' 
Retirement System - and even investment arms of central banks (Truman, 2007: 2).17 
Others have adopted more technical approaches by arguing SWFs are distinguished 
by their unique 'liability profiles', which enable them to take abnormally long-term 
investment horizons (Rozanov, 2008: 13-18; Rietveld and Pringle, 2008: 5). In any 
case, how one defmes an SWF depends on the normative goals that commentator 
wishes to promote in their analysis. 
Financial regulators in OECD states, for example, have paid considerable 
attention to the way in which SWFs skirt the lines of dominant (neoliberal) fmancial 
proprieties due to the unique fiduciary relationship they share with their state 
overseers (cf. Truman, 2007: 2; Summers, 2008; Carson and Litmann, 2009). These 
commentators have subsequently emphasized it is the funds' government-linked 
identity that is their most important, albeit threatening, characteristic. Financial 
economists, on the other hand, have attempted to quantify the extent to which SWF 
17 This understanding of SWFs has, however, been largely discredited for two reasons. First, SWFs 
have no fiduciary responsibilities to trustees or short-term payment liabilities in the same manner as do 
public pension funds. Secondly, such an expansive definition would inflate the global value of 
'sovereign wealth' from approximately $3 trillion to $15 trillion (see, for example, United Nations, 
2008: Annex table A.LII). For a review of several similar definitions of SWFs, see: Miracky et aI. 
2008: 13-21: Monk, 2009: 451-455. 
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investments impact the day-to-day functioning of the broader fmancial realm. Such 
analyses have subsequently emphasized it is their long-term investment horizons and 
systematically significant capital bases that defme SWFs as a distinctive investor 
class. They argue that due to these unique properties, SWFs are capable of imposing 
their interests onto their portfolio companies either directly through voting or 
indirectly through the exertion of 'soft-power' on company management (cf Farrell, 
Lund, and Sadan, 2008: 7; Derwenter, Han and Malatesta, 2009; Bortolotti et aI, 
2009: 10-15; Kvam, 2008). The following defmition identifies three distinguishing 
features in particular that demarcate SWFs as a unique and cohesive class of like-
minded fmancial institution. As this dissertation is focused on examining the domestic 
sources of SWFs' social and political legitimacy, each of these features draws 
attention to the nature of the relationship binding SWFs with their state owners. 
2.1 The First Distinguishing Feature: 
Speculation in 'risky' assets 
The first of three distinguishing features is that SWFs are pools of sovereign -
read: public - capital managed with the intent of generating a return above what is 
commonly known as the 'risk-free rate' (cf Balding, 2009).18 They thus invest in 
riskier asset classes and markets, including 40-70 percent equities and some 
combination of government-guaranteed and corporate bonds, real estate, private 
equity, commodities, and foreign currency (Fernandez and Eschweiler, 2008: 12-13; 
IMF, 2008: 14).19 The exclusive pursuit of fmancial returns and increased appetite for 
18 The risk free-rate of return is defined as the interest an investor would expect from an absolutely 
risk-free investment over a specified period oftime. As no such 'riskless' investment exists in reality, 
the interest rate on a three-month US Treasury bill is usually taken as the risk free rate. 
19 The IMP has calculated the average SWF portfolio to be invested in approximately 40-70% equity, 
4-10% of private equity funds, 13-40% fixed income, 2-5% infrastructure, 2-5% commodities, and 8-
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fmancial risk are commonly believed to enable states to circumvent various problems 
associated with traditional approaches to sovereign wealth management. 20 Financial 
economists in particular argue that adopting high amounts of fmancial risk enable 
states to capitalize on 'rationally desirable' investment opportunities proffered by the 
broader fmancial realm (c£ Jen, 2007; Miracky et aI, 2008: 11-12; Rozanov, 2008: 
13-18; Kern, 2008). 
Like central banks, SWFs' capital bases are derived from the foreign exchange 
(FX) reserves that constitute a state's sovereign wealth. Unlike central banks, 
however, SWF's are generally assumed to consist of 'surplus' sovereign wealth, 
which typically derives from one or a combination of three sources (Santiso, 2008: 
183-185): 
(1) Export of state resources, with revenues generated either directly from 
state owned companies - such as in Botswana, Chile, Abu Dhabi and Kuwait 
- or export taxation - such as in Russia or Alaska 
(2) Fiscal revenues arising from either budget surpluses - as in Korea or New 
Zealand - or privatization receipts - as in Malaysia or Australia 
(3) Pure FX sources generated by central bank activities such as the sale of 
government debt - as in China, Singapore, and Ireland. 
The problem, argue mainstream analyses, is that conservative central banks are ill-
equipped to manage the sovereign credit bubble that has expanded so rapidly since the 
1980s. To be sure, central bank reserves have risen 11 percent annually throughout 
the past two decades, 15 percent over the past ten years, and 22 percent over the past 
five years. This has been particularly pronounced in the so-called developing world, 
wherein FX reserves rose 27 percent between 2006 and 2007, largely driven by 
reserves in Asia (31 percent), the Middle East (35 percent) and Latin America (47 
10% real estate (IMF, 2008). Moreover, 90 percent of all listed SWF investments are international in 
focus, and more than 75 percent are in OEeD companies (Bortolotti et aI, 2009: 5). 
20 Traditional strategies to manage surplus foreign exchange reserves - particularly those generated 
from commodities - have been extensively co\"ered by the World Bank and IMF in particular (see 
Devlin and Lewin. 2005; Fasano, 2000; Soderling, 2002; Ramirez and Tan, 2004). 
percent) . This is opposed to the OEeD whose revenues grew only eight percent 
(Kern, 2008: 5; see Figure 1).21 
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Figure 1: Global Reserve Growth (1945-2005) 
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Mainstream SWF analyses assume that numerous states expenencmg such 
reserve growth had little choice but to invest into a diverse array of international 
financ ial asse ts so as to sterilize foreign currency inflows, smooth long term 
21 Th is expansion in global reserve levels is largely attributab le to US monetary poli cy since th e 
abandonment of the gold standard in 1971. The US's hi storica l propensity to expand it s rl money 
suppl y - and thus the globa l supply of credit - through the Federal Reserve has propelled the U 
current account deficit to equa l the CWTent accoun t urpluses of the re t of th e world (cf. Clarida. 200 : 
Block, 1977; Hi ldebral1d, 2008 : 33), It also attributab le to a nwnber of gO\'elTUllents ' acti\ 'ely building 
their reserves as a buffer aga inst globa l economic vo lat ili ty, Between 1997 and 2007. for example. 
Korea increased their reserves by $250 billion, Their capacity to re-inflate their tledling eCOnl)I11:' in the 
curren t cri sis was then part ly dependent on the greater freedom these reserws ga\'\:' them to man<lge 
pecul ati ve out tlows, 
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consumption and investment patterns, avoid experiencing econOffilC boom-bust 
cycles, and other such expected maladies associated with reserve growth (Rietveld 
and Pringle, 2008: 1-2; Hildebrand, 2008)?2 For Noreng, the problem posed by this 
wealth is that is must be able to 'secure a level and pattern of economic activity that 
maintains social and political stability, without dislocations and undesirable structural 
changes that can be caused by rapidly rising [household] incomes' (1981: 28). 
Diversified investment strategies are moreover thought to enable states to capitalize 
on rationally desirable opportunities afforded by speculative capital markets (cf 
Summers, 2008: 21-24; 10hnson-Calari, 2008: 47-70). Given a lack of domestic 
investment opportunities, limited capital absorption capabilities, and inefficient or 
non-existent fmancial services within these states, such diversification was then 
forced to take an outward-looking international focus (cf Balding, 2008: 3; 10hnson-
Calari, 2008: 47; Rietveld 2008, 8). SWFs are consequently assumed by such analyses 
to be inevitable by-products of modern fmance capitalism, rather than politically and 
strategically established institutions of the state. 
Financial economists in particular argue FX reserve growth will inevitably 
lead state actors to model reserve management around riskier types of investment 
behaviour. This is due to the fact that there is no expectation this money will be called 
upon in the short term (Sweeney Barnes, 2008; Rozanov, 2008: 18; Summers, 2008: 
18). They then also assumes there are no alternative beneficial uses for this capital 
22 A number of SWF commentaries have demonstrated that the funds are structured around several 
liability 'tranches', each of which carries a unique set of goals and functions (Rozanov, 2008: 17; 
Sweeney-Barnes, 2008). For example, almost all SWFs have a stabilization and currency sterilization 
function in order to address what are known as contingent liabilities. These liabilities include 
unforeseen commodity-price shocks, domestic overheating, or rapid currency appreciation. Additional 
investment tranches are then determined according to whether the SWF must meet fLXed liabilities 
(such as the Chinese Investment Corporation having to meet annual interest payments on its debt-based 
source of funding), mixed liabilities (have limited long-term liabilities \\ith an obligation to make 
regular budgetary payments to government, such as Norway's Government Pension Fund-Global or 
Russia's National Reserve Fund), or open-ended liabilities (no identifiable or contractually defined 
obligations such as the Kuwaiti and Qatari InYestment Authorities). 
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and, if there are, governments should not make them anyway lest they destabilize the 
general efficiency of the private market mechanism. Instead, stagnant reserves can be 
transformed into a diversified portfolio of fmancial assets, thereby minimizing the 
'implicit cost of capital' associated with traditional central bank-style management 
(Rietveld and Pringle, 2008: 6). They cite that central bankers are constrained to 
invest primarily in sovereign debt assets - such as highly liquid US Treasury Bills -
so as to maintain an undisputed reputation in international debt markets. 
Indeed for central bankers, a loss of profitability is synonymous with a loss of 
credibility. As Leyshon and Thrift describe (1997: 19), 'state credit money' is 
distinguished from 'bank credit money' not because of the private-public nature of 
central banks themselves, but the private-public nature of the debt they manage (cf 
Maxfield, 1997: 24). Hence increased levels of fmancial risk could undermine a 
central bank's capacity to conduct monetary policy in times of global or regional 
crisis, specifically by reducing the attractiveness of their sovereign debt to 
international bond markets (Hildebrand, 2008: 40; Bakker and van Herpt, 2008: 284; 
De Beaufort, Berelaar and Petre, 2008: 132).23 The existing SWF literature has 
consequently argued the funds were created to enable state actors to invest in riskier 
and more volatile fmancial assets, which are assumed to be profitable in the long-
term. This is given central banks are constrained to give precedence to domestic 
monetary and fiscal responsibilities such as wealth preservation and liquidity, 
maintenance of healthy exchange rates, price stability, and the orchestration of private 
sector bailouts in the case of crisis (Sweeney-Barnes, 2008; Nugee, 2008; Dumenil 
23 Some exceptions to this rule - which remain unresolved anomalies in mainstream S\\,F analyses .. 
are witnessed in those central banks pursuing a higher rate of return such as the Swiss National Bank 
(cf Hildebrand, 2008) or the Bank of Mexico (cf Ortiz, 2008). 
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and Levy, 2000: 69).24 Simply put, central banks are constrained to preserve the 
structural conditions believed necessary to make speculative credit practices efficient, 
and thus profitable for private market investors. 25 Some commentators have even 
argued governments who can afford to lose state money credit to volatile equity 
markets in the short-term, but who only invest in government-guaranteed liquid 
securities, are 'guilty of fmancial malpractice' (Summers, 2008: 22). Sovereign 
wealth funds' focus on fmancial maximization is thus portrayed in the existing 
literature as correctly filling the gaps left by central banks' management of FX 
reserves. This is rather than begin their analysis by noting SWFs are strategically 
constructed, debated and contested institutions created and sustained through time by 
domestic political actors. 
F or mainstream analyses, S WF s' first distinguishing feature is thus attribu ted 
to the authoritative influence of mobile finance capital itself. State actors' hands were 
effectively tied by the pull of fmancial opportunity on the one hand, and the fear-
induced push of domestic economic failure from fiscal mismanagement on the other. 
How this policy path won out over alternative strategies of sovereign wealth 
management - such as infrastructural investments, domestic diversification, or more 
risk-averse investment strategies - is left unexamined. Their understanding of SWFs 
are instead couched in the assumption that fmancial maximization through 
diversification is always a normatively good and rationally-desirable end in itself. As 
24 Central banks have short-term liquidity requirements and therefore must invest in highly liquid but 
safe financial assets, typically government bonds such as US Treasury Bills. These assets do not, 
however, generate profitable yields such that inflation renders annual central bank returns, especially 
those in emerging markets, close to 0% (Summers, 2008: 21). 
25 Additional perceived deficiencies of central banks by mainstream SWF analyses include: (i) lack of 
experience in dealing with riskier investments; (ii) lack of incentives to pursue more aggressive 
strategies due to high levels of accountability to both the state as well as international capital markets; 
,md (iii) low compensation relative to the private sphere which leads to the hiring of managers of sub-
optimal talent and fmancial acumen (Rietveld and Pringle, 2008: 6). 
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such, little attention is paid to either the po litico-economic contexts or alternative 
short-term government interests SWFs were ultimately created to serve. 
2.2 The Second Distinguishing Feature: 
Risk management through diversification 
Diversification in the sense of investing in riskier assets as a strategy to 
maximize financial returns can also be pursued in an attempt to control for increased 
fmancial risk. This is achieved by diversifying investments within and between 
equities, corporate bonds, real estate, private equity etc. The second distinguishing 
feature of SWFs can thus be summarized as the process whereby a states' sovereign 
wealth is continuously embedded throughout the financial realm in both a 'functional' 
as well as 'spatial' sense of capital mobility (cf. Watson, 2007).26 This ultimately 
limits state actors' access to this capital and, by extension, their immediately 
realizable policy preferences. To be sure, the diffusion and geographic reach of SWF 
investments steadily increased from 1990 onwards alongside the expansion in global 
reserve levels (cf. Chang, Covrig, and Ng, 2005; Bortolotti et aI, 2009; Miracky et aI, 
2008: 47-48). Mainstream SWF analyses argue this distinguishing feature is the 
26 What distinguishes functional from spatial capital mobility will be more closely examined in this 
Section as well as in Chapter Three, Section 3.2. It can nonetheless be indicated here that 
understanding fmance capital as mobile in these two senses is necessary when analyzing the global 
embedment of sovereign wealth engendered by SWFs' second distinguishing feature. Indeed, more 
traditional accounts of finance capital as diffuse yet fungible in a purely spatial sense (see: Obstfeld 
and Rogoff, 1996; Rodseth, 2000; Ugur, 2001; Watson, 2007: 5; Hay, 2007: 127-32) cannot account 
for why at particular historical moments investors will 'rebalance their investments so as to reduce 
their exposure to trading dynamics on one asset market but to increase exposure to trading dynamics on 
another' (Watson, 2007: 11). In short, traditional characterizations of financial capital mobility do not 
adequately account for the social or political underpinnings of modern fmancial relations and practices. 
They instead explain real-world phenomena through a systemic view of how financial markets should 
operate under assumptions of pareto-optimal equilibrium and rationality. They do not account for the 
way in which attitudes towards and ideas of finance perforrnatively constitute financial market reality 
(cf. Mackenzie, 2006; de Goede, 2007; Langley, 2008). Thus the political and social relations that 
actively constitute and transform speculative capital markets and the legitimated choice-sets - or 
strategies - available to SWFs embedded therein go unnoticed and inadequately theorized in 
mainstream analyses. 
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natural by-product of two factors. First, and as just mentioned, is the perceived ability 
of diversification within and between riskier assets to minimize the overall risk of an 
investment portfolio. The second is the increased mobility of transnational fmance 
capital witnessed since the 1980s. 
To this effect, the reigning paradigm for fmancial economists when 
determining investment strategy is still the 'mean-variance efficient frontier' approach 
introduced by Harry Markowitz in 1956 (Weinberger and Golub, 2008: 75; Poitras, 
2005; IMF, 2008: 14). Providing the basis for today's lauded 'modern portfolio 
theory', Markowitz made the normative claim that rational investors should - and 
thus would - further diversify their investments within and throughout apparently 
uncorrelated asset classes and markets. This represented a means to reduce the 
amount of 'unsystematic risk' of a portfolio - or variability in stock prices produced 
by company or asset class-specific developments - while at the same time allowing 
for other types of potentially more profitable risk to be assumed. 27 Because 
unsystematic risk cannot be predicted but only controlled for under the assumptions 
of the random-walk hypothesis (Malkiel, 1999), SWF portfolios are constructed 
around how much of the latter categories of potentially more profitable risk states are 
willing to assume - the so-called risk-reward trade-off.28 Given SWFs' seemingly 
long-term investment horizons and burgeoning capital bases, mainstream analyses 
argue SWFs can diversify their investment risk on a more universal and thus effective 
27 Examples of such profitable forms of risk include: systemic risk, credit risk (the likelihood of 
repayment on debt-based instruments such as bonds), and liquidity risk (the ease to which assets can be 
converted into cash). 
28 The random walk hypothesis states that the price of speculative financial assets evolve according to a 
'random walk' and cannot therefore be predicted (cf. Malkiel, 1999). 
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manner than other synchronically-minded investors such as mutual funds or hedge 
funds (Johnson-Calari, 2008: 68-69; Weinberger and Golub, 2008: 82-85).29 
Indeed for the existing literature, fmancial volatility and the possibility of 
crisis are necessary and expected ills SWFs are assumed capable of weathering. The 
funds are theoretically capable of withstanding high degrees of short and medium 
term price vo latility, such as equity assets' 14-16% annual volatility swings versus 
government bond's 1-2% (de Beaufort, Berkelaar and Petre, 2008: 134). Financial 
economists in particular thus characterise SWFs as a stylised version of the long-term 
oriented 'value' (or 'buy-and-hold') investor as presented in the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model. So when investments are diversified in accordance with the assumptions of 
modern portfolio theory, mainstream SWF analyses posit that riskier investment 
strategies will actually raise the likelihood of preserving sovereign wealth than would 
conservative central bank investment strategies (Summers, 2008: 25). This is despite 
the high degree of short-term risks this strategy entails. Hence if fmancial risk is not 
only inherently profitable but also quantifiable and manageable, SWF -states were 
incentivised to universally embed sovereign wealth throughout the fmancial realm. 
Such mainstream analyses then also argue the increased functional and spatial 
mobility of fmance capital witnessed since the 1980s has made this incentive to 
globally diversify a logical inevitability. First, the functional mobility of capital refers 
to the degree to which investors are able to transfer wealth between various categories 
of financial instrument (Watson, 2007: 9). If market sentiment in a certain market or 
asset-class was perceived as turning 'bearish', for example, the proceeds from an 
equity sale could be used to purchase corporate bonds. For fmancial economists, 
sovereign wealth can consequently remain invested and continuously 'put to work' in 
29 For a review of the constraints imposed by a synchronic approach to investment on mutual funds' 
investment activities and their significance to IPE scholarship, see Harmes, 1998. For hedge funds. see 
Robbotti,2003. 
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accordance with SWFs' long-term investment horizons. This is rather than remain 
'stagnant' in cash or sovereign debt (Gieve, 2008: 17, 22; De Beaufort, Berelaar and 
Petre, 2008: 132-138).30 The spatial mobility of capital, on the other hand, is reflected 
in most all accounts of fmancial globalization. It refers to the ability of investors to 
switch their wealth's national orientations but remain invested in the same type of 
instrument, such as the sale of one country's debt instruments for another's (Watson, 
2007: 9). Finance capital's increasing spatial mobility is synonymous with the 
deregulation of fmancial borders for transnational investment, the OECD's 
commitment to which was reiterated in the updated Washington Consensus (cf 
Rodrik, 2006). The increasing functional and spatial mobility of [mance capital, 
assume mainstream analyses, has naturally enabled SWFs to extensively diversify 
sovereign wealth in attempts to mitigate the risks inherent to their equity-exposed 
portfolios. Indeed as Truman summarizes, SWFs' fIrst and second distinguishing 
features are portrayed as co-dependant in mainstream analyses: 
'The rapid accumulation of FX reserves coupled with a swelling appetite for 
returns ... increased global integration, substantial elimination of restrictions 
on international capital flows, technological innovation ... recognition that 
diversification contributes to increased investment returns, and loosening of 
"home bias" in investment decisions has led to a dramatic increase in the rate 
of SWF investments' - Truman, 2007 
Yet by assuming such diversifIcation and fmancial embedment of public 
capital to be inherently desirable, mainstream analyses do not make explicit the 
reasons why they should be considered desirable. SWFs' need to control for increased 
fInancial risk through diversification is instead rendered axiomatic; it becomes an 
30 Various IPE scholars have attributed the increasing functional mobility of finance capital to a 
nmnber of factors, such as: (a) the rapid expansion of financial innovation in the 1980s and 1990s, 
motivated by the need to hedge risk in the context of increasingly volatile equity markets (Watson, 
2007: 15); (b) opportunities afforded by technological innovation - such as telecommunications and 
computer-based algorithmic trading (Sassen, 2005); and (c) the popular rise of rational choice theory 
throughout academia and practitioner spheres to substantiate the claim that markets are inherently 
efficient and self-sustaining if investors are left to their own devices (Hay, 2007: 98-101). 
56 
unremarkable and self-evident feature of modem fmancial thought and practice. Yet 
SWFs' diversified investment strategies are worthy of more rigorous examination as 
they prevent this systematically significant amount of capital from being used for any 
other purpose than fmancial maximization (cf Davis et aI, 2001). The illiquid nature 
of the riskier asset-classes in which public capital is invested effectively limits the 
realizable policy preferences of state actors and, ultimately, its relationship with 
domestic society.31 The global fmancial embedment of SWF capital thus appears to be 
in tension with the short-term interests of the interest-maximizing politicians that 
establish and maintain SWFs through time. To this end, the existing literature does 
not adequately account for the reasons why state actors would want to limit their 
realizable policy preferences by pursuing the SWF policy path. The assumed capacity 
of spatial and functional diversification to control for increased fmancial risk does not 
adequately explain the desirability of this second distinguishing feature of SWFs. 
2.3 The Third Distinguishing Feature 
The Government-SWF authority relationship 
The extensive diversification of public capital throughout the fmancial realm 
by sovereign wealth funds appears to have propelled a number of governments to 
become systematically significant fmancial market participants. To this end, SWFs' 
third distinguishing feature is that the funds are ultimately accountable to government 
31 Despite the increased mobility of finance capital witnessed since the 1980s, each financial 
transaction requires both buyers and sellers, the matching of which is not as seamless or instantaneous 
when dealing with large block trades as SWFs are. SWFs are thus constrained in their capacity to sell 
poorly performing assets as readily as other investors due to the large size of these investments, as \\ell 
as the spatial and functional embedment of their diversified portfolios. Hirschman refers to this feature 
of investment as 'exit' capacity (1970). Sovereign wealth funds' exit capacity is often further 
constrained by their underlying legislation - whether it be a parliamentary Act, or constitutiYe, fiscal or 
company law passed by government (cf. IMF, 2008: 5-7). Such legislation limits S\VF capital to the 
strictly commercial pursuit of financial maximization, often times dictating what percentage of assets 
should be allocated to specific asset classes. 
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actors but managed by an operationally independent - though still government-linked 
- group of fmancial actors. Simply put, SWF management is placed at one remove of 
the political arena in a similar fashion to independent central banks (cf Maxfield, 
1997). Hence given their public source of funding, the funds do not readily fit into 
predominantly binary public-private framework dominating the SWF literature. This 
simplified and altogether polemic approach narrowly pits irrational states against 
efficient markets. This third feature of SWFs also remains anomalous for much of the 
IPE literature on fmance. Here, a number of scholars have increasingly focused their 
attentions on the practices through which 'everyday people' are drawn into the market 
(cf Langley, 2008; Seabrooke and Hobson, 2007), as well as 'pointing out the 
implausibility of the agential assumptions underlying the logic of market stability' 
(Watson, 2007: 2; cf Blyth, 2007; Frankfurter and McGoun, 1999). The presence of 
SWFs is therefore anomalous for both literatures given the administrative state must 
maintain relations with their funds, but at the same time cannot be treated as just 
another everyday citizen or market participant. So what is the nature of the state-SWF 
relationship? 
To this end, SWF managers are deliberately placed at one remove of 
regulatory entities such as fmance ministries or central banks traditionally tasked with 
the management of sovereign capital. 32 These managers can be developed internally 
as in Norway and Alberta or hired externally as in Ireland, although all SWFs are 
invariably managed by a combination of both types. According to fmancial 
economists, the delegation of operational authority to SWF managers necessarily fills 
32 The terms 'SWF manager' and 'state manager' will be used to demarcate between two different sets 
of actors. SWF managers are those actors who make the day-to-day investment decisions and are not 
currently employed as politicians. This can include both 'in-house' and externally hired managers. 
State managers, on the other hand, refers to those actors that are either represented on their SWF's 
board of directors or other oversight committee while at the same time holding some other official post 
in government bureaucracy. 
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a gap left by political actors' lack of fmancial expertise (Balding, 2008: 14; cf 
Section 2.1). As this belief is taken as axiomatic, what fmancial expertise actually is, 
why it is necessary, and thus why state managers should limit their authority over 
sovereign wealth management in favour of SWF managers goes critically 
unexamined. The knowledge that fmancial expertise is necessary for successful 
speculation is instead taken as implicit, and relegated to Polanyi's 'tacit dimension' 
(1967: 4). The ideationally constructed and politically contested nature of fmancial 
expertise subsequently goes unobserved. The specific fmancial and political interests 
this feature of SWFs serves are also left unidentified. 
Financial market regulators in particular have emphasized SWFs' umque 
organizational structure are fundamentally necessary if fmancial market equilibrium is 
to be maintained. This is due to the potential for SWFs' strictly fmancial identities to 
be compromised by the meddling and ultimately destabilizing influence of self-
interested government actors. 33 To be sure, SWFs have fiduciary responsibilities to 
the state similar to those of policy-minded central banks as both are entrusted with the 
management of public funds (Hildebrand, 2008: 43). The problem for these primarily 
OECD-policymakers, then, is that it is unclear what mechanisms of authority SWF 
managers possess over state managers. This is opposed to central banks that can 
theoretically impose fiscal discipline on the state by fmancing government budget 
overdrafts through purchasing government securities, making unsecured loans on its 
reserves, or printing money (Maxfield, 1997: 7, 20). SWF managers, on the other 
hand, lack the same degree of discretion over their funds' short, medium or long-term 
goals. Their authority is limited to determining which fmancial tools and strategies 
should be used to achieve the goals set by the state. The potential for political 
33 For a review of the international regulatory debate that occurred after a number of SWFs invested in 
various Western financial institutions in the fall of 2007, see Carson and Litrnann, 2009. 
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authorities to interfere in SWF managers' investment activities is thus framed as 
posing a threat to fmancial market equilibrium. This third distinguishing feature also 
creates the potential for states to abuse their position of authority by directing SWF 
managers to take stakes in so-called strategic industries, such as aerospace and 
defence (Truman, 2007; Cox, 2007; Weisman, 2007). 
The origins of this international regulatory debate arose following a number of 
very large SWF investments into several failing western fmancial institutions in the 
fall of 2007 (IWG, 2008: 11-13; Connon, 2008). SWFs and their supporters in the 
IMF, OECD and various fmanciallobbyists were subsequently pressured to ease these 
fears by actively supporting the funds' legitimacy throughout international 
policymaking circles (Gordon, 2008; Monk, 2009: 457-460).34 Legitimacy in this 
sense thus refers to 'the belief that an organization or fIrm is authorized (legally and 
morally) to operate in a certain place' (Monk, 2009: 458; cf Tucker and Hendrickson, 
2004). To be sure, promoting SWFs legitimacy through forums such as the 
International Working Group on Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG) became 
synonymous with 'gaining access to operate and invest in a given country or market' 
(Monk, 2009: 459). The transnational regulatory debate did not therefore trigger a 
regulatory backlash against SWFs. Instead, it instigated a promotional movement that 
sought to legitimate SWF directed investment in general (cf IWG, 2008: 11). 
The IWG emphasized the following characterization of the state-SWF 
relationship in particular. On the one hand, state managers were argued to derive 
authority from their design capacity (cf Vipond, 1993: 1987) - i.e. the ability to 
34 The IWG - renamed the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF) in 2009 - is a 
voluntary group of 23 of the world's largest SWFs that meet, exchange views on issues of common 
interest, and facilitate an understanding of SWFs activities throughout the international financial 
community. Of particular importance were the 'Santiago Principles' passed in October 2008 which 
detail a number of 'Generally Agreed Practices and Principles' member states are expected to meet. 
The Group's primary function is to promote these principles in a way that ensures financial borders for 
SWF investment remain open (IWG, 2008: 11-13). 
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structure the laws and regulations through which SWFs' fmancial activities are 
implemented (IWG, 2008: GAPP #7, 8, 18). At the same time, SWF managers retain 
their operational capacity as an entirely separate, technocratically managed 
institutional body that detennines which specific industries and companies capital 
under its management will be invested and how. SWF managers are thus responsible 
for the operational execution of investment decisions in compliance with the fmancial 
risk preferences approved by their state overseers (IWG, 2008: GAPP #9, 11; cf Das 
et aI, 2008: 75). State managers are therefore expected to rely on SWF managers' 
expert fmancial know ledge when it comes to operationalizing a fund's speculative 
fmancial mandate. It is SWF managers that actually invest in markets: they have 
licenses to trade, formal and informal fmancial networks to help them do so, and the 
expertise to justify their investment preferences. State managers, on the other hand, do 
not invest but still retain the capacity to either determine or approve their SWF's 
investment universe (cf IWG, 2008).35 
According to this understanding of the SWF -state relationship as promoted by 
SWF lobbyists and support organizations, authority is portrayed as existing in two 
senses. First, an actor or firm can be in authority such that they are entitled to decide 
how others behave (Friedman, 1990: 57, 80-81). Conversely, actors and firms can be 
an authority in that their views are entitled to be believed by others. This distinction 
between an versus in authority derives from the presupposition of inequality: that one 
actor (e.g. state managers) lacks the knowledge or insight they assume another (e.g. 
SWF managers) to possess. This effectively abdicates state managers from 
judgement. Friedman refers to this second form as 'epistemological' authority (1990: 
35 This governing role of the state has manifested itself in various ways that differ bet\\'een individual 
SWFs and are both formal (i.e. degree of bureaucratisation, legislation, and political representation) 
and informal (i.e. informational feedback loops) in nature. For a summary of the different reporting 
mechanisms employed by states in their oversight ofSWFs, see: IMF, 2008: 5-9: IWG, 2008: 38-56. 
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83), a term that will be more thoroughly introduced in Chapter Three. It suffices to 
indicate here that SWF proponents in the IWG and elsewhere argued the funds could 
be considered legitimate investors as political authorities were placed at one remove 
of SWF management. Indeed, the more vaunted position of being an authority was 
rightly retained by SWFs in their role as operational managers of sovereign capital. 
SWFs' third distinguishing feature is thus commonly attributed to the need for state 
managers to act in strict accordance with the recommendations provided by 
epistemologically authoritative financial experts. 
Despite these convictions, however, why state actors would be willing to defer 
their authority for SWF capital to professional fmancial speculators has not been 
adequately addressed. Examining the authority relationship that exists between state 
and SWF managers remains an empirical exercise yet to be engaged with by SWF 
scholarship. This is given the fact that the fmancial data used in these typically 
econometric analyses - such as actual versus benchmark asset allocation and 
performance history - is limited. In any case, moreover, what fmancial data is 
available cannot be used to quantify state versus SWF authority - which is not a 
material thing but an intransitive act that must be iteratively performed to become 
'real'. Indeed, mainstream SWF analyses have yet to convincingly demonstrate 
fmancial expertise exists as a measurable concept, what it is composed of, and thus 
why state managers should defer their authority to it. Simply put, the SWF literature 
has yet to critically examine the ideational building blocks upon which modern 
fmancial knowledge is constructed, and through which SWF discourse is filtered. As 
will now be explored in Chapter Three, it is only by identifying these ideas and their 
capacity to inform state actors of legitimate action that these gaps in the SWF 
literature can be filled. 
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Conclusion 
The growmg clout of sovereIgn wealth funds throughout global capital 
markets since 2000 represents a shift in many states' attitudes towards speculative 
investment. Rather than be relegated to playa game of regulatory catch-up, SWF-
states have propelled themselves to the frontlines of the global fmancial arena. With 
support from fmancial economists, professional investors, and international 
organizations such as the IWG, speculative investment of sovereign wealth has 
become increasingly synonymous with good governance. The preceding Chapter 
drew attention to three features in particular that distinguish SWFs from other 
government-linked fiscal institutions. First, SWFs are pools of public capital managed 
with the intent of generating returns above the risk-free rate into the long-term. They 
thus speculatively invest in a broad range of traditionally riskier asset classes and 
markets, primarily public equity. Second, SWFs continuously embed this public 
capital throughout the financial realm in both a functional and spatial sense of capital 
mobility. Such global diversification is pursued in attempts to control for the higher 
degree of risk their investments entail. It is moreover facilitated by the funds' 
systematically significant capital bases and lack of short-term liabilities. Finally, 
SWFs are managed by an operationally independent, though still government-linked, 
array of SWF mangers placed at one remove of the political arena. It was emphasized 
that each of these features prevents state managers from using SWF capital for 
anything but fmancial maximization in the short and medium-terms. 
Despite these features, the SWF literature has left the state and domestic 
politics unexamined variables in explaining the funds' global emergence. They 
instead take the desirability the SWF policy path as implicit, building their analyses 
on preconceived notions of the inherent benefits afforded by speCUlative investment. 
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Discussion has consequently been limited to asking whether fmancial regulators 
should allow the funds to invest, and in what amounts, asset classes and markets. 
Mainstream analyses moreover argue that governments cannot be trusted to profitably 
invest SWF capital due to the meddling influence of self-interested politicians. Yet 
they then contradictorily maintain these same state actors will altruistically create an 
SWF so as to benefit future generations and preserve domestic economic stability. 
Why so many state actors, supposedly motivated by competing and self-serving 
policy preferences, all chose to create and maintain their SWFs through time thus 
remains critically unexamined. How did the SWF policy path appeal to the short-term 
interests of state managers - as well as the domestic populations to whom SWFs are 
ultimately accountable - given their long-term and internationally focused fmancial 
orientations? How was each of SWFs' three distinguishing features legitimated over 
alternative fiscal management strategies considered by these states? 
The existing SWF literature has provided a rough sketch of why the funds are 
categorically distinct fmancial entities. They are nonetheless lacking in their analysis 
of the relationships that bind SWFs with financial markets as well as states and 
domestic political interests. These commentaries understand the administrative state 
and its public interests ultimately defme SWFs' unique fmancial identities, but go no 
further than acknowledge this unique public-private identity exists. The nature of the 
SWF-state relationship, why it should be considered a legitimate partnership, and its 
significance for domestic society as well as political authority are consequently left 
unexamined. The following Chapter provides an alternative explanation for the global 
emergence of SWFs than that currently offered in either the IPE or fmancial economic 
literatures. It does so by first identifying and then deconstructing the ideational 
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building blocks - or forms of modern fmancial knowledge - upon which SWFs' 
institutional legitimacy is based. 
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Cha pter Three 
Politicizing the Sovereign Wealth Fund Puzzle 
The preceding Chapter argued that sovereign wealth funds are distinguishable 
from other government linked fmancial vehicles such as central banks, commodity 
stabilization funds, and public pension funds. This is due to their: (i) investment of 
public capital in speculative fmancial assets, (ii) universally diversified orientation, 
and (iii) unique authority relationship shared with the state. The following Chapter 
seeks to expand on this understanding of SWFs, and where they can be situated in the 
IPE literature on global fmance. It argues the funds are best conceptualised as 
domestic strategies of governance, first and foremost created to support the short-term 
interests of state managers. This is to fill in a gap left in the SWF literature currently 
dominated by fmancial economists. That is, if state managers are strategically 
selective when devising their often-competing policy preferences, how to explain the 
global diffusion of the SWF policy path witnessed over the past two decades? Taking 
the desirability of SWFs as implicit, existing analyses are exclusively focused on 
examining the funds' significance for fmancial market participants. In their rush to 
either condemn or celebrate SWFs' legitimacy as private market participants, these 
analyses speciously paint the funds as evolutionary by-products of modem fmance 
capitalism. They assume extra-budgetary sovereign wealth derived from commodity 
exports, trade surpluses, or the privatization of state owned enterprises must indeed be 
'put to work' through speculative investment so as to avoid incurring unnecessary 
'opportunity costs' (cf Nugee, 2008; Summers, 2008; 10hnson-Calari, 2008; 
Rietveld, 2008). In so doing, these assumptions rigorously abstract political agency, 
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and the domestic political struggles that underpin SWF creation and development are 
left unexamined. 
The following offers an alternative explanation to the puzzle presented by the 
global diffusion of the SWF policy path. It posits the funds' speculative fmancial 
identities represent a means for state actors to immediately address various problems 
of uncertainty they are expected to address as governors of domestic society. If left 
unaddressed, these problems may undermine a government's political legitimacy (cf. 
Seabrooke, 2006: 3-4). SWFs effectively enable states to reconceptualise these 
problems of uncertainty in the quantitative terms of fmancial risk management. State 
actors can thus construct forward-looking fmancial projections that command the 
authority to be believed, thereby managing short-term expectations of these actors' 
capacity to govern. In short, establishing an SWF serves much more inward-looking 
and short-term political interests than currently assumed in the SWF literature. For 
example, the expectation that Ireland's vaunted state pension system was 
unsustainable represented a great problem of uncertainty for the Fianna Fail majority 
government in the late 1990s (cf. Chapter Eight). Establishing the National Pension 
Reserve Fund - mandated to maximize fmancial returns through fmancial speculation 
- thus immediately created forward-looking expectations of Fianna Fail's capacity to 
generate investment income and lessen the cost-savings gap. The SWF policy path 
was thus only pursued once Fianna Fail saw a great need to pacify emerging fears of 
their pension system's seemingly imminent demise. It was not pursued due to any 
innate properties of speculative fmance or rationally desirable opportunities afforded 
therein. Yet from where did the fmancial expectations promoted by Fianna Fail derive 
their authority to be believed? 
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As a flrst step to addressing this question, the following Chapter identifies the 
authoritative fmancial ideas upon which each of SWFs' distinguishing features is 
based. It is these ideas that render SWFs more desirable strategies of governance over 
competing policy preferences for state managers faced with problems of great 
uncertainty. These ideas have been categorized under three headings: financial 
profitability, financial calculability, and financial expertise. The Chapter draws 
attention to the specific ontological presuppositions that lend these ideas the authority 
to inform belief-driven action. For example, both the rational investor and efficient 
market hypotheses substantiate the notion that riskier assets such as equities will 
always pay a premium over more conservative assets. These theories about the nature 
of speculative fmance subsequently lead to the idea that speculative investment is 
profitable, a powerful tool used by state actors to legitimate the creation of an SWF. 
The Chapter argues it is these specific ideas that represent the 'weapons' of 
institutional change state actors use to legitimate the SWF policy path over competing 
fiscal management strategies (Blyth, 2002: 38). Chapters Four through Eight then 
examine three specific politico-economic contexts - Norway, Ireland, and Alberta -
within which these fmancial ideas were internalized over competing policy 
preferences to guide state agency (Campbell, 2004: 77). 
At the same time, however, these fmancial ideas also serve to constrain states 
in their approach to the socioeconomic problems their SWFs were created to solve. 
Indeed for Nobel Prize winning economist James Buchanan, these ideas about the 
nature of speculative fmance have become 'absolute absolutes', and thus the 
'constraints and constitutions' within which modem fmancial discourse is conducted 
(1991: 13-14). Once institutionalized into an SWF, these ideas limit what can be 
considered acceptable uses for this public capital lest they be accused of fiscal 
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unaccountability or malfeasance. In short, successive governments must ensure their 
policy preferences remain within the bounds of acceptable action enforced by these 
ideas no matter how volatile the markets or recurrent the fmancial crises. As such, 
SWF-states are constrained to actively normalize the contemporary fmancial 
relations, thoughts, and practices upon which their funds' speculative fmancial 
identities are based. As the case studies demonstrate, this constraint is problematic, as 
SWFs do not necessarily solve the long-term problems of uncertainty they were 
created to address. Instead, they primarily serve to replace socioeconomic uncertainty 
with a seemingly more measurable and manageable form of fmancial uncertainty. 
This ultimately increases these states' vulnerability to the inherent contradictions and 
destabilizing crisis tendencies of the speculative financial realm. 
Chapter Three is structured as follows. Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 present the 
theoretical arguments for why SWFs appeal as strategies of governance that meet the 
short-term political interests of state actors. Each Section examines the authoritative 
fmancial ideas underlying each of SWFs' three distinguishing features, and are thus 
divided into three associated headings: financial profitability, financial calculability, 
and financial expertise. Section 3.4 then concludes by arguing these ideas also 
constrain state actors to defer their policy preferences to the fmancial interests of their 
SWFs, and the speculative fmancial realm in general. To reiterate, then, the purpose 
of this Chapter is to construct an alternative explanation for why SWFs represent 
desirable strategies of governance than that currently offered in the SWF literature. 
This theoretical argument will then be applied to each of the dissertation's three case 
studies to test its plausibility. 
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3.0 SWFs as Strategies of Governance 
Sections 3.1-3.3 identify the authoritative fmancial ideas that legitimate 
SWFs' speculative fmancial identities to state actors and domestic constituents. In 
short, it is these fmancial ideas and their authority to be believed that ultimately lead 
individuals to perceive the SWF policy path as a legitimate and desirable strategy of 
governance. SWF-state actors are particularly dependent on the work of fmancial 
economists to reinterpret speculative investment practices from matters of 
unpredictable uncertainty to manageable fmancial risk. Without this distinction, 
SWFs would be cast as irrational gambles that subject public capital to unnecessarily 
high degrees of global fmancial volatility. This is to highlight that fmancial 
economists do not merely debate the fmer points of investment strategy, occasionally 
providing a theory that transcends the academic-practitioner divide - e.g. modem 
portfolio or options pricing theory (cf Jovanovic, 2007; MacKenzie, 2006). Rather, 
these intellectuals also dogmatically maintain the ideational building blocks of 
modern fmancial knowledge through which SWF discourse has thus far been filtered. 
Indeed, fmancial economists seek to present knowledge of speculative fmance in a 
normatively objective and methodologically-positivist light. Yet modem fmancial 
knowledge is in no way value-neutral, but is 'imbued with certain beliefs and cast in a 
certain language that make it out to be what its believers want it to be and not the way 
things in any sense 'are'" (Frankfurter and McGoun, 1999: 161). As Maki has argued, 
to be considered a legitimate participant in either the fmancial economics or 
investment professions requires the world be viewed through the same . shared 
ontological windows' (2001: 5). These ontological windows - or ideas - then gain 
strength as an ideology of speculative fmance through their iterative communication 
and performance across territorial borders. This modern fmancial ideology provides 
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an authoritative interpretation of the speculative financial realm while simultaneously 
prescribing how to act within it (cf Denzau and North, 1994: 4; Roy, Denzau and 
Willet, 2007: 6). Sections 3.1 to 3.3 thus look critically at - and not merely through _ 
the ontological windows upon which the domestic institutional legitimacy of SWFs is 
based (Maki, 2001: 6).36 
3.1 SWFs as Strategies of Governance: 
The Idea of Financial Profitability 
Sovereign wealth funds are pools of public capital managed with the intent of 
generating returns above the risk-free rate into the long-term. According to fmancial 
economists, the primary means through which this can be achieved is by investing in 
a variety of traditionally riskier asset classes and markets. Simply put, then, this 
feature of the SWF policy path is legitimated by the idea that diversified fmance - and 
the accompanying levels of increased fmancial risk assumed therein - is profitable 
into the long-term. This idea of fmancial profitability derives from the notion of the 
'equity-risk premium' (ERP): that investment into riskier assets such as equity will 
always payout a premium due to the natural risk aversion of investors. 37 The 
36 Several genealogical analyses of modem finance have been conducted elsewhere in both the 
sociology and history of finance literatures (see for example Poitras, 2005; McGoun, 2007; Preda, 
2007). While these genealogical accounts provide a detailed history of modem finance, they have yet 
to identify the specific assumptions that substantiate the 'science' of modem financial speculation. 
They have instead primarily focused on the' gendered constructions of danger and security' that have 
led to the widespread commercialization of speculative investment (de Goede, 2004: 197), as well as to 
the cultural practices that rendered fmancial speculation as distinct from gambling (Preda, 2007). As 
this dissertation's case studies reveal, however, states place great emphasis on the 'scientistic' 
properties of financial speculation and their authority to be believed when debating the merits and 
demerits of the SWF policy path. It is a critical reading of these scientistic properties that is this 
Chapter's focus. 
37 Based on historical data of the past twenty years, financial economists have calculated the equity-risk 
premium to be six percent annually. However, economists assume the more likely long-term equity-
risk premium to be three to four percent due to the uncertain future of this 'favourable environment' 
and impending 'demographic change' in the world's developed and emerging markets (Summers, 
2008: 22). In any case, the ERP is extremely difficult to measure even in a historical sense, and its 
calculation into the future is an entirely theoretical exercise. 
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following Section identifies the ontological presuppositions that underpin the notion 
of the ERP. This is a necessary task as the ERP is the primary idea from which SWFs' 
fIrst distinguishing feature derives its legitimacy as a governance strategy for state 
actors. This is to demonstrate it is the simplified assumptions about the nature of 
fmancial market reality - and not any innate properties of speculative fmance itself -
that lead state actors to perceive the SWF policy path as benefIting their short-term 
interests over competing fiscal management strategies. 
While formally defmed as the 'difference between the return on common 
stock and the return on government securities' (Cornell, 1999: 19), the ERP 
represents the single most important concept that makes speCUlative investment 
possible. Poitras asserts that investing in riskier assets in the belief their returns will 
be greater than those on safer assets is the 'procedure underlying the mantra of 
modern fmance' (2005: 46, 23). For Maki (2001: 5), the ERP is fmance's 'ultimate 
and unquestioned presupposition' to which all of its relative suppositions are justified. 
Indeed, the ERP represents a 'unified theory' through which uncertain fmancial 
futures can be reduced to the axiomatic assumption of fmancial risk's inherent 
profitability (cf Constantinides, 2002: 1567). Without the ERP, SWFs would lack 
institutional legitimacy as there would be no incentive to establish and maintain their 
risk-laden portfolios. There would be little point for governments -let alone any other 
investor - to invest sovereign wealth in equities as they could not expect to be paid a 
premium for any extra risk assumed. 
Yet despite its significance to modem fmancial thought and practice, the ERP 
remains a theoretical and empirically unsubstantiated proposition. Its value can only 
be approximated ex post where data over particular time periods can be collected and 
analyzed (Cornell, 1999: 19). Such historical measurements have in any case been 
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accused of suffering from' survivorship bias' - as only continuously profitable stocks 
are accounted for - and a lack of sufficient data (Goetzmann and Ibbotson, 2005: 8). 
Attempts to quantify, measure and prove the ERP's existence are in fact a relatively 
recent phenomenon; the belief it existed long predated any attempts to measure it or 
prove why it existed.38 It was not until so-called 'modem [mance' gained a position of 
intellectual superiority over that of 'old [mance' - who were preoccupied with 
analyzing firm-specific risk and individual stock selection - that economists would 
attempt to do so (Poitras, 2005: 125). 
To this effect, the idea of the ERP is substantiated by the presuppositions of 
investor rationality and market efficiency that only gained prominence in economics 
in the 1960s. Financial economists have since internalized these presuppositions as 
the 'central abstractions upon which theoretical knowledge about security pricing can 
be obtained' (Poitras, 2005: 130; cf Kindleberger, 2005: 29; Haugen, 1999). Prior to 
this intellectual revolution, economists lacked a methodologically inductive, 
quantitatively testable, and universally accepted narrative to legitimate speculative 
[mancial practices. The forefathers of old [mance such as Withers (1916) and Graham 
and Dodd (1934) subsequently lacked the ability to project how stock markets should 
behave in the future with any degree of mathematical certainty. They lacked the 
theoretical abstractions and quantitative models that a new network of academics 
emerging out of the Chicago School of Economics and elsewhere in the 1950s began 
to develop (Fourcade, 2009). To be sure, the assumptions that investors were rational 
utility maximizers and markets were efficient were 'intellectually enforced' by this 
new brand of academics who wished to cast off the epistemological straightjacket of 
38 The first real attempt at introducing the presence of the ERP from a theoretical perspective was by 
Edgar Lawrence Smith's Common Stocks as Long Tenn Investments (1928). It would be another six 
decades before Mehra and Prescott (1985) first attempted to compare the theory of the ERP - as based 
on the assumption of static investor preferences - with empirical measures of historical returns. 
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old fmance (Haugen, 1999; Poitras, 2005: ch. 2). Those who questioned the rational 
investor and efficient market mantras were quickly 'dismissed as 
gauche .. . ridiculed ... their methods, of course, naIve' (Haugen, 1999: 7; cf. 
Frankfurter and McGoun, 1999). 
In regards to the presupposition of investor rationality, fmancial economists 
assume people prefer more wealth to less, and the pleasure - or utility - derived from 
an extra unit of wealth decreases as their total wealth rises (Cornell, 1999: 126-27). 
As summarized by Petit: 
'Every agent has a utility function that identifies a certain degree of utility, a 
certain intensity of preference, for every way the world may be ... and a 
probability function that determines, for each option and for each prospect, 
the probability that the choice of that option would lead to the realization of 
that prospect' - Petit, 2001 
If investors are rational, concluded the new generation of mathematically-trained 
fmancial economists in the 1960s, they would avoid purchasing riskier assets unless 
adequately compensated for doing so. As such, rational investors always make 
calculated bets on assets that carry a higher potential reward for the added risk of 
losses such investments entail. The rational investor hypothesis (RlH) thus helped 
explain why the ERP should exist in the 'real' world. The efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH), on the other hand, helped explain why the ERP should be considered a 
measurable constant. The EMH argues that investors will not take the risk of 
purchasing equities if they lack the information necessary to accurately assess the true 
value of the premium they should be paid on these assets (Frankfurter and McGoun, 
1999: 170). It claims that investors will analyze all relevant past and present market 
data - i.e. 'price signals that are presumed to provide "information" about future 
events' - when forming rational expectations as a basis for making utility-maximizing 
decisions (Davidson, 2007: 221). Hence the EMH substantiated the argument that the 
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market is capable of forming a consolidated opinion of what value the ERP should be 
and, as such, why it should be considered an accurate quantification of investor 
rationality. 
Given the idea of fmancial profitability as substantiated by the notions of the 
ERP, EMH, and Rill, fmancial economists are quick to argue riskier assets such as 
public equities represent optimal investments for the likes of long-term oriented 
SWFs. To be sure, the profitability of diversified fmance has been high over the past 
four decades, with investors averaging a noteworthy six percent above the risk-free 
rate each year since 1971 (Summers, 2008: 22). It has been so high, in fact, a hotly 
contested debate surrounding this 'ERP Puzzle' continues to thrive in fmancial 
economic scholarship since first introduced by Mehra and Prescott in 1985. The ERP 
puzzle simply states that in order to explain the abnormally high return of US equities 
versus government bonds since the 1970s, either the ERP as a theoretical concept 
does not exist or investors must have implausibly higher risk aversions than fmancial 
economists assume. The majority of fmancial economists nonetheless maintain that 
despite this unresolved puzzle, the idea of the ERP has proven an 'accurate forecast' 
for investors since the 1970s despite its not being empirically proven to exist 
(Goetzmann and Ibbotson, 2005: 13). 
A major contribution of critical IPE scholarship, however, has been to fill in 
the gaps left by fmancial economists by providing an alternative explanation for the 
ERP puzzle. These scholars have highlighted the active role played by states -
particularly those of the DEeD - to provide an abundant supply of transnational 
fmance capital while at the same time institutionalizing rules and policies that have 
facilitated this capital's spatial and functional mobility. Indeed, political economists 
have shown the modern fmancial era to be demarcated by the more multilateral and 
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deeply embedded 'patterns of institutionalization' through which speculative fmance 
is made possible (Watson, 2007; cf Langley, 2003: 11; Harvey, 2005; Helleiner, 
1994; Dumenil and Levy, 2004; Germain, 1997; Moran, 1991; Underhill, 1997).39 
These patterns are evidenced in existing regulatory institutions designed to foster high 
capital mobility, large private capital flows, market-conforming tools of 
macroeconomic management, and the role of central banks to maintain the primacy of 
price-stability over social welfare and full employment (Blyth, 2002: 6; Peet, 2007: 
117; Rodrik, 2006). 
As documented by much of the literature on 'fmancialization', the end result 
of these policies has been the rapid expansion in both volume and profitability of 
speculative fmancial practices over the past four decades (cf Epstein, 2006; Froud, 
2006; Dore, 2000).40 Critical IPE scholarship has subsequently demonstrated that the 
profitability of diversified fmance since the 1970s is not just a natural by-product of 
rational utility-maximizing actors operating within efficient markets. Nor has it been 
the result of the global growth of developed and developing economies alike as 
fmancial capital far exceeds the day-to-day needs of this so-called real economy. 
Rather, it has been the product of state-sponsored and orchestrated interventions into 
the structural conditions that aid and abet transnational and increasingly integrated 
39 Hay distinguishes between two periods in which the formal institutionalization of neoliberal ideals 
took place (2007: 98-100). The first period of 'normative' neoliberalization of the 1970s and 1980s 
provided a theoretical critique of the former Keynesian fmancial order, presenting a 'science of 
political failure' that attempted to subvert actors' belief in Keynesian models' 'science of market 
failure' (Buchanan, 1988: 3). The political and bureaucratic overload theses in particular provided a 
'powerful, public and highly politicized dramatization of the "crisis" afflicting the advanced liberal 
democracies' of the time (ibid. 98). This 'normative' period was followed by a 'normalized' period of 
'diffusion and consolidation' from the mid-to-late 1980s onwards wherein rational expectations 
microeconomics, new public management theory, and open macroeconomics were 'used to derive 
stylized models which demonstrate[d] the necessity of the neoliberal economic paradigm' (ibid. 100). 
This period essentially allowed the ideas underpinning neoliberalization formed in the normative phase 
to be decentralized across a number of previously peripheral territories. This ideas subsequently 
provided an 'interpretive framework' upon which a scientific and normative critique of how economies 
work and how they should be constructed was based (Blyth, 2002: 10). 
40 In the United States alone, for example, equity markets grew from $136 billion or 13 percent of GDP 
in 1970, to $14.2 trillion or 144.9 percent ofGDP in 2000 (Crotty, 2006; Dumenil and Levy, 2004: chs. 
13-15). 
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fmancial market systems and practices. This is in addition to the fact that states have 
regularly provided much needed emergency capital to reassert investor rationality and 
market equilibrium distorted by recurrent financial bubbles and crises ( cf. 
Kindleberger, 2005: chs 10-13; Wright, 2010). This interventionist role played by 
states to facilitate and maintain fmancial market equilibrium consequently 
demonstrates the fallacy of presenting the ERP as a naturally occurring feature of 
speculative fmance. 
The simplified idea that speculative fmance is inherently profitable has 
nonetheless found and constructed numerous 'points of resonance' with a variety of 
state actors throughout the global political economy (Hay, 1999: 321). Chapter Two 
demonstrated how fmancial economists are quick to assume these state managers 
consequently saw the profitable opportunities to be reaped through the diversified 
investment of sovereign capital. It is argued here, however, that political actors view 
their SWFs' long-term and riskier approach to investment in a slightly different light. 
Indeed when institutionalized into an SWF, the idea of fmancial profitability suspends 
a government's need to develop alternative policy and expenditure frameworks to 
address various problems of uncertainty that may arise. If faced with the rapid 
accruement of petroleum-derived FX reserves as in Norway, for example, belief in the 
ERP renders investing in risky fmancial assets an optimal means of saving this 
wealth. SpeCUlative investment into the long-term would prevent them from having to 
set conservative extraction limits on much prized petroleum revenues. It would also 
help the Norwegian government avoid instigating the reoccurrence of a deep 
recession exacerbated by government overspending as that experienced in the 1980s. 
Thus if socioeconomic stability is a prerequisite of political stability (cf. 
Burnham, 2001: 127-8; Seabrooke, 2006: 21), the ERP's ability to manage short-term 
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fmancial expectations is an invaluable benefit provided by SWFs. That is, belief in the 
ERP comes to manage and coordinate future expectations of the long-term 
profitability of their diversified portfolios such that these expectations converge to 
become 'self stabilizing over time' (Blyth, 2002: 41). The idea of fmancial 
profitability is an authoritative 'imaginary' that suspends states' governance function 
in time vis-a-vis the problem of uncertainty their SWFs were tasked to address (cf 
Langenohl, 2008: 8). When these problems are situated within SWFs' long-term 
investment horizons, what matters for a scrutinizing public is not the past or present 
but the distant future. SWFs' intent to harvest the ERP over time is thus an abstraction 
because it resists being specified in concrete situations, or into any clear temporal 
perspective. Yet while the idea of the ERP is a social imaginary never to be fully 
realized, to pursue it requires the continuous investment and reinvestment of 
sovereign wealth into the indefmite future. Hence no matter how negative the returns 
or volatile fmancial markets become, the legitimacy of speculation as a strategy of 
governance is preserved.41 States are consequently enabled to recast their governance 
function as a matter of promoting their SWFs' expected vs. actual fmancial 
performance. 
Yet the fmancial crisis that began in August 2007 and those that preceded it 
have demonstrated the fallacious nature of this long-term fmancial logic. It demands 
41 As demonstrated throughout the case study Chapters, financial crises are in fact necessary moments 
through which the legitimacy of the SWF policy path is reproduced. If such crises and heightened 
periods of volatility did not occur, it would be an indication that SWF managers were not assuming any 
extra risk in their diversified approach to investment. They should thus not expect to be paid a premium 
as a result. Simply put, belief in the long-term profitability of diversified finance is not grounded in the 
smooth functioning of markets but 'on their constant crisis and criticisms'. Indeed each period of 
'irrationality' - such as bubbles, herding, and noise trading - give rise to 'moments of openness' that 
can be used to strengthen the imaginary of long-term market efficiency and growth (Langenohl, 2008: 
7; Edkins, 1999: 8). For Langley (2002: 12), crises are subsequently 'cast as resulting not from inherent 
features of world finance, but from misguided domestic economic policy choices and institutional 
arrangements' that fall outside the realm of 'rational' financial practice. As the experiences of Norway, 
Alberta and Ireland show, criticisms of SWFs in the midst of financial crises can in fact be 
appropriated and turned into a resource of legitimacy by the state. 
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the state place faith in the inherent rationality of investors and efficiency of markets. 
At the same time, however, state actors must be willing to stabilize market 
equilibrium and investors expectations in the face of recurrent financial bubbles and 
crises with the same public capital that compose SWFs. Hence SWFs do not 
necessarily solve the underlying problem of uncertainty they have been tasked to 
address, but merely replace this uncertainty with the expectation of financial 
profitability. The following section now identifies the means through which fmancial 
economists have rendered fmancial uncertainty into a more quantitatively measurable 
and manageable form offmancial 'risk'. 
3.2 SWFs as Strategies of Governance: 
The Idea of Financial Calculability 
SWFs' second distinguishing feature regards the way in which sovereign 
capital is continuously embedded throughout the fmancial realm in both a functional 
and spatial sense of capital mobility. For fmancial economists, the desirability of this 
feature for state managers is attributable to two factors. First is the notion that 
diversification within and between riskier asset-classes can control for the high 
degrees of risk adopted in an SWF's portfolio. Second is that the increased mobility 
of transnational fmance capital witnessed over the past four decades has greatly 
increased the ease through which capital can be diversified. Thus if states wish to 
maximize their SWFs' speculative fmancial returns, the global diversification of 
sovereign wealth is a rationally desirable investment strategy these actors logically 
pursued. However, such an explanation of SWFs' second distinguishing feature takes 
little regard of the state or political agency. It does not adequately explain what short-
term incentives this feature presents for states if it means limiting their access to a 
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systematically significant amount of public capital. Why would state actors 
voluntarily and continuously embed national wealth throughout the fmancial realm if 
it limits their ability to devise and pursue alternative policy preferences? 
To this effect, the second distinguishing feature of SWFs can also be 
understood as a strategy of governance that benefits states' short-term political 
interests. The following seeks to demonstrate that such diversification strategies 
enable state managers to reconceptualise complex problems of uncertainty they face 
as issues of short-term fmancial risk management. This follows from the idea that 
fmance is calculable, which is in tum premised on the assumption that fmancial risk is 
a calculable and manageable form of uncertainty. For Beckert, uncertainty is 'the 
character of situations in which agents cannot anticipate outcomes of a decision and 
cannot assign probabilities to the outcome' (1996: 804). It is therefore fundamentally 
different from risk in that 'the distribution of the outcome in a group of instances is 
known [i.e. probabilities can be assigned to possible outcomes] ... while in the case of 
uncertainty .. .it is impossible to form a group of instances because the situation dealt 
with is in a high degree unique' (Knight, 1921 quoted in Beckert, 1996: 229). So 
while contemporary understandings of risk provide a readily communicable guide for 
action, it is nonetheless a contestable simplification of fmancial market reality. As 
with the ERP, the distinction between risk and uncertainty is a theoretical abstraction 
whose ontological presuppositions have yet to be critically engaged by either fmancial 
economists or SWF-states. Critically engaging with these assumptions that render risk 
distinct from uncertainty is thus necessary given the extent to which they have come 
to substantiate SWFs' institutional legitimacy from a domestic perspective. 
To this end, the distinction between risk and uncertainty was a highly 
contested issue in economics until intellectual consensus was reached by fmancial 
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economists m the 1950s. Prior to some theoretical leaps made in the preceding 
decade, there was little agreement as to how fmancial risk should be defmed let alone 
whether it should be considered distinct from uncertainty (McGoun, 2007: 199). 
Financial risk, economists of the early 20th century argued, was just immeasurable 
uncertainty by another name. The 'reference-class' problem proved a particularly 
problematic obstacle in this debate.42 For Knight, whose work is still referenced but 
not taken seriously by modem economists, the reference-class problem can be 
summarized as follows: 
'Business decisions ... deal with situations which are far too unique, generally 
speaking, for any sort of statistical tabulation to have any value for guidance. 
The conception of an objectively measurable probability or chance [derived 
from historical data] is simply inapplicable' -- 1921: 231 
Thus prior to the 1940s, risk was synonymous with uncertainty as a 'lack of 
knowledge' that could in no way guide short-term investment behaviour (Fisher, 
1930; Hardy, 1923: 46; McGoun, 2007). Under such an understanding of the fmancial 
realm, investment decisions can only be affected by actors' subjective expectations 
and 'not the future as it will turn out but the future as it appears to us beforehand 
through the veil of the unknown' (Fisher, 1930: 222). Scholars of so-called 'old 
fmance' were therefore limited to make individual stock selections in the short-term 
based on the identification of a firm's 'fundamentals'. According to McGoun (2007: 
1999), there were just too many theoretical problems to be ignored to make the 
'foolish simplification' that an optimal investment strategy could be determined 
through the probabilistic measurement of uncertainty-as-risk. 
Throughout the 1940s, however, a new generation of Austrian and German 
mathematicians turned the ontological roots of old fmance on its head by portraying 
42 McGoun alternatively defines the reference-class problem as follows: 'There is no simple way to 
determine which historical conditions, if any, are sufficiently similar to current conditions in order to 
use the relative frequencies of an event under those conditions then as an appropriate measure of 
rational probability with which to expect the event to occur under these conditions now' (2007: 193). 
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risk as a calculable expression of economic activity. Led by the likes of Marschak, 
Tintner, Rosenstein-Rodan, and Lange, probabilistic-based measurements of risk 
began to creep back into mainstream scholarly debate. What remain unclear are the 
reasons behind this ideological transformation. Indeed, none of the theoretical 
problems that had prevented the likes of Knight and Fisher from approaching risk in 
the same way had been dealt with. Rather than attempt to address these problems head 
on, these economists began to 'cavalierly dismiss them' (McGoun, 2007: 203). 
Snooks (1993) accounts for this transformation in approach to a decline in concern for 
the reality content of econometric models. Both Weintraub (2001) and Davidson 
(2007) have similarly argued that what amounted to 'truth' in economic analysis 
began to rapidly change. Thus rather than be constrained to the philosophical musings 
of economic theorists such as Knight, this new generation of mathematicians-turned-
economists could increasingly rely on axiomatization and mathematical abstraction as 
'the path to discovery of new scientific truths' (Davidson, 2007: 216). 
Dominant among these assumptions introduced in the 1940s was the ergodic 
axiom, which held all investors analyze past and present market data to form 'rational 
expectations as a basis for making utility-maximizing decisions' (Davidson, 2007: 
221 ).43 The ergodic axiom substantiated the notion that 'relative frequency 
probability' - or the chance an event will occur given a history of recorded events -
provided a basis from which fmancial risk could be distinguished from uncertainty 
(McGoun, 2007: 192-3, 207). Without the assumption of a relative frequency theory 
43 In contemporary parlance, the ergodic axiom is referred to as the 'prudent person rule', wherein the 
term 'prudent' is synonymous with those of the rational and self-interested investor. The prudent 
investor is thus an ideal-type who only makes investment decisions they expect will maximize their 
utility, and who will only attempt to do so when in possession of all available and relevant information. 
While financial academia and practitioners alike would concede that investors may possess differing 
degrees of prudence, they nonetheless maintain that markets remain in a state of relative equilibrium 
largely because investors possess a base level of rationality. If this were not the case, there would be 
little difference between investing and gambling (cf de Goede, 2005). 
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of probability, economists lacked the means to quantify rational degrees of belief. 
With the ergodic axiom, however, fmancial economists could estimate the likelihood 
of reoccurring events such as market booms and busts from the use of historical data. 
This intellectual revolution subsequently propelled economists to collect statistical 
information in the form of past and current stock prices to develop 'conditional 
probability functions' as a basis for measuring risk (Davidson, 2007: 221). From these 
conditional probability functions, fmancial economists argued that investors could 
modify their behaviour and models according to the 'peculiarities' of the current 
situation (cf. Fellner, 1948: 196). With the seminal works of Arrow and Debreu 
(1954), the ergodic axiom and its ability to help economists distinguish between risk 
and uncertainty became the 'the defmitive mother-structure from which all further 
work in economics would start' (Weintraub, 2001: 122). 
To be sure, it was the work based on assumptions of the ergodic axiom that 
led to the notion of the ERP. More specifically, it substantiates why the rational 
investor and efficient market hypotheses should be taken as an accurate reading of 
fmancial market reality. The path-breaking works of Markowitz (1956), Modigliani 
and Miller (1958), and Sharpe (1964) among others built upon these assumptions and 
succeeded in what their predecessors had sought to do: render the fmancial realm a 
calculable system guided by identifiable rules of mathematical probability. Despite 
their vaunted position, however, these theories have yet to empirically prove their 
validity as accurate depictions of fmancial market reality. The notion of risk's 
measurability - and thus the benefits to be derived from diversification as a risk 
management strategy - is and always has been an idea based on an idealized market 
realm. It is a theoretical proposition that has exhibited a 'dismal empirical record' in 
terms of preventing or avoiding the recurrence offmancial crises and the destabilizing 
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effects that result (McGoun, 2007: 194). Perceiving fmancial uncertainty as risk is an 
act of faith, and 'the heroic strategies that are invoked to immunize [these] cherished 
theories are acts of faith as well' (ibid. 209). 
Thus as opposed to the assumptions of fmancial economists, the idea that 
speculative fmance is calculable is not a naturally occurring phenomenon discovered 
latent in reality. Rather, it is a contestable assumption strategically constructed and 
reinforced to meet the needs of economists whose work seeks to render fmancial 
reality into simplified and more calculable forms. As such, the need for states to 
globally embed public capital throughout the fmancial realm should not be 
unquestionably taken as a natural feature of speculative investment. Nor can the 
funds' preference for diversification be framed as a natural by-product of the 
increased spatial and functional mobility of fmance capital. Such analyses assume the 
state and political agency to be latent and unimportant variables. They consequently 
fail to provide an adequate account for specifically why state actors should wish to 
actively embed public capital throughout the fmancial realm. Clearly the ideas that 
[mance is profitable in the long-term and calculable in the short are attractive 
explanations for the SWF puzzle. But ignoring individual state interests cannot 
explain why these beliefs were internalized and legitimated over competing policy 
preferences. This requires us to provide an alternative account of SWF's appeal as 
strategies of governance. 
To this effect, SWF-states' use of fmancial risk management techniques also 
represents 'a way - or rather, a set of different ways - of ordering reality, of rendering 
it into a calculable form' so that it may 'be made governable in particular ways, with 
particular techniques and for particular goals' (Dean, 1995: 177; cf Beunza and Stark, 
2005: 90; Thevenot, 2001). Indeed, the notion that fmancial speculation is calculable 
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as based on a distinction between risk and uncertainty allows states to construct, 
manage, and promote fmancial expectations in precise mathematical ways (cf 
Watson, 2007: 17). This idea and the investment strategies it legitimates thus enable 
state managers to reconceptualise complex problems of uncertainty as solvable 
through the quantitative terms of fmancial risk management. It moreover provides a 
readily communicable means through which SWFs' exposure to high degrees of 
fmancial risk can be presented as manageable and thus legitimate to the domestic 
electorate. 
For example, the Canadian Province of Alberta has had a Progressive 
Conservative (PC) majority government since the mid 1970s. By the 1990s, however, 
the PCs faced a problem they nor their predecessors had yet encountered: a CDN$32 
billion budgetary crisis fuelled by petroleum-funded spending and decreased tax 
revenue. The PCs traditional approach to petroleum wealth management subsequently 
lost favour in both parliament and the public. This was due to the ambiguous and 
open-ended mandate upon which it was based. Indeed this mandate merely stipulated 
extra-budgetary petroleum wealth be used to 'strengthen and diversify' the provincial 
economy, which enabled politicians to invest in a wide variety of capital-intensive 
provincial projects. The PCs thus faced a problem of great uncertainty: how to reduce 
the budgetary deficit and assuage criticisms directed towards them, but while 
simultaneously ensuring they remain the ultimate managing authority over Alberta's 
prized petroleum wealth? As examined in Chapter Seven, the Albertan government 
opted to create an SWF to address this problem, thereby increasing their dependence 
on speculative risk technologies. They believed a wealth management strategy based 
on modem principles of risk management would limit them to invest in a way that 
would minimise fmancial risk and increase expected return. This strategy would 
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simultaneously provide elected officials with a quantitative and readily communicable 
means to show exactly how petroleum wealth was being invested and for what 
reasons to a critical Albertan public. 
The following Section now exammes why SWFs' umque fiduciary 
relationship with the state should not be understood as an evolutionary development 
of modem fmance capitalism. Rather, this fmancial depoliticization of public capital 
represents a strategy of domestic governance pursued only after it is perceived as 
benefiting the states' short-term interests. 
3.3 SWFs as Strategies of Governance: 
The Idea of Financial Expertise 
The existing SWF literature assumes diversification of sovereign wealth 
within and between riskier asset classes and markets to be a rationally desirable fiscal 
strategy. It enables these state actors to harvest the ERP into the future while 
simultaneously controlling for the high degrees of fmancial risk assumed therein. The 
problem for these analyses is that SWFs' government overseers lack the fmancial 
rationality - or utility function - assumed to be the cornerstone of this strategy's 
success. State actors are deemed incapable of successfully operationalizing their 
SWF's diversified investment strategies due to their being motivated by political 
versus purely commercial objectives. The third distinguishing feature of SWFs arises 
out of such an understanding of state identity. That is, SWF management is placed at 
one remove of government and its policymaking bodies by delegating operational 
authority to professional investors, whether internally developed or externally hired. 
This feature of SWFs is attributable to the idea that a specific form of fmancial 
expertise, which state actors lack, is required to harness speculative fmance's inherent 
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profitability. The following deconstructs what ontological presuppositions this idea is 
based on, and why state actors would perceive it as benefiting their short-term 
interests. 
To this effect, dominant understandings of why state actors should limit their 
authority over their SWFs begins with the so-called 'collective action problem'. This 
idea holds that states as public institutions are obligated to distribute national 
resources in such a way as to project and reinforce a sense of the collective good 
throughout domestic society. This is meant to circumvent the inherent self-interested 
rationality of a society composed of utility maximizing individuals (Hay, 2007: 2; cf 
Hirschman, 1977: 35-6). At the same time, however, government's are thought to 
suffer from a 'deficit bias', which is the tendency to distribute all available resources 
to the present so as to meet the self-interested demands of society. This school of 
thought derives from public choice theory, which posits governments are also 
comprised of individual value-maximizers. Hence if state actors can be expected to 
act in a self-interested manner, they will also be unable to ensure the delivery of 
collective goods to future generations. This is unless they limit as much as possible 
their influence over SWF managers and SWF capital (cf Dunleavy, 1991; Hay, 2007: 
95-99; Hindamoor, 2006). SWF -states' delegation of operational authority to fmancial 
experts charged with strictly fmancial objectives is therefore thought to address the 
collective action problem, mitigate the deficit bias, and circumvent the self-interested 
rationality of politicians. SWFs' third distinguishing feature is thus thought a means 
to ensure national wealth is fairly distributed to both current and future generations, 
given the belief that states are obligated but incapable of doing so themselves. 44 
44 A prominent example of a government succumbing to these problems is witnessed through the 
experience of Alaska between 1969 and 1975. In this time, the state legislature managed to spend 5900 
million accrued from the sale of state-owned land for the purposes of petroleum drilling two years 
before any revenues were actually accrued. The Alaskan government was then forced to request an 
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Yet the collective action problem, deficit bias, and public choice theory only 
help explain why states should wish to place themselves at one remove of SWF 
management. The idea of fmancial expertise, on the other hand, helps explain why 
professional investors are deemed more capable for overseeing this task. This idea of 
fmancial expertise dictates that state actors' capacity to make fmancial decisions is 
inferior to those of private market actors. As Harvey (2005: 21) summarizes, 'the 
information available to the state could not rival that contained in market signals'. 
The existing SWF literature attributes this to the fact that private market actors and 
institutions are rational utility-maximizers. Any informational advantages they may 
have will consequently be revealed in their investment decisions due to high levels of 
competition - hence the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1965; Malkiel, 1999). The 
delegation of operational authority to SWFs has therefore allowed states to participate 
in international equity markets while circumventing the informational disadvantages 
supposedly inherent to their public identities. 
While these presuppositions of investor rationality and market efficiency are 
theoretical abstractions, they are nonetheless grounded in two practical developments 
through which fmancial market reality is constructed and reproduced. First is that 
financial markets are influenced by a vast array of fmancial and non-fmancial actors, 
spaces and events that continuously reproduce information. Second is that the way 
this information is absorbed determines the actions (read: investment strategies) taken 
by fmancial actors and institutions. These actions then alter the pre-existing market 
environment from which the market signals originated. Knorr Cetina refers to this 
process as the 'doubly-reflexive character' of fmancial markets, wherein the constant 
flow of information 'continually project[s] fmancial reality as it emerges' just as 
interest-free loan from these oil companies in order to balance the 1976 budget, resulting in much 
embarrassment for the state congress. This experience directly led to the establishment of the Alaska 
Permanent Reserve Fund in 1977 (Cowper, 2008: 223-228). 
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investors' immediate reaction to this reality alters this projection (2005: 42). Modem 
fmancial epistemology posits that because financial markets are continuously 
(re )projected in the form of shifting prices and trading strategies, professional 
investors must be embedded within fmancial information networks so as to develop 
an instinct, or 'feeling', for market movements. 45 For Knorr Cetina, fmancial experts 
are those actors best capable of dealing with the 'ontological liquidity' engendered by 
the fmancial realm's 'reality in flux' (2005, 52-54). In short, they are those actors who 
are not only less susceptible to being influenced by non-commercial interests, but are 
faster than others to anticipate future market developments. Expert SWF managers 
thus derive their epistemological authority from the fact they are 'seen as holding, 
producing, and verifying relevant forms of knowledge' within an uncertain and 
forward-looking fmancial environment (Langley, 2004: 126; cf Sinclair, 1994: 447). 
The idea of fmancial expertise is thus based on the ontological presuppositions 
of investor rationality and market efficiency, which enable fmancial economists to 
render fmancial speculation into a highly technical albeit profitable exercise. This is 
despite it being a forward-looking task whose outcomes are highly uncertain. As such, 
the primary function served by this idea of fmancial expertise is to provide state 
actors with an authoritative guide to action when approaching speculative fmance. 46 
45 The tenn 'embededness' here reflects that used in economic sociology (cf Granovetter, 1985; 1992). 
The concept of embededness 'suggests that economic decisions and behaviour occur within concrete 
networks of relations' whereby 'information accrued within existing relationships is considered the 
most reliable guide to action' for financial actors (Granovetter, 1985: 487-493). 
46 The idea of financial expertise loses its value as a realistic guide to action when compared to the 
notion of investment 'skill'. This is to say there continue to be no reliable techniques for separating 
skilled from unskilled experts. Declaring an investor to be skilled is 'a value judgement' akin to 
declaring a stock to be attractively priced (Jaeger, 2008: 54). So while an SWF manager may possess 
financial expertise in that they are versed in the language of risk and return, as well as embedded in 
financial information networks, there is no way to ensure they possess investment skill. Investment 
skill subsequently remains an abstract concept for financial economists and professional investors who 
strive to prove its existence. In the face of the EMH, academics and practitioners can add nothing more 
to this debate than reiterate their convictions that investment skill exists. That is, investment skill 
cannot exist if market prices already reflect all available infonnation. Under such an assumption, the 
optimal strategy for all investors would be to 'buy the market' and passively wait for global economic 
growth to 'float all boats'. In his article entitled 'The Elusiveness ofInvestment Skill', Jaeger (2008: 
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Indeed, the delegation of operational authority to semi or fully independent fmancial 
experts is understood to be a prerequisite for SWFs' fmancial success (Nugee, 2008; 
Sweeney-Barnes, 2008; Mohohlo, 2008). State managers must limit themselves to the 
task of ex post oversight, and defer to the authority of specialist SWF managers 
divorced from the political arena and versed in the language of risk and return. So 
how does delegating operational authority for SWF management to fmancial experts 
appeal to the short-term interests of state managers? If it is only future governments 
that will be reaping their SWFs' fmancial rewards, how does limiting their access to a 
systematically significant amount of sovereign wealth represent a desirable policy 
preference? 
To this effect, SWFs' third distinguishing feature represents a desirable 
strategy of governance as it depoliticizes states' governance function vis-a-vis the 
problem of uncertainty their funds were created to address. In short, delegation of 
operational authority to SWF managers displaces the state's responsibilities from the 
government to quasi-public authorities who are more capable of circumventing the 
collective action problem than are states. The diversified investment of sovereign 
wealth by these managers offloads formal political responsibility for solving these 
problems to the seemingly more manageable ebb and flow of the fmancial realm. If 
the aim of government is to achieve in the eyes of the public a certain level of 
governing competence 'and not make anything worse in economic management', then 
such depoliticization of sovereign wealth management would appeal to the state's 
short-term interests (Burnham, 2001: 127-8). It serves to suspend both their 
governance function and political legitimacy in time. 
58) ambiguously concludes: 'Skill is elusive, but it's not illusory. Indeed, it is real precisely because it 
is elusin'. If nmr conception of investment skill is unrealistically simple, then the insights of the 
[EA1H] lI'ill f~rc{:' Y0l! to conclude that skill does not exist. What makes skill real is the fact that it '5 
more complicated than you might think'. 
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The depoliticizing impact of SWFs thus appears to fall within traditional 
approaches to depoliticization in IPE scholarship (cf Burnham, 1999; 2001: 128; 
Hay, 2007: 82; Flinders and Buller, 2006). That is, SWFs appear to benefit the state 
by making policymaking seem more credible, reducing the state's political overload, 
and insulating the state from failure. Thus rather than directly solve the problems to 
which their SWFs have been tasked to address through continuous engagement and 
policymaking, SWF -states can instead preoccupy themselves with persuading the 
domestic electorate 'that they can no longer be reasonably held responsible for [this] 
issue, policy field or specific decision' (Flinders and Buller, 2006: 296-298). 
Contentious issues and potential ramifications surrounding the expenditure of SWF 
capital in the immediate-term are passed as technical fmancial matters, thus shifting 
the locus of accountability to SWF managers. 
Yet while SWFs may insulate the state from political criticism by 
depoliticizing the management of a specific problem of uncertainty, it does not lessen 
public scrutiny over their funds' fmancial performance. This is to say that the 
institutionalization of the SWF policy path ultimately pressures states to ensure their 
funds are fmancially profitable in the short to medium-terms. As examined in the case 
studies, the Norwegian, Albertan, and Irish governments' political legitimacy was 
immediately implicated with the fmancial performance of their SWFs. The funds 
essentially quantified that which was traditionally a qualitative judgement - i.e. 
political legitimacy - by providing a scrutable barometer of government's fmancial 
Successes and failures. Indeed if SWFs are not profitable in the short-term, the 
domestic electorate is apt to see better uses for this sovereign wealth than inflate the 
already bloated profits of international bankers and professional investors. SWFs 
subsequently limited these states' realizable policy preferences, pressuring them to 
91 
promote diversified investment of sovereign wealth as a desirable, long-term strategy 
of governance rather than consider alternative fiscal management strategies. The 
discussion now continues in this vein by examining the way in which SWFs constrain 
state agency through time. 
3.4 Concluding Remarks: 
A Constraining Strategy of Governance 
How to explain why so many previously unrelated states came to view the 
creation and maintenance of a sovereign wealth fund as befitting their otherwise 
divergent and competing interests? The preceding Chapter argued the global diffusion 
of the SWF policy path should not be solely attributed to the existence of rationally 
desirable investment opportunities afforded by finance capitalism. Such an 
assumption rigorously abstracts political agency, and reduces the state and its interests 
to latent variables. Instead, SWFs are best conceptualised as domestic strategies of 
governance whose desirability stems from their perceived capacity to benefit state 
interests in the short-term. Indeed, a primary interest of state actors is to maintain 
socioeconomic stability, a prerequisite for political legitimacy (cf Burnham, 2001: 
127-8; Seabrooke, 2006: 21). This stability can, however, be threatened by 
unexpected problems state actors are expected to address. These problems can range 
from how to ensure the sustainability of public pension systems (as which occurred in 
Ireland), how to manage the rapid and unexpected accumulation of sovereign wealth 
from energy revenues (as in Norway), or even how to avert politico-economic crisis 
by re-Iegitimating budgetary politics (as in Alberta). The preceding Chapter thus 
argued the fmancial ideas that substantiate modem financial epistemology provide an 
authoritative guide to action for state actors when faced with such problems of 
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uncertainty. It was also demonstrated, however, these fmancial ideas collectively 
represent an authoritative fmancial epistemology that does not accurately reflect how 
investors or markets operate. Rather, it legitimates the increasingly risky speculative 
practices through which this reality is performatively constituted on a daily basis. 
It was subsequently proposed SWFs are the institutional embodiment of this 
speculative fmancial epistemology. As such, the funds enable states to create and 
manage forward-looking projections as to how problems of governance will be solved 
by their SWFs into the future. This serves to stabilize the domestic electorate's short-
term socioeconomic expectations by rendering uncertainty into a seemingly calculable 
and more manageable fmancial form. Section 3.1 argued the idea of fmancial 
profitability dictates that high amounts of fmancial risk are inherently profitable into 
the long term given the assumption of the equity-risk premium. Tasking SWFs to 
maximize fmancial returns into the long-term thus suspends and stabilizes state 
actors' governance function in time. The expectation of fmancial returns reduces 
uncertainty as to how successive governments will be able to fund socioeconomic 
growth and development, and thus how future generations will benefit from this 
wealth. Section 3.2 then argued the idea of financial calculability posits SWFs' 
exposure to fmancial risk can be controlled for through extensive diversification 
within and between these asset classes and markets. This effectively reconceptualises 
problems of uncertainty as problems of fmancial risk management, reducing their 
solvability to a quantitative and technical - albeit manageable - exercise. Finally, 
Section 3.3 argued the idea of fmancial expertise dictates that such an exercise can 
only be legitimately executed by professional investors who are divorced from the 
political arena and versed in the language of risk and return. This appears to 
depoliticize the states responsibility to address the socioeconomic problems their 
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SWFs were created to support, thereby reducing political overload and insulating the 
state from criticism of fiscal mismanagement or incompetence. 
At the same time, however, the SWF policy path is a constraint on state agency. 
It limits successive government's capacity to devise and pursue alternative policy 
preferences in regards to the problems of governance their SWFs were created to 
address. The term 'fmancial depo liticization' is used here to capture this constraining 
feature of SWFs. Existing understandings of depoliticization are limited in their 
primarily functional description of authority. They only account for the transfer of 
authority between institutions, either through 'placing at one remove the political 
character of decision making' or the promotion or relegation of certain issues from 
one arena to another (Burnham 2001: 128; Hay 2007: 78). In such accounts, only the 
fact that SWFs are government-linked entities appears to impact state actor's 
realizable policy preferences. Financial depoliticization, on the other hand, entails an 
ideational - or epistemological - reading of authority. This is to emphasize that 
expert SWF managers are an versus in authority, and thus command the expectation 
to not only be followed but also believed by their state overseers (Friedman, 1990: 81-
83; cf. Sinclair, 2001: 103). The SWF policy path thus constrains political agency as 
state actors must come to view the world through the same epistemological 
framework that inform the actions of SWF managers. This is despite their being 
barred from accessing this same knowledge through learning or experience due to 
their political and thus non-commercial identities (cf. Friedman, 1990: 83). Common 
sense is effectively fixed by this interpretive framework, which provides an 
authoritative and 'scientistic' critique of what constitutes proper versus improper 
action in regards to SWF management (Langley, 2002: 2; cf. Blyth, 2002: 10). 
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This dissertation maintains this constraint is inherently problematic as SWFs 
prioritize the pursuit of fmancial returns above any other socioeconomic objective. In 
the event of crisis, for example, negative returns must be recouped. As witnessed 
between 2007· and 2009, this was pursued through the continued fmancial 
diversification of sovereign wealth. These SWF-state actors were also constrained to 
intervene in their own domestic capital markets to ensure their continued functioning 
and mitigate emerging recessionary pressures (Couturier et aI, 2009: Section 4). 
Modem fmancial epistemology thus contradictorily demands government actors 
distance themselves as much as possible from SWF management, but at the same time 
continuously support the fmancial markets throughout which their public capital is 
embedded. As SWFs' portfolios continue to expand in size and global breadth 
throughout crises prone speculative markets, such constraint poses significant 
challenges to the future character of sovereign authority. The preceding discussion 
has, however, been largely theoretical in nature. It is therefore necessary to test these 
arguments against three case studies: Norway's Government Pension Fund - Global, 
Alberta's Heritage Savings Trust Fund, and Ireland's National Pension Reserve Fund. 
Chapter Four: 
Norway's Government Pension Fund-Global 
(1990-1997) 
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Through a comprehensive system of direct and indirect taxes, resource 
revenues have accounted for a significant portion of Norway's GDP since petroleum 
was fIrst discovered in the North Sea in 1969. This wealth has, however, represented a 
burden as much as boon for the Nordic state as evidenced by the dislocating 
socioeconomic effects it provoked between 1976 and 1990 (Eide, 1997; Storvik, 
1998).47 Since 1997, however, these resources have been managed by a government-
linked sovereign wealth fund through which all of the state's petroleum wealth is 
channelled. Established in 1990 as a conservatively managed stabilization-savings 
vehicle - and fIrst known as the 'Petroleum Fund' - this fund was reconceptualised as 
an SWF in 1997. It was then renamed the Government Pension Fund-Global (GPFG, 
or the 'Fund') in 2005.48 At $350 billion in 2009 and projected to grow to $900 billion 
by 2020, the GPFG is one of the largest SWFs in the world (Qvigstad, 2009a; see 
Appendix 1; Figure 2). 
47 In 2010, the petroleum sector accounted for approximately half of Norway's exports and over 30 
percent of annual government revenue. This is compared to 1997 figures where the petroleum sector 
represented 18 percent of GDP and 16 percent of central government revenues (CIA, 2009). . 
48 For the purposes of continuity, all references to Norway's SWF will be to the 'Government PensIOn 
Fund - Global', the 'GPFG'. or the 'Fund'. 
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Figure 2: Annual Changes in GPFG Market Value 
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By 2009, the GPFG's universally diversified and risk-exposed portfolio was 
invested approximately 60 percent in equity and owned a full one perc ent of total 
shares in global capital markets (Annual Report, 2009: 22). The embedment of public 
capital on such a global scale represented a massive feat considering the Fund only 
began investing in equities in 1998 (Annual Report, 2008: 2). More impressive is the 
fact this fmancial expansion was entirely orchestrated by Norges Bank Investment 
Management (NBIM) - a specialized investment arm of the central bank also 
established in 1998 to act as the Fund's autonomous operational manager. This meant 
GPFG management was placed at one remove of its owners and governors in the 
democratically elected Storting (Parliament) and the Ministry of Finance. Thus 
despite its origins as a highly liquid and conservatively managed stabilization and 
savings fund in 1990, by 2009 the GPFG had come to exhibit the three distinguishing 
features of the SWF policy path. The following Chapter seeks to account for why thi 
policy path was adopted and maintained as a desirab le strategy of governance in 
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Norway between 1990 and 2009, and its significance for the politico-economic 
landscape of this welfare state. 
According to central government ministers in the wake of the global crisis of 
2007-2009, the widespread embedment of petroleum wealth throughout the fmancial 
realm was legitimated by a pragmatic approach to a daunting socioeconomic problem. 
Indeed, the welfare state 's public pension expenditures were projected to rise from 
seven percent of GDP in 2000 to fifteen percent by 2030, just as petro leum revenues 
were expected to drop from sixteen to four percent ofGPD (see Figure 3; cf. Gjedrem 
2000, 3; Kjaer, 2006) . Converting current and future petroleum wea lth into a 
diversified portfolio of fmancial assets was therefore portrayed as a means through 
which an aging Norwegian population could be supported by the state into the future. 
Figure 3: The' Pension Issue' 
Expected Pension Expenditures vs. Petroleum Revenues (% of GDP) 
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Yet neither the GPFG 's investment strategy, relationship with the Norwegian 
state, or even fundamental purpose have remained fixed since the Fund 's inception in 
1990. To be sure, the pension issue was only made a formal element of the GPFG' 
mandate a full e ight years after the Storting opted to speculati \'e ly invest public 
cap ita l throughout a broad range of riskier financi al asse ts, markets. and management 
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strategies. If not originally for the pension issue, why was the SWF policy path and its 
high levels of fmancial risk pursued in 1997 by the Norwegian state? Given the 
Fund's long-term and outward-looking orientation, how was this strategy internalized 
as befitting the state's short-term interests over alternative approaches to sovereign 
wealth management? Financial economists, DEeD fmancial regulators, and numerous 
Norwegian policymakers have argued that even in the absence of the pension issue, 
reconceptualising the GPFG as an SWF represented a rationally desirable policy 
preference. It effectively transforms stagnant foreign exchange reserves into 
influential positions in an array of global companies and markets. It also makes the 
role of petroleum wealth in the budgetary process 'highly visible', enabling the 
central government 'to stand firm against popUlist appeals for spending rather than 
saving' (Kjaer, 2008: 194; cf Skj0restad, 1998; Bergo, 2003; Caner and Grennes, 
2010). Yet these desired outcomes do not by themselves explain why SWF's three 
distinguishing features were institutionalized by the central government in 1997 over 
alternative strategies. 
The following offers an alternative explanation to this puzzle than those 
currently offered in the SWF literature. It argues the SWF policy path represented a 
quick -fix means for the Storting to address an unexpected but not unprecedented 
problem of great uncertainty that faced them in 1996 (cf Eide, 1997). At this time, 
petroleum revenues were suddenly projected to grow by 1,500 percent from 
previously held expectations in just three years. Investing this systematically 
significant pool of expected capital for speculative fmancial gain would stabilize 
socioeconomic expectations as to how Norway's highly politicized petroleum 
resources would be managed into the indefmite future. To be sure, these revenues 
were seen as threatening socioeconomic stability given the central government's 
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previous approach to petroleum wealth management had exacerbated a prolonged 
domestic recession between 1976 and 1990. Investing its vast petroleum wealth 
reserves in a diverse array of speculative fmancial assets thus represented a strategy to 
stabilize the states governance function in the face of this uncertainty. Yet from where 
did this strategy derive its legitimacy given the distance it would place between 
government and this capital, as well as the risks it entailed? What were the political 
channels through which this strategy was internalized? 
Structural conditions alone - such as the prevalence of developed fmancial 
markets and unprecedented resource revenues - cannot explain why the SWF policy 
path was pursued over competing alternatives. The most noteworthy of these 
presented in the Storting and media included implementing counter-cyclical 
monetary, fiscal and commodity extraction policies that would stymie the inflow of 
so-called 'surplus' resource revenues (Trall0Y, 2009: 372; Storvik, 1997). By 
assuming speculative investment to be inherently desirable as a fiscal strategy, the 
politics of the GPFG's origins have remained unexamined. Indeed, the Storting had to 
be proactively convinced of the SWF policy path's legitimacy over more conservative 
and thus safer alternatives. This was given the extent to which it would expose the 
state's prized petroleum wealth to the fluctuations and crisis tendencies of the 
fmancial realm. Losses arising from the global liquidity crisis of 2007 -2009 in fact 
amounted to a 23.3 percent decline in the Fund's value, reducing it 'right back where 
it started' thirteen years earlier. This subsequently exposed the Norwegian central 
bank - 'Norges Bank' - and Storting officials to widespread domestic criticisms, and 
initiated a widespread review of the GPFG's investment strategy and relationship with 
the central government (Gjedrem, 2009; cf Qvigstad, 2009a). 
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The following Chapter thus argues that despite its risks and long-tenn 
orientation, the SWF policy path was adopted as a strategy of governance intended to 
benefit the Storting's interests in the short-tenn. It draws attention to the authoritative 
fmancial ideas that informed Norwegian state actors of what their interests should be 
- as well as how to achieve them - when faced with the task of managing windfall 
petroleum revenues. These ideas ultimately created forward-looking expectations of 
the benefits to be derived from speculative investment that commanded the authority 
to be believed over competing alternatives presented to the Storting. They are 
evidenced in the numerous policy documents, internal memos, recommendations, and 
external reports produced and commissioned between 1990 and 2008 by Norges Bank 
and the central government. Identifying these authoritative ideas is important for IPE 
scholarship as they allow us to critically examine the contested and ultimately 
fallacious ontological foundations upon which SWF legitimacy is based. 
To be sure, the GPFG's significant losses in 2008 were eventually recouped in 
2009. This sudden change in fortune was championed by the Fund's supporters in the 
Storting, as well as its managers in Norges Bank. The globally reverberating crisis 
and its rapid recovery in 2009 were thus strategically appropriated as a resource of 
legitimacy that 'proved' the validity of the GPFG's long-term and risk-exposed 
investment strategy. Yet such a rapid turn from loss to profit in 2009 was the product 
of large-scale and ad hoc government interventions into global capital markets. 
Governments around the world were called upon to reassert investor confidence by 
providing much needed liquidity the markets were unwilling to put at risk (cf 
Altman, 2009). The need for these emergency capital injections undermines the 
financial logic of market efficiency and investor rationality that legitimated the SWF 
policy path to the Norwegian government, Norges Bank, and - most importantly 
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considering the public nature of the GPFG's wealth - the domestic electorate between 
1997 and 2009. The following Chapters therefore seek to problematize the 
relationship that exists between SWFs, their state owners, the fmancial markets in 
which they are invested, and the domestic societies to which they are ultimately 
accountable. This is to provide a necessary fIrst step towards the development of 
alternative and potentially more beneficial means of managing a state's foreign 
exchange reserves. 
Chapter Four exammes why and how the SWF policy path was 
institutionalized in Norway in 1997, and then charts the Fund's institutional 
development to 2005.49 It demonstrates how reconceptualising the GPFG as long-term 
oriented SWF was pursued as a desirable strategy of governance, but whose 
legitimacy had to be actively constructed by offIcials in Norges Bank. This is to 
highlight that the Norwegian central government did not immediately view 
speculative investment as an inherently desirable pursuit as assumed by mainstream 
SWF analyses. Section 4.1 introduces the GPFG's origins by examining the history of 
Norway's experience with petroleum wealth management from 1970 onwards. 
Sections 4.2 and 4.3 then examine how the ideas of fmancial profitability and 
fmancial expertise were drawn from by N orges Bank to provide an authoritative guide 
to action for the state when faced with a problem of great uncertainty. Indeed, 
uncertainty as to how to manage the state's petroleum wealth surged in 1996 
following the expectation these revenues would swell by 1,500 percent in just three 
years. The Sections consequently reveal the extent to which a discernable 
epistemology of speculative fmance was strategically drawn from by Norges Bank 
officials to legitimate the SWF policy path over competing alternatives within the 
49 It was not until 2006 with the passing of the Government Pension Fund Act that the SWF policy path 
was officially made a substantive feature of Norway's politico-economic landscape. 
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central government, and in a way that appealed to these state actor's immediate 
interests. 
Sections 4.3 and 4.4 then examine the constraining impact these ideas had on 
the central government's policy preferences when institutionalized into the GPFG in 
1997. They examine how throughout this period, Norges Bank's authority over the 
central government grew in congruence with the GPFG's expansionary capital base 
and universally invested portfolio. This was based on the capacity of these ideas to 
dictate of what constituted legitimate and desirable action, and what did not. As a 
consequence, the central government became increasingly dependant on the 
epistemological authority of Norges Bank officials to inform them of their policy 
preferences in regards to petroleum wealth management from 1997 onwards. Chapter 
Four therefore seeks to fill a gap in the IPE literature on depoliticization. Accounts of 
depoliticization such as those offered by Burnham (1999; 2001: 128), Hay (2007: 82), 
and Flinders and Buller (2006) cannot account for how SWFs directly influence the 
way in which government's formulate their policy preferences through time, but can 
only gauge the effects of these preferences once acted upon. Indeed, the influence of 
sovereign wealth funds on a state's approach to fiscal governance is not just by their 
having placed the political character of decision making at one remove of 
government. They also limit what government actors consider to be an optimal means 
of engaging with sovereign wealth management. 
Chapter Five then expands upon these arguments by drawing attention to the 
key role played by the central government to construct and maintain the GPFG's 
domestic legitimacy between 1997 and 2009. This supportive role provided by state 
actors was crucial in the face of ideational competition posed by minority parties in 
the Storting, as well as the dislocating socioeconomic impacts engendered by t\VO 
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fmancial crises experienced in this time. Chapter Five thus seeks to further fill in the 
gaps pervading mainstream analyzes by drawing attention to the politics behind the 
SWF policy path's institutional legitimacy. More specifically, it sheds light on the 
GPFG's impact on the fiscal governance strategies pursued by the Norwegian state 
between 1997 and 2009. 
4.1 The GPFG as a Stabilization-Savings Fund (1990-1996) 
With the discovery of North Sea oil in 1969, the Norwegian government faced 
a number of important questions. How to manage the unexpected revenues accrued 
from oil production that fell outside short-term budgetary needs? What role should it 
play in supporting the future development of the Norwegian state? What of the 
everyday lives of current citizens? The Storting initially endeavoured to spend the 
majority of this wealth on a variety of welfare programs, targeting industrial 
development and public pension provision in particular. While made with good 
intentions, these investments coincided with a wider structural downturn in the global 
economy following the Petroleum Crises of 1973 and 1979. Thus between 1970 and 
1990, public welfare programs were expanded just as non-petroleum sector industries 
were contracting; manufacturers became dependant on state support; domestic 
consumption demand grew with the injection of Krones into the economy; and a 
credit bubble developed which subsequently burst in 1986 at the same time as a 
significant drop in the international price of oil. The government's petroleum 
spending consequently exacerbated a deep recession characterized by highly volatile 
inflation from which Norway would not fully recover until the 1990s (Eriksen, 2006: 
6-8; cf Gjedrem, 2000: 1; Gjedrem, 2005; Tral10Y, 2009: 367-70). 
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These experiences with petroleum wealth spending left a lasting impression on 
both the Norwegian electorate and Storting. They resulted in the social-democratic 
Labour government of the early 1990s to internalize the notion that petroleum wealth 
must be preserved and in such a way that Norway would not be negatively - let alone 
positively - affected (Norges Bank, 1990: Section 3.2; Eriksen, 2006: 7; Odelsting, 
1974; Skfmland, 1988). To be sure, the 'problems' posed by Norway's surplus 
sovereign wealth were framed in a number of ways and to varying degrees of 
significance in the years preceding the creation of a conservatively-managed GPFG in 
1990. Primary of these concerns were: 
(i) Budgetary concerns - how to distinguish between petroleum and non-
petroleum savings on government balance sheets? 
(ii) Monetary policy concerns - how to counteract the appreciation of the 
Norwegian Krone from the excess currency income generated from 
petroleum? 
(iii) 'Sector balance' concerns - an appreciation of the Krone would shift 
resources to non-competitive sectors as well as potentially instil 'Dutch 
disease' 
(iv) Savings concerns - how can future generations of Norwegians benefit 
from today's petroleum wealth? 
These unresolved issues posed very real problems of uncertainty for the Storting's 
approach to domestic governance once the economy stabilized in the early 1990s. It 
was within this historical context that the notion of a twin stabilization-savings fund 
was born in the Conservative-led government in 1987, but which was eventually acted 
upon by left-leaning Labour in 1990. Such an extra-budgetary and highly liquid fiscal 
vehicle managed by Norges Bank would provide a readily visible means of separating 
petroleum from non-petroleum revenues on government balance sheets. Transfer of 
accumulated revenues to the Fund would then also prevent the Krone from 
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appreciating while being left free of large-scale governmental budgetary tampering -
a real fear given Norway's volatile economic history (Kjaer, 2000: 13; Eide, 1997). 
Passing the Petroleum Fund Act in 1990 and its establishing the GPFG was 
thus a direct reflection of Norway's fiscally conservative values at the time. The Act 
institutionalized the objectives of liquidity, safekeeping and preservation as top 
priorities in the state's approach to petroleum wealth management. This original 
version of the GPFG thus embodied the Storting's fears of reliving the experiences of 
the 1970s and 80s, and their new desire to ensure 'intergenerational justice and 
economic policy considerations' above all other objectives (Storvik, 1998; cf Norges 
Bank, 1990). This would in tum complement the Storting's policy tradition of 
prioritizing the energy export sector and its competitiveness as a driving feature of 
socioeconomic development (Trall0Y, 2009: 361). 
For Norwegian politicians, however, the Petroleum Fund Act was more 
significant in its acting as a symbol of fiscal conservatism. The Act ambiguously 
stipulated for 'the deployment and investment of a fund intended to safeguard long-
term interests through the use of petroleum revenues'. This was to be achieved 
through the foreign investment of resource revenues in 'the same manner as the 
central government's other assets', such as government-guaranteed bonds and other 
short-term liquid assets (Petroleum Fund Act, 1990: Sections 1, 4). The GPFG and its 
conservative approach to investment thus represented a quick-fix and easily 
operational means to manage extra-budgetary petroleum wealth once the domestic 
economy stabilized in the 1990s. Indeed, the 1990 Act represented a symbolic means 
to stabilize domestic expectations in regards to petroleum wealth management 
considering all accrued and expected petroleum revenues had already been 'spent' up 
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to 1995 (Gjedrem, 2005: 2).50 It provided the newly elected Labour-led government 
with a domestically desirable means of immediately alleviating the burden to manage 
petroleum wealth. It would at the same time limit their exposure to criticism for 
mismanagement endured by the Storting throughout the 1980s (cf. Traooy, 2009: 372-
3). 
Yet just one year into operationalizing the Fund's conservative management 
strategy in 1997, the passive savings mandate was replaced with one of aggressive 
profit maximization. From then on, the Fund would be tasked to maximize fmancial 
returns through risk-based speculation rather than ensure the government's short-term 
liquidity requirements were met (Revised National Budget, 1997: Section 3.5.2).51 In 
little over a decade, the GPFG would come to hold some 7,900 equity and bond 
positions, represent approximately $100,000 per Norwegian citizen, and own a full 
one percent of world fmancial markets (Qvigstad, 2009a; Annual Report, 2009: 22). 
Why did government actors in the Ministry of Finance and Storting choose to forego 
the GPFG's objective of thrift and stability in favour of excess fmancial risk and 
reward given Norway's volatile economic history? Why was the uncertainty posed by 
50 This is to note that the first allocation of state petroleum revenues to the GPFG did not occur until 
1996 despite the Petroleum Act being passed six years earlier. The first two oil billions were 
transferred to the GPFG in May 1996, and were invested in the same way as Norges Bank's foreign 
exchange reserves - i.e. in foreign denominated government guaranteed fixed-income assets. This 
investment strategy was also applied to the NOK48 billion transferred at the end of that same year 
(Kjaer, 2006: 2). 
51 This amendment made three immediate changes to the GPFG's managerial structure. First, the fund 
was to be placed under the management of a newly established division within the central bank: -
Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) - tasked to 'achieve the highest possible return on the 
separate portfolio within the limits set out in the regulation' (Petroleum Fund Amendment Act, 1997: 
Section 2). Second, a benchmark portfolio was to be established by NBIM and regularly adjusted 
according to market conditions (ibid. Section 4). This meant that the GPFG would be judged in much 
the same way as any other large institutional investor rather than an entity of the state restrained by 
domestic policy commitments, such as a central bank (Norges Bank, 1997 b: Section 3). Third, the 
Fund's investment universe was expanded so as to include international equities which, 'with a high 
degree of probability', would provide a higher return than the original GPFG's investments (Norges 
Bank, 1999a: 2; Petroleum Fund Amendment Act, 1997: Sections 5, 6). At year-end 1998, the GPFG 
was invested in over 2,000 different companies across 9,000 total equity holdings, and o\\11ed 500 
different bonds, in addition to warrants, various types of money market instruments, futures contracts 
and pure foreign exchange positions (Norges Bank, 1999b). 
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speculative investment deemed more manageable and less threatening to 
socioeconomic stability than that posed by passive savings or domestic development 
initiatives? In short, what led state actors to revaluate their interests in regards to 
petroleum wealth management in a way that favoured their direct exposure to global 
ftnancial volatility? Sections 4.2 and 4.3 address these questions. They examine how 
Norges Bank offtcials drew from the ideas of fmancial profttability and fmancial 
expertise to inform the central government of their policy preferences in a context of 
heightened uncertainty they unexpectedly found themselves facing in 1996. 
Norwegian state actors did not therefore naturally internalize the SWF policy path as 
the optimal strategy for managing their petroleum wealth, but had to be proactively 
convinced of this strategy's desirability by Norges Bank offtcials. 
4.2 The GPFG as an SWF (1996-1997): 
The Idea of Financial Profitability 
The uncertainty originally associated with windfall petroleum revenues in 
1970 suddenly re-emerged in 1996 following a triennially released government white 
paper. The report revised the government's future allocations to the Government 
Pension Fund-Global upwards to N0K300 billion in 2000 and NOK400 billion in 
2001 - more than a 1,500 percent increase from earlier projections (Norges Bank, 
1997a; National Budget, 1996: Section 3.5; Kjaer, 2006: 2).52 The Storting and its 
ever-shifting string of coalition governments thus faced a situation they believed 
could once again instigate a domestic recession. Norges Bank offtcials were quick to 
52 This report was the Long Term Programme of 1998-2001 (National Budget, 1996: Section 3.5): a 
government white paper that approximates the future development of various aspects of the Norwegian 
economy. The Long-Term Programme of 1998-2001 also judged that the Fund's resources would not 
be drawn from until 2020 given the new projections of the GPFG's expected growth (Norges Bank, 
19970). 
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provide an actionable plan within this context of uncertainty. They argued the 
GPFG's conservative investment strategies no longer fit with its 'considerably longer 
time horizon'. As such, the Storting was empowered to adopt a riskier approach to 
investment by making 'some adjustments' to the Fund's mandate and managerial 
structure (Norges Bank, 1997a: 2). These recommendations emerged out of the 
'Investment Management Project': a specialized commission created on Norges 
Bank's initiative in 1996 to devise alternative wealth management strategies. Yet the 
adjustments these central bank officials recommended amounted to the total overhaul 
of Norway's approach to petroleum wealth management. At the same time, however, 
the ideas they drew from to legitimate such institutional change would effectively 
suspend the Storting's need to devise alternative strategies to deal with this problem 
of great uncertainty they faced. The following investigates this development. It 
demonstrates the SWF policy path did not emerge in Norway as a natural by-product 
of contemporary fmance capitalism, nor was it proactively sought out by the state as 
an inherently desirable means of managing petroleum wealth. Norges Bank officials 
had to first delegitimize the GPFG's conservative investment strategy, while 
simultaneously promoting the SWF policy path's desirability as a more favourable 
strategy of governance. 
Norges Bank officials first sought to frame the SWF policy path as benefiting 
the central government's short-term interests. They did so by arguing the GPFG must 
be considered a long-term investor with no short-term liabilities in the face of the 
revised revenue projections (cf N orges Bank, 1997 a: Section 1; Skj0restad, 1998; 
Norges Bank, 1999b; Skancke, 2003: 318; Norges Bank, 2003: 6-7; National Budget, 
2004: Section 3.5.1.3; Ministry of Finance, 2007: 41). The GPFG's short-term 
performance was thus argued to be of little importance, placating politicians' 
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uncertainty concerning the benefits to be derived from petroleum wealth with the 
expectation of the Fund's profitability (Norges Bank, 1997 b: Section 4). Indeed, 
Norges Bank officials went so far as to argue the GPFG's unspecified time-horizon 
meant the Storting should ignore short-term performance altogether and 'instead 
focus more on the expected return' (Norges Bank, 1997a: 5). The central bank 
aggressively promoted the notion that it was impossible to predict 'any period during 
which markets or market segments [ would] seem, in retrospect, "cheap" or 
"expensive'''. Norges Bank subsequently framed the heightened revenue projections 
as presenting the Storting with an ambitious opportunity to stabilize their petroleum 
wealth management strategy in a forward-looking and sustainable manner (Ministry 
of Finance, 2007; Eide, 1997: Section B). 
A small number of officials in the Ministry of Finance and even Norges Bank 
were nonetheless wary of these claims made by the Investment Management Project. 
This doubt arose in the context of the highly profitable equity markets of the late 
1990s. They worried a concomitant cyclical downturn would soon follow this period 
of rapid fmancial growth. Supporters of the financial maximization mandate in 
Norges Bank were nonetheless capable of reducing this fear by again emphasizing the 
GPFG's new long-term investment horizon. They successfully argued that what 
happened in the short-term was of little consequence for the state (National Budget, 
1998: Section 3.5.1, referenced in Ministry of Finance, 2007: Section 3.2.1; cf 
Norges Bank, 2001). By vociferously promoting expectations of the Fund's long-term 
profitability, the SWF policy path represented a means to stabilize the state's 
petroleum wealth management strategy into the indefmite future. This was an 
appealing prospect that readily gained prominence in the Ministry of Finance given 
the recessionary fears brought on by the increased revenue projections (Revised 
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National Budget, 1997: Section 3.5.1; Storvik, 1998). Indeed, the prevalence of the 
'New Labour light' political grouping that has assumed the majority of ministerial 
posts from the mid-1990's to 2008 readily internalized these ideas given their 'so lid 
belief in free markets and [refusal] to see the fmancial sector as anything else than just 
another sector' (Traooy, 2009: 370). Norges Bank, those in the Investment 
Management Project specifically, drew from the basic qualitative assumptions of 
modern fmancial epistemology to lend authority to their recommendations. 
The notion of the equity-risk premium (ERP) was given particular emphasis. It 
was reiterated throughout committee meetings and informal communications that 
equities are only ever purchased on the expectation they provide a higher rate of 
return than safer investments. If this were not the case, there would be no incentive to 
speculate on riskier assets given a lack of compensation and thus demand (Vik, 2008; 
Norges Bank, 1997 b; Annual Report, 1997: 32-34; Eide, 1997; Revised National 
Budget, 1997: Section 3; Norges Bank, 1999b: 4; Gjedrem, 2001). In a 'normal' 
situation based on 'generally accepted assumptions about rational investor behaviour', 
Norges Bank argued, equities would have a higher long-term return than fixed-
income assets. This was, in tum, supported by 'undisputed empirical results' (N orges 
Bank, 1999b: 4). Norges Bank subsequently argued it is 'normal' to assume investors 
who take risks should expect to earn higher returns by their capacity to 'harvest' the 
risk premium over time (National Budget, 2004: Section 3.5.1; Revised National 
Budget, 1997: Section 3.5.1).53 
53 Two quantitative studies in particular were referenced as providing the undisputed quantitative 
evidence substantiating Norges Bank's belief in the ERP. First, a 0-10 study commissioned in 1995 
analYled the relationship between saving, investment, and real interest rates from a historical 
perspective (0-10, 1995). This study provided quantitative evidence for the argument that the Storting 
should expect to realize an ERP of at least four percent if it elected to adopt equities into its portfolio. 
The second study, Siegel's Stocks/or the Long Run (1994), was based on similar US stock market data 
to that used in the 0-10 study. It argued that equity has paid out an average seven percent premium 
over the fixed income assets the OPFO was invested in between 1996 and 1998 (Siegel, 1994). The 
study confirmed the idea that equity does in fact experience more volatility in the short term than fixed 
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The expectation of increased revenue projections, the GPFG's unspecified 
long-tenn investment horizon, and thus its perceived capacity to earn speculative 
financial returns enabled Norges Bank officials to promote an authoritative guide to 
action the Storting should pursue (Eide, 1997). This was over alternative strategies 
being considered, such as maintaining the Fund's conservative status quo, investing in 
infrastructure, or attempting to diversify the domestic economy away from petroleum 
dependence (cf Gjedrem, 2009). The Jagland administration - in power between 
1996 and 1997 only - was particularly influenced by the argument that long-tenn 
international investors were invested 30-70 percent in equities (Revised National 
Budget 1997: Section 3.5.1). The government would thus not be going it alone in its 
management of petroleum wealth as it did previously, but would be participating in a 
wider fmancial realm of discernable rules and established precedents. 
Yet what Norges Bank officials did not do in 1997 was make a serious attempt 
to explain why equity should payout a premium over fixed income into the future. 
This was no matter the evidence offered by the historical studies cited in their 
recommendations, which even they cited as being incapable of providing a complete 
depiction of historic let alone future trends (Norges Bank, 1997b; Annual Report, 
1998: 34). The qualitative assumptions that substantiated Norges Bank's quantitative 
historical data would not in fact be questioned by the Storting until 2003, and then 
only by an externally hired consultancy firm (cf Mercer, 2003: Section 2.6-2.17). 
Norges Bank could not explain away the 'survivorship bias' these studies' underlying 
data was eventually accused of harbouring (Qvigstad, 2009a). That is, the tendency to 
income assets, but also that higher returns are virtually guaranteed upon adoption of a time horizon of 
30 or more years (Siegel, 1994: 5-7). Both of these studies are referenced throughout Norges Bank's 
first proposal to focus on financial maximization as a means for the government to maintain 
socioeconomic stability following the increased petroleum revenue projections of 1996 (Norges Bank, 
1997a: 2; Norges Bank, 1997b: Section 1; cf. Norges Bank, 1999b). A third unpublished study 
conducted by Jorion and Goetzemann (1999) was then also cited a year later in the 1998 Annual Report 
(pp. 34) as further supporting the existence of the ERP if a long enough time horizon was adopted. 
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analyze those markets and time periods for which data is most readily available, and 
which have not experienced crises that reduce equity values to nil such as in China, 
Russia, and Poland. This would mean that '[ e ]ven though the probability of a lower 
return is reduced when the [time] horizon is extended', the size of these lower returns 
will increase when accounting for extreme losses arising from recurrent crises 
(Norges Bank, 2001; cf Annual Report, 1998: 33; Mercer, 2003: 5; Ministry of 
Finance, 2007: 49). This is in addition to the costs to government who have 
historically been expected to support failing markets with the same public capital that 
compose SWFs. 
It nonetheless suffices to indicate now that including the survivorship bias 
clause in Norges Banks' recommendations would have dampened their authority to 
inform the Storting of what their policy preferences should be. These quantitative 
studies of the ERP did not therefore provide the Storting with a rationally desirable 
guide to action in themselves, but their underlying assumptions were strategically 
drawn from to advocate Norges Bank's recommendations over competing 
alternatives. And to reiterate, these recommendations were not entirely motivated by 
the self-interested desire ofNorges Bank officials to increase their own authority over 
public capital management. Rather, they were made once these officials were 
convinced new ideas to inform them of how to best manage the GPFG had to be 
turned to given the significant growth the Fund was projected to experience between 
1997 and 2001. It was the uncertainty presented by these projections and modern 
fmancial epistemology's capacity to manage this uncertainty in the present that led to 
the GPFG's reconceptualisation as long-term fmancia1 maximizer. These ideas then 
had to be framed by Norges Bank as complimenting the Storting's short-term 
interests. Specifically, their desire to avoid setting conservative extraction limits on 
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much prized petroleum fields, and in a way that would prevent them from inducing a 
similar period of socioeconomic turbulence as that experienced in the 1980s. Despite 
the authority - or perhaps believability - of these recommendations, however, what 
remained uncertain in 1997 was who exactly would manage the Fund's new fmancial 
mandate given Norges Bank's lack of experience overseeing such riskier investment 
practices. 
4.3 The GPFG as an SWF (1996-1997): 
The Idea of Financial Expertise 
The Government Pension Fund-Global's reconceptualisation as a fmancial 
speculator in 1997 led to major changes in its managerial structure, as well as its 
relationship with the central government. The following Section examines why the 
central government approved these changes given the fact they would limit the 
Storting's authority to manage Norway's prized petroleum wealth. Particular attention 
will once again be paid to the role played by ideas - modern fmancia1 epistemology's 
notion of fmancial expertise, specifically - to guide the development of the 
government -GPFG relationship. 
While the roles performed by Norges Bank, the Ministry of Finance, and the 
Storting would remain formally unchanged from the 1990 Petroleum Fund Act, the 
central bank would now be responsible for overseeing the purchase of global equities 
with which they had little to no experience. While there were other organizations 
considered for the role, the Storting held that Norges Bank should retain its position 
as operational manager of the Fund. This was given the bank's two years of 
experience with GPFG management, and their already being subject to governmental 
oversight (Eriksen, 2006: 13; Revised National Budget, 1997: Annex 1). Operational 
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management by Norges Bank would therefore contribute to the 'national confidence' 
required for the GPFG's success if it were to be domestically scrutinized to the extent 
the central government suspected. This was considering the state's historical 
experience with a hands-on approach to public capital management, as well as the 
degrees of fmancial risk to which the GPFG would be exposed from 1997 onwards 
(Storvik, 1998: 1-3). 
To be sure, the desire to retain Norges Bank as operational manager was 
primarily influenced by the Storting's previous experience with petroleum wealth 
management. Since the 1970s, Norway had established a tradition for both relatively 
weak minority governments and correspondingly 'spend happy' parliaments (Traooy, 
2009: 269). To reiterate, then, the substantial increase in resource revenue projections 
from 1997 onwards therefore presented a problem of great uncertainty for the 
Storting. However, this was not just in terms of how to manage these resources, but 
also who was to manage them. They believed they could be neither hands-on with the 
GPFG's now risky financial mandate, nor could they leave it unmonitored lest the 
domestic electorate accuse them of unaccountability. Empowering the central bank as 
a 'force of prudent demand management' - despite the inclusion of equities - was 
therefore deemed an optimal compromise that would satisfy the GPFG's fmancial as 
well as the central government's domestic political obligations (Traooy, 2009: 269; 
Storvik, 1998; Kjaer, 2000). 
Thus in a functional sense of depoliticization - i.e. placing the political 
character of decision-making at one remove of government (cf. Burnham, 2001: 128; 
Hay, 2007: 82) - Norwegian state managers believed they were fortifying 
socioeconomic stability by limiting their managerial influence over current and future 
petroleum revenues. Thus resonating with the arguments of public choice theory, the 
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Storting internalized the notion they could not be trusted to manage this wealth into 
the long-term. This was given their short-term political orientations, as well as the 
fragmented and unstable nature of the Storting's historically short-lived coalition 
governments. Whether such views were an accurate depiction of what would unfold 
was unimportant in the context of uncertainty both Norges Bank and the government 
found themselves facing in 1996. More important was their pre-existing belief that 
elected officials remained ill suited to adopt a hands-on approach to GPFG 
management no matter the form of its mandate. 
In debates leading up to and following the GPFG's 1997 transformation, 
officials in both the Ministry of Finance and Storting cast themselves in an openly 
pessimistic light when speaking of their relationship with petroleum wealth 
management (Eide, 1997; Storvik, 1997; Skj0restad, 1998; Revised National Budget, 
1997: Section 3.5). Acting on these beliefs would in turn limit their responsibility for 
this task and the potential domestic criticisms it exposed them to. Government actors 
in the then majority Centre-Left coalition proclaimed that not only were they 
incapable of managing the GPFG in any fashion, but they were also unable to 
internalize the lessons-learnt between 1976 and 1990. This was in regards to populist 
appeals to spend petroleum revenues for short-term socioeconomic gain. They would 
instead once again succumb to their inherently self-interested desires in approaching 
GPFG management to the detriment of medium to long-term socioeconomic stability 
and growth. By informing themselves of how to act based on these pre-existing 
beliefs, the government proactively delegitimized their capacity to manage the 
GPFG's new SWF identity to the rest of the Storting and Norwegian public in 
general. Their responsibility would instead be to ensure these political and everyday 
actors viewed Norges Bank as more legitimate managers despite the bank's lack of 
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experience with speculative fmance. This was to be achieved by communicating this 
message through the Fund's annual and quarterly reports, as well as the Ministry of 
Finance's annual reports to the Storting (Qvigstad, 2009b). 
However, depoliticization of GPFG management to Norges Bank also 
occurred in an ideational sense of authority. That is, the notion that the Storting would 
be open to 'disciplining from empowered technocrats in the central bank' was a major 
reason Norges Bank was delegated managerial authority for the GPFG's new 
fmancial mandate (Trall0Y, 2009: 269). Thus in addition to being largely detached 
from government auspices and political pressures, Norges Bank's capacity to direct 
the GPFG's institutional development would also stem from the epistemological 
authority commanded by their expert knowledge of speculative fmance. As just 
mentioned, however, Norges Bank had yet to develop its fmancial expertise to the 
extent it could be deemed such an authority over the Norwegian SWF. These newly 
empowered technocrats traditionally tasked with overseeing monetary and fiscal 
policy would first need to develop their organization in a way they believed would 
accommodate the GPFG's new fmancial maximization objective. Norges Bank's 
development would in tum serve a non-fmancial function for the state. That is, it 
would satisfy the interests of a sceptical Norwegian public who preferred their prized 
petroleum wealth be managed independent of politicians, but with Norwegian 
interests in mind (Revised National Budget, 1997: Annex 1; cf Trall0Y, 2009: 371). 
The development ofNorges Bank's fmancial expertise was therefore in the interests 
of the state not just for its perceived capacity to enhance GPFG returns and preserve 
the Fund's international purchasing power. It also served to shift the locus of 
accountability for petroleum wealth management even further from central 
government auspices. Indeed, the expectation that Norges Bank would be developing 
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its fmancial expertise from 1997 onwards was understood as capable of insulating 
election-wary politicians from the negative reputational impacts that would arise from 
a poorly performing GPFG (Annual Report, 2007: 74-75; Skancke, 2003). 
Yet Norges Bank as it stood in 1997 only satisfied one requirement of what 
modern fmancial epistemology considers 'fmancial expertise'. That is, they were free 
of political interference and would thus make decisions based on strictly commercial 
interests. They therefore could be considered 'rational' investors, and could thus reap 
the equity-risk premium into the long-term without fear of succumbing to ulterior 
motives, po litical or otherwise (Revised National Budget, 1997: Annex 1; Annual 
Report, 2007: 75). What they lacked, however, was an intimacy with the language of 
risk and return required to determine exactly how they should act in the short-term to 
ensure the GPFG generated these returns. As a fIfst move to fill this gap, a new 
'Management Agreement' between Norges Bank and the central government was 
drafted in 1998. The Agreement stipulated the Bank could hire external managers, but 
it also established Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) as an operationally 
autonomous investment arm within the central bank to take over all responsibility for 
GPFG management (Norges Bank, 1998: Section 2.2; Norges Bank, 2000a).54 
The way NBIM would develop as a semi-independent investment fIfm 
between 1997 and 2009 thus started with the notion that the government's short-term 
political outlook would only hinder the GPFG's new long-term fmancial 
maximization mandate. Norges Bank officials instead framed an autonomous NBIM 
as more capable of developing the unique brand of fmancial expertise necessary to 
ensure the GPFG's speculative fmancial (Revised National Budget, 1997: Annex 1; 
Norges Bank, 1997 b: Section 2; Kjaer, 2001). The 1998 Management Agreement was 
54 As a point of clarification, Norges Bank's Executive board decided to establish NBIM following 
recommendations proposed to them by the Investment Management Project. This group was led by 
Knut Kjaer, who would eventually become NBIM's first Chief Executive Officer (Kjaer, 2001: . .n. 
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thus significant due to its symbolism. It signified to the Norwegian public that NBIM 
officials would be drawing from a range of strictly fmancial ideas and commerc ial 
interests to inform them how to act and develop as a fmancial management institution. 
This is to highlight the Agreement did not affect the formal degree of authority 
separating the central bank from the central government. It would nonetheless 
increase the Storting's dependence on professional investors in NBIM to support their 
governance function and domestic legitimacy. Indeed, NBIM immediately became the 
primary advisor to the Ministry of Finance as well as Storting in all matters of 
investment strategy as befitting 'the Bank's general obligation to provide professional 
advice to the political authorities' (Storvik, 1998: 1).55 
The following Section now examines how the authority exerted by the ideas of 
what constitutes fmancial expertise under modem fmancial epistemo logy continued to 
inform both NBIM and central government officials of how they should approach 
GPFG management between 1998 and 2005. This constrained the central government 
to increase the independence and specialization of tasks for the GPFG's new 
managers in NBIM. These ideas about what the speculative fmance realm was and 
how to successfully participate within it were repeatedly turned to so as to inform 
both groups as to how NBIM should develop as speculative fmancial manager. Both 
sets of state actors faced similar problems of uncertainty - i.e. how to monitor versus 
operationalize speculative investment of petroleum wealth - that this prescriptive 
knowledge framework helped them 'plan and politic' their way through (cf Blyth, 
2002: 10). Identifying these particular ideas and how they were internalized to inform 
the Norwegian state's policy preferences from 1998 onwards helps explain how the 
unique relationship between the GPFG, NBIM, and the central government emerged. 
55 The Norwegian central bank was not made fully independent of the central government until 2001. 
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This is a necessary task as it was those ideas and their authority to inform legitimate 
action in the face of uncertainty that would ultimately expand NBIM's authority over 
the central government in all matters of petroleum wealth management. Section 4.4 
therefore seeks to fill in a gap left in existing SWF commentaries that take the 
necessity of politically divorced fmancial experts as implicit. Such an assumption 
prevents these analyzes from critically examining how this feature of the SWF policy 
path constrains government agency. This is through its limiting political actors' 
capacity to implement policy preferences that fall outside the bounds of legitimate 
action prescribed by modern fmancial epistemology. Whether SWFs are in a domestic 
population's short, medium, or even long-term socioeconomic interests therefore 
remain unquestioned. The following Section identifies the ideational form of this 
constraint and how it emerged in Norway between 1998 and 2005. 
4.4 The GPFG-Central Government Relationship (1998-2005): 
The Deve lopment of NBIM's Financia 1 Expertise 
Between 1998 and 2005, the central government approved a number of 
recommendations made by NBIM to increase the Government Pension Fund-Global's 
risk exposure. These included expanding the Fund's equity portfolio by 20 percent, as 
well as increasing the use of short-term active - or 'alpha' - management strategies. 56 
56 The most noteworthy of NBIM's recommendations adopted by the Ministry of Finance were: (i) 
inclusion of 40 percent equities in the GPFG' s investment universe in 1997, then 60 percent in 2006 
(Norges Bank, 1997b; Olsen, 1997; Norges Bank, 2001); (ii) inclusion of more markets, and then 
emerging markets, in the investment universe (Norges Bank, 1999c; 2002; 2003b); (iii) higher 
allowable ownership concentrations, from one to three percent, then three to five percent, then five to 
ten percent (Norges Bank, 2000b; 2008); (iv) inclusion of non-govemment-guaranteed bonds (Norges 
Bank, 2002a); (v) inclusion of private equity, inflation-linked bonds, and real estate (Norges Bank, 
2002b; 2007); (vi) inclusion of pre-IPO investments (Norges Bank, 2008b). This is not to say that all 
NBIM's recommendations were adopted without consideration or debate. In 2008, for example, 
NBIM's CEO - Yngve Slyngstad - requested the GPFG increase its ownership concentrations to 
fifteen percent, but was granted only ten. There is also a prolonged lag-period between investment 
advice being offered and approved by the government (Vil<, 2008; Kvam, 2008). In any case, NBIT\l 
has been the sole driver behind the expansion of the GPFG's investment universe due to their being 
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Why would the central government want to expose Norway's petroleum wealth to 
such increased fmancial risk rather than maintain their already risky investment 
strategy? To be sure, the Storting was well aware that increasing the GPFG's 
exposure to equities was no assured means of increasing its short-term returns 
(Revised National Budget, 2007: Section 3). If government actors are motivated by 
political self-interest as posited by mainstream SWF analyzes, what would the 
Storting gain from increasing their susceptibility to short-term financial volatility? 
Explanations offered by NBIM and fmancial economists have thus far been 
unsatisfactory. They simply maintain the GPFG's expansionary investment universe 
and more risk-exposed portfolio were necessitated by the demands of the Fund's 
fmancial maximization mandate (cf. Annual Report, 2007: 83-87; Vik, 2008; Nugee, 
2008). These accounts do not adequately explain how or why the central 
government's interests became increasingly synonymous with those of the GPFG's 
fmancial interests. The following attempts to fill in this gap by demonstrating how 
NBIM aggressively began developing what they understood to be their fmancial 
expertise from 1998 onwards. It was these efforts that increased NBIM's 
epistemological authority over GPFG management, and which ultimately constrained 
government actors to approve their recommendations. Indeed, development of their 
financial expertise led to an increased proportion of the GPFG that was managed 
internally by NBIM, as well as their capacity to dictate how the Fund's investment 
strategy should develop into the future (see Figure 4). 
informed by modern financial epistemology such extensive diversification is in the interests of the 
Fund's speCUlative financial mandate. 
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Figure 4: The proportion of GPFG being managed internally by NBIM (1997-2007) 
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From 1997 onwards, the central government wished to be transparent and 
accountable in regards to all matters of GPFG management and governmenta l 
decision-making given Norway's volatile economic history. Yet this transparency 
campaign only revealed the extent to which central government actors depended on 
what Traooy (2009: 363) refers to as 'a highly technocratic form of authority ' . This 
had the effect of shielding NBIM - and GPFG management in general - from public 
and democratic scrutiny due to 'the sheer complexity of its tasks' (ibid . 363). Indeed, 
NBIM internally developed fmancial risk management techniques between 1997 and 
2005 that everyday Norwegians and most members of government had 'scant chance 
of understanding' (ibid. 363). This is to highlight that once the SWF policy path was 
adopted in Norway, modern fmancial epistemology' s understanding of leg itimate 
versus illegitimate actions rapidly came to constrain central government agency in 
regards to petroleum wealth management. 
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To this effect, the Storting' s creation of the GPFG in 1990 was pursued as a 
means to avoid incurring a similar period of socioeconomic instability as that 
experienced throughout the 1980s. As an extra-budgetary stabilization-savings 
account, it would prevent current and future government administration's from once 
again spending petroleum wealth, which could potentially destabilize the country's 
tenuous fiscal position. N orges Bank was thus delegated operational autonomy for the 
management of the Fund, which was to be invested 'in the same manner as the central 
government's other assets'. This was without giving consideration for generating 
excess returns (Petroleum Fund Act, 1990: Section 4). This governance structure was 
intended to provide enough buffer room for the central government to maintain it was 
not involved with the management of the Fund, but at the same time ensure it kept 
within the regulatory bounds they set through the Ministry of Finance (Kjaer, 2006: 
2). To be sure, the vast majority of governing authority between 1990 and 1997 
resided with the Ministry of Finance, as the GPFG's conservative investment strategy 
was operationalized entirely 'in house' under the auspices of existing central bank 
arrangements. 57 
This level of authority over GPFG's management would, however, be subject 
to contestation and change in NBIM's favour from 1998 onwards. Indeed the central 
government would come to increasingly rely on the epistemological authority of 
financial experts in NBIM to provide policy advice as petroleum revenues swelled 
even more than projected into the 2000s (cf Annual Report, 2004: 2). This is to 
indicate that the continued expansion of the GPFG's investment universe and 
57 Norges Bank's Executive Board was initially charged with being 'responsible for making sure that 
asset management is practised in accordance with the framework defined by the Ministry of Finance' 
(Norges Bank Act, 1985: Section 5). This governing role would primarily be served every two years 
through the Executive Board's setting of strategy plans which determined the framework of operations 
for NBIM (Annual Report, 2007: Feature Article). At the same time, a 'Supervisory Council' 
composed of 15 members elected by the Storting would supervise Norges Bank's activities and ensure 
that the rules set by its Executive Board were observed (Norges Bank Act, 1985: Section 5). 
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exposure to fmancial risk is not attributable to any inherently rational desires held by 
state managers as currently assumed in the SWF literature (cf Caner and Grennes, 
2010). Nor was NBIM's increasing authority and desire to expose GPFG capital to 
higher amounts of risk uncontested by either the Storting or Norwegian public. 
Instead, NBIM's capacity to direct the GPFG's institutional development had to be 
proactively constructed and iteratively promoted to both the Storting and public 
throughout this period. A primary means of achieving this was through NBIM's 
'strategy plans', released every two years (cf Annual Report, 2007: 51, 89). These 
reports strategically drew from the same authoritative - but ultimately fallacious -
ideas that convinced the central government of the SWF policy path's legitimacy as 
petroleum wealth management strategy in 1997. 
To this effect, the 1998 Management Agreement - which determined NBIM's 
relationship with both the GPFG and central government - placed the Ministry of 
Finance in a position 'to control all the main aspects of management'. That is, in 
formulating the overall guidelines of how GPFG's capital was to be invested (Kjaer 
2001: 4-5; Norges Bank, 2000a). Yet given the central government's desire to limit 
their interference with the fund, it would ultimately be NBIM that decided 'how to 
use its latitude to achieve the highest possible return' (Gjedrem, 2000: 4). Thus not 
only was NBIM expected to operationalize the GPFG's fmancial mandate, but it also 
had great influence in determining what its risk limits should be (Norges Bank, 
2000a; Revised National Budget, 1997: Annex 1). NBIM was consequently enabled 
throughout the ensuing years to propose significant changes to what assets the GPFG 
could be invested, as well as how they were to operationalize this investment 
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strategy. 58 Yet in 1998, NBIM only satisfied one of the criteria of what constituted 
fmancial expertise - i.e. it was shielded from the self-interested interference of 
Norwegian politicians. It was the authority of these fmancial ideas that enabled 
Norges Bank officials to construct a believable and desirable guide to action in 
regards to how petroleum wealth should be managed. The SWF policy path cannot 
therefore be said to have emerged in Norway due to the evolutionary tendencies of 
speculative fmance. Instead, several qualitative assumptions concerning the 
speculative fmancial realm had to be strategically drawn from to authoritatively 
prescribe how NBIM should develop as an organization. The informative role of these 
ideas proved especially important as Norway's petroleum revenues continued to swell 
into the 2000s. 
To this effect, the Fundamental Law of Active Management (FLAM) was 
cited in particular throughout NBIM's biennial strategy reports as providing 
'extremely important guidance' on how NBIM should be managed and organized 
(Annual Report, 2007: 86).59 FLAM posited that 'the risk-adjusted return ... increases 
proportionally with skill (information coefficient) and with the square root of the 
number of positions'. As such, it was believed NBIM would be more successful as 
operational manager if it made 'many more decisions each accounting for less of the 
58 For example, acting on NBIM's advice in March 2002, the Ministry of Finance lifted the restrictions 
on non-government-guaranteed bonds (Norges Bank, 2002: 5). Prior to this change in regulation, the 
GPFG was allowed to invest only a maximum of five percent of the fixed income portfolio in non-
government-guaranteed bonds with a credit rating ofBBB, and ten percent in those bonds with a higher 
rating. These types of assets were not, however, included in the GPFG's benchmark portfolio. This 
meant that taking positions in such riskier bonds forced the GPFG to assume more risk than that 
allowably prescribed by the Ministry of Finance. After 2002, however, NBIM would 'in fact be taking 
active risk if it fails to invest in non-government-guaranteed bonds' (emphasis added, Norges Bank, 
2002: 1). Hence from March 2002 onwards, NBIM went from being limited in their ability to assume 
extra fmancial risk in the fixed income portfolio to being limited in their ability not to do so. As will be 
further examined in Chapter Five, this would prove highly significant for the Centre-Left's political 
legitimacy as the active bond portfolio decimated GPFG returns in 2007 and 2008 in the wake of the 
2008 global liquidity crisis. 
59 FLAM was first introduced into the financial economics literature by Gimold and Kahn (1995). Its 
newness to the literature despitc its long-standing use in practice is due to the continued debate as to 
\\Ohether activc management strategies are capable of enhancing annual returns over and above more 
traditional strategies of passive investment. 
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overall risk limit. ... and in such a way that these positions are as independent of one 
another as possible' (Annual Report, 2006: Feature Article 1; c£ Kjaer, 2003; Annual 
Report, 2008: Section 3.1.2). The internalization of FLAM to provide a blueprint for 
action thus brought about real institutional change in the Norwegian state. It was 
expectations of legitimate action it authoritatively enforced that directly altered the 
power relationship between the Fund, NBIM, and the central government in Norges 
Bank's favour from 1998 onwards. Four ideas in particular were internalized by 
NBIM in their approach to developing their financial expertise and, by extension, 
their epistemological authority over the GPFG. 
First, NBIM believed they needed to develop 'the strategy, capacity and 
control systems' necessary to manage a portfolio the size of the GPFG's. Indeed 
between 1998 and 2005, NBIM consistently cited investment strategies and 
organizational principles as being 'two sides of the same coin' (Annual Report, 2007: 
Feature Article; c£ Norges Bank, 1999a). These organizational capacities developed 
unexpectedly fast, however, as NBIM oversaw a total of 17,258 equity transactions 
carried out in 21 countries between January and June of 1998 (Norges Bank, 1999b). 
The investment arm of the central bank therefore began arguing in 1999 that the 
'extensive infrastructure' that had been developed to manage the GPFG in its ftrst two 
years provided 'sound system platform[s] and trading routines' that would beneftt 
internal management'. This was in addition to the argument that the GPFG's size 
ensured 'ease of access to important sources of information' that would give them an 
advantage compared to other investors (Norges Bank, 1999a). 
In a similar vein, the second requirement of fmancial expertise NBIM believed 
necessary was to have a clear 'information advantage' based on better access to 
relevant information, and better generation of investment ideas based on this 
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information (Norges Bank, 1999a: 2). This meant 'processing information better than 
the average participant' rather than 'possessing special information on the individual 
market' (Norges Bank, 2000a). Thus in 2001, NBIM began using 'RiskManager', a 
system that 'provide[ d] an updated overview of holdings of cash and equities in all 
the internal portfolios' (Norges Bank, 2002b: 2).60 At the same time, they also 
installed 'market information systems' such as Bloomberg Terminals that would 
enable them to 'obtain knowledge of events [in financial markets] at an early stage'. 
Such systems were argued as necessary in their provision of 'continuous price info 
and other news, and ... access to historical data'. This was in addition to the data that 
was developed in-house 'as an aid in constructing portfolios, analytical work and 
reporting' (Norges Bank, 2002b: 2). These information systems were thus deemed 
capable of enabling NBIM to better deal with global fmancial market's 'reality in 
flux' (Knorr Cetina, 2005: 52-54). 
Third, NBIM believed GPFG managers had to have 'skill... in constructing 
their portfolios resulting from their information advantage' (Norges Bank, 1999a: 2). 
To be sure, NBIM gave academic backgrounds and skills a greater priority than other 
Norwegian and international investment firms. 'Technical expertise' - or an 
affiliation with the intricacies of modem financial risk management techniques - was 
in fact put on equal footing with managerial competence (Annual Report, 2007: 
Feature Article). NBIM subsequently went on a global headhunting spree in order to 
lure professional investors in possession of what they determined to be investment 
skill. Between 1999 and 2005, NBIM as an organization grew by 44 percent - from 
71 full time employees in 1998 to 128 in 2005 - with approximately 25 percent of this 
growth consisting of 'skilled investors' according to NBIM (Annual Report. 2007: 88; 
60 Perhaps not so incidentally, Knut Kjaer - NBIM's former CEO - became president of RiskMetrics in 
2009. 
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see Figure 5) . Such growth was achieved by offering unconventiona l - at least from a 
Norwegian public services standpoint - remuneration packages that were structured 
so as to more closely resemble wages offered in the private sector. 61 It was believed 
that such wages would instil ' a professional and vigilant business culture within the 
central bank ' believed necessary if the GPFG were to maximize it s investment returns 
(Bergo, 2007 ; cf. Annual Report, 2003: Section 6). At the same time, these 
performance-linked wages would serve to further distinguish NBIM's distinct 
commercial mentality from that of the politically minded central government. NBIM 
managers could therefore be considered 'rational ' investors capable of reaping the 
ERP into the future . Governmental involvement would only complicate this pursuit. 
Figure 5: Number ofNBIM employees versus assets under management (1997-2007) 
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Finally, specialization of tasks within NBIM - i.e. more individual autonomy 
of decision-making - was also understood to be a necessary prerequisite for the 
development of fmancial expertise (Norges Bank, 1997a). For NBIM's frrst CEO, 
Knut Kjaer, this could be derived from 'spreading active management over a large 
number of independent decisions' as well as 'combining external and internal 
management and specialising internal management in areas where there is a good 
possibility of predicting price movements better than the average market participant' 
(2001: 6). NBIM thus argued increased individual autonomy, and not just 
organizational autonomy, was necessary. This was because 'investment decisions 
across sectors must to a greater degree be based on the managers' views concerning 
developments in macroeconomic conditions, structural developments and the rate of 
change of various sectors' (Norges Bank, 2002b). 
In sum, turning to these four ideas promoted by FLAM to develop NBIM's 
fmancial expertise lent them greater authority over the GPFG's institutional 
development with each passing year (cf Annual Report, 2007: 87). This aggressive 
development of NBIM's fmancial expertise was, however, surprising. Norges Bank 
had in fact stressed in their 1997 recommendations that it was unlikely they would 
assume the majority of responsibility for the Fund's equity portfolio (Norges Bank, 
1997a: 16; Norges Bank, 2000a). Indeed, there was initially a strong resistance from 
several Norges Bank and Ministry of Finance officials - as well as the 1996 
Investment Management Project itself - to increase the proportion of the GPFG 
managed by NBIM vs. external managers (Annual Report, 2007: 86; cf Johnsen, 
2010a; Gjedrem, 2009a). Yet based on the guidance provided by FLAM, NBIM 
argued that by 2005 they had gained 'considerable expertise as far as equity 
management is concerned, together with experience in the handling of fluctuating 
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portfolio performance from one year to the next' (Ministry of Finance, 2007: 46). As 
evidenced by the adoption of a new Management Agreement in 2005 that only served 
to increase NBIM's independence to determine investment strategy, the majority of 
Storting officials were fully supportive of the investment arm of the central bank at 
this time (cf. Ministry of Finance, 2005). 
The development of NBIM's fmancial expertise consequently demonstrates 
how Norway's approach to sovereign wealth management was depoliticized in both a 
functional as well as ideational sense of authority. Throughout this period, good 
governance in regards to petroleum wealth management was increasingly framed 
throughout policymaking circles as a purely technical matter that could only be 
managed by professional investors in NBIM (Norges Bank, 1997b: 5-9; Norges Bank, 
1999b; Norges Bank, 2000a). NBIM in fact cited in 2007 that it should not just be 
considered as an investment arm of the central bank, but a 'modem knowledge 
company'. This was given that its management function was derived more from a 
'natural' or knowledge-based reading of authority, rather than a 'formal' hierarchical 
view of authority (Annual Report, 2007: 87). It was depoliticization in the first sense 
of authority that ultimately came to constrain the central government's capacity to 
determine the form and function of the GPFG, as well as its relationship with 
Norwegian society.62 These state managers came to place more and more faith in 
NBIM's fmancial expertise to help them traverse the volatile ebb and flow of the 
speculative fmancial realm. To reiterate, this constraint is witnessed in the 
government's approving the continued expansion of the GPFG's investment universe 
based on NBIM's advice between 1998 and 2005. This was despite the fact that such 
62 What's more, NBIM managers were themselves constrained by the prescriptions of modem fmancial 
epistemology. Indeed in the face of uncertainty arising from their lack of experience with speCUlative 
finance. NBIM could only act in a way they believed optimal based on the dominant fmancial ideas of 
the time. This dissertation nonetheless emphasizes the constraint these ideas put on governmental 
agency when formulating policy preferences. 
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increased exposure to risk would not necessarily benefit government managers in the 
short-term, but would expose public capital as well as their domestic legitimacy to a 
much higher degree of fmancial volatility. 
Conclusion 
The preceding Chapter demonstrated that the Government Pension Fund-
Global was not naturally or logically reconceptualised as a sovereign wealth fund by 
the central government between 1996 and 1997. As a fund composed of public 
capital, the government had to be proactively convinced by Norges Bank officials that 
investing for speculative fmancial gain was a legitimate means of managing windfall 
petroleum revenues. They also had to be convinced that adopting such increased 
levels of fmancial risk would not expose them to criticisms for fiscal recklessness or 
unaccountability in the short-term. Norges Bank officials thus strategically drew from 
several qualitative assumptions espoused by modem fmancial epistemology to placate 
any uncertainties, and to lend authority to their recommendations. This fills in a gap 
pervading the literature on sovereign wealth funds. These commentaries have yet to 
empirically examine the politics behind SWFs' institutional development, instead 
assuming SWF-states' policy preferences to remain fixed through time. They 
consequently ignore the authoritative role played by ideas to inform action in the face 
of uncertainty over competing alternatives. These commentaries also have yet to 
critically engage with the fact that these ideas do not account for the fmancial realm's 
contradictions and crisis tendencies. Indeed, Chapter Three demonstrated that SWFs' 
underpinning fmancial logic is rooted in a number of simplified presuppositions that 
primarily serve to legitimate modem fmancial practices rather than provide an 
accurate or objective guide to action. 
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NBIM and the Storting nonetheless heavily relied on several of these basic 
assumptions of modern fmancial theory to inform them of their policy preferences 
when faced with the problem posed by unexpected windfall petroleum revenues. 
These ideas then also acted as important mechanisms through which the SWF policy 
path's legitimacy could be communicated to the Norwegian pUblic. NBIM fIrst placed 
particular emphasis on the notion that speculative investors are rewarded with an 
equity risk premium. This belief primarily derived from the assumptions that markets 
were effIcient and investors were rational. For the Storting, then, belief in the ERP 
effectively stabilized expectations of how profItable the GPFG's fmancial 
maximization mandate would be. The notion of financial expertise - specifically that 
the GPFG must be managed by professional investors divorced from the clouding 
influence of politics - was then called upon to legitimate NBIM as the manager best 
suited to operationalize this mandate. The SWF policy path thus benefIted the central 
government's short-term interests as it immediately stabilized their governance 
function in regards to the highly scrutinized issue of petroleum wealth management. 
Indeed, the SWF policy path effectively managed short-term socioeconomic 
expectations as to how the state's petroleum wealth would be managed by 
reconceptualising them as more calculable and predictable financial expectations. 
The Chapter then also demonstrated how these ideas continued to dictate to 
the central government how the GPFG should develop as a systematically significant 
strategy of governance between 1997 and 2005. This was firstly in terms of dictating 
the GPFG should continue to diversify its portfolio into more speculative asset classes 
and markets as a means to better manage fmancial risk. Anything less than continued 
diversifIcation was argued to be irrational and even threatening to the long-term 
interests of the Norwegian state. These fmancial ideas then also served to enhance 
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NBIM's authority in making these recommendations to expand the Fund's investment 
universe. Indeed, the idea of what constitutes fmancial expertise under modern 
fmancial epistemology informed these officials how they should develop as an 
organization given their lack of experience with speculative investment. These ideas 
then increasingly came to constrain central government agency between 1998 and 
2005. Indeed, it enhanced NBIM's epistemological authority and thus their capacity 
to guide the GPFG's institutional trajectory. This is to highlight that it was not just 
NBIM being placed at one remove of government in matters of petroleum wealth 
management that lent them their authority over the GPFG. It was more importantly 
their command of a particular form of fmancial knowledge that enabled them to couch 
their recommendations in an authoritative 'science' of speculative investment. 
The authority NBIM derived from their unique position as government-linked 
fmancial experts was eventually issued as a point of concern by the Ministry of 
Finance in 2006. The Ministry questioned their diminishing capacity to monitor the 
GPFG given their increasing dependency on fmancial experts to provide advice. How 
could they be considered accountable regulators of the risk-exposed Norwegian SWF 
given their reliance on NBIM? The Ministry argued that the rules defming the central 
government's relationship with NBIM 'are brief and general. .. [and] need to be 
defmed more clearly' (Revised National Budget, 2006: Section 1.5.3). Simply put, the 
central government recognized the high degree of autonomy NBIM had gained for 
itself between 1997 and 2005. Yet the creation of an additional government-appointed 
supervisory layer - the 'Advisory Council' - in 2006 would not increase the 
government's authority over GPFG management. 63 Indeed, while it placed the 
63 The Advisory Council was meant to provide an additional check on NBIM in 'their work on 
investment management'. It would consist of four 'internationally recognised experts with extensive 
experience from large investment management institutions' and would meet with NBIM's Executive 
Board bi-annually (Annual Report, 2006: Section 5.1). 
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democratically-elected Storting closer to GPFG oversight in a functional sense of 
authority, they were still heavily reliant on the epistemological authority of fmancial 
experts in NBIM. 
The following Chapter takes a closer examination of this constraint imposed 
by NBIM's epistemological authority on the central government's political agency 
between 2005 and 2009. It also highlights how the central government was 
increasingly constrained to actively construct and promote the GPFG's domestic 
legitimacy throughout this time. The following Chapter thus examines how N orges 
Bank as well as central government officials legitimated the SWF policy path to the 
Norwegian public. This is opposed to the task of the preceding Chapter, which limited 
its analysis to how the SWF policy path came to be internalized as a legitimate 
strategy of governance by the central government. Chapter Five thus demonstrates 
how the SWF policy path's legitimacy had to be proactively constructed and 
maintained by central government actors in much the same way that Norges Bank 
convinced these actors of its desirability in 1997. Chapter Five therefore also adds to 
the discussion on how SWFs as strategies of governance constrain government 
agency. This by their rendering state actor's policy preferences synonymous with the 
demands of the funds' long-term and outward-looking fmancial interests. Specific 
evidence will be drawn from the Norwegian government's reaction to the fmancial 
crisis of 2007-2009 to elaborate on this constraining and altogether problematic 
feature of sovereign wealth funds. 
Chapter Five 
Norway's Government Pension Fund-Global 
(1997-2009) 
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In efforts to maintain domestic accountability, both the Norwegian central 
government and Norges Bank Investment Management sought to be transparent in all 
aspects of decision making in regards to the Government Pension Fund-Global 
(Qvigstad, 2009b). A variety of consultancy papers, detailed annual and quarterly 
reports, committee hearings, and letters between the Storting, Ministry of Finance and 
Norges Bank were consequently made available and promoted throughout the press 
and government websites between 1997 and 2009. An unexpected product of this 
transparency campaign, however, was that it revealed to both the Storting and public 
the unresolved inconsistencies pervading the GPFG's long-term fmancial logic and 
actual investment practices. Their concern was predominantly with NBIM's 
increasing use of short-term oriented 'active' management strategies. The Fund's 
expansionary and increasingly risk -exposed investment universe was also 
increasingly scrutinized throughout this period. This was as the GPFG' s capital base 
began to rapidly expand on the back of increased petroleum revenues in the early 
2000s. Such concerns were problematic for the Norwegian central government as they 
threatened to undermine the GPFG's domestic institutional legitimacy. The following 
Chapter consequently examines the efforts pursued by central government and NBIM 
officials to appease these concerns by actively constructing the GPFG's legitimacy 
between 1997 and 2009. It argues these efforts - which spanned from writing new 
legislation to 'educating' the public of fmancial theory's base assumptions -
ultimately constrained the Norwegian state in their approach to management of 
petroleum revenues. Chapter Five seeks to demonstrate this constraint is problematic. 
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It does so by examining how the GPFG influenced the government to increase their 
vulnerability to global fmancial volatility following the global crisis that began in 
August 2007. 
To this effect, recall that Norges Bank originally emphasized in 1996 that the 
influx of windfall petroleum revenues granted the GPFG a long-term time-horizon. Its 
lack of short-term liabilities thus meant it could invest in riskier assets that were 
believed to have historically paid a premium over more conservative assets. Storting 
officials could therefore adopt an equally long-term perspective in their management 
of highly scrutinized petroleum wealth. They could and should have little regard for 
short-term fluctuations in the Fund's performance. Yet shortly after these 
recommendations gained the Storting's approval in 1997, the Fund's managers in the 
newly formed NBIM began to increase their use of a short-term oriented and riskier 
investment strategy known as 'active' management. This is a noteworthy 
development as active management strategies are premised on the notion that markets 
are capable of producing inefficiencies that can be exploited for short-term gain. 
Indeed, its basic ontological assumptions on the general efficiency, rationality, and 
thus profitability of speculative capital markets stood in stark contrast to NBIM's 
initial arguments for why the SWF policy path should be pursued. The increased 
reliance on active management strategies would then prove costly in the wake of the 
fmancial crisis that began in August 2007. Indeed, such riskier strategies ultimately 
exposed the GPFG to higher degrees of fmancial risk than other institutional 
investors, which greatly contributed to the GPFG's 23.3 percent losses -
approximately NOK500 billion - in 2008 (Caner and Grennes, 2009).64 According to 
the Governor ofNorges Bank, the GPFG's dependence on active management prior to 
64 The return generated by NBIM in 2008 was 3.4 percent lower than the benchmark portfolio against 
which they are measured (Gjedrem,2009b). 
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the crisis relegated the Fund 'right back where it started' thirteen years earlier 
(Gjedrem, 2009a). 
The crisis, the losses accrued therein, and the socioeconomic instability that 
followed exposed central government officials to much domestic criticism -
especially those in the majority Centre-Left coalition that had overseen the GPFG's 
rapid expansion (Esmerk, 2009; Qvigstad, 2009a; Halvorsen, 2009a; Johnsen, 
20l0a). Surprisingly, however, the majority of Norwegians continued to see the SWF 
policy path as benefiting their long-term interests. Criticisms were instead directed 
more towards the use of the Fund's capital to support the Norwegian banking system, 
which was experiencing a liquidity crisis of its own (Londt, 2008; Johnsen, 20l0b). 
Given the crisis's destabilizing effects, why did the Norwegian public remain so 
committed to the GPFG as not just a savings fund, but as an aggressive fmancial 
speculator? How to explain this unfaltering policy preference given the complex and 
highly technical nature of the GPFG's fmancial activities, the likes of which everyday 
Norwegians would 'have scant chance of understanding' (Traooy, 2009: 363; 
Qvigstad, 2009b; Hegge, 2009)? In short, how was the GPFG's legitimacy 
communicated to the general public, and in such a way that it became embedded in 
the national psyche as the optimal strategy for petroleum wealth management? 
To address these questions, the following Chapter builds off the arguments 
developed in Chapter Four. That Chapter demonstrated the SWF policy path appealed 
to the Storting as it provided them with an immediate means to stabilize their 
governance function. This was in the face of unexpectedly high petroleum revenue 
projections expected to be accrued between 1997 and 2000. Yet neither the central 
government nor Norges Bank officials were aware at this time of how rapidly the 
Fund would grow as a universal investor in the ensuing years (Annual Report, 2007: 
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75). As commented by the governor ofNorges Bank in 2009: 'I have every reason to 
believe that the people that prepared the proposal [for the GPFG] did not think at the 
time that the savings in the Fund would prove to be of any significance' (Gjedrem, 
2009b). Thus from 1997 onwards, the GPFG's increasingly diversified and risk 
exposed portfolio had to be actively promoted to the Norwegian public so as to 
construct its domestic legitimacy. This was achieved through various means, four of 
which are examined in this Chapter. 
Chapter Five also seeks to problematize this support provided by the central 
government. It effectively limited government's policy preferences in regards to vast 
petroleum wealth reserves to remain within the bounds of legitimate action prescribed 
by modern fmancial epistemology. This prevented the Storting from engaging with 
alternative and less risky sovereign wealth management strategies in this period. It 
constrained them to normalize the GPFG' s speculative fmancial identity rather than 
critically examine if this strategy was in fact the optimal means to manage the state's 
petroleum wealth. Such critical engagement should have been more aggressively 
undertaken given the novelty of this fiscal strategy and the risks it exposed this wealth 
to. Indeed, the SWF policy path greatly influenced the government's understanding 
of, and approach to, broader socioeconomic issues of governance throughout this 
period to the detriment ofnon-fmancia1 and non-petroleum sectors. 
Section 5.1 examines how the central government re-tasked the Fund in 2006 
to pursue the long-term goal of supporting the state pension system. This was in an 
attempt to bestow a greater sense of ownership over the GPFG's SWF identity 
throughout Norwegian society. Section 5.2 then examines how the government also 
sought to aggressively normalize the fmancial ideas from which NBIM drew to guide 
the GPFG' s institutional development between 1997 and 2009. Section 5.3 
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deconstructs the central government's efforts to reconcile the contradictions 
pervading NBIM's use of short-term 'active' versus long-term 'passive' investment 
management strategies. This followed their being criticized by minority opposition 
parties for allowing Norway's petroleum wealth to be exposed to an unreasonable 
degree of fmancial risk. Finally, Section 5.4 examines how modem fmancial 
epistemology dictated what 'lessons' the government should learn from the global 
fmancial crisis that began in August 2007. This constraint led the central government 
to in fact increase the GPFG's dependence on the modem risk technologies that fed 
the crisis in the fIrst place. It therefore increased the Norwegian state's vulnerability 
to future fmancial crises. Hence despite this crisis revealing the fallacious nature of 
the GPFG's long-term fmancial logic, the government nonetheless held fast to the 
stabilizing narrative espoused by modern fmancial epistemology. SpecifIcally, both 
NBIM and Ministry of Finance offIcials were quick to argue the crisis represented an 
expected feature of speculative fmance despite its magnitude and global breadth. 
Norway should therefore remain committed to the SWF policy path in the belief 
markets would correct themselves eventually. This argument was then maintained 
even as the crisis necessitated state-directed interventions be made into ailing 
financial institutions and systems to stabilize global capital markets. 
The following Chapter thus examines how the SWF policy path gained 
legitimacy throughout Norwegian society only through the promotional support 
provided by the central government. This is to fIll a gap in the SWF literature, which 
leaves the state and the domestic politics of SWF legitimacy latent and unexamined 
variables. Indeed, the GPFG's new fmancial identity had to be constructed and 
iteratively promoted by the Storting and NBIM as it expanded between 1997 and 
2009. This was achieved by drawing from several qualitative assumptions that 
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appeared to render fmancia1 reality into a quantitative and manageable form. This 
further suggests that the GPFG should not be considered a naturally or immediately 
desirable fiscal tool of the state due to any innate properties of fmance. Chapter Five 
thus critically examines how modem fmancial epistemology constrained the 
government to increasingly expose Norway's expansive petroleum wealth reserves to 
the contradictions and crisis tendencies of the speculative fmancial realm. This is to 
demonstrate that the short-term socioeconomic costs of investing for speculative gain 
in the crisis prone capital markets between 1997 and 2009 outweighed the expected 
fmancial benefits the GPFG's SWF identity was intended to provide. 
5.0 Constructing the GPFG's Domestic Legitimacy (1997-2009) 
From 1997 onwards, the Ministry of Finance believed that building 'trust and 
support' in the Government Pension Fund-Global's speculative fmancial identity was 
a 'fundamental and continuous process' they should proactively engage with 
(Qvigstad, 2009b). A lack of public confidence in the GPFG's expansion into equities 
and other riskier securities was perceived as threatening the long-term interests of the 
Norwegian state as a whole (cf Gjedrem, 2001; Bergo, 2002; Annual Report, 2009: 
66-69; Halvorsen, 2009a; Johnsen, 2010a). As the Fund began to grow unexpectedly 
fast from 2000 onwards, however, the central government had to actively 'sell' the 
SWF policy path to an emerging group of dissenters in the Storting and domestic 
electorate. This group was spearheaded by the politically isolated but still primary 
opposition - the 'Progress Party' (cf TraIl0Y 2009: 9, 14-15). 
In order to sell the GPFG's SWF identity to the public, Ministry of Finance 
and Norges Bank officials drew from the same ideas that had convinced them -
through Norges Bank's recommendations - of the long-term benefits to be gained 
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from speculative investment. In so doing, however, these same officials became 
aware of several inconsistencies in the GPFG's underlying fmanciallogic that were 
not remarked upon in the 1996 deliberations. Yet if the government were to retain the 
psychologically stabilizing effects brought by the GPFG's long-term investment 
horizon, these basic inconsistencies could not remain unaddressed as they are in 
fmancial economics (Maki, 2001: 5; cf. Poitras, 2005; McGoun, 2005). Indeed a 
GPFG that lacked domestic legitimacy would be highly damaging to both the Storting 
and central bank's reputation given the substantial risks it exposed Norway's prized 
petroleum wealth to. Existing commentaries have yet to account for this crucial 
supportive role played by state actors to maintain their SWF's legitimacy through 
time. Nor do these analyses critically engage with the contestable fmancial 
presuppositions state actors draw from to construct this legitimacy. Sections 5.1 to 5.4 
examine four instances where the GPFG's domestic legitimacy had to be supported 
by the government. This is to highlight four times in which the SWF policy path came 
to constrain government actors when formulating their policy preferences between 
1997 and 2009. 
5.1 Constructing the GPFG's Legitimacy (1997-2005): 
The Government Pension Fund Act 
Norway's petroleum wealth began producing another unexpected problem for 
the Centre-Left coalition government by the early 2000s. This was the extent to which 
the GPFG's growth propelled the SWF policy path to become a highly scrutinized 
feature of the central government's politico-economic landscape. Indeed between 
1997 and 2004, the Government Pension Fund-Global grew much faster than either 
the Storting or Norges Bank had originally envisioned (Annual Report, 2004: 5, 8; 
1-+1 
2007: 75). This was fIrst ly in terms of its underlying capital base, which by 2004 had 
increased by NOK902 billion on the back of swelling petroleum revenues (GPFG 
Annual Report, 2004: 2). This far exceeded the expectations put forth in the Long-
Term Programme of 1998-2001 that ultimately led to the GPFG 's reconceptualisation 
as a speculative investor in 1997 (see Figure 6) . The Fund also expanded in terms of 
its investment universe, and thus risk exposure, based on several recommendations 
made by NBIM. Indeed, it qu ickly came to include a higher concentration of equities, 
riskier types of bond assets, and more emerging market assets (cf Chapter 4: Section 
4.4). 
Figure 6: The Unexpected Growth of the GPFG (1997-2004) 
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With this rap id growth, uncertainty as to how to best manage Norway's 
petro leum wea lth once again resurfaced within the central government. Both the right 
wing Progress Party and left wing Liberal Party were vocal critics of the GPFG 's 
expansionary portfolio given the fmancial volatility it exposed Norway to. Criticisms 
beca me espec ia lly pronounced following the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and 1998 
and then again fo llowing the Dot-Com bubble burst between 2001 and 2003. G lobal 
economic vo latility was, after a ll, w hat had ultimate ly instigated the prolonged 
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recession between 1976 and 1990 from which the Nordic state had only recently 
recovered. These opponents also argued the Fund's SWF identity had yet to be fully 
approved by society - or at least made transparent to them - as its significance for 
fiscal policy increased. In short, critics in the Storting argued the GPFG's primary 
role as budgetary stabilizer did not provide ample justification for its increasingly 
risky and long-term oriented approach to petroleum wealth management (Ministry of 
Finance, 2007: 49; Trall0Y: 2009: 369). 
To be sure, the GPFG's official mission statement remained rooted in open-
ended and ambiguous terms despite its growth in size and global fmancial 
embedment. Its primary guiding principal was simply to 'safeguard long-term 
interests through the use of petroleum revenues' (Petroleum Fund Act, 1990: Section 
1). The Fund's institutional legitimacy in the short-term thus derived from its making 
petroleum revenues in the budget 'more easily visible', as well as distancing this 
wealth from a 'spend happy' Storting (Trall0Y, 2009: 269; Annual Report, 1998: 1; 
Eide, 1997; Kjaer, 2000: 13; Skancke, 2003: 334-35; Gjedrem, 2005: 1).65 This 
ambiguity in long-term purpose meant that financial maximization through 
speculative investment immediately became a primary end goal in itself. Various 
members of the Storting and media form both the right and left questioned this 
65 This purpose of the GPFG as stabilizer of budgetary politics was solidified in 2001 with the 
introduction of the 'Fiscal Rule'. This rule was intended to ensure the use of petroleum revenues over 
the annual budget be phased into the domestic economy in pace with an estimated four percent annual 
real return the Fund was expected to generate (Ministry of Finance, 2001: 7; Revised National Budget, 
1997: Section 3.5.1). Four percent as an average was selected as it was believed to be 'fairly close to 
the return achieved by the business sector as a whole over a long period' (Gjedrem, 2000: 5). From a 
technocratic standpoint, the 2001 fiscal policy guidelines were framed as a means to 'take into account 
certain risk factors' associated with the accruement of petroleum revenues in government reserves, 
'such as uncertainties to future oil revenues, growth in pension liabilities or the costs of restructuring 
the economy' (Eriksen, 2006: 9). From a political standpoint, however, the 2001 fiscal rule was a 
political tool used by the first Stoltenberg government to ward off calls for spending the GPFG's 
capital from the then increasingly powerful Progress Party. As such, the fiscal rule officially resembles 
'a clear rule, but in reality it should be understood as a focal point upon which the decision-making 
process of the "responsible" parties of parliament can converge' (Tran0)', 2009: 269-70). That is, four 
percent 'of a fast growing fund translates into a degree of fiscal freedom that would cause most other 
social democratic parties ... to envy the Norwegian Social Democrats who have been spearheading the 
centre-left coalition which has ruled the country since 2005' (ibid. 370). 
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strategy. They asked whether the potential costs outweighed the rewards of 
stabilization given the high degree of fmancial risk involved (cf Hartzok, 2004; 
Traooy, 2009: 372; Eriksen, 2006: 6-12). Between 1997 and 2004, the GPFG thus 
lacked a legitimating end-goal towards which its speculative and increasingly risky 
investment activities could work. 
The Government Pension Fund Act ('GPF Act', 2005) was crafted to provide 
such a legitimating mission to appease these critics. It also represented a symbolic 
mechanism through which the state's commitment to the SWF policy path could be 
legitimated to the domestic population. Indeed, the Act formally tasked the GPFG to 
accommodate the significant projected increase in future pension provisions that 
began emerging as a problem of concern in Norway, as well as the EU in general, in 
the early 2000s (see Figure 3). The GPF Act was therefore not solely created to meet 
the fmancial interests of GPFG's managers in NBIM, although it did stipulate that 
NBIM expand the Fund's investment universe in various ways.66 It was more 
importantly created to buttress the government's domestic political interests by 
strengthening the Fund's perception as a tool for 'intergenerational wealth transfer' 
(Eriksen, 2006: 7). Indeed prior to 2006, numerous changes had been made to the 
GPFG's investment universe with little of the same legislative fanfare or publicity as 
that accompanying the GPF Act. 
The 2006 Act therefore served to legislatively - but more importantly for 
government's short-term interests - symbolically anchor the SWF policy path as 
66 These changes included: the allowable allocation of equity and fixed income investments being 
revised to 30 - 70 percent, up from 30 - 50 percent; investment in non inflation-linked and lower grade 
bonds being permitted; investment in commodity-based contracts and fund units being permitted; the 
allowable ownership percentage being raised from three to five percent, and then from five to ten 
percent; and more global manoeuvrability being introduced into the allowable currency and market 
weights. The universally diversified and riskier investment strategy pursued since 1997 was in fact 
legislatively embedded into the Fund's mandate. Form then on, it was stipulated that the 'actual 
portfolio shall be composed through extensive use of diversification' (GPF Act, 2005: Section 2). 
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benefiting the Norwegian public's long-term interests. It redefmed the Norwegian 
SWF's underlying purpose from largely ambiguous terms to a more concrete and 
comprehensive long-term action path that built off of existing welfare policies. That 
is, to 'support central government saving to fmance the National Insurance Scheme's 
expenditure on pensions and long-term considerations in the application of petroleum 
revenues' (GPF Act, 2005: Section 1). This new official task would, however, remain 
a guideline to which the central government need not adhere in the future (Bergo, 
2003: 4; c£ Skancke, 2003: 325; Gjedrem, 2005: 4). As summarized by the chief 
advisor to the Minister of Finance and a lead authority driving the GPF Act: 
'In order to strengthen the public's sense of ownership of the Fund and make 
it easier to accumulate financial assets for the state, the Petroleum Fund was 
renamed the Government Pension Fund - Global as from 1 January 
2006 .... The pension system under the National Insurance Scheme will, 
however, remain financed over government budgets on an ongoing basis 
("pay-as-you-go '')' - Eriksen, 2006: 7 
The GPF Act thus not only sought to legitimate the Government Pension 
Fund-Global as a fiscal institution of the state, but its SWF identity in particular. 
Central government actors therefore played a necessary role in supporting the GPFG's 
perception as a legitimate strategy of governance by the Norwegian public. The 
construction of sovereign wealth fund legitimacy remains critically unexamined in 
both the fmancial economist and IPE literatures. To be sure, this task constrained 
Norwegian state actors to accommodate the GPFG's speculative fmancial practices 
rather than critically examine whether they exposed Norway's petroleum wealth to an 
unnecessarily high amount of risk in the short-term. Indeed as Section 5.4 examines, 
the recent global fmancial crisis reduced the GPFG's value by far more than that 
compared to its peers. The government would nonetheless be constrained to maintain 
their support of this fiscal strategy despite the large-scale interventions of public 
capital that were required to rectify the crisis. In any case, the Chapter now examines 
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a second instance wherein the government was constrained to reinforce the domestic 
legitimacy of the GPFG's speculative fmancial identity. 
5.2 Constructing the GPFG's Legitimacy (1997-2005): 
Critically engaging the epistemology of speculative finance 
Despite its symbolic significance, the 2005 Government Pension Fund Act did 
not by itself legitimate the SWF policy path to the Norwegian public as the optimal 
means of managing their petroleum wealth. The central government also had to 
actively learn, promote, and ultimately normalize the fmancial logic upon which the 
GPFG's SWF identity was based. Indeed building trust and support in the SWF policy 
path was deemed a necessary task by the government if the GPFG was to be 
successful as a highly scrutinized strategy of governance (Qvigstad, 2009b). This 
meant the central government also had to come to terms with this policy path's 
unresolved contradictions and inconsistencies. This was especially so after NBIM 
began increasing the portion of the Fund being managed under a short-term oriented 
and riskier 'active' management strategy. Indeed, whether value can be added through 
active management over the long-term remains a highly contested issue in fmancial 
economics. While it is common in fmancial practice, active management's 
ontological assumptions contradict many of those that legitimate the GPFG's long-
term investment horizon. The following discussion first outlines the way in which the 
central government was made aware of these contradictions between the GPFG' s 
underlying logic and its practices. It then charts the way in which they reconciled 
these problems so as to maintain their SWF's institutional legitimacy. This is to 
highlight that as the GPFG began to rapidly expand into the 2000s, so too did the 
go\'ernment's reliance on the SWF policy path as a means to stabilize their 
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governance function also grow. As such, the Storting and Ministry of Finance were 
constrained to maintain their support of this epistemology in the face of domestic 
criticism they encountered throughout this period. 
The Storting ftrst expressed concerns for the GPFG's speculative ftnancial 
identity and its increasing signiftcance for Norwegian ftscal policy in 2000. They 
requested NBIM provide more proof that equity investments should be included in 
GPFG's portfolio following the unprecedented period of fmancial growth now 
referred to as the Dot-Com Bubble (Ministry of Finance, 2000). In its March 2001 
repsonse, NBIM utilized 'new and enlarged data material' to support its original 
argument that historical analysis provides reasons to believe a premuim will be paid 
out to riskier portfolios (Norges Bank, 2001; 2005).67 NBIM then issued a contiuation 
report in 2003 following the Dot-Com Bubble's crash and ensuing two-year period of 
negative GPFG equity returns. In this response, NBIM drew from a 2002 empirical 
study to reiterate their 'unconditional expectations' - or fundamental beliefs - in 
regards to the long-term profttability of investing in equities (Norges Bank, 2003a).68 
The primary function of these reports, then, was to remind the government and 
Norwegian public of the SWF policy path's underpinning fmancial logic. The fact 
that the Dot-Com crisis necessitated large-scale government intervention in the US to 
contain its destabilizing effects was consequently paid no critical attention (cf Embry 
and Hepburn, 2004). If it were, the whole rationale for the GPFG's long-term 
investment logic would be undermined, and the government's desirability as 
managers of petroleum wealth along with it. 
67 NBI11 did, however, revise its initial estimate of this premium downwards from four to 3.6 percent 
as it was conceded 'historical estimates are not necessarily good estimates of future returns' (Norges 
Bank, 2001 referenced in Norges Bank, 2003a: Section 2.2). 
68 This study, Triumph of the Optimists, was conducted using historical equity and long-term bond 
returns from the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany and Japan (Dimson, Marsh and 
Staunton, 2002). 
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However, these two NBIM reports did not entirely appease either the 
government or public's concerns for the GPFG's new fmancial mandate in the wake 
of the Dot-Com crisis. The Minister of Finance of the time, Per-Kristian Foss, thus 
also commissioned an external consulting fIrm, Mercer Investment Consulting, to 
conduct an independent review of the GPFG in 2003 (cf Mercer, 2003). Mercer was 
specifIcally tasked to explore the 'consequences of a possible change in the mix 
between equities and fIxed income', as well as 'a change in the benchmarks and the 
inclusion of new investment alternatives' (National Budget, 2004: Section 3.5.1).69 It 
was the fIrst time the Norwegian government went outside of its own knowledge 
centres for an alternative interpretation of the GPFG's underlying fmancial logic. It 
was also the fIrst time NBIM's unconditional beliefs about the nature of speculative 
[mance were contested. Indeed, Mercer's 2003 report critically targeted a number of 
the basic assumptions upon which the GPFG's institutional legitimacy was originally 
based. 
First, Mercer argued the distinction between short and long-term investment 
perspectives was inadequately addressed in the Fund's legislation. This was a point of 
concern considering a departure from a long-term trend - such as an historical equity 
risk premium of 6.5 percent, for example - 'can correct at any time' (Mercer, 2003: 
Section 2.4). That is, the 'existence or otherwise of time horizon effects is open to 
debate', and that 'there is general agreement that intuitive beliefs about long term 
investors being able to "ride out the ups and down of the market" are simply wrong' 
(emphasis added, Mercer, 2003: 11). Mercer cited the emerging 'time diversifIcation 
fallacy' literature as quantitatively demonstrating these intuitive beliefs 'are often 
fallacious ... [and] tends to explain observed behaviour rather than prescribe it' 
69 Mercer is in fact the primary consultancy firm hired by all three of this dissertation's case studies. 
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(Mercer, 2003: 14_5).70 This effectively undermined NBIM's assertions that the 
Storting need not focus on the GPFG's short-term returns given its assumed long-term 
profitability. 
Mercer also drew attention to the problems with NBIM's use of the 
Fundamental Law of Active Management (FLAM) to inform them how to develop 
their fmancial expertise. In particular, Mercer argued the performance oriented 
remuneration packages offered to attract skilled investors pressured these managers to 
enhance GPFG returns in the very short-term. That is, NBIM managers typically 
assumed an investment horizon of only three to four months. These short-term 
pressures thus stood in stark contrast to the long-term objectives and management 
mandate to which the GPFG had been officially charged in 1997. There was thus a 
'certain contradiction in NBIM between the amount of sophistication put into the 
construction of the total Fund, in terms of risk allocation and the monitoring of risk, 
and the actual bottom-up portfolio investments'. Mercer argued the GPFG should 
adopt a 'more conventional institutional approach', which was an investment horizon 
of three to five years (Mercer, 2003: Section 2.4). 
Mercer's arguments in 2003 therefore challenged the central government's 
rationale for why they reconceptualised the GPFG as an SWF in 1997. They thus also 
challenged the Storting's dominant policy preference in regards to their burgeoning 
petroleum wealth reserves. First, the distinction between short and long-term market 
temporalities provided government actors a respite in overseeing this highly 
scrutinized issue. As such, alternative and equally uncertain wealth management 
strategies need not be devised as long as Norway retains its faith in the forward-
70 It is interesting to note that despite Mercer's criticism of the underlying rationale behind the Fund's 
diversification campaign, they still recommended the GPFG should assume more types of risk than it 
held at the time. Mercer recommended that a 'representative investor' approach be taken, which 
essentially meant adopting a strategic asset allocation that was comparable to that of other large-scale 
institutional investors, such as CaIPERS, ABP Amro, and the CPPIB (Mercer, 2003: 2, 13). 
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looking imaginary of long-term fmancial profitability. Second, the notion that NBIM 
was capable of hiring skilled managers to buttress their fmancial expertise alleviated 
the central government's responsibility for overseeing the GPFG's new fmancial 
mandate. 
The Mercer Report nonetheless had little effect on the government's pre-
existing po licy preferences given the vested interest they had already developed in the 
GPFG's SWF identity between 1997 and 2003. This vested interest was in terms of: 
(i) the Storting's lack of an equally plausible petroleum wealth management strategy 
(cf. Bergo, 2003); (ii) the sunk costs put into establishing NBIM as operational 
managers (cf. Ministry of Finance, 2005); and (iii) the four percent spending rule 
introduced in 2001, which increased government's dependence on the Fund's annual 
returns (cf. Revised National Budget, 2003: Fiscal Policy).71 Indeed the Ministry of 
Finance's response to the Mercer Report stated that its proposals were 'interesting 
because they challenge some of the rationale underlying the current guidelines' 
(Revised National Budget, 2004: 11). Nevertheless, they maintained the GPFG's 
'[long-term] objectives indicates that particular emphasis should not be placed on 
short-term fluctuations in returns' as substantiated by NBIM's own research (ibid. 
13). 
The Mercer Report instead led government actors to conclude they should be 
more active in their legitimation campaign of the GPFG. That is, they came to believe 
they should more proactively convince the public of the same ideas of speculative 
[mance that had been advocated to them by NBIM five years earlier. Indeed, the 
GPFG's management strategy as being readily conveyable and perceived as 
domestically legitimate was of high importance for the Storting since they established 
71 In 2003, for example, NOK50.8 billion of the GPFG's returns were transferred to the government's 
central account to fill in a gap left between the projected and actual 2003 budget (Revised ~ational 
Budget, 2003: Fiscal Policy). 
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the Fund in 1990 (cf. Skancke, 2003: 318-19; Johnsen, 2010; National Budget, 2004: 
11; Annual Report, 2007: 75). The government thus not only cavalierly dismissed 
Mercer's arguments based on NBIM's guidance, but embarked on a campaign to 
foster a sense of ownership in the GPFG's SWF identity. This was pursued through a 
communication strategy that sought to publicise the internal deliberations of NBIM 
and the Ministry of Finance in a 'clear, honest, and effective' manner (Qvigstad, 
2009b). 
The pnmary communicative tools used to anchor the SWF policy path's 
theoretical propositions in the public perception were the Fund's annual reports, as 
well as the government's National Budgets (Norges Bank, 2009a).72 Indeed, NBIM 
conceded in 2003 that both they and the government actors they advised had to now 
incorporate a 'qualitative evaluation of strategic choices' when formulating the 
GPFG's investment strategy (emphasis added, Norges Bank, 2003a: 3). This was a 
noticeable change in tone from the quantitative and positivist methodology through 
which NBIM's 1997 recommendations were presented. 73 While the reports still 
emphasized the Fund's performance, they also began providing a more detailed 
theoretical discussion of the government's 'fundamental attitudes and assumptions as 
to how the fmancial markets work' (Ministry of Finance, 2007: Section 3.1.2; 
72 The Fund's annual report was one among six nominated for the Farmand award for best annual 
report and website. However, the same report was also strongly criticised by the Norwegian journalist 
Per Egil Hegge for its impenetrable language (cf Hegge, 2009). 
73 This is not to say that this ambiguity in founding rationale for investing in equities did not go 
unnoticed by the investment arm of the central bank. A 2005 NBIM report posited that '[i]dentifying 
today's [i.e. 2005] consensus view is difficult enough ... [i]dentifying the average perception eight years 
ago, when the basis for deciding the current allocation was formulated, is even more difficult' (Norges 
Bank, 2005: 5). NBIM also stated in 2003 that 'there is considerable uncertainty associated with risk 
measurement [such that] Norges Bank cannot base its calculations on a single method of approach and 
model' (Norges Bank, 2003a). The fact that risk continued to be assigned probabilistic variables in the 
face of this uncertainty and Mercer's ideational contestation speaks of the supportive role played by an 
unwavering belief in the calculability of finance. Only by turning to the ideas which supported NBIM's 
perccption that finance was indeed calculable as premised upon a broad understanding of 
divcrsification as a risk management strategy could they reconcile their desire to assume more risk for 
the GPfG's portfolio on the one hand, \\ith their inability to coherently valuate this risk on the other. 
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Ministry of Finance, 2008: Section 2.1.2). The assumptions of global fmancial 
markets being efficient and comprised of rational and therefore predictable investors 
were emphasized in particular (cf. National Budget, 2004: Section 3.5.1.3; National 
Budget, 2007: Section 5.2.4.2). The argument that occasional periods of crisis and 
volatility are to be expected was also advertised in each year's National Budget (cf. 
National Budget, 2004: Section 3.5.1.3; National Budget, 2007: 5.2.4.2). Promoting 
these basic assumptions of the nature of speculative fmance therefore reinforced 
central government claims that the GPFG would be reaping an equity-risk premium 
into the indefmite future. 
To summarize the preceding Section, the central government sought to 
transform the gap spearating the GPFG' s underlying fmanical theories from its 
practices into resources of legitimacy for the state. This was from 2003 onwards in 
particular, which followed the losses generated by the Asian Financial Crisis coupled 
with the Fund's rapid expansion. This development speaks of the constraint the SWF 
policy path put on Norwegian state agency. This is to say that central government 
actors were constrained to defend to critics in the Storting and general public why the 
SWF policy path and its fallacious fmanciallogic should be maintained. Simply put, 
they were constrained by their desire to retain the stabilizing effects engendered by 
their SWF in its management of Norway's petroleum wealth. Indeed for governments, 
the SWF policy path represents a means to manage short-term socioeconomic 
expectations in regards to problems of uncertainty they face. The Norwegian central 
government achieved this by turning to NBIM and their superior forms of knowledge 
about speculative finance to legitimate their SWF's underpinning fmanciallogic when 
criticised by Mercer in 2003. 
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This suggests that as opposed to the assumptions of mainstream analyses, 
Norwegian state managers did not naturally internalize speculative investment by 
fmancial experts as a rationally desirable policy preference. Nor should the GPFG be 
understood as substantiated by any objective or scientific theories that accurately 
reflect fmancial market reality. Rather, state managers relied on the authority of 
politically divorced professional investors to promote several authoritative - yet still 
value-laden - ideas of fmance's profitability and calculability to the domestic 
electorate. This was to help avoid the central government being accused of taking 
unnecessary fmancial risks in their approach to sovereign wealth management. This 
moreover speaks of NBIM's epistemological authority in constraining government 
from developing alternative policy preferences despite the ideational contestation 
presented by the Mercer Report. The following Section elaborates on this constraining 
feature ofSWFs. It examines a third instance wherein the central government's policy 
preferences towards their petroleum wealth management strategy were constrained by 
the epistemological authority exerted by NBIM managers. 
5.3 Constructing the GPFG's Legitimacy (2005-2009): 
Reconciling the contradictions of 
'active'vs. 'passive' management strategies 
From 1997 onwards, the proportion of the Government Pension Fund-Global 
that was managed under an active versus passive-index investment strategy steadily 
increased: from 0 to 28 percent between 1997 and 1999, to 40 percent by 2000, and 
then to 67 percent by 2003 (Annual Report, 2002: Section 4.2; 2003: Section 4.2; 
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2006: Introduction).74 The GPFG would then be actively managed in its entirety 
following a reViSion made by NBIM's Executive Board in 2005 (Annual Report, 
2005: Section 7).75 This transformation in investment management strategy proved 
problematic for the central government between 1997 and 2009. Active management 
contrasts with many of the basic assumptions upon which the GPFG's SWF identity 
was originally based. To engage with active management is to believe that markets 
are not perfectly efficient and prices do not accurately reflect complete information in 
the short-term.76 It assumes heterogeneity versus homogeneity among investors, 
which produces 'special pricing situations' that can be exploited for short-term 
fmancial gain. This consequently entails the assumption of increased levels of 
74 NBIM initially employed a passive index strategy because it represented a simple means to monitor 
the GPFG's portfolio. This meant replicating as close as possible the benchmark index determined by 
the Ministry of Finance (i.e. the FTSE World Actuaries Index for equities and the Salomon Smith 
Barney's World Government Bond Indices for fixed income). This strategy would enable NBIM to 
achieve a high degree of diversification of equity investments relatively quickly (Norges Bank, 1999d). 
It thus allowed for the centralization of the GPFG' s management and more rigorous governmental 
oversight despite the universally diversified nature of the Fund's portfolio. Moreover, a passive index 
approach carried lower transaction costs 'because the administrative work involved in portfolio 
maintenance is independent of the size of the portfolio' (Norges Bank, 2002a: 2; cf. Norges Bank, 
2000a). Passive investment was also deemed a 'natural' fit for the GPFG given its projected size, 
primarily because '[a ]ccording to established financial theory, it is rational for investors to behave in 
this way ... [as] over time, markets do not pay for taking specific risk in connection with choosing one 
or a small number of securities, because many market participants can eliminate this type of risk by 
spreading their portfolios over many securities' (Norges Bank, 2003a). As such, the GPFG became 
invested in over 2,000 different companies across 9,000 total equity holdings, and owned 500 different 
bonds in addition to warrants, various money market instruments, futures contracts and foreign 
exchange positions in the first year of its diversification campaign (Norges Bank, 1999b). 
75 In 2002, NBIM discontinued the use of the passive index approach, instead opting for an 'enhanced 
index' approach (Annual Report, 2002: Section 4.2). This was rationalized by the belief that 'an 
investor who follows the index slavishly gives away money to other investors' (Norges Bank, 2002b). 
NBIM believed they should instead 'make better use of the opportunities for excess return by 
employing active strategies in the management of all index portfolios' (Annual Report, 2002: Section 
4.2). For NBIM, enhanced indexing entailed taking advantage of various 'opportunities ... that are 
created by technical or structural aspects of equities or equity markets [which] exist for short periods of 
time' (Norges Bank, 2002a). These opportunities can arise from initial public offerings (IPOs), or 
changes to market indices - such as various companies entering or leaving an index - and mergers and 
acquisitions. They can then be exploited by: (1) changing the foreign currency and market distribution 
of the individual portfolios under management; (2) changing the portfolio's spread between equities 
and bonds; (3) including sectors or companies in the equity portfolio that are expected to do better than 
others; and (4) by changing interest and credit rate risk in the bond portfolio. Mercer's 2003 report 
refers to this enhanced indexing approach as an overtly active approach to investment in its adoption of 
'a large number of small amounts of alpha' (Mercer, 2003: Section 2.4). Despite its increased risks, the 
GPFG's enhanced indexing portfolio would nonetheless remain classified as a passive 'beta' 
investment strategy. 
7~ This is referred to as weak versus semi-strong forms of market efficiency, the discrepancies of which 
are engaged with and reconciled by NBLM in a 2003 Staff Memo (Norges Bank, 2003c). 
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fmancial risk that cannot be controlled for through diversification to the same extent 
as passive index strategies. 77 According to NBIM's Executive Director Knut Kjaer, 
active management 'is about taking risk that the investor is often not paid to take [but] 
is worth taking when the investor has a specialist skill' (Kjaer, 2006). Active 
management therefore undermined the main arguments cited by Norges Bank to the 
central government to legitimate the GPFG' s reconceptualisation as an S WF in 1997. 
It also appeared to undermine the arguments substantiating the government's 
campaign to legitimate the Fund's long-term outlook as detailed in the previous 
Section. That is, fmancial markets are generally efficient, comprised of rational 
utility-maximizers, and would thus payout a risk-premium to large long-term 
investors like the GPFG. 
How to explain why short-term oriented active management was pursued 
given it contradicted the long-term fmanciallogic that ultimately legitimated the SWF 
policy path to the government and Norwegian public? Why did central government 
actors permit NBIM to increase their engagement with this management strategy 
considering the increased short-term risks it exposed their petroleum wealth to? The 
following discussion argues that due NBIM's epistemological authority, the central 
government was constrained to support these managers' desire to increase the use of 
active management. This is to say it was not just NBIM's being delegated 
responsibility for GPFG management in a functional - read: operational - sense of 
77 NBIM officials have nonetheless consistently contested the argument that active management entails 
assuming increased financial risk. They instead argue active management actually reduces the GPFG's 
overall risk. This is because the majority of risk has already been incorporated into the GPFG through 
the inclusion of equities (i.e. systemic risk). Increasing the active management portion, however, would 
reduce the Fund's investment management risk. That is if concrete and measurable targets were 
assigned for individual GPFG managers, this would enhance the development of NBIM's financial 
expertise as everyone would be repsonsible for the 'quality of the fundamental inputs into investment 
management' (Annual Report, 2007: Feature Article). Indeed, individual responsibility complimented 
~BIM's conceptualization of financial expertise as being a largely agential affair in which 'each 
individual employee must have an opportunity to develop his or her specialist expertise ... which 
derives from responsibility and an absence of intervention from superiors' (Annual Reposrt, 2007: 
Feature Article). 
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authority that constrained central government agency between 1997 and 2009. Indeed, 
it was the authority of the ideas from which NBIM strategically drew that enabled 
them to persuade the Ministry of Finance that active management should be pursued 
over more conservative passive strategies. To be sure, active management was fIrst 
resisted due to the increased risks it posed to both the government and central bank's 
reputation. Large-scale GPFG losses would severely undermine both groups' capacity 
to effectively set fIscal and monetary policy (Eide, 1997; Slyngstad, 2009; Annual 
Report, 2007: 75). 
NBIM initially argued that managers would want to invest outside the 
benchmark portfolio set by the Ministry of Finance for two reasons. Both of these 
reasons were in tum argued to exclusively support the GPFG's fmancial 
maximization objective. First, active management would minimize total management 
costs as it is expensive to own all stocks in the benchmark - a key feature of passive 
strategies. Second, active management was believed capable of achieving 'a higher 
return in relation to the benchmark portfolio' (Norges Bank, 1997a: Section 2). This 
benefit was made possible by what NBIM cited as the relative ineffIciency of 
fmancial markets. Indeed, they began advocating to their government overseers the 
idea that there may exist 'strategies that offer profItable deviations from the 
benchmark portfolio' due to 'the existence of erroneous pricing, and the assumption 
that good management can generate a return in excess of the market return' (Mnistry 
of Finance, 2007: Section 1.3.1; cf. Annual Report, 2007: 74; Norges Bank, 2000e: 
Section 3). 
Economists at Norges Bank and the Ministry of Finance were nonetheless 
initially opposed to active management. These critics were 'well aware' of empirical 
research indicating how diffIcult it was for investors to beat the market over the long-
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term or whether this was even possible. This was especially in the uncertain 
environment left by the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. Indeed this crisis left a 'high 
degree of scepticism about active management' considering it was instigated by the 
same opportunistic trading strategies NBIM wished to engage with (Annual Report, 
2007: Feature Article). NBIM was nonetheless detemrined 'to be among the few 
managers to succeed with active management' as stressed to the Storting by Norges 
Bank officials as early as 1997 (Annual Report, 2007: 74; Norges Bank, 1997a: 9). 
And given the fact they had been delegated operational autonomy over the day-to-day 
management of the GPFG in 1998, they were put in a position to attempt to do so. 
Seciton 4.4 demonstrated that NBIM's capacity to direct the GPFG's insitutional 
development grew in congruence with their fmancial expertise - which became 
synonymous with their epistemological authority - between 1997 and 2009. It was 
this authority derived from their superior knowledge of specualtive fmance that 
ultimately prevailed over critics in the central government and N orges Bank. 
To this effect, NBIM stated two years into their diversification campaign that 
if 'it is possible to attain an information advantage, it will normally be of short 
duration'. Active management for NBIM subsequently hinged upon 'being able to 
predict or foresee price trends ... by having appropriate analyses of what a "fair" price 
is and comparing it with the prevailing market price'. This analysis can be achieved 
through the 'compilation of many open information sources or more or less unique 
insight based on comprehensive research' (Norges Bank, 2000d). For NBIM, then, 
active management could be utilized in such a way that the 'general efficiency' of 
financial markets was circumvented through NBIM's acquisition and further 
development of their fmancial expertise - their information advantage and level of 
investment skill in particular (Bergo, 2007; Kjaer, 2006). This belief thus followed 
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from the guidance provided by FLAM, which provided 'a good seedbed for applying 
fmancial theory and approaching strategy in a structured, near scientific manner' 
(Annual Report, 2007: 75). More specifically, FLAM dictated that the profitability of 
active management strategies 'increases proportionately with skill ... and with the 
square root of the number of positions' (Annual Report, 2006: Feature Article 1). 
Hence the belief that NBIM was corning to possess a satisfactory level of fmancial 
expertise lent authority to their argument for increasing the portion of the GPFG that 
should be actively managed (Kjaer, 2006: 4).78 
Active management was, however, problematic for government officials in 
their desire to maintain the GPFG's domestic legitimacy. It posed a number of 
problems the Ministry of Finance found increasingly difficult to reconcile (cf Mercer, 
2003). The government could not legitimate active management in the same way as it 
could expanding the Fund's exposure to equities, corporate bonds, or other types of 
specualtive asset. Indeed, the pursuit of active management contradicted the notions 
of market efficiency and investor rationality that substantiated their belief in the long-
term profitability of the GPFG's specualtive fmancial identity (see Section 5.2). The 
contradictions between active versus passive management strategies nonetheless 
remained largely unaddressed between 1997 and 2005. This would change in 2005 
when the Government Petroleum Fund Act stipulated the GPFG would be actively 
managed in its entirety (GPF Act, 2005: Sections 2, 7). The central government was 
thus constrained to depend on NBIM to reconcile this discrepancy between the Fund's 
78 It is necessary to note that NBIM's desire to engage with active management was not entirely based 
on the belief that this strategy could generate additional returns as an end in itself. While this notion 
indeed played a motivating role, active management also represented a means to legitimate NBIM's 
aggressive campaign to develop its financial expertise and increase its authority over OPFO 
management. To be sure, NBIM believed in 1997 that 'there was no point having ambitions to achieve 
the highest international standards without the organization having a concrete target to work towards', 
and that the target of excess returns through active management 'was very concrete' (Annual Report, 
2007: Feature Article). Successfully engaging \\ith short-term oriented active management strategies 
therefore represented a symbolic end towards which NB11vI's budding expertise could aspire (~orges 
Bank, 1997a; Annual Report, 2007: 7-l-75). 
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underpinning long-term investment logic with its increasingly risky and short-term 
oriented investment strategy (cf Vik, 2008; Kvam, 2008; Ministry of Finance, 2009: 
Section 4.2; Gjedrem, 2009a). 
Starting in 2005, NBIM began to rationalize active management along 
alternative lines than those employed in the preceding eight years - i.e. active 
management was desirable because markets occasionally presented pricing anomalies 
that could be harnessed to maximize GPFG returns (cf Norges Bank, 1997a: Section 
2). Instead, active management was reframed from a mechanism that would allow 
Norway to capitalise on short-term fInancial opportunities, to a fundamentally 
necessary means to performatively induce the long-term effIciency of markets. In 
short, NBIM reframed the contestation that existed between the short-term active and 
long-tenn passive fmancial logics as necessary corollaries, arguing the former 
performatively constituted the latter: 
'Norges Bank ... believes that if major investors, such as the Government 
Pension Fund - Global work exclusively on the assumption that other 
participants ensure efficient price formation, this can undermine the 
functioning of capital markets .... Overall, an element of active management is 
necessary for Norges Bank to have legitimacy when carrying out important 
parts of the management assignment' - Annual Report, 2008: Section 1.2.1 
Active management was therefore reframed from a problematic contradiction to a key 
source of support for the GPFG's success; NBIM must be able to make active bets in 
the short-tenn to bring about effIcient pricing in the long-term (Norges Bank, 2009). 
It was thus NBIM's capacity to manipulate the qualitative assumptions and theories of 
speculative fmance that put them in a position of authority over the Ministry of 
Finance in regards to GPFG management. NBIM would subsequently become 
increasingly specifIc and more persuasive in its theoretical arguments from 2005 
onwards, positing that: 
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'a long-term investor will be able to create value by exploiting the 
opportunities that arise when other investors are forced to adopt a short 
investment horizon due to special regulations or a short-term need to generate 
income for their owners. This has led to a modified efficient market 
hypothesis. The modern version argues that financial markets are close to 
efficient most of the time, but that active investments help to eliminate 
mispricings and make markets more efficient' - Norges Bank, 2010; cf 
N orges Bank, 2006 
Thus the notion that markets were inefficient in the short-term legitimated 
NBIM's pursuit of active management to the central government between 1997 and 
2009. This in tum substantiated why they should be allowed to develop their fmancial 
expertise and increase their authority over the GPFG's institutional development. At 
the same time, however, the notion that markets were efficient in the long-term was 
used to legitimate the GPFG as a forward-looking strategy of governance to the 
Storting and domestic electorate. That is due to the presence of the equity-risk 
premium, neither state managers nor the electorate should place too much emphasis 
on the Fund's short-term returns. The preceding discussion then highlighted how this 
discrepancy between the GPFG's long-term fmancial logic and short-term oriented 
practices was reconciled by NBIM through their construction and promotion of a new 
financial narrative between 2005 and 2009. This ensured the SWF policy path would 
continue to serve both the central government's domestic political interests, as well as 
NBIM's speculative fmancial interests. These authoritative fmancial ideas thus acted 
as legitimating tools for the SWF policy path once the GPFG became an increasingly 
significant strategy of governance in Norway. They did not therefore provide an 
uncontested blueprint for action, but were strategically drawn from by NBIM to 
legitimate the growth of the Fund's investment universe, and then also the use of 
internal active management. It was these ideas and NBIM's superior knowledge of 
them that ultimately constrained government's capacity to formulate alternative 
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policy preferences, or even critically engage with the SWF policy path and the 
extensive short-term risks it posed to Norway's prized petroleum wealth. 
This lack of engagement would prove significant. Indeed the Chapter now 
examines how the government was constrained to maintain support of their risk-
exposed SWF in the face of global fmancial crisis. More specifically, it examines how 
the crisis that began in August 2007 put government under increased pressure to 
maintain the domestic legitimacy of the GPFG' s risky investment strategy. This 
followed from the active equity portfolio accruing losses of 41 percent in 2008 - far 
above the losses accrued by the Fund's institutional peers (Annual Report, 2009: 30). 
The crisis and its ramifications thus led central government actors to more 
aggressively legitimate the GPFG's speculative fmancial identity to the Norwegian 
public. This was rather than critically examine whether the GPFG's high-risk 
investment strategy was in the best medium to long-term interests of socioeconomic 
stability, as pondered by some in the Ministry of Finance (cf Johnsen, 2010). This is 
surprising as the crisis revealed how destabilizing the speculative fmancial realm 
could be for not just GPFG returns, but Norwegian society in general. The state-
driven recovery the crisis necessitated then also revealed the fallacious nature of the 
GPFG's underlying fmanciallogic. 
5.4 Constructing the GPFG's Legitimacy (2007-2009): 
The Global Financial Crisis 
Chapters Four and Five have thus far examined how the central government's 
adoption of the SWF policy path constrained their agency in regards to petroleum 
wealth management between 1997 and 2009. This was primarily evidenced in Norges 
Bank Investment Management's capacity to direct the Government Pension Fund-
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Global's institutional development throughout this time. Specifically, their capacity to 
convince the central government that expanding the Fund's investment universe - as 
well as increasing the use of short-term 'active' management strategies - was in the 
state's best interests. Constraint in this sense was thus evidenced in government's 
approving - as well as actively endorsing - these changes to the GPFG despite: (i) the 
significant short-term risks they entailed, and (ii) the various sources of resistance 
presented by members of the Storting, Ministry of Finance, and even Norges Bank 
officials (cf Madslien, 2009; Liinanki, 2008; Anderson, 2009a; 2009b; Stott, 2010). It 
was moreover argued this constraint arose from NBIM's epistemo logical authority. 
This is to fill in a gap in the depoliticization literature, which only speaks of authority 
being delegated outside government auspices in a functional or operational sense. Yet 
depoliticization in this sense cannot adequately account for why state managers' 
policy preferences continued to change in favour of the interests of modem fmancial 
epistemology even after the SWF policy path was adopted in 1997. The authority 
exerted by identifiable fmancial ideas to inform action and guide institutional change 
over competing po licy preferences must therefore be paid critical attention to fill this 
gap in the IPE literature. 
The following Section elaborates upon this discussion of the constraint posed 
by the GPFG and its SWF identity on Norwegian state agency. It seeks to explain 
why the global fmancial crisis that began in August 2007 increased the government's 
dependence on the SWF policy path as a substantive element of Norwegian fiscal 
policy and, by extension, their domestic political legitimacy. This increased 
dependence is witnessed in NBIM and their use of modem technologies of risk 
gammg more authority over GPFG management. It is argued this increased 
dependence on such risk management techniques IS problematic as the CrISIS 
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demonstrated their ultimately fallacious nature. Indeed, the crisis undermined the 
speculative fmanciallogic upon which the Norwegian SWF's legitimacy was based. 
The central government's increased commitment to the SWF policy path is also 
surprising given the crisis also relegated the GPFG 'right back where it started' 
thirteen years earlier after it lost a quarter of its value in 2008 (Gjedrem, 2009b). Why 
did the crisis not prompt the Ministry of Finance to increase their oversight of the 
GPFG and limit its risk exposure? This was in fact a task the Ministry had been 
pursuing as early as 2006 (cf. Revised National Budget, 2006: Section 1.5.3).79 The 
following once again demonstrates it was NBIM's epistemological authority that 
enabled them to authoritatively dictate what the central government's policy 
preferences should be in the midst of the crisis. 
To this effect, NBIM immediately appropriated the fmancial CrISIS as a 
resource of legitimacy when global equity markets began to crash in the fall of 2007. 
They argued this period of extreme fmancial volatility was an expected feature of 
speculative fmance, as well as the fIrst major test to the Fund's long-term investment 
horizon (cf. Slyngstad and Gjedrem quoted in Storting, 2009; Slyngstad, 2009). Thus 
rather then sell off their most speculative and vulnerable assets, NBIM dramatically 
increased the size of their equity portfolio by 20 percent between 2007 and 2009 
(Annual Report, 2009: 30).80 This increased Norway's ownership of world stock 
markets from 0.49 percent in 2007 to more than one percent in 2009 (Annual Report, 
79 As summarized by the Ministry of Finance in 2009: 'The National Budget for 2006 described the 
Ministry's intention to introduce regular due diligences of Norges Bank's management of the Fund and 
particular~r the bank's risk management, in collaboration with consultants possessing suitable 
expertise ... Report no. 16 (2007-2008) to the Storting describes the due diligence project consisting of 
an external rn'icH' of Norges Bank's risk management systems (referred to as the Ernst & Young 
fJroject)' (Ministry of Finance, 2009). 
Xil Caner and Grennes (2009: 5) found that the significant losses incurred in 2008 'are tangible evidence 
of the Flmd's increased exposure to risk'. 40 percent of the Fund's equities in 2009 were in fact 
purchased in 2008 (Gjedrem, 2009a). 
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2009: 12).81 The Ministry of Finance was nonetheless wary of NBIM's aggressive 
expansion of the Fund's equity portfolio given the size and global breadth of the 
crisis. They consequently requested two reviews of the GPFG's risk management 
structure, the ftrst in October 2008 and the second in February 2009 (Ministry of 
Finance, 2008: Section 1.5; Norges Bank, 2009b). Yet rather than increase the 
Ministry's authority over GPFG management, the reviews would actually increase 
their dependence on NBIM's fmancial expertise to support them in their governance 
of Norway's expansive petroleum wealth reserves. 
To this effect, the crisis had demonstrated to both NBIM and government that 
'historical relationships between risk factors collapsed' and that the GPFG's approach 
to risk management should be adjusted accordingly (Qvigstad, 2009a; Esmerk, 2009). 
As such, NBIM and their superior fmancial expertise were put in a position of 
authority over the Ministry of Finance to dictate what and how these adjustments 
were to be made. For example, the Ministry of Finance proposed in 2008 that they 
should increase their capacity to restrict the types and degrees of risk the GPFG could 
be exposed to. This desire emerged out of the Ministry'S belief that numerous ftrms 
associated with 'best international practice' in risk management had 'encountered 
serious problems and have been forced to ask for help from their respective 
authorities'. The Ministry therefore argued they should be more engaged with the 
GPFG's approach to risk considering 'the international norms for risk management' 
had fundamentally changed (Ministry of Finance, 2008: Sections 1.5.1, 1.5.4). NBIM, 
however, perceived this request as encroaching on their authority, as well as a slight 
~1 Motivated by suboptimal returns in 2007, the newly appointed CEO ofNBIM - Yngve Slyngstad-
issued three additional proposals to Minister of Finance Kristin Halvorsen requesting: a higher 
ownership ceiling for individual company investments (asked for fifteen percent and received ten), the 
inclusion of more emerging markets such as China, India and the Middle East, and the ability to make 
pre-IPO investments (Norges Bank, 2008a; 2008b; 2008e). The inclusion of small cap equities in the 
benchmark portfolio and the classification of real estate as an allowable asset class were also passed 
between 2005 and 2008 (Norges Bank, 2006; 2007). 
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to the fmancial expertise they believed they had developed since 1997 (Vik, 2009). 
They subsequently countered the Ministry's proposals by arguing 'the expression 
"internationally recognised practice" is imprecise' in the diverse context of modern 
fmancial risk management techniques. Instead, NBIM should be left to make 
qualitative judgements and use various risk factors, the success of which is contingent 
on minimal government interference. In so doing, NBIM began implicating an 
increase in governmental oversight with threatening the long-term interests of the 
Norwegian state as a whole (Norges Bank, 2009a: Section 4; Storting, 2009). 
NBIM was particularly resistant to the Ministry's request that so-called 
'extreme loss risk' - also known as 'Value at Risk' - measures be introduced and set 
by the central government. 82 NBIM fIrst argued that the Ministry's inclusion of such 
specifIc rules would confuse international regulators, market participants, as well as 
the Norwegian public as to who was actually in charge of managing Norway's 
petroleum wealth. SpecifIcally, NBIM claimed: 
'In the long term, excessively detailed rules and reporting requirements will 
entail a risk of the Ministry effectively assuming [Norges Bank's] Executive 
Board's role. Lines of responsibility will then become muddied, and the 
governance model less robust in the face of new challenges and financial 
crises' - N orges Bank, 2009a: Section 1 
NBIM also argued that these types of quantitative risk measures were in any case 
incompatible with the GPFG's long-term investment logic. That is, these risk 
measures would have forced the GPFG to sell off the majority of its assets at huge 
capital losses. VaR measures would have thus been detrimental to the GPFG's long-
term success given the Fund's high-risk investment strategy was pursued on the basis 
it could withstand such periods of volatility (Norges Bank, 2009a: Section 3). Rather 
82 Value at Risk models are used to quantify risks in a financial portfolio. It measures the potential 
future losses a portfolio may incur within a specified period of time, and a specified probability these 
losses will happen. This risk management technique effectively force institutions to sell off poorly 
performing assets if these assets fall below a previously determined VaR metric (Jorion, 2006). 
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than instigate a mandatory fITe sale of GPFG assets, then, NBIM should be allowed to 
make qualitative judgements of how to act in the event of crisis. This was argued to 
increase their chances of reaping the equity-risk premium into the future, and would 
thus ensure the GPFG's success as a substantive feature of Norway's politico-
economic landscape. In short, they argued the fmancial expertise they had developed 
in the preceding years made them far better suited to deal with the ongoing effects of 
crises than the restrictive quantitative models proposed by the Ministry (N orges Bank, 
2009a: Section 3). 
Thus despite the fact the crisis undermined the 'near-scientific' approach to 
active investment they had been developing since 1997 (Annual Report, 2007: 75), 
NBIM officials were nonetheless capable of resisting the Ministry's attempts to 
increase their oversight of the GPFG. They did so by framing any political 
interference that undermined their position as GPFG managers as threatening to both 
the Fund's fmancial success, as well as the long-term interests of the Norwegian state 
as a whole (Slyngstad in Storting, 2009; Norges Bank, 2009a; Qvigstad, 2010a). As a 
consequence, the push to include VaR measures was quickly abandoned by the 
Ministry. Instead, NBIM increased the GPFG's institutional complexity by 
introducing even more measures of risk to guide its investment activities. 83 According 
to NBIM, these measures were more in accordance with the recommendations made 
by 'authorities and other expert bodies' published in the wake of the crisis than those 
proposed by the government. The external experts cited - primarily the Institute of 
International Finance - argued investors should attach less weight to any single 
quantitative risk measure. They should instead depend on 'aggregates of a number of 
83 Based on advice from one of four government-commissioned reports on active management (cf. 
:\ng, Goetzmann and Shaefer, 2009: 23-5) NBIM stated it would use 'different approaches to risk and 
complementary methods of measurement' in its assessment of various sources of market risk, 
including: deviation from the benchmark index, risk from price history, exposure to systemic risk in 
emerging markets, and liquidity exposure (Norges Bank, 2009a). 
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independent models', and ensure they 'combine quantitative measures with 
qualitative evaluations ... [based on] expert judgement' (Norges Bank, 2009a). 
NBIM's implementation and development of these new risk management techniques 
subsequently secured more autonomy for individual NBIM managers than they had 
before the crisis. This was despite the fact these new techniques did not really deviate 
from the same ontological assumptions that had led fInancial economics to 
differentiate fmancial risk from uncertainty in the fIrst place. NBIM's new techniques 
remained rooted in the notion that diversifIcation amongst speculative assets remained 
an optimal and fully legitimate strategy for public capital management (Norges Bank, 
2009b).84 
NBIM was thus capable of convincing the central government they were in 
possession of more advanced forms of expert fmancial knowledge than their 
counterparts in the Ministry of Finance. To be sure, whether NBIM's 
recommendations to avoid using VaR models would prove more benefIcial for the 
GPFG's long-term success was highly uncertain at the time these recommendations 
were made. Global capital markets had yet to 'return to normal' and the GPFG was 
experiencing heavy losses across its equity and bond portfolios. What was certain was 
that NBIM believed their recommendations were preferable based on the authority 
they derived from the prescriptive ideas espoused by modern fmancial epistemology. 
As such, NBIM was able to authoritatively dictate what government's policy 
preferences should be in the volatile and unstable market environment of the crisis. 
This effectively stymied the Ministry in its attempts to increase their authority over 
Norway's petroleum wealth. It also prevented the Ministry from critically engaging 
with the actual benefIts to be derived from the risk management techniques upon 
84 For a review of these new risk management techniques, see Norges Bank, 2009b. 
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which NBIM's epistemological authority was based. After all, such a critical 
evaluation would render the whole basis for investing Norway's petroleum wealth in 
speculative assets suspect. Indeed, economists have yet to provide an alternative 
depiction of speculative fmance than that provided by theories that have remained 
essentially unchanged since the 1960s. 
NBIM was also able to dictate what 'lessons' the government should take 
away from the fmancial crisis. Their immediate response to the GPFG's significant 
losses was that periods of intense volatility are recurrent and expected conditions of 
fmancial markets, as are the recoveries that inevitably follow. They emphasized that 
despite not having reaped the ERP as expected between 1997 and 2009, the 
government must hold fast to the GPFG's risky investment strategy if it was to do so 
in the next ten years (Gjedrem, 2009a; 2009b; Qvigstad, 2009a; Johnsen, 2010a). 
Based on NBIM's leadership, the government consequently began emphasizing the 
necessity of maintaining both the GPFG's long-term outlook and speculative 
investment strategy throughout the Norwegian media (cf Halvorsen, 2009b; Johnsen, 
20 lOa). This was despite the Ministry of Finance's disagreement with NBIM on the 
risk-management techniques that should be used to guide GPFG investment strategy. 
This was also despite the Storting's vocal criticisms of NBIM in private committee 
hearings throughout this time (cf Storting, 2009). Instead of present a divided front to 
the public, both the Ministry of Finance and NBIM worked together to promote the 
notion that markets will return to 'normal' eventually despite the 'abnormal' situation 
posed by the crisis. Indeed, speeches made by Ministry and NBIM officials in 2008 
and 2009 were nearly verbatim repetitions of each other. Time and again they 
reiterated the same messages about what the crisis meant for Norway's petroleum 
wealth management strategy - particularly that the GPFG had a long-term horizon 
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and could thus withstand volatility in the short-term (Qvigstad, 2009a; Gjedrem, 
2008; Gjedrem in Storting, 2009; Halvorsen, 2009a; Johnsen, 2010a; 2010b).85 The 
government and NBIM also sought to 'anchor' the legitimacy of active management 
in the public psyche given it was these strategies that heavily contributed to the 
Fund's losses in 2008 (Halvorsen, 2009b; Johnsen, 201 Oa). The Ministry of Finance 
subsequently commissioned four reports to be written on the subject, each of which 
sought to legitimate NBIM's pursuit of active management (Ang, Goetzmann and 
Shaefer, 2009; Mercer, 2009a; Mercer, 2009b; Norges Bank, 2010). A widely 
publicized and attended seminar on active management was also organized so as to 
provide 'a robust assessment of active management that can stand the test of time' 
(Johnsen, 2010a; cf Norges Bank, 2010; Halvorsen, 2009b). 
Hence neither NBIM nor government officials were transparent m their 
decision-making so much as aggressIve in their construction and promotion of a 
convmcmg narrative that stabilized the GPFG's legitimacy as a sovereign wealth 
fund. Central government officials were constrained to work with NBIM to convince 
the public the crisis did not threaten the GPFG's long-term success as a petroleum 
wealth management strategy. This was if they wished to preserve the GPFG's 
legitimacy as a highly scrutinized strategy of governance (Storting, 2009). This 
reveals the contested and ideationally based origins of SWFs' institutional legitimacy. 
Indeed, the funds' continued existence is contingent on the continued provision of 
support by political authorities. The Norwegian experience also reveals the 
problematic nature of this form of constraint on state agency. It prevented the central 
government from critically engaging with the root causes of this crisis - although the 
H5 Norges Bank officials were heavily influenced by the ideas espoused by crisis psychiatry in their 
approach to calming Norwegian's fears of financial contagion. These officials believed that 'to be 
succcssful in managing a crisis, the responsible authorities must be perceived as competent and at the 
same timc have a reputation for openness and honesty' (Qvigstad, 2009b). 
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failing of modern technologies of risk management and lack of a transnational 
regulatory framework did not go unacknowledged by government officials (Gjedrem, 
2009a; Johnsen, 2010). This constraint moreover limited the government's capacity to 
decrease the GPFG's risk exposure so that it would not be so severely affected by 
another global crisis (cf Canner and Grennes, 2009). 
At the same time, however, the government's commitment to the long-term 
investment strategy appeared to have paid off in 2009. Indeed, the losses accrued in 
2007 and 2008 have been mostly recouped as the Fund's equity portfolio gained 34.3 
percent in 2009 versus 2008's losses of 40.1 percent (Annual Report 2009: 30). 
According to NBIM, this was due to stronger-than-forecast global earnings and 
'reduced uncertainty' in equity markets (ibid. 14, 30-37). Seeing their expectations 
validated in fact built a stronger consensus in government that the Fund can take on 
even higher degrees of fmancial risk in spite of its already above-average risk profile 
(Vik, 2008; Gjedrem and Slynsgtad in Storting, 2009; Halvorsen, 2009a; Esmerk, 
2009; Anderson, 2009a). The crisis and its rapid recovery were consequently 
appropriated to stabilize the SWF policy path's institutional legitimacy; indeed they 
were used to 'prove' the validity of the Fund's underlying fmancial ideas. But again, 
this recovery was not based on speculative fmance reverting to an inherent tendency 
towards equilibrium due to the efficiency of markets and rationality of investors. The 
global recovery in speculative fmancial assets in 2009 was only made possible by the 
large-scale interventionist and stabilizing hand of numerous governments worldwide 
(cf Altman, 2009). Investor rationality and market equilibrium had to be actively 
reinforced by global governments in much the same way as the GPFG's legitimacy 
was between 1997 and 2009. Thus if it can be assumed the long-term success of these 
funds is dependant on public capital to stabilize markets in times of recurrent crisis, 
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the SWF policy path's theoretical benefits may be outweighed by the costs required to 
support the very system throughout which their public capital is embedded. With the 
GPFG set to double from petroleum revenue allocations in just ten years, the SWF 
policy path may not necessarily be in the best interests of Norwegian citizens as its 
supporters are so quick to suggest. Indeed, the fmancial crisis of 2007 -2009 revealed 
how SWFs constrain states to defer their realizable policy preferences to the interests 
and contradictions of a crisis prone fmancial realm. 
Conclusion 
The preceding Chapter sought to fill a sizable gap pervading the literature on 
sovereign wealth funds. It demonstrated that the Government Pension Fund-Global's 
institutional legitimacy was not passively gained through the public's internalization 
of speculative investment as an inherently desirable strategy of governance. Rather, 
this strategy's legitimacy had to be actively and aggressively constructed through the 
collaborative efforts of Norges Bank and the Ministry of Finance in the face of 
domestic criticisms and ideational competition. This was when doubts of the GPFG's 
underpinning fmancial logic fITst began to emerge in the face of its rapid expansion 
and the various crises it was exposed to in the early 2000s. The Chapter drew 
attention to four instances in particular where state actors were problematically 
constrained to actively construct the GPFG's legitimacy. 
First was through government's formalization of the pension issue into the 
Fund's mandate with the Government Pension Fund Act in 2006. Prior to this Act, 
financial speculation as a petroleum wealth management strategy had not been fully 
anchored with either the minority opposition in the Storting or the Norwegian pUblic. 
The act provided a symbolic end towards which the GPFG·s increasingly risk-
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exposed portfolio could legitimately work. The second instance regarded the 
government's efforts to normalize the GPFG's long-term fmanciallogic when faced 
by ideational competition of the 2003 Mercer Report. This led them to promote the 
same basic assumptions of speculative fmance that Norges Bank had initially drawn 
from to convince them of the SWF policy path's desirability in 1997. Particular 
emphasis was placed on the notion that markets were efficient, investors were 
rational, and thus that the GPFG' s speculative assets would inevitably be paid a 
premium over the long-term. 
The third instance regarded the central government's attempts to reconcile the 
inconsistencies that began to pervade the GPFG's underlying long-term investment 
logic with its increasingly short -term oriented 'active' investment practices. Due to 
the increased use - but also the public's increased wariness - of active management, 
central government officials pressured NBIM to construct a fmancial narrative that 
would increase Norwegian's sense of ownership with this strategy. The fmal instance 
wherein government was constrained to support their SWF's legitimacy emerged 
during the fmancial crisis of 2007-2009. Indeed the crisis and its eventual recovery 
revealed the fallacious and ultimately problematic nature of speculative fmance' s 
most basic assumptions. Central government officials were nonetheless constrained to 
maintain their support of the SWF policy path and NBIM as its managers. This was 
given the vested interest they had already developed in the SWF policy path and thus 
the speculative fmancial realm in general to support their legitimacy as governors of 
Norway's prized petroleum wealth. 
Hence due to these promotional efforts of the state, by 2009 the majority of 
Norwegians were in agreement they would not want to pursue an 'uncertain' 
a Itcmative petroleum wealth management strategy (Lont, 2008). The G PFG 's S WF 
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identity in fact annually receives 'broad political agreement [ ... which] strengthens the 
credibility of, and confidence in, the Fund' (Ministry of Finance, 2007: 39; cf 
Revised National Budget, 1997: Section 3.5.1; National Budget, 2004: Section 
3.5.1.1). By 2009, the SWF policy path came to represent a means to strengthen the 
Norwegian economy, reduce the state's overall risk, and provide a permanent revenue 
stream for future generations of the expensive and petroleum-dependant welfare state 
(Halvorsen, 2009a). Chapter Five thus demonstrated that it was only through the 
central government's active endorsement of the ideas substantiating modem fmancial 
epistemology that the SWF policy path was anchored as a desirable fiscal vehicle in 
the minds of the Norwegian public. 
The Chapter also drew attention to how the success of these efforts to 
legitimate the GPFG as an SWF hinged on the epistemological authority NBIM had 
gained for itself between 1997 and 2009. This ideationally-based form 0 f authority 
was shown to be particularly constraining for state agency. That is, it limited the 
central government's capacity to formulate alternative policy preferences in regards to 
petroleum wealth management between 1997 and 2009. This is to fill in a gap in the 
IPE literature on depoliticization by emphasizing it was the power of ideas - versus 
functional or operational capacities - that lent NBIM's policy preferences authority 
over competing alternatives. This is to also show that NBIM officials were themselves 
constrained by the prescriptions of modern fmancial epistemology when faced with 
fmancial crises between 1997 and 2009. They could only hold on to their diversified 
investment strategy and hope that markets recovered as quickly as possible given a 
lack of alternative and equally legitimate fmancial action paths available to them. 
Conceptualising SWFs first and foremost as domestic strategies of governance 
thus enables us to critically examine how the GPFG problematically exposed 
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Norway's substantial petroleum wealth reserves to the logical fallacies and crisis 
tendencies of the speculative fmancial realm. Indeed, the GPFG is legitimated by a 
fmancial epistemology comprising a number of fallacious presuppositions that do not 
provide an objective or realistic blueprint for action. Rather, these ideas primarily 
serve to legitimate increasingly risky speculative fmancial practices to fmancial and 
non-fmancial participants alike in the face of recurrent and increasingly destabilizing 
global fmancial crises. The preceding Chapters thus sought to provide a first step 
towards developing a more rounded critical analysis of SWFs currently lacking in the 
IPE and fmancial economist literatures. Indeed, Caner and Grennes recently 
concluded that the GPFG 'has been a model of transparency, but whether it has 
performed effectively as an agent for Norwegian citizens depends on the risk 
preferences of citizens' (2009: 10). Chapters Four and Five have consequently shown 
that rather than be fully informed of the risks they were being exposed to, Norwegian 
citizens were told a wholly convincing fmancial narrative non-fmancial experts would 
be hard-pressed to refute. This suggests that if government's are to pursue the SWF 
policy path, citizens deserve the right to critically engage with their SWF's 
speculative fmancial identity and investment philosophy in a democratic manner 
currently lacking in Norway. This prevents alternative forward-looking - and 
potentially more domestically beneficial - petroleum wealth management strategies 
from being seriously considered (cf Gjedrem, 2009b). 
The need for such a critical engagement with SWFs' basic assumptions 
became most pertinent in the wake of the 2007 -2009 fmancial crisis. To be sure, the 
GPFG's eventual recovery was in large part the result of ad hoc government 
interventions into the fmancial system and not the efficiency of markets or even 
NBIM's financial expertise. This was well documented by NBIM in their 2008 and 
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2009 Annual Reports. So while the governor of the central bank was quick to claim 
that 'history has seen a number of deep fmancial crises, and market conditions will 
return to normal in time', the fact that government support is crucial for this eventual 
return to 'normality' is conveniently ignored (Gjedrem in Storting, 2009). To 
reinforce this argument that sovereign wealth fund's are best conceptualised as 
domestic strategies of governance that problematically constrain state agency, 
Chapter's Six and Seven now examine the dissertation's second case study: the 
Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund. 
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Chapter Six: 
Alberta's Heritage Savings Trust Fund (1976-1997) 
In 2009, the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund (AHF, or 'the Fund') 
represented CDN$3,000 for each Albertan, 80 percent of the provincial government's 
net fiscal assets, and could finance the provincial budget - the largest in Canada - for 
a full six months (Gartner, 2007: 16; Gibbins and Vander Ploeg, 2005: 16_17).86 
While established in May of 1976 on the back of windfall petroleum revenues, the 
Fund had been subject to such a vast array of changes by 2009 that virtually nothing 
of its original form or function remained. The only constant throughout this period 
was the Albertan government's dependence on AHF capital to support annual budgets 
(see Appendix 2). What did change were the mechanisms through which this role 
would be fulfilled, the changes eventually culminating in the AHF being 
reconceptualised as a sovereign wealth fund in 1997. Prior to this institutional 
transformation, the Fund was tasked to achieve four contrasting objectives. First was 
to contribute to intergenerational wealth transfer given the [mite nature of Alberta's 
petroleum resources. Second was to strengthen and diversify the domestic economy 
so as to wean the province off its dependence on non-renewable resources. Third was 
to improve Albertan's quality of life in the short-term through funding social welfare 
policies and programs. Finally, the AHF was intended to act as an alternative future 
revenue source for the government, a so-called 'rainy day' fund (Lougheed, 1976a: 
828; Warrack, 1985: 15). Of these four objectives, the AHF's focus on diversifying 
the domestic economy away from petroleum dependence was initially cited by 
go\'emment as its most important objective (Lougheed, 1976a: 828). Indeed, the first 
86 Unless noted, currency is calculated in Canadian Dollars for Chapters Six and Seven. 
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two decades of the AHF would see its capital being almost exclusively used in the 
name of economic and social development to support budgetary expenditures. It 
would consequently invest in a variety of socioeconomic assets as disparate as 
medical research facilities, subsidized housing, parks, irrigation works, and pulp and 
·11 87 paper nu s. 
Yet while initially a source of pride for Albertans, as well as a significant 
political asset, the AHF became implicated with a budgetary crisis that greatly 
undermined the government's legitimacy between 1988 and 1994. Indeed not only did 
this crisis serve to delegitimize the Fund's focus on socioeconomic development, but 
the government's capacity to manage Alberta's petroleum wealth in aggregate was 
also cast in doubt. Following its being put into a passive state in 1994, the SWF 
policy path was eventually adopted as a means to address this crisis of legitimacy. 
The AHF's broad and lofty goals of improving Albertan society through 
socioeconomic diversification were replaced with a strictly commercial mandate to 
maximize fmancial returns into the indefmite future. As such, the AHF immediately 
came to embed public capital throughout a variety of riskier Canadian and 
international fmancial assets as the only means to achieve this new objective. And 
while its pursuit of fmancial maximization would be overseen by the Legislature, it 
would be operationalized by the Alberta Investment Management Corporation 
(AIMeo) - an organizationally distinct Crown corporation largely independent from 
government auspices. 88 
87 These investments were to be overseen by the Heritage Savings Trust Fund Investment Committee -
consisting of all members of the Legislature's executive council (Cabinet) - which retained managerial 
authority over 80 percent of the Fund's assets. Only 20 percent of the Fund's assets were subject to 
legislative debate and approval. 
ss The Treasury was renamed the 'Ministry of Finance and Enterprise' in 2001. For continuity's sake, 
the follOwing Chapters refer to the 'Treasury' when referencing the department of government tasked 
with the oversight of the AHF. 
177 
Hence more than two decades after it was established, the AHF was subject to 
an institutional transformation that saw it come to exhibit the three distinguishing 
features of the SWF policy path. That is, the AHF: (1) became a pool of public capital 
invested in traditionally riskier asset classes and markets in pursuit of fmancial returns 
above the risk-free rate; (2) began to universally embed this public wealth in both a 
functional and spatial sense of capital mobility in attempting to control for fmancial 
risk; and (3) is governed by the state but operationally managed by a government-
linked entity akin to an independent central bank - it is thus neither fully integrated 
into the state apparatus but neither is Parliament removed from its oversight role. The 
Albertan case is significant as the AHF' s institutional transformation was not driven 
by government's desire to capitalise on opportunities inherent to the fmancial realm 
as would be argued by mainstream SWF analyses. Rather, it was pursued as a 
politically desirable alternative once the AHF's original mandate and management 
regime was framed as in crisis by opposition members of the government, academics, 
and the media. It was thus only after being interpreted as a means to buttress political 
legitimacy in the short-term that the long-term orientated SWF policy path was 
internalized as a desirable strategy of governance. 
How to explain why both Norwegian and Albertan policymakers came to 
perceive the SWF policy path as befitting their otherwise unique and divergent 
interests? Financial economists and neoliberal policymakers have been quick to argue 
that the diversification of sovereign wealth by fmancial experts into the long-term is a 
rationally desirable pursuit government's should willingly pursue. According to such 
analyses, SWFs enable government actors to capture the inherent profitability of the 
financial realm for the benefit of current and future generations. Yet such analyses 
render government and political agency latent unexamined variables in the puzzle 
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presented by SWFs' global diffusion. Their weltanschauung is rooted in modern 
fmancial epistemology, preventing them from noting other means through which 
SWFs can and do serve the short-term interests of political actors. The primary 
example offered in this dissertation is the funds' ability to stabilize political actors' 
governance function in time through their ability to manage socioeconomic 
expectations. 
To this effect, this dissertation's analytical approach is grounded in the role 
played by ideas to induce and guide institutional change through time. It seeks to 
demonstrate that when faced with unprecedented forward-looking tasks ripe with 
uncertainty, state managers have only ideas to inform them of what constitutes 
rational and legitimate action and, ultimately, which policy paths should be pursued. 
This is not to say that structural factors did not also play a role in influencing the 
adoption of the SWF policy path in Alberta. Indeed, the rapid expansion of the 
budgetary deficit on the back of collapsing world energy prices was a key 
development preceding this transformation. Yet structural factors alone, such as an 
expansionary budget deficit or the presence of developed capital markets, cannot 
explain why the SWF policy path met the unique interests of government actors in 
both Norway and Alberta. Instead, this dissertation emphasizes that ideas embedded 
in institutions are necessary - albeit often overlooked - prerequisites for the 
construction of agency (cf Konings, 2009). 
The following discussion therefore seeks to fill in the gaps left by such 
mainstream SWF analyses that take for granted both political agency and the power of 
ideas to shape its character. It does so by examining how the authoritative fmancial 
ideas substantiating the SWF policy path were framed as capable of supporting the 
short-term interests of the Albertan government when faced with a politico-economic 
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crisis in the early 1990s. It then traces how these ideas continued to shape the interests 
and policy preferences of these actors into 2009. To be sure, the reasons for and 
necessity of political support underpinning the AHF's institutional legitimacy is taken 
for granted in mainstream SWF analyses. The SWF policy path must support political 
actors' short-term interests in some fashion lest there is no incentive for them to 
preserve their funds' institutional legitimacy. The Albertan case supports this 
argument, demonstrating the SWF policy path's legitimacy had to be actively 
promoted by Albertan policymakers in the decade following its adoption lest it be 
delegitimized as the original AHF had been. 
Yet in so doing, the SWF policy path became a constraint on political agency, 
as Albertan politicians were pressured to promote the legitimacy of the AHF's 
speculative fmancial identity. This was rather than critically engage with the 
underlying ideas that substantiate this strategy of governance. The following argues 
this constraint is problematic. Indeed, the AHF's SWF identity derived its legitimacy 
from a number of simplified presuppositions about what speculative fmance is and 
how to successfully engage with it. It is these ideas that provided provincial 
politicians with an authoritative and readily communicable fiscal management 
strategy that could be promoted as legitimate throughout the domestic electorate. 
However, these ideas do not accurately reflect financial market reality so much as 
legitimate the speCUlative investment practices through which this reality is performed 
on a day-to-day basis. This proved problematic as their promotion of these ideas 
pressured government officials to defer their policy preferences to the demands of a 
financial realm in crisis throughout the volatile 2000s. This is despite these crises 
revealing the fallacious nature of modem fmancial epistemology when relied upon as 
a guide to action. 
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The following case study will be divided between Chapters Six and Seven. 
Section 6.1 details how the AHF developed as a government-managed domestic 
investment fund between 1976 and 1982. Section 6.2 then examines the way in which 
the AHF's original form and function was gradually delegitimized by an emergent 
politico-economic crisis between 1983 and 1994. It was following this crisis that the 
government opted to reconceptualise the Fund as an SWF in 1997. Section 6.3 then 
deconstructs how the SWF po licy path was internalized as a viable alternative to the 
pre-existing AHF between 1994 and 1997, and thus how this strategy won over 
competing alternatives. Chapter Seven will then demonstrate how SWFs' substantive 
fmancial ideas came to constrain the Albertan government's political agency between 
1997 and 2009. More specifically, it will detail how these fmancial ideas came to 
constrain the Albertan government's approach to fiscal governance in two ways. First 
was by their influencing the AHF to expand its investment universe and deepen its 
global fmancial embededness. Second was by their giving rise to AIMCo as an 
independent Crown corporation tasked to manage $45 billion in additional public 
funds. These sources of constraint proved especially significant in the wake of 
domestically destabilizing fmancial crises experienced between 1997 and 2009. 
Chapter 7 then summarizes these arguments and concludes. 
6.1 The Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund (1976-1982): 
A 'Vehicle for Social Policy' 
The Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund was established by the provincial 
Legislature in 1976 as a means to manage the accumulation of windfall petroleum 
revenues in 1973. It was initially tasked with a mandate to achieve three disparate 
objectives, each focused on benefiting a different element of Albertan society (Smith, 
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1987: 14).89 First, a domestic diversification objective would seek to benefit business 
interests outside the province's dominant petroleum industry by providing funding for 
various economic development projects. A social development objective would be 
focused on improving everyday Albertans' quality of life by funding welfare 
programs and other not-for-profit projects. Finally, a fiscal savings objective through 
the retaining of investment income and annual government allocations would ensure 
future generations would continue to benefit from the AHF's fIrst two objectives into 
the long-term. 
Shortly after its creation, the AHF and its lofty goals became a significant 
source of pride for everyday Albertans. To be sure, Canada's federal system of 
parliamentary democracy features a high degree of competition, mistrust, and 
occasional hostility between provinces. 90 Feelings of inferiority were especially 
poignant for Alberta who, prior to the growth of its petroleum industry in the 1960s, 
was relegated to the backbenches of federal politics. With the AHF, however, 
Albertans could distinguish themselves from the rest of the provincial pack. Indeed, 
the Fund was immediately imbued with considerable symbolic meaning for everyday 
Albertans who grew up in the shadows of more economically heavyweight provinces 
such as Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia. The AHF was in fact a highly 
debated topic in the lead up to the 1975 provincial election, and the popular support it 
received helped secure its authors in the Progressive Conservative (PC) party another 
89 A fourth objective - that of becoming a 'rainy day' fund for government - would not be introduced 
until the early 1980s as budgets began to slip into deficit. 
90 Alberta is clearly not an independent state as is Norway or Ireland. Yet as a province within the 
Canadian federal system, it possesses the freedom to govern itself in a number of ways that reflect state 
sovereignty. Fiscal policy, for example, is a provincially governed affair. The Albertan legislature must 
nonetheless pay royalties on its energy income to the federal government. This made saving a portion 
of this wealth outside the reach of Ottawa a highly politicized Albertan issue. Indeed, the AHF has 
been a significant source of pride for everyday Albertans since its inception in 1976 (Elniski, 2009). 
The provincial government has consequently retained its sovereign authority to determine the Fund's 
purpose, mandate, and thus relationship with provincial society throughout these three decades. The 
:\Ibertan government therefore meets this dissertation's conceptualization of both the 'state' and 'state 
governance' as outlined in Chapter One: Section 1.1. 
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parliamentary majority (Warrack, 1985: 2_5).91 As summarized by one Member of the 
Legislative Assembly (MLA) reflecting on the Fund's symbolic significance: 
'[The AHF] came to mean that finally in this province we were allowed to 
play on the national scene ... That we have a bank account in this province and 
we have a bigger bank account than anybody else in the country' was 
impressive to the people of Alberta and very comforting. They were able to 
say, "We don't need handouts, " to Ottawa and the rest of the country, "We are 
rich; we are smart; we're not just out here in the boondocks, " and make that 
stick' - Hewes, 1995: 1477 
Yet despite this symbolic importance and lofty ambitions, the AHF's primary 
function has from 1976 onwards been to support the short-term fiscal needs of 
government. While not problematic for Albertans in itself given the popular success 
of the Fund's initial years, the ad hoc and convoluted way in which this dependence 
on the AHF developed between 1976 and 1997 was heavily criticized. Use of the 
AHF in this way in fact abetted the emergence of an unsustainable budget deficit. 
This ultimately led to the Fund - and by extension its owners and managers in 
government - being framed as in crisis between 1988 and 1994. It was following this 
period that the SWF policy path was internalized as a viable means to address this 
crisis so as to reassert governmental legitimacy. Yet before the ascendance of the 
SWF policy path can be examined, it is first necessary to deconstruct how the AHF' s 
original form and function was gradually delegitimized within Alberta between 1976 
and 1988. 
To this effect, the origins of the AHF can be traced to the months following 
the 1973 Oil Crisis when petroleum and natural gas royalties accrued by the Albertan 
government rapidly increased on the back of rising world energy prices (see 
Appendix 2). According to the Deputy Provincial Treasurer of the time, the global 
economy's demand for oil was such that 'cutbacks in production could not be 
()I The Progressive Conservative Party of Canada has in fact held a majority in Parliament since 1971. 
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considered'. The AHF thus arose out of a desire to save a portion of these petroleum 
revenues (Collins, 1980: 159). In this sense, then, the AHF's origins are similar to 
those of Norway in that the sudden accruement of surplus petroleum revenues became 
a problem of uncertainty the government was expected to solve (c.f Noreng, 1981: 
23-25). MLAs were consequently pressured to design and implement a strategy 
through which this capital could be managed in a socioeconomically beneficial and 
domestically desirable manner (Lougheed, 1976a: 833). What was uncertain, then, 
was how this was to be achieved. Should the government save, spend, or invest this 
wealth?92 Indeed, the surplus petroleum wealth accrued in 1973 presented both a 
problem and opportunity for government. The problem was that spending these 
revenues in the short-term would create unsustainable socioeconomic expectations 
(Warrack, 1985: 18). Albertan's deep-seated mistrust of government also led to the 
belief that such investments should be dampened so as to avoid 'possible overzealous 
aspirations' of wayward politicians. It was generally believed that such aspirations 
would only serve to interfere with the natural order of the marketplace (Ghitter, 1976: 
869; cf Pratt and Tupper, 1980: 260).93 Thus within an environment hostile to the 
government's presence in the private market, the problem of surplus petroleum wealth 
92 The province of Alberta had and continues to have the highest rates of public expenditure out of any 
Canadian province. At the same time, it also has the lowest tax rates. As such, the government has 
always depended on the highly volatile petroleum industry to maintain the high level of services 
Albertan's had come to expect but without increasing taxes. The provincial government has moreover 
pursued a spendthrift approach to budgetary politics, increasing services in times of booming 
petroleum revenues and ruthlessly cutting back in times of deficit (cf Pratt and Tupper, 1982; Gibbins 
and Van der Ploeg, 2005; Warrack, 2009). The reasons for this approach to fiscal policy are numerous, 
but can in large part be attributed to a uniquely Albertan approach to personal and public money 
management (Elniski, 2009). According to MLA Doug Elni ski , Deputy Chair of the Standing 
Committee for the AHF: 'it's boom time bust time in the kind of economy we've lived in .. .it's a really 
interesting phenomenon that everyone is so leveraged all the time .. .it's not a Canadian trait, no, it's a 
totally Albertan trait' (Elniski, 2009; cf Hyndman, 1980). 
9) The executive branch of the Albertan parliament (read: the Cabinet) possesses much authority in 
influencing the character of political debate as well as the development of policy and legislation in 
Canadian politics (Warrack, 1985). The Lougheed government was consequently put in a strong 
position to determine how the petroleum-derived wealth rapidly accrued in 1973 should be managed 
despite these reservations. 
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management led to a heightened sense of uncertainty within the Legislature between 
1973 and 1976 (Pratt and Tupper, 1980: 260; Ghitter, 1976: 867; Notley, 1976: 839). 
Yet from the start of legislative debates, it was clear that the PC majority 
parliament - led by Premier Peter Lougheed from 1971 to 1985, who was also the 
1976 AHF Act's author - wished to pursue all three options at once. 94 This money 
could be saved in an extra budgetary account from which government could draw to 
stabilize future budgets in the face of fluctuating oil prices. When not serving this 
function, it could be used to diversify the domestic economy away from petroleum 
dependence, thereby increasing government's tax revenues (Lougheed, 1976a: 828).95 
Thus while delineated a savings vehicle for future generations, the original AHF was 
also tasked to help the government 'diversify and strengthen' the provincial economy 
by investing in projects providing 'long term economic or social benefits to the people 
of Alberta but which will not by their nature yield a [fmancial] return' (AHF Act, 
1976: Section 6 a, c_i).96 Social welfare spending was therefore originally intended to 
work in congruence with the AHF's savings function. As emphasized by Lougheed in 
Legislative debates: 
'[The AHF must) offset the probability of declining revenue in the future by its 
appreciation and by its income. At the same time, it must be a vehicle for 
diversification and for strengthening our economy .. .It must do both; not just 
one, but both' --Lougheed, 1976a: 829 
94 Based on an initial proposal by Premier Peter Lougheed in 1974, draft legislation for the AHF was 
developed and presented in the Legislature for debate in the Fall of 1975. This draft was subsequently 
let to die on the Order Paper, a common strategy used in Albertan politics in matters of potential policy 
significance, complexity, or controversy (Warrack, 1985: 22). The AHF concept was then widely 
debated in the March 1975 Provincial election, after which the original draft bill was modified and 
eventually passed in Spring of 1976. The first $1.5 billion was transferred to the AHF by late summer 
1976 (ibid. 5). 
95 The Lougheed government opted to allocate a one-off payment of $1.5 billion to the AHF in 1976, 
while 30 percent of petroleum income would be allocated to the Fund each year thereafter (AHF Act, 
1976: Section 5). In addition, all investment income earned by the AHF would also be retained. 
96 Premier Lougheed's 1971 election campaign was in fact premised upon a platform of economic 
dih'rsification, and its inclusion within the AHF's mandate can therefore be seen as a continuation of 
this policy preference. Indeed, between 1971 and 1975, program expenditures increased by 34 percent 
while resource revenues rose 400 percent (Boothe, 1990: 6). 
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It was, however, the latter focus on econOffilC diversification and 
strengthening that initially found the most support across party lines in the 
Legislature. Indeed, both majority PC as well as opposition Social Credit and Liberal 
policymakers framed the idea of the AHF in a positively opportunistic light, arguing 
that: 'we have such a sum of money in our hands as legislators that we can determine 
what society is like in Alberta ... We can mould it ... We can take it and guide it to a 
greater degree than ever before' (Speaker, 1976: 878; cf Smith, 1987: 15).97 The 
AHF was then divided into four divisions through which each of the Fund's 
contrasting objectives could be accommodated. 98 Through these divisions the AHF 
began to invest in Albertan assets as diverse as provincial parks, hospitals, subsidized 
housing, medical research facilities, irrigation works, and educational programs. This 
is in addition to conservative fmancial assets such as high-grade corporate bonds, 
government-guaranteed debentures, and other liquid marketable securities (Annual 
Reports, 1977-1982).99 
97 The government had in fact already developed a rough economic plan dictating in which areas AHF 
and other assets should be invested before the Legislation was passed. These included: agricultural 
processing, resources upgrading, technology and skills, tourism, northern development, and financial 
services. This was in addition to the necessary infrastructural investments required of large-scale 
economic diversification projects which had always been provided by the public sector in Alberta 
(Warrack, 1985: 16-17). 
98 These divisions were the: Capital Projects (CPD), Canada Investment (CDNID), Alberta Investment 
(AID), and Current Assets. 
99 The call for flexibility Lougheed cited as so crucial for the AHF's success only referred to its 
management objectives and not the way in which the Fund was to be managed on a day-to-day basis. 
That is, the AHF Act delegated managerial authority for 80 percent of the Fund's assets to an 
'Investment Committee' - composed of Cabinet members and high-ranking Treasury officials - who 
did not require legislative approval for investments. These investments would then be subject to an ex-
post review by an all-party watchdog committee, known as the 'Standing Committee'. Such a 
concentrated managerial structure within the auspices of the Executive was intended to make the Fund 
more 'businesslike' in the absence of a 'legislative straightjacket' that would hamper timely investment 
decisions to be made in a competitive Albertan market (Lougheed, 1976a: 81 cited in Pratt and Tupper, 
1980: 259). Premier Lougheed deflected criticism of the interventionist the AHF presented by focusing 
on the Fund's savings dimension, suggesting only the Cabinet could protect this wealth for future 
generations from a Legislature prone to manipulation by 'special interest groups' (Lougheed, 1976a: 
X33; cf Warrack, 2009). This argument would at the same time serve the provincial development 
project - the most immediate and thus politically desirable focus of the AHF - which was argued to 
require 'an executive armed with maximum tactical flexibility and all necessary discretionary powers' 
to he successful (Pratt and Tupper, 1980: 258; cf Hyndman, 1980; Warrack, 2009). 
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Thus by 1980, the AHF had become overwhelmingly focused on 
socioeconomic diversification such that the majority of its investments earned 
minimal to no short-term fmancial return. This emerging gap between fmancial versus 
socioeconomic return subsequently became a polarizing issue within the Legislature 
(cf. Collins, 1980: 163). Indeed, the AHF's managers in the Cabinet and Treasury 
came under increasing fire for not being more focused on earning fmancial returns to 
support government budgets (Smith, 1980: 142; cf Collins, 1980: 160; Standing 
Committee Report, 1979; Mirus, 1980; Jarislowsky and Grant, 1980; Hyndman, 
1980). In attempting to reinforce the AHF's legitimacy in the face of this criticism, 
the Commercial Investment Division (CID) was established in 1980, and tasked to 
earn 'a commercial return or profit' by investing in riskier fmancial assets such as 
equities and mutual funds. This was compared to the Fund's other divisions which 
only had to earn a rather ambiguous 'reasonable return or profit', which allowed them 
to make investments in long-term socioeconomic development projects (emphasis 
added, AHF Amendment Act, 1980: 1).100 The Provincial Treasurer in fact argued this 
focus on return maximization reflected the 'natural evolution' of the Fund and that the 
'goal of maintaining a good return, is the key if not the primary goal of the [AHF, 
which is] of course a savings account for the future' (Hyndman, 1980: 933). 
Reflecting the then emerging academic literature on the equity risk premium, 
Hyndman legitimated the CID's increased risk appetite by citing 'studies [which] 
have indicated that over the long run, equities have significantly outperformed all 
major categories of fixed income investments' (Annual Report, 1982: 6). Despite 
100 The CID was, however, limited in that it could only invest in companies that met the requirements 
of the Canadian and British Insurance Companies Act. This limited the CID to invest in blue-chip 
stocks \vith a long history of dividend payments. Thus it cannot be said that the AHF was investing in a 
finanCially diversified and riskier way to the same extent it would be by 1997. Moreover, assets 
invested through the CID would remain less than 1.5 percent of total assets between 1980 and 1985, 
with investment income earned therein being divided and spent between the Fund's other divisions. 
Thus little of the CID's investment income actually contributed to the Fund's appreciation. 
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these arguments from his Treasurer, however, Premier Lougheed maintained that the 
AHF was not primarily a savings fund, but a socioeconomic development vehicle that 
would 'over a decade or so ahead' enrich the domestic economy and enable Albertans 
to 'begin to pay a much larger share of provincial services by way of customary 
taxation' (Lougheed, 1980b: 936). This conflict of ideas demonstrates there was a 
motive to adopt the SWF policy path as early as 1980, but it wasn't yet in the 
government's interests to do so. They also demonstrate the AHF was from the very 
start a strategy of governance whose objectives could be adapted to accommodate the 
short-term political interests ofMLAs. 
Indeed shortly after the CID was established, both the Fund's savings and 
domestic diversification functions were to be sacrificed in favour of its being used as 
an alternative source of budgetary fmancing. This followed from the 1980 amendment 
to the original AHF legislation. Here, not only was the CID established, but the 
wording of the Fund's mandate was also changed: from making investments that 
would 'strengthen and diversify' the Albertan economy to 'strengthen or diversify' 
(AHF Amendment Act, 1980). This increased the AHF's flexibility in regards to how 
its capital could be managed and to what ends. That is, its managers in the Lougheed-
led Investment Committee were freed to utilize AHF assets in general ways that 
would not necessarily diversify the Albertan economy but may, arguably, strengthen 
it. As a result, a significant portion of AHF capital was used to subsidize domestic 
taxes in the face of rapidly swelling annual budgets (Smith, 1987: 14-15; Warrack, 
1985; 2009). To be sure, public spending had only increased by four percent between 
1976 and 1978, but rapidly swelled by 62 percent between 1979 and 1982. This was 
at the same time as income from petroleum taxation dropped by 29 percent (Smith, 
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1987: 7-8; see Appendix 2).101 Thus rather than decrease services and raise taxes. the 
government opted to use AHF assets and investment income to meet the budgetary 
short-fall by lending money to various provincial Crown corporations in need of 
funds. They also began redirecting the AHF's investment income back to the 
government's main budgetary account - the General Revenue Fund (G RF) - in 
1992.102 The importance of the AHF to support government budgets subsequently 
grew alongside the Fund's expanding domestic investment portfolio, which 
represented approximately 13 percent of annual government revenues by 1982 
(Standing Committee Hearings, 2006). 
6.2 The Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund (1983-1994): 
The Delegitimization of the AHF as 'Vehicle for Social Policy' 
When the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund was established in 1976, its 
contrasting objectives represented a legitimate and desirable means through which 
surplus petroleum wealth could be managed. First, saving through annual 
contributions would preserve this wealth for future generations. Second, investments 
in underdeveloped sectors of the domestic economy would eventually decrease the 
government's dependence on the energy sector for tax revenues. Finally, social 
welfare development would immediately better the quality of life for a vast array of 
101 This squeeze between increased spending and decreased resource revenues can be attributed to a 
nwnber off actors. First, the AHF spent $1.3 billion on 'deemed assets' through the CPD between 1976 
and 1982. Not only did these investments earn no return, but they also set a higher base for operating 
expenditures covered by the government in the annual budget (Smith, 1987: 8). Second, Alberta was 
facing recessionary pressures due to a resource-dependant business cycle so government spending was 
increased to pick up the slack. Third, the Federal government's 'National Energy Program' of 1980 
reduced the amount of non-renewable resource royalties accruing to the Albertan government. Finally, 
interest rates became increasingly volatile from 1979 onwards and AHF money was used to alleviate 
the pressures this put on Albertan homeowners - albeit just prior to an election, a move for which the 
goyernment received much condemnation (ibid. 46; cf Gartner, 2007: l3). 
Iii' . 
- :\n amendment passed in 1982 saw the portion of resource revenues allocated to the Fund remam at 
30 pl'rcent, but with all investment income being diverted to the GRF wherein it was used to subsidize 
taxes (AHF Amendment Act, 1982). 
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Albertans. Between 1976 and 1982, these objectives served to address the problem of 
uncertainty posed by this petroleum wealth, and in a way that sustained the 
Progressive Conservative's dominance in domestic politics. Indeed, the AHF's 
stabilizing influence on budgetary politics has been a substantive contributor to the 
PC's popular support since 1976 (cf. Smith, 1987; Warrack, 1985). This support arose 
directly through AHF expenditures, but also indirectly from the goodwill engendered 
by the Fund's existence in Federal Canada. Throughout this time, each of the Fund's 
objectives went to support the government's short-term interests: fIrst to invest in a 
variety of public works Albertan's could immediately benefIt from; second to keep 
interest rates low for home owners prior to the 1982 election; and third to subsidize 
taxes. This is, in effect, the primary task to which governments apply themselves: 
they manage domestic expectations by planning into the future, thereby providing 
social, economic - and hopefully for those in power - political stability in the present. 
As Seabrooke argues, a government's capacity to influence the shared expectations of 
domestic society is a substantive feature of legitimacy construction (2006: 21; cf 
Hay, 2006: 4-7). Uncertainty as to how to best manage Alberta's petroleum wealth 
would nonetheless resurface as the Fund's original mandate and managerial structure 
were gradually delegitimized and cast as in crisis between 1983 and 1994. 
This is not to say the Fund was in crisis from a social welfare standpoint given 
the variety of social programs and economic development projects it had funded (cf 
Llniski, 2009; Matheson, 2009). Rather, it would become increasingly apparent that 
investing in such projects was not the government's primary concern. Nor was it the 
Albertan public's primary desire, which was later revealed by an extensive survey 
campaign to be preserving the AHF as a savings fund for future generations (Review 
Committee, 1995). This uncertainty was thus problematic as not only had the 
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government become increasingly dependant on AHF capital to support annual 
budgets since 1980, but they also lacked a viable alternative to replace the pre-
existing management strategy. This problem was compounded by the fact that the 
AHF and its convoluted mandate still held great symbolic significance for the 
Albertan electorate. Their criticisms were directed more towards what they as well as 
opposition MLAs perceived to be the government's mismanagement of an otherwise 
problem-free AHF (cf. Review Committee, 1995: 12; Matheson, 2009). As a 
consequence, the PCs were repeatedly criticized for lacking fiscal accountability 
d 4 103 between 1983 an 199 . 
A strategy to address the delegitimization of the pre-existing AHF regime was 
therefore an issue of high importance for the incumbent PC government in 1994. 
Simply put, the crisis incentivized the government to tum to alternative ideas to 
inform them how to govern in the face of uncertainty posed by the AHF crisis. This 
eventually led to the adoption of the SWF policy path in 1997. Yet before the reasons 
behind this institutional transformation can be further examined, it is first necessary to 
deconstruct how the original AHF was delegitimized between 1983 and 1994. Indeed, 
it was the specific way in which the AHF crisis materialized that led government to 
conclude the SWF policy path and its three distinguishing features would support 
their short-term interests. The following breaks this crisis into three interrelated 
sources: a fiscal source, a measurement source, and a management source. 
103 Such was the embededness of their political base, however, the PCs still managed to retain the 
parliamentary majority following these elections, but by replacing Premier Getty with Ralph Klein 
(Elections Alberta, 1993). They nonetheless lost a significant share of the vote in the 1993 provincial 
election to the Liberals on the back of AHF and related fiscal issues. The PCs would then regain the 
lost support in the 1997 general election following Premier-Klein's efforts to eliminate the fiscal deficit 
through reconccptualising the AHF as an SWF as well as through implementing a four-year austerity 
program (Flcctions Alberta, 1997). 
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6.2.1 The AHF Crisis - Fiscal 
The fiscal source of the AHF cnsis IS grounded in two interrelated 
developments. First was the government's decision to gradually eliminate the Fund's 
savings objective. Second was the way in which this helped facilitate the emergence 
of a $30 billion provincial deficit by 1994. This deficit proved highly undesirable for 
an Albertan public that had been 'conditioned to reject debt' by the government since 
the 1970s. This is referring to the unique 'boom-bust' fiscal culture of the resource 
rich, but also resource dependant, province (Elniski, 2009). The deficit also proved 
highly problematic for the government who would face an electoral backlash if they 
either cut services or raised taxes. It is hence ironic that the origins of the crisis 
emerged as a direct consequence of the Lougheed government's decision in 1982 to 
use the AHF to subsidize taxes. This first manipulation of the AHF in fact established 
a precedent the government would re-enact twice more. The first was in 1984 when 
the Fund's annual contributions were halved from 30 to 15 percent of resource 
revenue, and the second in 1987 when these contributions entirely were stopped 
altogether (AHF Amendment Act, 1984; 1987; Warrack and Russell, 2002: 7).104 So 
while the redirection of investment income to the government's main account in 1982 
was meant to last only two-years, it became a permanent fixture of fiscal policy as the 
budget balance continued to deteriorate throughout the 1980s (Boothe, 1990: 8; see 
Appendix 2).105 
To be sure, these changes were made in attempts to accommodate Alberta's 
high level of public expenditure while keeping taxes low in the face of declining 
104 To put this in context, between 1976 and 1987 approximately $15 billion had been allocated to the 
AHF from resource revenues, with $3 billion having been allocated to the CPD. 
lOS On the surface, however, the government was still committed to its pursuit of the AHF's long-term 
economic diversification and social development goals as evidenced by a 1984 White Paper (Alberta 
Treasury, 1984). The government's actions in regards to AHF's investment following the issue of this 
\\hite Paper \vould nonetheless suggest these goals were more or less undermined by the short-term 
liscal needs of the government. 
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resource revenues - which dropped from $1037 to $454 per capita between 1986 and 
1990 due to collapsing world energy prices (Boothe, 1990: 9). From 1983 onwards, 
the AHF thus rapidly became a means for the government to reduce its dependence on 
fmancial markets for debt fmancing. As summarized by a member of the AHF 
Review Committee in 1997: 
'[Sjince 1982 all the income earnedfrom the heritage Fund has actually been 
used for government spending. Without that income it would have been much 
more difficult for the budget to be balanced, we'd probably have a larger debt 
than we do now, and so on' -- Zwozdesky, 1997: 2 
The decision to stem the flow of annual contributions of petroleum wealth in 1987 
thus made clear to Albertans the AHF no longer represented a savings vehicle for 
future generations. It no longer had a steady source of income, was not being proofed 
against inflation, and was losing money each year through the Capital Projects 
Division (CPD) on so-called 'deemed assets'. These included provincial parks and 
subsidized housing among other 'quality-of-life' investments. With no new revenue 
sources the AHF was left to a fate of gradual decline, a clear violation of the Fund's 
savings mandate for which the government received much criticism (Warrack and 
Russell, 2002: 7; McEachern, Hawkesworth, Piquette, 1987; Smith, 1987; Boothe, 
1990; Institute of Chartered Accountants of Alberta, 1992; 1993). So whereas the 
Fund had been a political asset between 1976 and 1982, it increasingly became a 
political liability from 1983 onwards as more questions and criticisms were directed 
at both the Fund and government (Smith, 1987: 46). 
These criticisms would nonetheless be weathered by the PCs, who had come 
to so dominate Albertan politics in the 1980s. What they could not withstand was just 
how unsustainable the budget deficit would become between 1987 and 1994 on the 
back of collapsing world energy prices. Hence despite the AHF being used as a lender 
of first resort, Alberta's fiscal picture rapidly deteriorated as the budget deficit grew 
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from $1561 per capita in 1987 to an unmanageable $5500 per capita in 1993. Debt 
servicing costs also skyrocketed by 150 percent, and just as petroleum income fell 
from approximately 40 percent to less than 25 percent of total government revenues 
(McMillan and Warrack, 1993: 6; Alternative Solutions for Albertans, 1994: 2). Such 
was the size of the deficit, the rapidity of its growth, and the inability of the 
government to generate enough revenues to keep it under reasonable control that even 
the AHF's use as an alternative source for government borrowing became negligible 
(Standing Committee Hearing, 2006). MLAs were therefore incentivized to revaluate 
the Fund's multi-purposed mandate, but in such a way that would not compromise the 
Fund's ability to support the government's short-term fiscal plan. Uncertainty as to 
the best means of doing so nonetheless remained when the AHF was put into a 
passive state and an official review was called in 1994. 
6.2.2 The AHF Crisis - Measurement 
The delegitimization of the AHF's original mandate is also attributable to its 
lack of measurability. Calls to liquidate the Fund to address the burgeoning deficit 
more head on were complicated by the fact that neither its total value nor performance 
could be readily measured in quantitative terms. Indeed, the AHF had as early as 1985 
lent approximately $6.5 billion to four Albertan crown corporations that met the 
qualifications for strengthening but not necessarily diversifying the provincial 
economy (Warrack, 1985: 25-26; Annual Reports 1980-1987: Introduction).lo6 While 
these loans were not necessarily controversial in their own right, their repayment was 
highly scrutinized due to their being paid from already borrowed capital in the 
106 These investments included a $3.5 billion loan to Alberta Mortgage and Housing Corporation 
(which provided subsidized housing); two loans of $1.5 billion each to Alberta Government 
Telephones and Alberta Municipal Financial Corporation; and a $160 million loan to Alberta 
Opportunity Company (Warrack, 1985: 25-26). 
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General Revenue Fund. The government was accused of engaging with 'circular 
accounting', repaying itself in lODs that only served to increase the net deficit 
(Mumey, 1990-1994; AHF Standing Committee, 1992; Mitchell, AHF Standing 
Committee, 1994). While the Treasury and Auditor General maintained this practice 
complied with federally regulated accounting principles and the repayments 
constituted 'real' income, the practice was condemned by a number of sources within 
academia and government (Payne, AHF Standing Committee, 1992; Taylor, AHF 
Standing Committee, 1992; Mumey, 1990-1994; Matheson, 2009). The debate 
produced much uncertainty as to how much capital the AHF held and whether it 
should still be considered an account independent from the rest of public [mances. 
Between 1988 and 1994, for example, consensus could not be reached as to whether 
the Fund was worth $12 billion or as little as half that. 107 
Further complicating the determination of the Fund's value was the 
controversy surrounding the so-called 'deemed assets' in the CPD. Debate became 
particularly pronounced between two of the Fund's primary overseers - the Provincial 
Treasurer and Auditor General - between 1990 and 1993. On the one hand, the 
Auditor General argued that the then $3.2 billion CPD was not generating any 
revenues - nor was it ever intended to do so - as it invested in assets such as 
provincial parks which provided a number of quantitatively immeasurable social 
benefits. Considering these assets could not be valuated let alone sold for profit, they 
should be excluded from the Fund's balance sheets. To sell the CPD's assets would 
ultimately require changing 'the whole concept and policy of the government in 
relation to this Fund' (Salmon in Standing Committee Hearing, 1992). The Treasurer 
107 For a summary of the different values of the AHF throughout this time, see Murney, 1990-1994. It 
was not until 1994 that this debate was resolved when the government commandeered the services of 
four private market consultants to valuate the Fund at an officially recognized $11.4 billion (Review 
Committee, 1995: 1). 
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strongly disagreed with these arguments. He interpreted CPD assets as still being a 
part of the Fund due to the ambiguity of what constituted real versus deemed assets 
under the AHF Act (Salmon in Standing Committee Hearing, 1992). This was largely 
motivated by the fact he wanted the public to recognize the government's fmancial 
commitment to bettering their quality of life in the short-term. 
The AHF's value therefore remained an unresolved and polarizing issue in the 
Legislature, particularly between 1988 and 1994. This was for both those opposition 
members that wanted the Fund liquidated to address the swelling budgetary deficit, 
and the PCs who wished to maintain the status quo. What these camps could agree 
upon was that the AHF' s institutional legitimacy was being undermined by an 
inability to quantify in an easily communicable manner what it was doing for either 
the government or public. Indeed, it could not be readily determined just how 
effective the Fund was in supporting fiscal policy or socioeconomic development. 
This was significant as the Fund's budget-stabilizing investments in irrigation works, 
medical research, education, and provincial parks represented approximately 60 
percent of AHF assets (Warrack, 1985: 26; Review Committee, 1995: 1-3). Due to 
this confusion surrounding its value and benefits, the AHF could not be compared to 
other institutional funds of similar sizes - such as public pension funds, mutual funds, 
or commodity stabilization funds. Unsurprisingly, this lack of measurability produced 
great uncertainty as to what the AHF's primary task was supposed to be, let alone 
how well it was doing it (Review Committee, 1995: 2). 
6.2.3 The AHF Crisis - Management 
The belief that the AHF's socioeconomic investments were beneficial 
nonetheless continued to be the narrative from which the government drew to 
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legitimate maintaining the status quo into the 1990s. They cited the importance of 
these investments from a 'strategic basis' in particular, suggesting the extent to which 
the AHF had come to support the PCs legitimacy (Orman in Standing Committee 
Hearing, 1992). What became increasingly difficulty was the government's ability 'to 
rationalize and explain what is going on here to the general public of this province' in 
the face of the mounting budget deficit (Jonson in Standing Committee Hearing, 
1992). The inability to measure either performance or real value resulted in the AHF 
and its managers in government being increasingly criticized for a lack of 
transparency and accountability. This served to delegitimize the AHF's original 
mandate and management structure from the perspective of both the electorate and 
opposition policymakers (cf Toronto Star, 1987; Nikiforuk, 1995; Flanagan, 1998; 
Mumey, 1990-1994; Smith, 1987; Mitchell in Standing Committee, 1992; Taylor in 
Standing Committee Hearing, 1992; Dalla-Longa in Standing Committee Hearing, 
1994; Warrack, 2009). 
The Legislature and Cabinet were accused of managerial incompetence 
between 1988 and 1994 in particular. The gradual elimination of the Fund's annual 
allocations served to confuse Albertans of the AHF's already ambiguous mandate. 
Several underperforming and highly publicized investments throughout the 1980s 
buttressed these negative sentiments. 108 The end result of the fiscal and measurability 
sources of the AHF crisis was that the government's hands-on managerial approach 
was condemned as woefully incompetent and captured by self-interested politicians 
(Public Meetings, 1997; Elniski, 2009). Performance benchmarks could not even be 
108 Among the most publicly criticized investment decisions were: inter-provincial loans made through 
the ('~madian Investment Division which were characterized as 'un -Albertan'; lowering interest rates to 
help homeowners just prior to the 1982 general election; establishing the venture capitalism firm of 
\'cllcap: investments in Miller-Western, who defaulted on their loans costing the AHF $272 million by 
1987- although it was a 'great investment from an operational and impact on community level' 
(Elniski, 2009); and other questionable loans in the name of diversification to AL-Pac, Ridley Grain, 
and Murphy Oil, all of which were not required to pay interest or any principal until 2005. 
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assigned to AHF managers in the Cabinet and Treasury, rendering its management 
seemingly unaccountable to the domestic electorate. With exception to the small 
percentage of assets being invested under the CID, the AHF's only guidelines were to 
invest in either 'projects which by their nature will not yield a return of capital', or 
those that would provide an ambiguous 'reasonable fmancial return' (emphasis 
added, AHF Act, 1976). 
The fact that the AHF's government managers could not be 'fIred' from their 
posts therefore led to the AHF being increasingly characterized as a government 
'slush fund'. Even outside Alberta, widespread sentiment was that the Fund had been 
captured by self-interested politicians and rentier special interest groups (Mumey, 
1990-1994; McMillan, 1995; Nikiforuk, 1995; Bercuson and Cooper, 1998; Flanagan, 
1998; 10hnson-Calari, 2007: 51; Cowper, 2007: 224). Many argued the AHF was in 
fact 'worse than useless' as it gave a false sense of affluence, which then led to the 
massive budgetary defIcit (Review Committee, 1995; Mitchell in Standing Committee 
Hearings, 1994). A wide variety of policy papers were produced by opposition parties 
and privately-funded think-tanks between 1982 and 1994 that attacked the 
government's management of the AHF. They also offered a diverse range of 
recommendations, from liquidation to an exclusive focus on social welfare 
spending. 109 Thus throughout the early 1990s, it became increasingly clear that if the 
pes were to retain their parliamentary majority, they could not maintain the status 
quo vis-a-vis the AHF and its role in supporting their unsustainable and highly 
undesirable approach to fIscal policy. 
109 These papers nonetheless primarily served to act more as a political strategy to undermine the PC's 
power rather than strengthen the AHF (NDP, 1981; Office of the Liberal Opposition, 1986; 
t-.kEachcrn, Hawkesworth, Piquette, 1987; Institute of Chartered Accountants of Alberta, 1992; 1993; 
Alkrnati\'c Solutions for Albertans, 1994; Office of the Leader of the Official Opposition, 1980). 
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6.3 The Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund (1994-1997): 
Legitimating the SWF Policy Path 
Section 6.2 demonstrated that while government's management of the Alberta 
Heritage Savings Trust Fund was criticized as early as 1982, public pressure to 
revaluate its form and function became more pronounced between 1988 and 1994. 
This followed the government's landmark decision to abandon the AHF's savings 
function so as to support the budget in the face of shrinking resource revenues. This 
fiscal strategy was taken by Albertans as a gross abuse of the symbolically significant 
AHF. Indeed without these contributions, Alberta would eventually lose a major 
distinguishing feature of their provincial landscape. The continued decline in 
government revenues between 1988 and 1994 then gradually eroded even this 
function of the AHF, as the fiscal deficit soon became unsustainable (see Appendix 
2). The Fund's lack of measurability in terms of both overall value and annual 
performance also meant that it was unclear as to how much the fund was worth, and 
even how beneficial it really was to everyday Albertan's. The AHF was thus 
increasingly referred to as a government 'slush fund' throughout media, accusations 
the PC majority found increasingly difficult to ignore. 
In order to deal with these criticisms, the PC government - led by Premier 
Ralph Klein after his predecessor was ousted prior to the 1993 election - put the AHF 
into a passive state in 1994 and called for an extensive review of its form and 
function. liD In particular, the parliamentary appointed Review Committee was tasked 
to find ways the AHF could be re-tasked to more successfully support the short-term 
fiscal needs of government. This was both in terms of helping eliminate the budget 
deficit, as well as satiate the public's desire for change and increased accountability. 
110 Thus in the transition phase of 1994 to 1997, no new investments other than those in the CrD and 
cash and marketable securities portfolio could be made. 
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Following an extensive public consultation that consisted of provincial surveys, 
public hearings and roundtable discussions, the Review Committee reaffIrmed that 
Albertans wanted to keep the AHF, but not at the status quo (Alberta Legislature, 
1995: 3, 22). More specifIcally, the Committee recommended: (i) the government's 
relationship with the AHF should be limited to setting its objectives, (ii) private sector 
experts should be more involved with investment decisions alongside the Treasury, 
and (iii) the Fund should be made more transparent in its operations and objectives 
(Review Committee, 1995: 22_24).111 
Yet even with the eventual adoption of the SWF policy path in reaction to 
these recommendations, the AHF would continue to serve the short-term interests of 
government. What would change was the means through which this supporting role 
would be achieved, as well as how it was presented and promoted by government. 
First, the SWF policy path would help support the short to medium-term income 
needs of the government's fiscal plan. It was also thought capable of preserving the 
AHF's principle, meaning the Fund could once again be considered a savings fund 
Albertan's could proudly support. Finally, the government would task themselves 
with promoting the reasoning behind the AHF's speculative approach to public capital 
management. This would help insulate MLAs from accusations of unaccountability 
and - perhaps ironically given the AHF's continued use to support annual budgets -
shortsighted self-interest (c£ AHF Act, 1997: Sections 2_6).112 
III This is not to say the Klein Cabinet saw the original AHF as all bad given the wide variety of 
beneficial projects it funded and its ability to stabilize provincial finances (Klein in Standing 
Committee Hearings, 1994). To say the Fund did nothing for Alberta would do both the government 
and the Fund itself a huge disservice. Rather, these MLAs recognized their predecessor's decision to 
redirect AHF capital to subsidize the budget eventually undermined their political legitimacy despite 
their best intentions. Indeed, redirecting a significant portion of its capital towards budgetary financing 
enabled Albertan's to continue benefiting from Canada's highest level of public services but at no extra 
cost. Yet this practice proved unsustainable in the face of fluctuating petroleum reyenues, for which 
ML:\s were eventually criticized. 
112 It should be noted that one of the primary objectives that arose from the recommendations of the 
1994 Review Process was to protect the fund's assets against the effects of inflation through inflation-
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Yet how did the SWF policy path and the authoritative fmancial ideas 
substantiating its legitimacy come into the interests of Albertan po licymakers over 
competing alternatives? Why did the government opt not to pursue these alternatives 
introduced both in and outside the Legislature from the late 1980s onwards? For 
example, why not liquidate the fund to pay down the deficit; improve the 
government's commitment to achieving long-term socioeconomic diversification; or 
make annual allocations to the Fund a permanent fixture of fiscal policy so as to 
discipline the budgetary process? In approaching these questions, this Section seeks to 
reinforce the theoretical claim that SWFs stabilize political actors' governance 
function when faced with problems of uncertainty. The epistemology of speculative 
fInance upon which SWFs' legitimacy is based authoritatively coordinates 
socioeconomic expectations into the indefmite future. The funds enable governments 
to reconceptualise uncertainty as fmancial risk, while simultaneously placing the 
responsibility for management of this public capital at one remove of their auspices. 
For the Albertan government, the SWF policy path was pursued only after the AHF's 
original form and function was implicated with facilitating a wider budgetary crisis 
between 1988 and 1994. 113 As such, the crisis not only posed a problem of uncertainty 
in regards to how the government could reassert the AHF's legitimacy, but also how 
to reassert their own appeal as ultimate governors of Albertan society. It served to 
reaffIrm a long-standing belief that government could just not be trusted in a PC 
proofing (Alberta Treasury, 1996: 4). Priority was, however, given to deficit reduction. The 
government was only required to inflation proof the fund once the deficit was entirely reduced, and 
then additional transfers could be made only if 'authorized by a Special Act' (AHF Act, 1997: Section 
9-1). Between March 31 2005 and January 2008, the government has, however, transferred a total of 
$3.9 billion from investment income and budgetary surpluses back to the fund (Annual Report, 2008). 
IIJ This crisis was not all about ideas, but also the product of very real structural factors. Primary of 
these was the collapse of world energy prices which led to the expansion of the deficit in the first place. 
Thus there is a dialectical relationship between structural factors which can induce periods of 
uncertainty, and the ability of ideas to inform action in the face of this uncertainty. Emphasis here, 
however, is ultimately placed on ideational factors as the prerequisite for the construction of agency in 
situations of uncertainty. Only through analyzing ideas can the specific reasons for which the 
government opted to pursue the SWF policy path over competing alternatives be revealed. 
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dominated province where the 'sanctity of property rights and a hatred of socialism 
almost constitute a secular religion' (Pratt and Tupper, 1980: 260). The AHF was thus 
not reconceptualised as an SWF just as a profitable opportunity to be capitalized on as 
assumed by mainstream SWF analyses. Rather, it primarily represented a strategy of 
governance intended to avert a crisis of legitimacy the democratically-elected 
Albertan government found themselves facing. 
6.3.1 The SWF Policy Path and the AHF Crisis - Fiscal 
The fiscal source of the AHF crisis regards how the Fund was increasingly 
implicated with supporting an unsustainable budget deficit between 1988 and 1994. In 
response, the Review Committee concluded that the public majority demanded the 
Fund be reinstated as a savings vehicle. However, this conflicted with the 
government's desire to have it support their short-term fiscal plan. Between 1994 and 
1997, the first distinguishing feature of the SWF policy path - that AHF assets would 
be invested in a broad range of riskier assets in pursuit of returns above the risk-free 
rate - was gradually internalized as a means to achieve both these desires. The AHF 
was thus eventually tasked with new legislation to exclusively pursue the 
maximization of fmancial returns to the benefit of 'current and future generations of 
Albertans' (AHF Act, 1997: Preamble).1l4 It would at the same time be barred from 
making 'economic development investments ... [and] social investments' of any kind. 
Instead, it was to base its investment criteria 'solely on fundamental investment 
principles and strategies' (Alberta Treasury, 1996: 4). This is opposed to the Fund's 
original mandate which broadly stipulated 'a substantial portion' of resource revenues 
114 F ul . 
ollowing recommendations made by an externally hired consultancy firm - Mercer Cons tmg - to 
Tri:asury officials, it was decided the AHF would invest 40 percent of its portfolio in Canadian and 
international equities and 60 percent in fixed income. 
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be 'set aside and invested for the benefit of the people of Alberta in future years' 
(AHF Act, 1976: Preamble). 
Tasking the AHF to exclusively pursue fmancial returns into the long-term 
would thus reinstate the perception that the Fund was a savings vehicle for future 
generations. The epistemological authority exerted by the idea that riskier investments 
would be profitable in the long-term would then also reassert the government's 
credibility in regards to petroleum wealth management. Indeed, the AHF would 
continue to support the government's short-term fiscal plan, but the idea of fmancial 
profitability would recast it as an intergenerational savings fund. It was the 
epistemological authority commanded by this idea and the fmancial expectations it 
engendered that helped reassert the government's legitimacy in regards to AHF 
management, as well as overall fiscal policy. This idea of fmancial profitability meant 
the Fund would be earning investment income capable of stabilizing budgetary 
frameworks indefmitely. Investing in risky assets into the long-term would also 
preserve the AHF's principle, insulating MLAs from criticisms of fruitlessly wasting 
its capital as they had between 1988 and 1994. The SWF policy path thus appeared to 
provide a sustainable source of annual revenue not derived from highly volatile 
petroleum revenues. The first distinguishing feature of SWFs therefore represented a 
means to stabilize socioeconomic expectations in regards to AHF management, but 
without sacrificing its use as a supportive feature of Albertan fiscal strategy. How did 
this strategy, as underpinned by the idea of fmancial profitability, overcome 
competing alternatives proposed by various policymakers between 1994 and 1997? 
To this effect, recall the AHF was partially tasked to generate fmancial returns 
in 1980 following the creation of the Commercial Investment Division. However, the 
CID managed only a small percentage of total assets and was limited to pursue a 
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predominantly conservative investment strategy. Beginning in 1988, however, the 
looming deficit led the AHF Standing Committee to begin recommending there 
should be an increased focus on generating short-term fmancial returns. More 
specifically, they recommended the Fund begin investing in more Canadian equities 
and that the CID's capital base should be expanded (Standing Committee Report, 
1988; 1989). Given the province's fiscal position, Treasury and Cabinet officials by 
and large agreed an increased focus on returns to be within the government's interests 
(Treasurer in Standing Committee Report, 1989: 20). But still, they were unwilling to 
have the AHF exclusively focus on fmancial maximization as 'it would mean 
abandoning a balance of rate of return and economic development initiatives' (ibid. 
23). In short, it would mean abandoning a major contributing feature to the province's 
socioeconomic stability and makeup. 
It was not until 1993 that Alberta's rapidly deteriorating fiscal picture forced 
the government to revaluate the means through which the AHF should be used to 
support its spending habits. By this time, gross government debt stood in excess of 
$29 billion and was projected to grow in excess of $35 billion in four years (Alberta 
Treasury, 1993). Premier Ralph Klein subsequently initiated an austerity program that 
cut government expenditures by 20 percent over four years. He also suspended the 
AHF's domestic investment activities - which had made these spending habits 
possible in the first place - and initiated an official review to revaluate the way in 
which the AHF could support Albertan fiscal policy. What the Review Committee 
found was that the primary benefit of the AHF for government in the short-term could 
be isolated to the Commercial Investment Division (Review Committee, 1995: 7-9). 
The Cabinet reaffirmed these findings, citing those AHF assets invested in 'safe' debt 
instruments by the Treasury were 'competently managed on a day-to-day basis' and 
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required little government involvement (Klein in Standing Committee Hearings, 
1994). The Review Committee then took these fmdings one step further and 
concluded the Fund should 'focus on fmancial diversification using a number of 
different fmancial vehicles to maximize return on investments' (Dinning, 1995; 
1418). 
While a far cry from the simple objectives demanded by the Albertan public -
i.e. to keep the Fund but not at the status quo (AHF Review Committee, 1995: 22) -
fmancial maximization through speculative investment fit well with the principles that 
motivated the review be held in the first place. Specifically that, should the AHF be 
kept, it would be tasked with 'clear and measurable objectives' and 'a well defmed 
investment strategy' to support the government's budgetary needs (ibid. 3). What 
were being reconsidered throughout the review process, then, were the way in which 
this supportive role was to be fulfilled and the official recognition that it was doing 
SO.115 In light of these recommendations, a consensus spanning party lines began to 
emerge, which called for the AHF to greatly increase its focus on fmancial yield as a 
means of supporting Albertan fiscal policy. The lack of fmancial returns generated by 
the Capital Projects Division had by then become too much of a drain on the Fund's 
institutional legitimacy (c£ Carlson, 1995: 1475; Standing Committee Hearings, 
1994). In the face of $30 billion deficit, anything that would not help stabilize 
provincial fmances was deemd irrational and wholly irresponsible: 
'Any time we have funding in this heritage trust fund that is generating us a 
lower rate of return on what it is making than what we are paying, there is no 
115 The Balanced Budget and Debt Retirement Act passed in 1996 stipulated that any income accrued 
to the AHF was first and foremost considered income of the government's consolidated fiscal plan. 
This officially implicated future AHF revenues with the GRF's bottom line, and thus the flexibility of 
setting and meeting annual budgets. In addition, AHF assets would be netted off gross liabilities of the 
net debt whereas previously they were considered an external government account and thus an 
unofficial alternative revenue source. This had enabled the government to engage in 'circular 
accounting' practices and ultimately undermined their commitment to the AHF's savings function. 
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rationalization. There is no adjective except ineptitude that will describe that 
particular situation' - Germain, 1995: 1433116 
The diversified investment of its pre-existing capital base thus represented a 
means of supporting government's short-term interests, specifically its ability to 
reduce the destabilizing uncertainty they were subjected to by unsustainable fiscal 
policies. This is significant for the IPE literature on ideas and institutional change as it 
was the belief that riskier assets would be more profitable than the AHF's existing 
approach to sovereign wealth management that legitimated this large-scale 
transformation. The axiomatic notion of the equity-risk premium in particular enabled 
the government to convince themselves and eventually the public of the AHF's future 
profitability, thereby reasserting both their and the Fund's legitimacy in the short-
term. Indeed, transforming the AHF in this way proved a contributing factor to the 
PC's success in the 1997 election, where they won 63 of the Legislature's 83 seats 
and made up the political ground they had lost in the 1993 election (Elections Alberta, 
1997). The government argued in particular that 'equities have provided an average 
annual real return of seven percent and debt investments approximately three 
percent'. They then projected a fmancially-driven AHF would generate an annual 
return of 5.5 percent (Alberta Treasury, 1997: 9; Matheson, 2009). Hence not only 
could the Fund once again be considered an inter-generational savings fund, but it 
would also represent a legitimate and substantive feature of a seemingly sustainable 
Albertan fiscal policy. 
Despite the PC's promotion of the ERP as an authoritative guide to action 
between 1994 and 1997, the minority opposition Liberal Party were initially opposed 
to recasting the AHF as a long-term fmancial maximizer. They preferred the Fund to 
116 At the same time, however, Germain also argued in the same debates about the AHF in the 
following year that the government need not get involved with 'high-risk' investments to protect their 
'nest-egg' (Germain, 1996: 1547). 
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be liquidated so as to pay down the deficit more directly (Taylor in Standing 
Committee Hearings, 1990-1992; Mitchell in Standing Committee Hearings, 1992-
1994; Dalla-Longa in Standing Committee Hearings, 1994; Germain, 1995: 1433). 
The pes nonetheless overrode this opposition quite easily, it being argued the SWF 
policy path would accommodate their historically spendthrift approach to fiscal 
governance into the long-term rather than offer a one-off solution. To do so, they once 
again called upon the authoritative idea that speculative diversified investment would 
earn, on average, a substantial 5.5 percent return. The Liberals could not offer a more 
legitimate or viable alternative to these assertions. Nor could they undermine the 
epistemological authority exerted by the notion of the equity-risk premium and the 
vaunted position it had held over the preceding five decades of fmancial practice and 
academia. 
The opposition nonetheless continued to challenge the assertions of their PC 
counterparts on the basis that a fmancialized AHF to eliminate the debt crisis is 
'based on pure speculation', and that 'just as likely as the stock market going up next 
year in this metaphysical bull market, it can go down' (Mitchell in Standing 
Committee Hearings, 1995: 22; Germain, 1996: 1547). However, such objections 
were limited to the PCs staunchest critics in the Liberal minority, as the majority of 
MLAs had trouble disagreeing with the appeal the SWF policy path presented to the 
future sustainability of Albertan fiscal policy. Here was a strategy of governance that 
seemed to provide a sustainable source of annual revenues, would appease the 
demands of the Albertan public, and at the same time insulate them from accusations 
of squandering public capital in self-interested pet projects (cf Shariff in Public 
Meetings-Calgary, 1997: 5; Dinning, 1996: 1418). Thus by 1997, the vast majority of 
policymakers had fully internalized the idea that the SWF policy path would fill the 
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gaps left by the government's traditional approach to budgetary management 
(Doerksen in Public Meetings-Edmonton, 1998: 25; Dunford in Public Meetings-
Calgary, 1998: 72; Melchin, 2002: 926; Elniski, 2009). 
The AHF as an ardent risk taker and financial maximizer was thus eventually 
perceived as a means for government actors to stabilize their governance function in 
the face of criticisms of fiscal irresponsibility. It would effectively coordinate and 
manage domestic expectations as to how and what end the politicized and symbolic 
AHF would be managed. Speculatively investing AHF assets throughout the broader 
fmancial realm was thus not pursued due to any innate properties of fmance as argued 
by mainstream SWF analyses. Rather, it was the authority exerted by the entirely 
theoretical and simplified idea of the equity-risk premium that won over competing 
strategies as to how the government could fill in the gaps left by their previously 
unsustainable approach to fiscal governance. And despite being introduced as a viable 
option the government should willingly pursue as early as 1988, it was not deemed as 
such until it met the short-term interests of the debt-laden Klein government in 1997. 
Yet recall that the AHF was also subject to a crisis of measurement. The new AHF 
would thus also need to be more transparent and easily communicable to the Albertan 
public than its predecessor. The SWF policy path once again provided a means to 
solve this problem by simplifying the AHF's communicability to the quantitative 
language 0 f fmancial risk and return. 
6.3.2 The SWF Policy Path and the AHF Crisis - Measurement 
The use of risk-based investment techniques to support the AHF's new 
financial mandate provided a communicable means of measuring the AHF's 
performance. To be sure, measurement of the AHF's performance between 1976 and 
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1994 was handicapped by the multiple and often contradictory objectives it was 
tasked to pursue. This produced much confusion as to what the AHF should be doing 
let alone how well it was doing it. For example, the long-term success of economic 
diversification and welfare projects required the government to hand-pick which 
sectors of Albertan society should benefit from AHF investment and how. This 
required them to maintain stringent oversight of these projects so as to keep them in 
line with the popular interests of the Albertan electorate. The success of the savings 
objective, on the other hand, demanded the government minimize its involvement by 
delegating oversight to experts in the Treasury more familiar with central bank -style 
fiscal management strategies. 
These contradictory notions of how AHF capital could be legitimately used 
created much confusion as to how the government should approach Fund 
management between 1976 and 1994. This made making comparisons to other public 
funds altogether impossible for Cabinet and AHF Standing Committee members 
(Dinning in Standing Committee Hearings, 1996). The lack of such comparability 
proved highly problematic for these MLAs, who were replaced in their oversight 
capacities every four years. Comparing the AHF to a similar fund would have allowed 
newly elected or reshuffled politicians to gauge performance. More importantly, it 
would also provide them with a precedented guide to action in regards to AHF 
management. Establishing investment benchmarks based on the pseudo-science of 
fmancial risk management would thus simplify as well as stabilize the way in which 
successive governments would approach AHF oversight. No matter their lack of 
experience with speculation, MLAs would be able to monitor and communicate AHF 
investments and investment strategy through the prescriptive language of risk and 
return. According to the Review Committee, this strategy would make the AHF's 
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objectives and execution of those objectives 'more simple ... more 
straightforward ... more easily comparable to other funds that have an asset mix of 
where we [the government] want to be' (Dinning in Standing Committee Hearings, 
1996). Indeed if the AHF were to be made more measurable by comparing it to other 
public funds, it made 'good, common sense to have a balanced portfolio' consisting of 
a diverse range of equity and fixed income assets (Carlson, 1995: 1476). The so-
called 'prudent person rule' was written into the 1997 AHF legislation to ensure this 
would occur. 
To this effect, the prudent person rule clarified - or perhaps constrained - the 
means through which the AHF's now fmancial performance could be judged. It 
stipulated the Treasurer as operational manager: 'shall adhere to investment and 
lending policies, standards and procedures that a reasonable and prudent person 
would apply in respect ofa portfolio of investments to avoid undue risk of loss' (AHF 
Act, 1997: Section 3-4). It would thus ensure AHF managers conform to the 
expectations demanded of modern portfolio theory, specifically that 'the prudent 
investor controls risk by intelligent diversification' (Mintz et aI, 2007: 46). Hence 
from 1997 onwards, only the continuous diversification within and between riskier 
assets would be deemed a legitimate use of AHF capital (cf Mitchell in Standing 
Committee Hearings, 1992). This would at the same time appease the demands of an 
Albertan public long-since disillusioned with the ambiguities of the Fund's original 
form and function (Carlson, 1995: 1476; Mitchell in Standing Committee Hearings, 
1992; Review Committee, 1995: 7-9). The expected return of 5.5 percent the 
government projected the AHF to generate then helped indicate the level at which 
these performance indicators should be set (cf Alberta Treasury, 1997). Thus with the 
guidance provided by the prudent person rule - and its ability to tame the 
210 
unpredictability of speculative fmance through risk management - the AHF began to 
actively embed Albertan public capital throughout the global fmancial realm. 117 
However, recasting the management of the AHF in terms of fmancial risk is 
not without its problems. It seeks to portray uncertain fmancial futures as predictable 
and controllable despite the periods of 'irrational exuberance' and crisis that render 
this strategy empirically untenable. Financial economists have yet to deal with the 
problems early theorists such as Knight (1921), Hardy (1923) and Fisher (1930) 
encountered when approaching fmancial uncertainty as a measurable concept (cf. 
Chapter Three: Section 3.2). What distinguishes socioeconomic or political 
uncertainty from its fmancial equivalent is a matter of axiomatic principle: 
specifically the belief that fmancial uncertainty is probabilistically measurable as risk, 
and that this provides an accurate reflection of how the fmancial realm behaves. Yet it 
is precisely because these ideas reduce the epistemology of speculative fmance into a 
seemingly manageable language of risk and return that the SWF policy path appealed 
as a strategy of governance to Albertan policymakers. The continuous diversification 
of AHF capital to manage risk provided a means against which the Fund's success or 
failures could be readily tracked, measured and communicated. Even with this 
increased capacity to measure performance, however, the management source of the 
AHF crisis remained unresolved. That is, who could be deemed prudent enough to 
delegate operational authority for AHF management if, as Premier Klein famously 
declared in his 1993 electoral campaign, government was 'out of the business of 
business'? How could MLAs distance themselves from these experts, but also ensure 
they remained committed partners in supporting the government's short-term fiscal 
plan? 
117 Using the prudent person rule as a guideline for rational action, the Treasury determined a ba.sic 
asset mix of 40 percent equity and 60 percent fixed income best met the government's preferred nsk 
tolerance. 
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6.3.3 The SWF Policy Path and the AHF Crisis - Management 
Between 1988 and 1994, the AHF was portrayed throughout policymaking 
circles and media as 'a politicians' slush fund, out of which money could be shovelled 
for whatever happened to be going by at the time' (Germain, 1995: 1432). Both the 
Cabinet and Legislature were accused of unaccountability for eliminating the AHF's 
savings function, and fiscal irresponsibility for the way in which this decision 
facilitated the growth of a $30 billion deficit. While these same Albertans 
contradictorily demanded a high level of public services but funded by the country's 
lowest tax rates, their calls for change nonetheless brought the PC's pre-existing 
approach to petroleum wealth management into question. Revision of this relationship 
thus represented a first step towards ensuring they commit themselves to a more 
sustainable fiscal strategy (Dinning in Standing Committee Hearings, 1996). The 
SWF policy path consequently provided a desirable means through which MLAs 
could define and reassert their uncertain identities in relation to both AHF 
management and budgetary politics. 
To this effect, the SWF policy path would ensure the government increased its 
reliance on financial experts divorced from the political arena to oversee the day-to-
day management of the AHF. This complimented a primary recommendation of the 
Review Committee, which was to distance the Legislature from Fund management as 
much as possible. As stressed by one member of the Commission: 
'Albertans want accountability, but they also see the need for external experts 
to playa more active role in making investment decisions. As one person, ! 
gather, said to the committee: ! didn't elect mv MLA to be a banker ... ! COllldn 't 
agree H'ith that individual more' - Dinning, 1995: 1419 
This suggests that from the very start of the transition period, both policymakers and 
the general public saw fmancial expertise as synonymous with increased 
212 
accountability and good governance. From a political standpoint, then, placing the 
government at one remove of AHF management represented a means to support their 
legitimacy in the destabilizing wake of the broader politico-economic crisis. This is 
opposed to dominant SWF analyses that treat fmancial expertise as necessary for 
strictly fmancial purposes - i.e. to increase an SWF's institutional sophistication and 
hence capacity to earn returns. 
It is nonetheless worthy to note that despite its chequered history, the AHF 
was the driving force behind a variety of beneficial programs and initiatives that 
would not have otherwise occurred. Throughout this time, however, MLAs became 
increasingly aware that establishing medical research facilities, venture capital 
corporations and provincial parks were generating little fmancial or lasting political 
returns (Elniski, 2009; Matheson, 2009; Warrack, 2005). Opposition Liberals and 
majority pes subsequently grew ever more frustrated with the AHF' s shortcomings in 
the face of the mounting deficit. Between 1994 and 1997, there emerged a gradual 
consensus that the Fund was and always had been created with the best of intentions, 
but was contributing little to either fiscal or political stability. These frustrations were 
compounded by the increasingly vociferous cries the AHF was 'poorly implemented, 
poorly administered, and poorly protected for Albertans of the future' (Germain, 
1995: 1432; c£ Sekulic, 1995: 1533; Warrack, 2009; Elniski, 2009). The AHF's 
problem was thus gradually understood as not just the product of its socioeconomic 
objectives as much government's heavy handed approach to its management. They 
saw how their predecessors had used the AHF in much the same way they also 
intended to, but through a confusing, domestically polarizing, and altogether 
unsustainable approach. It was consequently believed that for the newly fmancialized 
AH F to avoid a similar fate, MLAs would be required to distance themselves as much 
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as possible from its investment portfolio, if not its investment returns (cf Hewes, 
1995: 1478; Carlson, 1995: 1475; Sekulic, 1996: 1533). Depoliticizing this aspect of 
government's fiscal governance function would thus satiate the public's desire to 
increase AHF accountability. At the same time, it also appeared capable of increasing 
the government's ability to reduce the deficit by increasing the AHF' s fmancial 
returns (Hewes, 1995: 1477; Dalla-Longa, 1996: 1549-1552). 
It should be noted that the idea to place the Cabinet and Legislature at one 
remove of AHF management was a recurrent theme in Legislative debates since 1976 
(cf. Lougheed, 1976a: 81; Pratt and Tupper, 1980: 259; Warrack, 2009). Yet it was 
not seriously considered until 1994, when MLAs perceived themselves as unable to 
maintain the status quo without suffering significant political consequences (cf 
Standing Committee Hearings, 1992; Review Committee, 1995). Depoliticizing AHF 
management was nonetheless resisted even in the months leading up to the Fund's 
official Review. Premier Ralph Klein would maintain right up until suspending the 
AHF's activities that, as opposed to his predecessors, he had little input on where or 
how the Fund's assets were to be invested. Indeed, most of its capital had by then 
already been locked into various domestic development projects or budgetary outlays. 
Klein argued further depoliticization of management was unnecessary given the 
AHF's already substantial commitment to supporting the current budget (Klein in 
Standing Committee Hearings, 1994). These sentiments were, however, made before 
the government had resigned itself to the fact that the AHF needed a complete 
overhaul. To be sure, the Cabinet and then PC majority's opinion towards AHF 
management changed in early 1994 when it became clear the provincial debt would 
be approaching an unsustainable $30 billion following that year's official Budget 
Report (Alberta Treasury, 1994). This was in addition to the criticism the AHF was 
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receiving for enabling this deficit to swell uninhibited. According to one member of 
the AHF Review Committee in the face of these developments, increasing their 
dependence on fmancial experts appeared to help solve both of these issues: 
'/ pushed for a greater private-sector role in the management of the fund 
[because] J thought private-sector managers would be very! av.'are of the 
linkages between our debt management strategy and our financial asset 
management strategy. They would look at what was in the best interests of the 
province in terms of both strategies' - Percy, 1995: 1421 
The SWF policy path was thus never intended to lessen the Albertan 
government's authority over AHF management so much as arena-shift it. Indeed, the 
majority of managerial authority in regards to the AHF's form, function and 
relationship with Albertan society would remain under the purview of the Cabinet and 
Legislature. What the 1997 AHF Act did ensure was that the Treasury was delegated 
responsibility for setting and operationalizing the Fund's investment strategy, 
displacing both the Cabinet and Legislature in this regard (AHF Act, 1997: Section 
7).118 This was to be overseen by the Investment Management Division (IMD), a 
direct descendant of the favoured Commercial Investment Division. 119 Also under the 
new regime, the AHF Standing Committee would now represent the Legislature by 
reviewing triennial AHF business plans and annual reports written by the Treasury 
(AHF Act, 1997: Section 6).120 This transformed the Standing Committee into an 
intermediary between AHF management, the Legislature, and Albertan society. It 
118 The Act also established the Operations Committee to act as advisor to the Treasury, and was 
chaired by the Provincial Treasurer and composed of a voluntary group of' a majority of private sector 
members with business and financial expertise' (Alberta Treasury, 1997: 14). 
119 While the IMD would be responsible for the day-to-day management of the Fund's investment 
activities, it also played an active role in setting the AHF's strategic asset allocation 'because they are 
the investment experts' (Matheson, 2009). The IMD would nonetheless remain under the purview of 
the Treasurer who would ultimately determine how the Fund should be invested at the 'strategic 
level. .. because nothing is guaranteed at the investment level' (ibid). Even still, the Legislature would 
maintain control of the Fund's investment income (both in terms of inflation proofing and allocations 
to the General Revenue Fund), as well as their ability to change the AHF's investment policies, 
~andate, and basic objectives. The Legislature would also maintain much informal authority through 
g~ ability to exert pressure on personnel within the Treasury overseeing the Fund (ibid; Elniski, 2009). 
:\ppf{wal of the AHF's Business Plans by the Legislature's Treasury Board was also a new 
r,equirement introduced in 1997, thus providing MLAs with another check on the AHF's form and 
tunction. 
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would thus also serve to act as the SWF policy path's promotional agents rather than 
its watchdog. Their primary task would not be to oversee and manage the Fund's 
investment strategy so much as to promote the modem fmancial epistemology from 
which its legitimacy derived. Incidentally, they would also be promoting the 
legitimacy of the AHF as a significant supporting feature of fiscal policy in general. 
This management structure introduced by the 1997 AHF Amendment Act 
therefore reinforces the argument the SWF policy path was initially pursued as a 
means to support the short-term interests of government. This point was reiterated on 
various occasions throughout the AHF Standing Committee's first promotional 
campaIgn: 
'By 2005 ... it's possible that by then there will be a whole new set of 
circumstances and we'll be able to access as much or as little [of the AHFJ as 
we want. It will depend on how tied to current legislation at that time the 
government wishes to be' -- Zwozdesky, 1997: 7 
What the 1997 Act had changed was the specific means through which the AHF 
would pursue its supportive role. Yet at the same time and perhaps unbeknownst to 
MLAs, the SWF policy path not only depoliticized authority away from their auspices 
in an operational or functional sense of the term. Authority was also ideationally 
depoliticized in the sense that government actors would be subjecting their capacity to 
act to the guiding prescriptions of modern fmancial epistemology. What could be 
considered legitimate uses of AHF capital would be only those actions that sought to 
maximize fmancial return while minimizing risk through extensive diversification. 
Institutionalization of the so-called prudent person rule ensured this. Put simply, 
neither Treasury nor Legislative officials could have the AHF engage with capital 
intensive economic development projects to generate returns, the strategy pursued by 
venture capitalists. Nor could they simply save by investing in highly-safe fixed-
income securities as pursued by central banks, as this would mean incurring large-
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scale opportunity costs given an expected 5.5 percent annual return. The SWF policy 
path was therefore intended to support fiscal policy, make AHF performance more 
measurable and communicable, make the Fund appear less susceptible to Legislative 
manipulation, and thus appear more accountable to the Albertan public as a long-term 
savings fund. 
Conclusion 
The preceding Chapter demonstrated how the SWF policy path was 
internalized by the Albertan government as a means to address a politico-economic 
crisis that grew in intensity between 1988 and 1994. The exclusive pursuit of fmancial 
maximization would simplify the Fund's pre-existing objectives, which had gradually 
lost legitimacy throughout this period. It would also enable investment benchmarks to 
be set against which the Fund's performance could be readily gauged and 
communicated in precise mathematical terms. Re-tasking the AHF in this way was 
not therefore pursued to capitalise on rationally desirable investment opportunities as 
currently assumed in the SWF literature. Rather, this transformation into fmancial 
speCUlator was meant to increase the Fund's measurability, transparency, and 
accountability. Indeed, if all managerial decisions were made by fmancial experts 
with purely commercial objectives in mind, government actors could not be held to 
account for losses accrued from expected - albeit unpredictable - market fluctuations 
and crises. What's more, the SWF policy path was fully expected to help stabilize 
volatile government revenues by generating fmancial returns into the long-term. 
Deconstructing the authoritative fmancial ideas substantiating the SWF policy path 
thus re\'eals an alternative explanation for this fiscal strategy's political appeal. 
Institutionalization of these ideas in a reconceptualised AHF would stabilize MLAs' 
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governance function in regards to Fund management, thereby helping reassert their 
legitimacy as governors of Alberta's highly scrutinized petroleum wealth. 
As compared to the alternatives strategies proffered by opposition parties, the 
SWF policy path appeared capable of stabilizing provincial fmances while 
simultaneously insulating MLAs from criticism of their role in AHF management. An 
investment portfolio exposed to higher degrees of fmancial risk would provide a 
renewable source of annual income, while at the same time recasting the symbolically 
significant AHF as an inter-generational savings fund. Belief in speculative fmance's 
calculability complimented this objective by providing a readily actionable plan 
through which returns could be maximized and risk of losses minimized. It would 
also address the problems with the Fund's measurability, which cast the AHF as 
opaque and unaccountable to the domestic electorate. Finally, the idea that fmancial 
experts were more qualified to oversee the AHF's new fmancial mandate addressed 
the Fund's managerial problems, which undermined the government's legitimacy as 
AHF managers. Each feature of the SWF policy path enabled the government to 
construct and promote forward-looking projections as to how and to what ends the 
AHF would be used, and in a way Albertan's could identify with. It enabled 
government actors to stabilize short-term socioeconomic expectations in regards to 
the AHF's relationship with fiscal policy and Albertan society as a whole. 
Yet the fact that political agency was a prerequisite for the AHF's 
rcconceptualisation as a long-term fmancial maximizer is not a revealing claim in 
itself. The AHF's public source of funding leads to the logical conclusion that the 
SWF policy path was favoured by MLAs as it would serve their interests in one way 
or another. What is worthy of note, however, is the way in which this strategy won 
mer competing alternatives. The way it came to constrain political agency only after 
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it was institutionalized is also significant. It was the way in which SWFs' ideational 
underpinnings came to determine MLAs understanding of legitimate versus 
illegitimate action that proved problematic. To be sure, the government had no 
intention for the AHF's fmancial performance to be as scrutinized an issue as it 
became from 1997 onwards. Its returns were almost immediately seen as a symbolic 
representation of MLA's capacity to govern as these returns were meant to fmance 
annual budgets. In this way the AHF actually came to constrain rather than enhance 
MLAs' capacity to govern Albertan fiscal policy. Given the authoritative 
prescriptions of modem fmancial epistemology, MLAs could only continue to more 
extensively diversify Fund assets in pursuit of the fmancial returns upon which their 
political legitimacy would increasingly depend. To be sure, the AHF gradually 
expanded its investment universe and deepened its global fmancial embededness 
between 1997 and 2009. Moreover, political legitimacy would become implicated 
with MLAs' ability to normalize and legitimate the speculative fmancial ideas upon 
which the new AHF was based. That is, the government was obligated to promote the 
narrative of long-term market efficiency, profitability and calculability as capable of 
benefiting Albertan's in the short-term. This was lest they once again be accused of 
fiscal irresponsibility and unaccountability. They would consequently have to 
maintain this narrative in the face of two globally reverberating fmancial crises 
between 1997 and 2009. This was so as to recoup the losses that decimated the Fund's 
returns, as well as to avoid being accused of illegitimately tampering with its 
management. The following Chapter now further analyzes how the SWF policy path 
and its ideational foundations came to constrain the interests of government actors in 
Alberta between 1997 and 2009. 
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Chapter Seven: 
Alberta's Heritage Savings Trust Fund (1997-2009) 
The Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund was reconceptualised as a sovereign 
wealth fund by legislation passed in 1997. The preceding Chapter argued the long-
dominant Progressive Conservative majority strategically pursued this legislation in 
attempts to address a domestic politico-economic crisis undermining their political 
legitimacy. This account differs from that offered by mainstream analyses that assume 
diversified investment of sovereign wealth to be a naturally desirable fiscal strategy 
all government's should willingly pursue. Such accounts render the state and political 
agency latent variables when accounting for the global emergence of SWFs. They 
also ignore the influence of ideas and the politics of idea construction to inform 
agency in the face of uncertainty. Indeed while a continuous presence throughout the 
AHF's history, uncertainty in regards to the government's relationship with petroleum 
wealth management was heightened by this politico-economic crisis between 1988 
and 1997. This uncertainty served to undermine the original ideas upon which the 
AHF's institutional legitimacy was based - those of savings, socioeconomic 
development, and welfare spending in particular. They also cast the legitimacy of 
MLAs - especially those of the PC majority - as governors of Albertan society in 
doubt. It was only then that the PC majority promoted the SWF policy path as a viable 
strategy of governance throughout the Legislature. This was despite similar arguments 
being recommended by the AHF Standing Committee as early as 1982. Hence 
between 1997 and 2009, the AHF was restricted to invest in fmancial assets thought 
capable of maximizing returns in the long run. Any project or investment opportunity 
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that did not meet these criteria would be deemed interventionist and threatening to 
both socioeconomic as well as political stability. 
In spite of this dramatic transformation, the re-drafting of the original AHF 
Act only marked the beginning of the changes the Fund and its relationship with fiscal 
policy would undergo between 1997 and 2009. Albertan policymakers would 
continue to be guided by the expectations of legitimate action prescribed by modem 
fmancial epistemology. This was in their attempts to better address the fiscal, 
measurement, and management sources of the politico-economic crisis that led to the 
AHF's transformation in the first place. In so doing, the SWF policy path not only 
transformed the institutional structure of government apparatus, but also shifted 
MLAs' understanding of what constituted best practice in their approach to fiscal 
governance. This continuing development of the AHF can be attributed to the 
continued prevalence of uncertainty in regards to AHF management and its 
importance in supporting MLAs po litical legitimacy throughout this period. To be 
sure, a number of questions as to what long-term purpose the Fund actually served 
continued to plague the Legislature despite the defmitive language of the 1997 AHF 
Act. As stressed by the Minister of Revenue five years after the SWF policy path was 
adopted, MLAs remained unsure of the AHF's position in overall fiscal policy: 
'How should any savings be used in thefl/ture and vvhat should the investment 
objectives of the savings be? Should the savings be maintained in the [AHF] 
or in some other vehicle? Before we start clarifying even the objective of the 
[~HF], I think it's important to reali::e: to what end and 1-that si::e should that 
jitnd be? What would be the investment purposes? Who'd be the beneficiaries 
of the income?' - Me1chin, 2002: 913 
The SWF policy path thus initially appeared to increase the government's 
agency by freeing it from the responsibility of managing the highly scrutinized and 
politicized AHF. It was also believed capable of providing them a replenishable 
source of annual income independent of volatile world energy markets to support 
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each year's budget as they saw fit. Yet between 1997 and 2009, the SWF policy path 
and its underlying ideas would gradually come to constrain rather than enhance the 
government's approach to petroleum wealth management, as well as overall fiscal 
policy. This constraint would come in three forms. First was in terms of its 
influencing government's understanding of how the AHF could be used to continue 
supporting annual budgets. This was even after the provincial deficit was reduced. 
This subsequently led them to approve of an expansionary investment universe, which 
increased the spatial and functional embedment of AHF capital throughout the 
financial realm. Indeed, modem fmancial epistemology dictated the only way through 
which the AHF could increase its returns was by adopting more types of risk through 
increased diversification. This had the effect of limiting the ways in which this capital 
could be used to benefit Albertan society, and arguably facilitated rather than 
contained the Albertan government's propensity to spend in a sustainable manner. 121 
Adoption of the SWF policy path also led MLAs to establish the Alberta 
Investment Management Corporation (ArMCo) to manage the Fund's expansionary 
investment universe. This increased MLAs' dependence on the epistemological 
authority exerted by fmancial experts to guide their approach to fiscal po licy. This 
constraint grew especially pronounced after an additional $45 billion was delegated to 
AlMCo's auspices in 2008. Finally, the government was also constrained between 
1997 and 2009 by their increased dependence on the SWF policy path as a strategy of 
governance that supported their domestic political legitimacy. Indeed, MLAs would 
see their interests in regards to AHF management be increasingly dependant upon the 
guiding influence of modem fmancial epistemology and its fallacious 
presuppositions. They would also come to preoccupy themselves with actively and 
121 Between 1982 and 2001, expenditures outpaced inflation and popUlation growth by 1.7 percent. then 
by 0.9 percent between 2001 and 2006. Without the aid of the AHF, the government would have 
experienced deficits five times between 1994 and 2006 (Milke, 2006: iv-v). 
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aggressively promoting the validity of this knowledge framework and the risk-laden 
fmancial practices it legitimated. As such, the expectations of legitimate action 
prescribed therein would be rendered increasingly synonymous with Alberta's 
socioeconomic interests. Indeed, the SWF policy path would be retained and even 
more vigorously promoted following two socioeconomically destabilizing fmancial 
crises between 1997 and 2009. This is despite each of these crises demonstrating the 
fallacious nature ofSWFs' underpinning logic. 
These arguments will be explored in three parts. Section 7.1 argues the rapid 
expansion of the AHF's investment universe was the direct result of the authority 
exerted by the idea of fmancial profitability. This increased exposure to risk was, 
however, pursued in an attempt to enhance the AHF' s expected short versus long-
term returns, which became a regularly relied upon source of budgetary fmancing. 
This served to increase the vulnerability of annual budgets - and by extension 
socioeconomic stability - to the contradictions and crisis tendencies of the speculative 
fmancial realm. Section 7.2 then details how the ideas of fmancial expertise 
constrained MLAs' approach to fiscal governance by placing them at one remove of 
AHF management, and then public capital management in aggregate through the 
establishment of AIMCo. MLA's would thus come to increase their dependence on 
the epistemological authority of politically independent fmancial experts to support 
both their fiscal governance function as well as political legitimacy. Section 7.3 then 
examines how MLAs were problematically constrained to maintain their support of 
these two aforementioned developments in the face of glo bal fmancial crises between 
1997 and 2009. 
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7.1 The AHF as Constraint (1997-2009): 
Increased Risk Exposure 
From 1982 onwards, the AHF's investment income was transferred to the 
General Revenue Fund (GRF) to meet the day-to-day priorities of government. 122 
Following the 1997 AHF Amendment Act, this income would be generated strictly 
through speculative fmancial investment. This strategy was a prominent feature of the 
PC's electoral platform as they had 'staked out such a huge piece of political territory 
on debt retirement' in the 1993, 1997 and 2001 general elections (Sapers, 1999: 332; 
Melchin in Standing Committee Hearings, 2002). Indeed, their commitment to debt 
reduction with the help of the AHF gained 'overwhelming support' from Albertans 
from 1997 onwards (Melchin, Hansard 2002: 221, 915; cf Alberta Treasury, 2003: 5; 
Mintz et aI, 2007). Debt has in fact been directly equated with taking an excessive risk 
a number of times in the Legislature since the 1970s. MLAs have maintained that debt 
has the potential to drag Alberta's petroleum-driven growth story to a halt, and the 
notion that debt 'is like a straightjacket' has been 'hammered into the public 
consistently'. As such, Albertans are uniquely 'conditioned to reject debt' to a greater 
extent than their provincial counterparts (Elniski, 2009; Review Committee, 1995). 
That the fmancialized AHF was tasked to address such a scrutinized issue highlights 
the faith government had placed on fmancial speculation to support their political 
legitimacy. 
In 1997, the AHF was divided into two accounts: one to enhance the Fund's 
debt reduction capacities, and the other to maintain its appearance as an 
intergenerational savings account. On the one hand, a 'Transition portfolio' of $10.6 
12~ This was with exception to some ad hoc inflation proofing in 1997, 1998 and 2000 totalling $431 
million (Johnston in Standing Committee Hearings, 2007). Then following the reduction of the net 
deficit in 2004 the fund was mandated to be inflation proofed by retaining a portion of its investment 
Income. 
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billion was to be invested in short-term, highly liquid fIxed income securities with an 
emphasis on immediately generating interest income. At the same time, a $1.3 billion 
'Endowment portfolio' was to be invested in those riskier assets that would maximize 
and preserve fmancial returns into the long-term (AHF Act, 1997: Section 2-3). Then 
over a ten-year period, the Transition and Endowment portfolios would be merged as 
the deficit presumably shrank. This transfer process was, however, rushed to 
completion in only fIve years as the Treasury convinced MLAs the Endowment's 
riskier and long-term focus could better serve their short-term needs. The Treasury 
thus began to rapidly expand the Endowment's already aggressive investment 
universe of 40 percent equity and 60 percent bonds, just as its capital base began to 
swell. This trend was guided by the assumption that diversifIcation would maximize 
fmancial return while simultaneously controlling for increased fmancial risk. This 
trend continued such that by 2009, the AHF's investment universe came to include a 
wide variety of riskier asset classes and markets. 123 Thus between 1997 and 2009, 
MLAs' developed a penchant for risk in efforts to increase the AHF's short-term 
returns. This was despite fmancial theory only legitimating such risk levels for long-
term investors. How does the ideational constraint of the SWF policy path - in 
conjunction with structural factors that faced MLAs - help explain this development 
in Alberta? What future implications would this development pose for MLAs' 
approach to fiscal governance? 
'"3 This asset mix included: 45 percent public equity (15 percent Canadian/IS percent US/IS percent 
non-~\Jorth American); 24 percent fixed income; ten percent real estate; six percent absolute return 
strategies; six percent private income; six percent private equity; two percent timberland investments; 
and one percent short term money market securities (Annual Report, 2008). Then in 2009, the 
Legislature approved a new asset mix for the AHF driven by a wish to increase flexibility of decision-
making. The new asset mix would comprise 35-70 percent equity, 30-45 percent money market and 
fix\.!d income, and 15-40% inflation sensitive (eg. Real Estate) and alternative assets (Matheson, 2009). 
There are also intentions of diversifying further into emerging and other international markets (Parihar 
In Standing Committee Hearings, 2008). 
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To this effect, government spending increased by 27 percent between 1999 
and 2001 on the back of increased petroleum royalty revenues following Premier 
Klein's four year austerity program (Kneebone, 2004: 8; cf Gibbins and Van der 
Ploeg, 2005: 15). As such, the AHF once again became a coveted source of support 
for annual budgets, and not just a vehicle for debt-reduction (Annual Report, 2009: 8; 
see Appendix 2).124 Treasury officials were subsequently pressured to generate 
speculative fmancial returns through the now dominant and riskier Endowment 
portfolio. As commented by the Treasurer in regards to this emerging role of the 
fmancialized AHF: 
'[It's] very critical that you look not just at how do we spend the money, but 
how do we ensure that you and I create sz!iJicient wealth to pay for all that 
we'd want? How do we create a bigger pie? It isn't about jllst splitting up a 
pie that's of the size that we know today. HOH'do we make it bigger so that we 
can have more of all the things that we value, so that we can have more to 
sustain the se(f-reliance?' - Melchin, 2002: 915 
Constraint was thus witnessed in how the only means of achieving this objective 
according to fmancial experts in the Treasury was to expand the AHF's investment 
universe. This meant subjecting the AHF and, by extension, budgetary stability to 
increased but seemingly more manageable levels of fmancial risk. 125 The Transition 
124 Between 1997 and 2007 prior to the last crisis, the AHF contributed to 6.3 percent of total 
government revenues through its investment income, or approximately $9 billion. This income was, 
however, primarily derived from the AHF's safer fixed income versus riskier equity assets (Gartner, 
2007: 16; Gibbins and Vander Ploeg, 2005: 16-17). 
125 The Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) came on the back of the 1997 AHF amendment and had the 
effect of further implicating AHF returns with the government's long-term fiscal strategy. Passed in 
1999, the FRA stipulated that (i) the government was to eliminate the Province's accumulated debt by 
March 31 2025, (ii) that annual budgets must be balanced, and (iii) the Treasurer was to inflation proof 
the fund only when the government had the revenue to do so (FRA, 1999: Section 2.1). The FRA was 
consequently characterized as an attack on the future growth of the AHF by opposition parties within 
the Legislature. They argued it incentivized the Treasury to rely on AHF capital and investment income 
when drafting each year's budget rather than save this money or inflation proof the fund (Sapers, 1999: 
332). Thus in order to appease these criticisms and protect the AHF's existing principle, the Alberta 
Sustainability Fund (ASF) was established by a 2003 amendment to the FRA following a 
recommendation of the Financial Management Commission (Gartner, 2007: 10; Kneebone 2004: 8). As 
an account within the GRF, the ASF was meant to provide a cushion for volatile resource revenues, 
prevent AHF capital from being used in the short-term by deficit-plagued governments and thus 
appeared to suggest the Alberta government's increased commitment to the AHFs savings objective. 
By the time the ASF was created in 2003, however, the Heritage Fund had already become a much 
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portfolio's conservative approach to generating investment income was thus gradually 
cast as inefficient by Treasury officials between 1997 and 2002, who instead favoured 
the Endowment portfolio's risk-derived returns. Indeed, these returns swelled on the 
back of the Dot-Com Bubble, generating approximately $3.8 billion in investment 
income from the AHF's $12.4 billion portfolio between 1997 and 2001. 126 This 
booming fmancial environment lent weight to the Treasury's arguments that, while 
increased fmancial risk was profitable in the long-term, it was also potentially 
profitable in the short-term. More specifically, the Treasury framed their 
recommendations as befitting the government's short-term interests by arguing they 
could 'tum the AHF's portfolio over' - or buy and sell equities each year to realize 
capital gains (Day in Standing Committee Hearings, 1999). This was a much riskier 
investment strategy than that presented to the Legislature between 1994 and 1997, and 
contradictorily applied SWFs' long-term investment logic to a short-term timeframe. 
Yet as argued by the Treasurer of the time: 
'[Y]ou're increasing your risk relative to being invested totally in bonds, but 
you've minimized the risk when buying into indexes .... When you see our 
return this year on the [Toronto Stock Exchange], it's something like 28 
percent. If we continued to be weighted on the bond side ... then J think our 
citizens and other people who watch what funds are doing could properly 
criticize us for being too cautious. People would say: why are you languishing 
at these lower levels?' - Day in Standing Committee Hearings, 2000 
What is noteworthy here, then, is how the expectation of financial profitability 
led government to strategically rethink the role of the AHF in supporting their 
governance function. The idea of the ERP legitimated the AHF's creation, while the 
inherent profitability of risk continued to inform - or perhaps constrain -
government's view of how to structure the AHF and its relationship with fiscal policy. 
coveted source of annual income to keep budgets balanced. The ASF stood at a value of $7.7 billion in 
~2~06-2007 (Gartner, 2007: 10). 
. On the back of booming equity markets riding the Dot-Com Bubble, the AHF generated $932 of 
inVestment income in 1998, $1.169 billion in 1999, $706.2 million in 2000, $206 million in 2001, but 
then nothing in 2002 due to an $894 million investment loss (Annual Reports, 1998-2002). 
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As will be further examined in Section 7.3, the authoritative influence of these 
expectations ultimately exposed both government and socioeconomic stability to the 
volatile day-to-day swings of the broader fmancial realm. In any case, these ideas led 
government to accelerate the transfer of AHF assets from the Transition to 
Endowment portfolio between 1997 and 2002, and just as they were invested in an 
increasingly diverse array of asset classes and markets. The Treasury believed that 
this would 'get those increased returns coming in faster than they normally would 
have', never entertaining the notion of this risk's potential downside (Pugh in 
Standing Committee Hearings, 2000). When pressured to maximize financial returns, 
AHF managers in the IMD could only offer recommendations that would increase 
their exposure to alternative forms and degrees of financial risk (cf Pugh, AHF 
Standing Committee, 2000). 
This ideational constraint of the SWF policy path is problematic as it limited 
how the AHF could be used to benefit Alberta's petroleum-dependant socioeconomy. 
Indeed between 1976 and 1994, the AHF generated approximately $21 billion in 
investment income, earning an average return of 3.98 percent on its investments. 
Chapter Six demonstrated how this income primarily served to fill the gaps left by 
petroleum-income dependant budgets, but while simultaneously funding a number of 
social welfare and economic diversification projects. 127 While some investments were 
not well received by the public due to their lack of transparency, a number of 
beneficial and even profitable foundations established by the Fund remained 
127 The government accrued $1-+9.6 billion in resource revenue between 1976 and 2007, S13.5 billion 
or 8.3 percent of \\'hich has contributed to the AHF's capital base. Conversely. the prmincial 
gowrnment has lost between $50 and $100 billion in petroleum resource revenue to the federal 
go\'ernment since 1980 due to the National Energy Program (Gartner, 2007). 
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operational in 2009. 128 With the 1997 reconceptualisation, however, such 
socioeconomic investments were deemed incompatible with the maximization of 
fmancial returns. The government would instead be constrained to rely upon the 
AHF's investment income to indirectly fund such socioeconomic development 
projects through GRF expenditure. As summarized by the Treasurer in 2002: 
'[I]t was thought better to let [investment] income go to general revenues so 
that the overall priorities of government in its business planning set the 
priorities of how to spend money rather than having a separate heritage fund 
pot of money that people could come to for separate priorities ... Let the 
income of the fund service part of those priorities, like health and education, 
rather than creating a separate stream of priorities - Melchin in Standing 
Committee Hearings, 2004 
Thus at fIrst glance, reconceptualising the AHF as an S WF appears only to 
arena-shift the source of funding for social development and economic diversifIcation 
projects. In short, direct funding from surplus petroleum wealth would be replaced 
with the indirect fmancial returns generated through diversifIed speculation. This 
strategy nonetheless subjects the capacity of government to support these typically 
long-term development projects to a very short-term horizon. Indeed, their success is 
contingent on highly uncertain extra-budgetary funding given Alberta's high level of 
public services, low tax-base, and dependence on volatile petroleum revenues. 129 The 
ideational constraint imposed by the SWF policy path thus limits government's 
capacity to approach issues of socioeconomic development, forcing it to rely on short-
tenn and equally uncertain fmancial returns. Despite it becoming a long-term 
orientated SWF in 1997, then, the AHF remained a short-term orientated fIscal tool of 
government - albeit one barred from making non-fmancial speculative investments 
12~ Of particular lasting significance of early AHF investments include: the Heritage Medical Fund, the 
Heritage Science and Engineering Fund, the Heritage Scholarship Fund, and the Kananaskis Provincial 
Park. 
129 It should be noted that a 'Capital Account' was established in 2002 (from a $910 million deposit) to 
fund projects for local authorities (school boards, regional health, post-secondary institutions) and the 
pro\'incial government. However, since the Capital Account is part of the GRF, allocations to it are 
dependent on GRF revenues and thus, in part, AHF investment income. 
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(Miller, 2007: 427). This supportive role of the AHF is in fact under increasing 
pressure since September 2009 due to the re-emergence of a $7 billion net deficit. 130 
7.2 The AHF as Constraint (1997-2009): 
The Alberta Investment Management Corporation 
Between 1997 and 2009, the AHF's investment universe rapidly expanded, it 
continued to be used as a source of government revenue, and thus the government 
increased its dependence on fmancial markets to support their short-term fiscal plan. 
This had the effect of gradually transforming MLAs' approach to public capital 
management in aggregate. Indeed in 2008, $45 billion in additional public assets 
spread across 26 individually tasked funds managed by the Treasury would be 
delegated to the Alberta Investment Management Corporation. This proved a 
significant break from government's traditional approach to fiscal po hcy considering 
this capital would be placed even further from their control in both a functional as 
well as epistemological sense of authority. Indeed, AIMCo was an independent 
Crown corporation mandated to be on the cutting edge of fmancial market 
developments, innovation, and expertise (Gartner, 2007; Oberg, 2007: 397). Financial 
experts employed therein were consequently expected to manage this near $65 billion 
in provincial assets by following the principles of modern investment theory 
institutionalized into the AHF a decade prior. That is, they were to 'adhere to 
130 The results of the 2007 Alberta Financial Investment Planning and Advisory Commission (FIP AC) 
report - implemented by the Minister of Finance in 2005 - called for increasing the role of a 
speculative AHF to support Alberta's fiscal future (Mintz et aI, 2007). The report generated much 
comment and support. Deputy Minister of Finance Rod Matheson said in 2009 that 'it was shocking 
how universal the agreement was that the government should increase the size of the Heritage Fund 
through savings' (Matheson, 2009). This support was based on the argmnent that the AHF's financial 
revenue would replace the province's resource revenue in the future. As of fall 2010, however. the 
government has yet to officially respond to the report's findings as the province has again fallen into 
defiL'it following a drop in global energy prices. Consequently, 'any formal plans for the Heritage Fund 
have been put on the backburner' due to the government's alternative priorities vis-a-vis the fiscal 
deficit (Matheson, ~009; cf. Stelmach, 2009). 
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investment and lending policies, standards and procedures that a reasonable and 
prudent person would apply in respect ofa portfolio of investments' (AHF Act, 1997: 
Section 3.4). The following discussion demonstrates how it was the epistemological 
authority exerted by these principles and the investment experts who wielded them 
that led government to reconceptualise their relationship with fiscal governance 
between 1997 and 2009. It argues the AHF's becoming an SWF in 1997 was a major 
contributing factor that led government to create AIMCo. Section 7.3 then 
problematizes the constraint AIMCo's epistemological authority placed on MLAs' 
political agency during two global fmancial crises experienced between 1997 and 
2009. 
To this effect, AIMCo' s origins and its significance for fiscal governance in 
Alberta can be traced to 1997, when the AHF first began pursuing its diversified 
investment campaign under the Treasury's guidance. Given the Treasury acted as 
operational manager, democratically elected MLAs would not necessarily be fmancial 
market participants. They could influence where and how the AHF invested only in a 
most indirect capacity: through approving the investment strategy presented to them 
by fmancial experts housed in and hired by the Treasury (AHF Act, 1997: Section 
6.4). MLAs would instead occupy themselves with actively promoting the AHF's new 
SWF identity, a task their predecessors had failed to do between 1976 and 1994. This 
was initially achieved through the widespread circulation of the AHF's 1998 Annual 
Report, and then later through annual town meetings, press conferences, and regularly 
distributed information pamphlets (cf Alberta Treasury, 1999; 2000; 2003; Alberta 
Future Summit, 2002; Mintz et aI, 2007).131 
111 Th d . 
. e Legislature'S ready adoption of this promotional role followed from the recommen attons 
offered by the AHF Review Commission in 1995. Primary among these was to improve Albertan's 
understanding of the Fund, a consequence of the confusing and contrasting objecti\'es that led the 
original AHF to be cast as in crisis (Re\'iew Committee, 1995: 17). 
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As a consequence of these promotional efforts, MLAs increased their 
dependence on the authority of fmancial experts in the Treasury. This was in attempts 
to better substantiate their claims of the expected profitability of fmancial speculation, 
and thus the benefits to be gained from the SWF policy path. The Minister of 
Revenue was rather tongue-in-cheek when he reiterated this new role for government 
in 2003, asking the Legislature for advice on 'how they can manage the markets so 
that they continually climb versus decline' (Melchin in Standing Committee Hearings, 
2003). This was not to suggest MLAs had grandiose notions of single-handedly 
facilitating the profitability of the international markets in which AHF capital - and 
eventually $45 billion in other public assets - would be invested. What they could 
control, however, was the domestic perception of the Fund's fundamental desirability 
as a strategy of governance as based on the assumption that markets were already 
efficient and profitable in the long-term. By promoting this narrative - as well as 
those of speculative fmance' s calculability and manageability - MLAs could stabilize 
public expectations as to how successful the symbolically significant AHF would be 
in the future. 
To be sure, the government's approach to petroleum wealth management 
through the AHF continued to be a scrutinized feature of Albertan politics between 
1997 and 2009. The Fund essentially symbolised Alberta's fiscal independence and 
individuality as a province in a fragmented and highly competitive Canadian federal 
system (cf. Hewes, 1995: 1477). The AHF Review Commission's fmdings in 1995, 
and then a 2003 Treasury-funded survey, demonstrated that 'any political party ... that 
would decide to tear apart the Heritage Fund would probably do so at its own peril' 
(Liepert in Standing Committee Hearings, 2006; cf. Alberta Treasury, 2003). Thus by 
drawing from the same fmancial epistemology that had legitimated the AHF's 
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reconceptualisation over competing alternatives between 1994 and 1997, MLAs could 
also convince the public of the SWF policy path's desirability (cf. Alberta Treasury, 
1996: 3; Day in Standing Committee Hearings, 1998). In so doing, the Fund's SWF 
identity became synonymous with the sustainability of Albertan fiscal policy by its 
helping to ensure the government could meet the high level of welfare spending the 
public had come to expect. 
As the government's representative, the AHF Standing Committee in 
particular took a noticeably more vigorous approach to increasing the Fund's 
communications to the public. They directed fewer hard-hitting questions about how 
the Fund was being managed to the Treasury as there had been when investing in 
domestic socioeconomic projects. They were instead focused on getting the message 
of the Fund's fmancial performance and reasons for this performance across to the 
public in years of fmancial success as well as failure (cf. Day in Standing Committee 
Hearings, 1998). In so doing, the Standing Committee became a cheerleader of 
financial experts in the Treasury and less of a government watchdog. Anything more 
interventionist would be characterized as unnecessary, completely irrational, and even 
threatening to the success of not just the AHF, but Alberta's vaunted socioeconomic 
status within Federal Canada. 
To reiterate, their promotional campaign's success hinged on the 
epistemological authority exerted by financial experts in the Treasury. These experts 
would need to keep MLAs convinced of the SWF policy path's desirability over 
alternative uses for the Fund. This was especially following crises and equity market 
crashes such as that which occurred between 2001 and 2003 in the Dot-Com crisis, 
and more recently between 2007 and 2009 following the so-called Credit Crunch. 
Throughout these periods, more knowledgeable and long-term orientated fmancial 
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experts would pacify the angst of election-wary politicians. MLAs therefore 
increasingly committed themselves to approaching all matters of public capital 
management through the prescriptive lens of the AHF's speculative fmancial 
epistemology. After all, if it was good enough for the highly regarded Alberta 
Heritage Savings Trust Fund and its $15 billion in public capital, why not for the rest 
of public fmances? MLAs' gradual yielding of authority over public capital 
management to the Treasury also increased alongside the AHF' s expansionary 
investment universe and increased reliance on short-term capital gains. This is to say 
these government actors' dependence on fmancial experts, constrained by the 
language of risk and return, would lead them to reconsider their relationship with 
public capital management in its entirety. 
To this effect, the department specifically tasked with operationalizing the 
AHF's new fmancial mandate - the Investment Management Division (lMD) -
initially out sourced its management of the more risk-exposed Endowment portfolio to 
external managers. By 1999, the IMD had hired 18 external investors to manage 
approximately 24 percent of the AHF's capital, while the Fund's bond portfolio was 
managed in-house. However, the expansion of the AHF's investment universe to 
increase returns shortly thereafter led MLAs to revaluate this managerial structure. 
IMD officials were particularly vocal in this regard, arguing the government had yet 
to develop an 'investment management framework' acceptable enough for the AHF to 
be comparable to its peers (Melchin, 2002: 909-913; Matheson, 2009). The IMD 
would require 'different analytical tools' such as 'very sophisticated software, 
hardware, [and] various measurement techniques' to keep in line with a fmancial 
industry that 'constantly changes and improves ... looks for the best tools ... the best 
and latest of knowledge ' (Melchin. 2002: 921). 
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The IMD's arguments therefore reflected modem fmancial epistemology's 
notion of what constitutes financial expertise. It was the authoritative expectations 
these ideas commanded that convinced MLAs they should defer to professional 
investors versed in the language of risk and return in matters of sovereign wealth 
management. In short, it was the capacity of these ideas to inform action in the face of 
uncertainty that ultimately convinced MLAs more public resources should be diverted 
to support the AHF in its pursuit of speculative financial returns. 132 While this was 
intended to improve the IMD's ability to minimize fmancial risk and maximize 
financial returns, it would also help stabilize the public's expectations of how the 
AHF should and would perform (Melchin in Standing Committee Hearings, 2003). 
MLAs would therefore benefit from this developing managerial structure not just by 
way of its potentially increasing returns. It would also help stabilize their political 
legitimacy in regards to the scrutinized issue of public capital management. 
The IMD rapidly grew as a division of the Treasury with the aid of 
government funding: from approximately 25 employees in 1998, to 44 employees -
including 28 Chartered Financial Analysts - in 2001, to 95 employees two years later 
in 2003 (Pugh in Standing Committee Hearings, 2001; Pugh, 2002: 910). Still 
motivated by the desire to accommodate the AHF's expansionary investment universe 
and increase returns, however, the Treasury continued to call for more resources to 
further specialize the IMD's management function. By the early 2000s, these 
proposals were in line with the government's ongoing campaign of promoting the 
AHF's new SWF identity. They fit well with the idea that continued development of 
the IMD's expertise could better accommodate the whole of public sector funds under 
111 0 . I - t ...,-
- perating ~:x.penses increased by 50 percent between 2000 and 2003. from appro:x.lmat~ y s~.~) 
million to $8.5 million (Annual Reports, 1000-03). 
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Treasury oversight (Melchin in Standing Committee Hearings, 2004).133 The IMD 
was in fact renamed' Alberta Investment Management' (AIM) in 2004 to reflect its 
increasing responsibility in supporting domestic fiscal policy through public capital 
management. Yet even with this growth between 1997 and 2003, the Treasury 
continued to argue the development of AIM's fmancial expertise was being outpaced 
by the AHF's accelerated diversification campaign. In response to these calls, the 
government commissioned a study in 2005 to review and develop ways to improve 
AIM's capacity to balance the Fund's risk-return profile and support annual budgets 
(Capelle Associates, 2006; MacDonald, 2007: 429). This single study - the Capelle 
Report - culminated in the passing of the Alberta Investment Management 
Corporation Act in March 2007, which transformed AIM as a department within the 
Treasury into AIMCo. The AHF, along with $45 billion in additional public funds, 
would now be managed by a privately run crown corporation with a board of 
governors, staff, and managerial structure formally independent from government 
auspices (AIMCo Act, 2007; Oberg, 2007: 397). 
The Capelle Report's arguments for establishing AIMCo were two-fold. First, 
the government hoped that centring a Crown corporation with a 'critical mass' of $70 
billion in assets in Edmonton would produce a 'spin-off fmancial industry' for 
Alberta (Oberg, 2007: 625).134 However, a second and more important rationale was 
that the semi-privatization of AIM into AIMCo was framed as means to increase 
annual returns through short-term active management: an approach that would greatly 
increase the AHF's exposure to exogenous shocks and financial volatility in its 
attempts to profit from market inefficiencies (Oberg in Standing Committee Hearings. 
D3 In 200.-l, these other funds totalled approximately $-1-5 billion, and included the General Resene 
Fund. the :\lberta Sustainability Fund. the Capital Account, the Heritage Medical Research Fund. the 
Heritage SdlOlarship Ftmd. and a \'ariety of public pension funds (Gartner, 2007). 
134 interestingly, the development of a home-grown financial industry was one of the original intentions 
for the establishment of the AHF in 1976 (Lougheed, 1976a: 828-833). 
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2007; Matheson, 2009). This proved contradictory to the rationale that led to the 
Fund's larger transformation in 1997 - i.e. that riskier and diversified portfolios 
should earn approximately 5.5 percent in the long-term due to investor's natural 
tendency to be risk-averse in efficient, self-clearing markets. Despite this 
contradiction in logic, the Capelle Report convinced MLAs of the notion that 'if they 
moved to an AIMCo type model with better governance and that was more 
entrepreneurial, they could expect the AHF to generate an additional 100-200 basis 
points' (Matheson, 2009; Capelle Associates, 2006). AIMCo was intended to 
establish a corporate environment more conducive to the organic process of value-
creation than that which could be developed under the political and thus interfering 
auspices of the Treasury (Evans in Standing Committee Hearings, 2008). 
The establishment of AIMCo was thus made without the democratic input of 
Albertans. This is significant as it would increase Alberta's exposure to global 
financial volatility, increase MLAs' dependence on financial experts to inform them 
of action in the context of this volatility, and hence limit what could be considered 
legitimate action in all matters of public capital management within a crisis prone 
financial realm. It was instead framed as a technical decision neither the public nor 
their elected representatives could fully understand. More knowledgeable experts in 
the Treasury and externally hired consultants instead commanded the authority to be 
believed, presenting AIMCo as a means for MLAs to increase the expected 
profitability of their provincial wealth. The AHF Standing Committee then 
communicated these arguments to the rest of government, asserting that 'it would be 
~xtremely difficult for us as a Legislative Assembly to tum our backs on the potential 
sayings, the potential increase in income of close to $500 million a year, which is 
\\hat 100 basis points would give us' (Oberg, 2007: 625). Such was the certainty that 
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annual returns would be enhanced that the Treasurer who introduced the AIMCo Act 
asked MLAs nervous of relinquishing such authority over the AHF to AlMCo: 'Is 
there anybody here that doesn't want to make another $476 million?' (Evans in 
Standing Committee Hearings, 2008). 
In any case, the Treasury also emphasized to MLAs that the independence 
required for the success of AIMCo would only affect them in an operational sense of 
authority, and not much at that. The Legislature, through the Treasury, would 
arguably retain design capacity over both the AHF as well as AlMCo's form and 
function. 135 Proponents of these proposals contended that AlMCo 'ultimately exists at 
the pleasure of the Crown so it's really no different [to governmental control] that 
way ... but it does remove management of the AHF from the government' (Elniski, 
2009; Melchin, 2002: 915). So as the government would retain the right to appoint 
AIMeo Executives, AHF management would not necessarily be depoliticized away 
from their auspices as much as the 'independent Crown corporation' moniker would 
suggest. What this dissertation emphasizes, however, is that the govenlment would be 
distanced from AHF management in an epistemological sense of authority. This 
would at once both stabilize their political legitimacy, but at the cost of exposing 
domestic socioeconomic stability to the volatility of a crisis prone financial realm. To 
be sure, AIMCo's capacity to traverse the ebb and flow of speculative fmance 
immediately became a substantiating feature of the government's approach to 
Albertan fiscal policy. Only an AIMCo-type entity was thought capable of generating 
the short-term fmancial returns that would support both the AHF's institutional and 
1J5 The relationship between Treasury officials and AIMCo is largely informal. The Assistant Deputy 
Minister of Treasury and Risk Management recently stated that they talk to AIMCo on a regular basis, 
and to remember that they're down the hall: 'If things come up they can wander down the hall and talk 
to us ... They are our service provider and they are investment professionals, so we have good dialogue 
with them' (Matheson, 2009). The Treasury does not, however, change the AHF's asset mix based on 
advice from AlMCo. 
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government's political legitimacy. Only actions that could be deemed as improving 
the AHF's risk-return trade-off by fmancial experts in ArMCo would represent 
legitimate uses of this systematically significant and scrutinized pot of public capital 
(de Bever in Standing Committee Hearings, 2008).136 
The delegation of an additional $45 billion to AIMCo for safekeeping as well 
as to ensure this capital was "put to work' through speculation further added to 
MLAs' dependence on the epistemological authority of AIMCo. Indeed. the 
government had already committed itself to this prescriptive approach to public 
capital management, first through their promotion of the SWF policy path and then 
their supporting the institutional development of the IMD between 1997 and 2004. If 
AlMCo would improve the AHF's investment returns as government officials 
believed, it would be a rational and forward-looking decision to have it manage all of 
public sector funds. These arguments were embraced by PCs and New Democrats 
alike, with muted criticisms but little formal resistance voiced by opposition Liberals 
in Legislative debates of the AIMCo Act (cf. Oberg, 2007; Miller, 2007: 428; 
MacDonald, 2007: 429-430; Eggen, 2007: 430; Elsalhy, 2007: 623). 
The government's increasingly distant approach to public capital management 
was not, however, without its share of critics. Indeed throughout the 2000s, concerns 
were expressed by "many public policy commentators that more and more 
government funds are being administered outside the scope of the public' or 
democratic input (Macdonald in Standing Committee Hearings, 2005; Miller, 2007: 
136 :\IMCo endeavoured to improve its financial instincts and investment skill by developing its 
'corporate services' such as 'big increases in staffing and operation and IT support because we're very 
weak there right now' as well as focusing attention on risk management (parihar in Standing 
Committee Hearings, 2008; de Bever in Standing Committee Hearings, 2008). Indeed by June 2008, 
:\IMCo had 144 employees with 60 of them being investment professionals working for the Chief 
In\,\?stment Officer alone, and had expectations to grow to 188 by year end (Parihar in Standing 
Committee Hearings. 2008). 
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426). Particular reference was made to the fact that the interests of money managers 
were not necessarily in line with those of everyday Albertans: 
'[Since 1980 J we have a boom in the economy. Then we have a bust in the 
economy. Then we have public policy exhorted to the benefit of investors, not 
to the benefit of people that built the province or want to live here in the 
future ... I'm very concerned about the massive amount of money that might be 
put in the hands of a fund manager whose purpose is just to build the 
shareholder profit in the fund, which is what he's mandated to do, but to the 
detriment of Canada, to the detriment of Alberta, and to the detriment of 
future generations' -- Teghtmeyer, 200i 37 
In spite ofthese criticisms, the rapid growth of the IMD and then AlMCo - as well as 
the internalization of the SWF policy path as the optimal strategy for public capital 
management in aggregate - had gained too much momentum within government to be 
reversed. By 2009, the creation of AIMCo to manage the AHF and other public funds 
meant MLAs 'are captive to them, they have a monopoly as service provider'. This 
represents 'a challenge because they work for government, but they are the managers 
of the Fund and the government wants to keep that line drawn' (Matheson, 2009). 
This ultimately means MLAs are limited in their ability to react to a poorly 
performing AIMCo as without new and most likely unpopular legislation, they can 
only seek to improve ArMCo's management function rather than delegate 
management to an alternative organization. 
The Albertan case is therefore significant for examining the authoritative role 
played by a discernable array of modern financial ideas in guiding institutional 
change. It demonstrates how the prescriptive demands of modern financial 
epistemology, when institutionalized into the AHF in 1997, eventually gave rise to the 
137 Aside from the rather significant authority derived from its ability to change the AHF's underlying 
legislation, one of the government's more significant roles in overseeing the fund was in fact removed 
in 2007. That is, the purpose of the Endowment Fund Policy Committee and its composition of MLAs 
was to tie the AHF's investment strategies and government policy closer together through its advisory 
role to the Ministry of Finance (Me1chin in Standing Committee Hearings, 2004). The Endowment 
Fund Policy Committee was, however, disbanded under the initiative provided by the Minister of 
Finance in 2007 'because of the newer, expanded view and vision of AIMCo' (Evans in Standing 
Committee Hearings, 2008). This served to further distance AHF management away from the political 
auspices of government in a functional sense of authority. 
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perceived necessity of establishing AIMCo as a semi-independent governmental 
investment manager. This resulted in AHF management being placed outside the 
auspices of governmental control and into the hands of fmancial experts whose 
interests are rooted in the pursuit of financial versus socioeconomic or even Albertan 
objectives. Hence, the SWF policy path proved to be a significant constraint on 
political agency as it limited the realizable action paths government could conceive of 
in regards to sovereign wealth management between 1997 and 2009. Yet the 
constraint of the SWF policy path also arose from the fact that AIMCo itself was 
captive to follow the expectations of modern financial epistemology. This was to 
inform them of legitimate action in the financially volatile and uncertain period of 
1997 to 2009. Indeed, even these financial experts were limited in their capacity to act 
in the wake of the crises that revealed the fallacious nature of the narrative 
legitimating the AHF's outward-looking and long-term orientated SWF identity. It is 
to an examination of the constraint imposed by the prescriptions of modern fmancial 
epistemology in the context of these fmancial crises - as well as their impact on 
socioeconomic stability in Alberta - that the discussion now turns. 
7.3 The AHF as Constraint (1997-2009): 
Financial Crises 
Shortly after being reconceptualised as a speculative fmancial maximizer in 
1997, the preceding Sections demonstrated the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund 
became an increasingly prominent feature of the province's politico-economic 
landscape. First, its portfolio began to rapidly grow in financial breadth and 
complexity; second, its expected investment income became a regular and supporting 
feature of budgetary tinancing; and third, the epistemological authority of 
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independent financial experts in the IMD and then ArMCo to direct fiscal policy 
began to supersede that of the Treasury and Legislature. These three developments 
indicate that between 1997 and 2009, democratically elected MLAs increasingly 
deferred their policy preferences vis-a-vis public capital management to the 
expectations demanded of modern fmancial epistemology. This proved problematic in 
the face of the Dot Com bubble burst (2000-2002) and the most recent global 
fmancial crisis (2007-2009). In these fmancially volatile periods, the AHF did not 
meet government's expectations of earning 5.5 percent on its investments, leaving 
realized budgets between two to five percent in deficit (see Appendix 2). However, 
the creation of ArMCo and its management of $45 billion in additional public funds 
meant the effects of the 2007-2009 liquidity crisis in particular were not isolated to 
budgetary shortfalls. They also affected the government's capacity to support a range 
of domestic constituents, including those benefiting from public sector pension and 
endowment funds (AIMCo, 2010: c). The most daunting problem posed by the SWF's 
constraint, then, is how it increased Alberta's exposure to the contradictions and crisis 
tendencies of the speculative financial realm. 
To this end, a third source of constraint imposed by the SWF policy path 
pertained to MLAs' realizable policy preferences when faced with financial crisis. 
These government actors were constrained to remain committed to the diversified 
investment strategy despite the crises revealing the fallacious nature of its underlying 
financial logic. These crises and the extensive ad hoc government interventions they 
necessitated revealed that the epistemology of speculative investment does not 
provide a reliable guide to action as purported by fmancial economists and 
practitioners. Nor does it accurately reflect fmancial market realty. Rather, the 
narratives of financial profitability, calculability and expertise espoused by these 
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theorists primarily serve to legitimate modem financial relations and practices. Once 
these authoritative ideas increased their influence over MLAs' approach to resource 
management - first through the AHF and then all of public sector funds managed 
under AIMCo - only they could inform government of how to understand, let alone 
approach, the globally reverberating crises of2000-2002 and 2007-2009. This loyalty 
to the science of speculation is significant considering the fallout from these crises 
transcended the fictitious borders of the speculative financial realm to impact 
Alberta's socioeconomic growth and stability (cf. AIMCo, 2010: iii, 9).138 
Why, then, was the fmancial uncertainty produced by these crises deemed 
more manageable - and acceptable - than that which arose out of the politico-
economic crisis two decades earlier? Why did the Albertan politico-economic crisis of 
1988 to 1994 result in inducing large-scale institutional change in regards to both 
resource management and fiscal policy, while the global fmancial crises served to 
deepen the government's commitment to these changes? These questions speak of the 
ideational constraint imposed by the SWF policy path on MLAs' political agency. As 
the government increased their commitment to diversified investment as a domestic 
strategy of governance, they further committed themselves to modem fmancial 
epistemology's understanding of what constitutes desirable action in regards to public 
capital management. 
To this effect, the PC majority government reconceptualised the AHF as a 
sovereign wealth fund in 1997 in attempts to reassert their legitimacy as governors in 
the face of politico-economic crisis. Soon after, the newly tasked Standing Committee 
sought to promote the legitimacy of the financial ideas substantiating the AH F' s new 
lJ~ This impact was most acutely felt following the global financial crisis, the worst hit being Alberta's 
petroleum, housing, and overall employment sectors. The province slipped into recession in 2008, with 
government receiving $4 billion less in tax revenues. The economy contracted by :2 percent in 2009, 
and a provincial deficit of over $5 billion re-emerged on the back of increased government spending to 
support the fledging economy (Government of Alberta, 2009). 
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direction throughout the Albertan public, a task their predecessors had neglected to 
do. This was achieved through quarterly and annual reports, media publications. and 
regularly scheduled meetings throughout the Province. They primarily promoted the 
notion that the SWF policy path would generate investment income to the benefit of 
Alberta in the long run. However, this narrative became a constraint as early as 1999 
when the Dot Com bubble showed its first signs of bursting. In one revealing 
exchange of the AHF Standing Committee, for example, Chairman Pham drew 
attention to the fact that a primary reason for the AHF's fmancialization in 1997 was 
to help government keep ahead of debt-servicing costs. Pham went on to ask that 
considering the AHF did not achieve this objective in 1998 - the fund earned 5.4 
percent while the market cost of debt was 5.9 percent - who can the government say 
is responsible? How were they to 'rationalize' this to Albertan's given the new AHF 
was meant to avoid such inefficient fiscal policies? In response, the Treasurer and 
operational manager of the Fund at the time stated: 
'Overall this fund was affected by downturns in the market ... as lrere allfimds 
or virtually all funds nationally and international/y ... Looking at the shift as 
we move from transition to endowment, you have to be prepared to ride out 
some of the dips in the market' - Day in Standing Committee Hearings, 1999 
This is one of a number of examples demonstrating that when confronted with crises 
and extensive volatility, AHF managers in AIMCo and its overseers in government 
need only cite the dogmatic expectation of financial profitability. Specifically, that 
losses in the short-term are to be expected when invested in riskier asset classes. Best 
practice dictates the AHF must maintain its diversified approach to speculative 
investment if losses are to be recouped (c£ Day in Standing Committee Hearings, 
1999; 2003; Annual Reports, 1999-2008: 5_10).139 In regards to a particularly 
139 In the following 2000-01 fiscal year, the AHF earned a 6.3 percent return while the cost of debt 
~crvicing was 8.3 percent (Annual Report, 2001: 3). In 2002-03, the Fund experienced a net loss of 
SIJ billion and generated no investment income. The negative ramifications experienced in the wake 
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turbulent period in 2006 that negatively affected the AHF's financial position, for 
example, the Minister of Finance stated: 
'It was probabZv one of the most interesting two week periods in the market 
for some time. You know, it's been a long time since I recall a two-week 
period that was that unusual. It's the only way you can really put it' -
McClellan in Standing Committee Hearings, 2006 
Hence given the assumption of a certain level of investor rationality and market 
efficiency, MLAs are constrained to tolerate even the most unexplainable, uncertain 
and potentially destabilizing of fmancial environments. In so doing, MLAs' are 
constrained to accede to the authority exerted not just by fmancial experts in AIMCo, 
but ultimately the modem fmancial epistemology from which these experts 
themselves derive their authority. 
Constraint of the SWF policy path was thus witnessed in its instructing MLAs 
to remain loyal to the belief that speculative financial markets would eventually return 
to profitability. They were prevented from critically examining whether or not 
diversification of sovereign wealth in the pursuit of financial returns was in the best 
short or medium-term interests of socioeconomic stability. This ideational constraint 
is problematic given the origins and causes of speculative asset bubbles remain more 
or less uncertain in academic and practitioner spheres (cf Kindleberger, 2005; Shiller, 
200 1; Dougherty, 2002; Ofek and Richardson, 2001). What is certain is that 
governments were called upon to reassert investor rationality and market efficiency in 
the midst of this crisis as regulators of last resort (Embry and Hepburn, 2004). This 
effectively undermined the unwavering assumptions that made the SWF policy path 
appear such a desirable strategy of governance to Albertan MLAs between 1994 and 
1997. Yet MLAs were nonetheless incapable of deviating from the authoritative logic 
of the Dot Com crisis were, however, muted considering the AHF had yet to fully expose itself to the 
same degree of risk it would by 2009. 
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substantiated by the idea of financial profitability even within this period of 
successive losses. Any tampering with the Fund would in fact contradict the reasons 
they adopted the SWF policy path in the first place. It would also undermine the 
promotional campaign they undertook to solidify this strategy's legitimacy from 1997 
onwards. As demonstrated in Section 7.1, only the continued diversification of 
sovereign wealth into speculative fmancial assets could be considered legitimate 
action by both experts in the lMD and their overseers in the AHF Standing 
Committee. 
The impact of the Dot-Com crisis was, however, rather muted. Its primary 
significance is it demonstrated how the SWF policy path directly exposed MLAs' 
capacity to govern to the ebbs and flows of the broader financial realm. This exposure 
to crises would then prove far more problematic between 2007 and 2009. This was 
especially considering AIMCo was now managing a total of $62 billion in public 
funds under the same approach to financial speculation as was the AHF. In some 
cases, these funds were in fact exposed to even more risk than the long-term oriented 
AHF (AlMCo, 2010: 2). The AHF incurred losses of $3 billion in this crisis period -
approximately 18 percent of the fund's capital and an -18.8 percent rate ofretum, 90 
percent of which arose from its exposure to equities (Annual Report, 2009: 3). While 
these losses were consolidated into the government's bottom-line, they represented a 
significant shortfall of $1.6 billion in expected investment income planned into that 
year's bUdget. Simply put, the SWF policy path and its high-risk exposure cost the 
government approximately $4.2 billion dollars between 2007 and 2009, the impacts of 
which would have to be spread throughout successive year's budgets. Indeed, these 
losses contributed to government's creation of a new 'Fiscal Framework" in 2009, 
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which was rooted in austerity and use of public sector savings outside the AHF to 
stabilize budgets for the next four years (cf. Fiscal Plan, 2010: 9-21; Stelmach, 2009). 
Yet aside from generating a 'little bit of noise', these losses had no impact on 
either the Legislature's or AIM Co , s approach to AHF management. There was in fact 
a 'unanimous chorus of "don't sell" or tamper with our investment strategy' (Elniski, 
2009; cf. Matheson, 2009). Indeed, recurrent crises are necessary moments that reify 
and legitimate the expectations promoted by the SWF policy path: the chance of crisis 
is what underlies risk's theoretical profitability. However, this crisis of 2007 -2009 
proved particularly problematic for two reasons. First, it demonstrated how MLAs' 
capacity to govern is vulnerable to broader fmancial volatility. The crisis thus called 
into question whether the AHF's exposure to such high degrees of fmancial risk - i.e. 
a 75 percent equity exposure - is an optimal management strategy for a systematically 
significant amount of public capital. Second, the crisis revealed the fallacious nature 
of SWF's underlying investment logic given the extent to which governments were 
called upon to stabilize markets through emergency capital injections. This point was 
in fact made in AIMCo's 2010 Annual Report, but was nonetheless glossed over as 
unimportant for their overall investment philosophy (AIMCo, 2010: 9). 
The severity of the crisis and the nature ofMLAs' response - which reflected 
verbatim the arguments made by AIMCo officials - revealed the extent to which 
notions of the ERP, risk as distinct from uncertainty, and fmancial expertise 
legitimate the AHF's speculative fmancial identity. The crisis and its aftermath 
exposed these concepts for the political tools they are: they were strategically drawn 
from by MLAs to stabilize socioeconomic expectations in the recession and 
heightened period of uncertainty that followed. In short, these authoritative ideas \vere 
capable of managing short-term uncertainty presented by the crisis. They reinforced 
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the expectation of market volatility and asset devaluation in the short and medium-
terms, but also the ultimate correction and continued profitability of these markets in 
the long-term. Various financial crises and the deficit years that follow can thus be 
accommodated by MLAs in their ongoing promotion and normalization of SWF's 
ideationally derived, forward-looking projections. To this end, the impact of the 
global crisis on government finances was casually dismissed by all members of the 
AHF Standing Committee, who posited: 'Yeah, you know, they've [AIMCo] had the 
odd bad year, but I mean that's not their fault really' (Macdonald in Standing 
Committee Hearings, 2007). The SWF policy path in Alberta is thus significant as it 
has demonstrated even fmancial experts in AIMCo are constrained to follow the 
expectations of rational action prescribed by modern fmancial epistemology. Both 
MLAs and AIMCo managers can only 'hang on' in times of crisis and hope market 
equilibrium and investor rationality will reassert themselves with as little cost as 
possible. 
This form of constraint imposed by the SWF policy path thus falls outside the 
explanatory bounds of much IPE scholarship. SWF constraint is not just a matter of 
governments being captured by exogenous fmancial interests, nor does it refer to the 
hegemonic power of fmance capital itself Indeed, these approaches bestow too much 
agency onto fmance capital and markets, which are perceived as collectively working 
towards a common set of goals or interests (cf Cerny, 1993; Gilpin, 2000; Bello, 
Bullard and Malhotra, 2000; Andrews, 1994). What is emphasized here, rather, is that 
SWF constraint only becomes apparent when accounting for ideas as prerequisites for 
agency. SWF constraint is thus the product of closely guarded and vehemently 
reinforced assertions that the fmancial realm is tameable through a science of 
speculation. This constraint proved problematic in Alberta as the more diversified and 
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risk-laden the AHF's portfolio became, the more exposed socioeconomic 
sustainability became to the global fmancial crisis - the effects of which continue to 
plague Alberta as of November 2010 (cf Flanagan, 2008). 
Conclusion 
Between 1997 and 2009, Albertan MLAs' realizable policy preferences were 
constrained by the demands of the SWF policy path. Indeed, the institutional 
development of the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund as an SWF throughout this 
time resulted in fmancial speculation becoming an increasingly important feature 
supporting their governance function. Section 7.1 demonstrated how the notion of 
fInancial profitability led the government to view diversified investment as a means to 
earn investment income into the indefmite future. This belief in the equity-risk 
premium as an unwavering feature of speculative fmance presented a means to reduce 
the deficit. It also immediately recast the AHF as a savings fund, which was 
demanded by a public majority. As the deficit was gradually reduced through 
investment income earned by the conservative Transition portfolio, however, MLAs 
opted to increase the AHF's risk exposure. This was again based on the expectation 
such risk would generate even higher returns in the short-term. 140 Ideational constraint 
of the SWF policy path in this sense of budgetary fmancing, then, ultimately led 
government to (partially) replace the uncertainty of future petroleum revenues with 
the uncertainty of speculative fmancial returns. However, the Chapter also argued that 
MLAs' reliance on the expectation of fmancial profitability as a guide to action is 
inherently problematic. 
140 The Legislature in fact delegated an additional $3.83 billion to the Fund between 2004 and 2007 in 
attempting to increase the returns generated from its speculative financial campaign (Mintz et aI, 2007: 
21 ). 
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First, the expectation of earning approximately $1.5 billion in investment 
income planned into each year's budget has arguably facilitated rather than contained 
the Albertan government's historical propensity to spend (c£ Alberta Treasury, 1997; 
Government of Alberta, 2009). Second, it led government to expose Alberta's 
socioeconomic stability to the destabilizing contradictions and crisis tendencies of the 
speculative fmancial realm - the ramifications of which were explored in Section 7.3. 
However, this was not to demonize fmancial speculation in general which, while 
imperfect, provides a ready means of allocating mobile fmance capital to productive 
sectors of the global economy. Criticism is instead directed towards SWFs' exclusive 
focus on adopting high amounts of risk, which exposes domestic societies to broader 
fmancial market volatility. The AHF's assumption of excessive fmancial risk to 
support its exclusively fmancial mandate is, however, unnecessary given the Fund's 
primary use as a supportive feature of budgets in the short-term. 
Section 7.2 then demonstrated how the authority exerted by the idea of 
fmancial expertise - as actively promoted and reinforced by Treasury officials -
further constrained government agency. This idea and the policy preferences it 
substantiated limited the Legislature's capacity to influence AHF management. It also 
limited their capacity to fund non-financial socioeconomic development projects. This 
authoritative idea convinced MLAs that a specialized task force divorced from the 
interventionist hand of politics would compliment the AHF's increasingly aggressive 
pursuit of speculative financial returns. Hundreds of millions of tax dollars were thus 
channelled first into the IMD and then AIMCo in the expectation such expenditures 
were in the best fiscal interests of the province. Yet in so doing, this had the effect of 
limiting what uses this systematically significant pot of public capital could be 
direckd to in attempting to better Albertan's quality oflife into the long-term. That is, 
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government would be prevented from participating In any long-term domestic 
development projects as the AHF had between 1976 and 1994, which were not 
possible without AHF support. The SWF policy path would instead constrain 
government to rely on financial experts in AIMCo to generate budget-stabilizing 
returns to support short-term socioeconomic stability. Simply put, the seemingly 
forward-looking and prudent SWF policy path constrained government to take a 
short-term and highly speculative view of socioeconomic development between 1997 
and 2009. 
This is not to ignore the variety of managerial problems the AHF was subject 
to between 1976 and 1994. Indeed, concentrating investment decisions for an 
ambiguous and easily manipulable public fund in the hands of a PC dominated 
Cabinet and Legislature produced a number of misuses and abuses. Yet to cast the 
fITst two decades of the AHF as detrimental to Albertan growth does the Fund and its 
original managers in government a great disservice. Alberta has greatly benefited 
from a number of development projects made possible by the AHF's stabilizing 
presence and support, a number of which continue to benefit current and future 
generations. Even under its confusing original management, the AHF's domestic 
development projects averaged a 3.98 percent return between 1976 and 1986. This is 
compared to the financialized AHF's negative average return of -3.34 percent 
between 1997 and 2009. This would suggest that what was problematic with the 
original AHF was not so much its inward-looking development focus, but the 
ineffective means through which the ever-shifting and toothless AHF Standing 
Committee enforced adherence to its convoluted mandate. 
Section 7.3 then demonstrated the constraint imposed by the SWF policy path 
on MLA agency in the crisis prone period of 2000-2009. These crises served to 
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undermine the long-term investment logic legitimating the AHF's 1997 
transformation, as well as highlight the inherent problem of applying this fallacious 
logic to serve short-term goals. Indeed, Chapter Six argued the SWF policy path was 
ftrst and foremost internalized by government as a means to stabilize MLAs' 
governance function and support their political legitimacy in the face of a politico-
economic crisis. However, MLAs' reactions to the globally reverberating fmancial 
crises experienced between 2000 and 2009 reveal the extent to which these actors' 
policy preferences were problematically constrained by this policy path. Indeed, only 
by maintaining and even deepening the AHF's global fmancial embedment could 
government recoup the more than $3 billion in losses incurred therein. Only by 
maintaining the AHF's risky investment activities could they help stabilize a 
socioeconomic landscape reeling from both its direct and indirect exposure to global 
ftnancial volatility. This constraint led the PC majority government to ignore calls 
from a variety of internal and external organizations to increase the Fund's savings 
objective by limiting government's access to AHF capital and minimizing its risk 
exposure (cf Mintz et aI, 2007; Milke, 2006; Alberta Liberal Caucus, 2002; Miller, 
2007b). Indeed the re-emergence of the deficit and the beginnings of recession 
brought on by the fmancial crisis of2007-2009 served to further increase pressures on 
the AHF to generate speculative returns (Matheson, 2009; Standing Committee 
Report,2009: 13). 
The preceding Chapter therefore argued MLAs' reliance on the SWF policy 
path to support fiscal policy is fundamentally problematic. The following remark by 
AIMeo's CEO in the wake of the 2007-2009 fmancial crisis perhaps best captures the 
reasoning behind this argument: 
',\larkets will do whatel'(!r thev do. Afarkets are driven br human behaviour, 
Ilhen p(!ople arefeeling good "and they are positil'e(l' disp·osed. particular~r to 
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equities, markets will go up. Then you '11 getfear setting in, and all of a sudden 
everybody pulls out of the market and sits in cash ... Maybe one of the things 
that hasn't been done as well as it could have been before in a lot of 
organizations is to focus on what risk really is' - de Bever in Standing 
Committee Hearings, 2008 
The fallacy of the SWF policy path in Alberta, then, is that even experts in AIMCo 
recognize the untenable nature of the science of speculation upon which modern 
financial practices are based. De Bever draws particular attention to the difficulties 
with treating risk as distinct from uncertainty, although he could have also referred to 
the ambiguous existence of the equity-risk premium, or the costs versus benefits of 
devoting scarce public resources to developing financial expertise. Despite these 
uncertainties, however, fmancial experts in AIMCo maintain there is some form of 
order and predictability to the financial realm throughout which Alberta's sovereign 
wealth is embedded. They maintain that while uncontrollable, financial market reality 
is nonetheless reducible to the same simplified ontological presuppositions that 
gained prominence in financial economics in the 1950s. The Albertan experience thus 
suggests these presuppositions and the theories they substantiate are narratives that 
primarily legitimate rather than inform SWFs in practice. These authoritative ideas 
collectively represent a way, or a set of ways, of rendering uncertainty into a 
calculable and communicable form. They allow for the creation of forward-looking 
financial projections that command the authority to be believed by the domestic 
electorate. This stabilizes expectations of how various socioeconomic problems of 
governance are to be solved by government. A similar story ofSWF development and 
constraint occurred in Ireland, following the government's establishment of the 
National Pension Reserve Fund in 1999. 
Yet what distinguishes the Albertan and Irish cases is the extent to which 
political agency was constrained in reaction to the financial crises experienced 
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between 2000 and 2009. That is for Alberta, the ramifications of the crises were 
limited to destabilizing budgets in the short-term, and not to unmanageable extents. 
Constraint was thus primarily witnessed in how MLA's maintained their exposure to 
high degrees of fmancial risk and dependence on fmancial experts despite these crises 
revealing the fallacious nature of SWFs' legitimating ideas as guides to action. The 
Irish case, on the other hand, demonstrates how SWFs' ideational prescriptions can 
actively dictate policy choice when fmancial crises have more extensive and deeply 
felt impacts on socioeconomic stability. The dissertation now examines why the SWF 
policy path appealed to the interests of Irish government actors, and traces its impact 
on their approach to domestic governance between 1999 and 2009. 
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Chapter Eight: 
Ireland's National Pension Reseroe Fund (2001-2009) 
Ireland's National Pension Reserve Fund (NPRF or the 'Fund') was formally 
established as a dedicated public savings account in April 2001. Its open mandate is to 
meet 'as much as possible' the cost of social welfare and public service pensions to be 
paid by the government between 2025 and 2055 (NPRF Act, 2000: 18-1). Through its 
primary source of income - mandatory annual Exchequer contributions equal to one 
percent of GNP - assets are projected to grow to E140 billion or 40 per cent of GNP 
by 2025. 141 In attempting to control for a deep-seated mistrust of historically 
spendthrift governments, the Oireachtas (parliament) ensured through the Fund's 
legislation that no drawdowns are to be made until 2025. Managerial authority has 
consequently been delegated to an independent body corporate known as the NPRF 
Commission (the 'Commission'), and operational authority to the pre-existing 
National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA).142 By 2009, assets totalling E22.3 
billion were invested in some 2,600 public companies throughout a variety of high-
risk asset classes and markets (see Figure 7). Given its public source of funding, 
arms-length relationship with the state, and speculative fmancial identity, the NPRF is 
exemplary of sovereign wealth funds' three distinguishing features. 
141 NPRF assets are also derived from: a one-off transfer of all assets in the government's Temporary 
Holding Fund for Superannuation Liabilities - a €6.515 billion pot accrued in 1999 from fiscal 
~urpluses and the privatization of state-owned Telecom Eireann; and all income earned on its 
mvcstments (NPRF Commission, 2005: 2). 
142 The NPRF Commission consists of seven members appointed by the Minister of Finance 'who have 
acquired substantial expertise and experience at a senior level in any of a number of listed areas' 
(Armual Report, 2008: 25). The NTMA was established in 1990 as a specialized financial institution 
tasked to manage the then burgeoning national debt. 
Figure 7: Fund Value vs. Exchequer Contributions (2001-2009) 
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Yet why were Irish state managers willing to support the NPRF and its cost ly 
source of debt-based funding given the extent it would constrain budgetary politics 
into the long-term? To be sure, the NPRF has come to constrain Irish state agency in 
two ways. First is that since its inception in 2001 , its fmancial performance has 
beco me a highly politicized issue. This has implicated the majority Fianna Fa il 
govermnent's domestic legitimacy with the short-term profitability of the Fund's 
heavi ly diversified and risky inves tment strategy. 143 Much effort between 2001 and 
2009 was consequently placed in actively normalizing and promoting the NPRF's 
speculative fmancial identity. In so doing, the state has come to increasing ly rely on 
the epistemological authority exerted by the Fund's managers in the PRE 
COITUl1ission and NTMA to support fiscal policy and, by extension, govermnent's 
po li tica l legitimacy. Indeed, the NPRF is also a constraint on state agency as it has 
become a central feature of government fiscal policy. In short, it fac ilitates the sta te's 
accc s to fore ign investment capital w hile simult aneous ly lowering the cost of debt 
14,1 Iri sh politics has been dominated by two parti es that emerged following th e 1922 -23 Ci\'il War: 
Flanna Fail and Fine Gael. At the time the NPRF Ac t was being debated, Fianna Fa il commanded 
\\',idespread domes ti c support due to its pres iding over the economic boom of the 1 990 ~ (i,e , the 'Celtic 
Tiger'), In 2007 it was re-elected as majority party for an unprecedented third five-year term although 
has since suffe red domesti c criti cism due to their overs ight of the 2008 Iri sh Ban king Cri is. 
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servicing. Maintaining Ireland's international investment attractiveness is of particular 
importance in governing the island's small and highly open economy. As such, any 
deviation from the NPRF's existing SWF identity is framed as threatening the 
stability of the Irish welfare state. Such constraint is, however, puzzling. Indeed, the 
NPRF was established as a public savings account, funded by annual Exchequer 
contributions, and dedicated to pre-funding future pension liabilities. How did the 
Oireachtas come to so heavily rely on the SWF policy path specifically - and thus the 
authoritative ideas that legitimate fmancial speculation- to support their approach to 
fiscal governance in general? 
To address this question, the following Chapter will be divided into two parts. 
Part I details why the Oireachtas decided to establish the NPRF. As in Norway and 
Alberta, it argues that the NPRF was first and foremost established as a strategy of 
governance to meet the short-term interests of government. Its primary remit is to 
address two problems of uncertainty facing the Irish state: those of budgetary 
stability, and the sustainability of state pension provision. This is to fill in a gap left 
by the existing literature, which assume SWFs to be natural by-products of 
contemporary fmance capitalism. Little consideration is thus paid to their contested 
political origins. To this end, Part I examines how the NPRF came to exhibit the three 
distinguishing features of the SWF policy path over the various alternative strategies 
debated throughout government. Part II then examines the constraint imposed by this 
policy path on the form and function of state governance in Ireland. Specific reference 
is made to the NPRF's role in supporting the state's access to bond fmancing, as well 
as its influencing the government's approach to rectifying a domestic banking crisis in 
2008. Part II argues this constraint is problematic as the NPRF's success as a strategy 
of gO\'l~rnance hinges on its ability to generate speculative fmancial returns, which are 
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highly uncertain. It is also problematic as it prevents alternative ways to address the 
pension issue from being seriously considered, let alone pursued. The Chapter then 
concludes by drawing attention to the contradictions of the SWF policy path as it 
currently stands in Ireland, as well as its implications for the future of the state's 
approach to fiscal governance. 
Part I: The NPRF as a Strategy of Governance 
Ireland's National Pension Reserve Fund emerged out of a much more 
ambitious government directive than either the Government Pension Fund-Global or 
Alberta Heritage Saving's Trust Fund. It has always been understood as a necessary 
cost the Irish state must incur. This is considering that in years of budgetary defic it, 
the government must borrow from international debt markets to meet its mandatory 
Exchequer contributions equal to one percent of GNP. This links the Fund's 
institutional legitimacy to its ability to earn returns above the cost of debt servicing; 
anything less would merely shift future liabilities on the public balance sheet from 
expected pension costs to debt obligations. The NPRF thus represents an anomaly and 
a challenge to the assumptions maintained in the existing SWF literature. That is, the 
Irish state is not directing extra-budgetary wealth to take advantage of rationally 
desirable investment opportunities. Instead, debt-fmanced capital is being 
speculatively invested as the primary means to ensure the sustainability of the state 
pension system - a substantive feature of the state's politico-economic landscape. 
Sections 8.1 to 8.4 examine why this policy preference was institutionalized by the 
Oireachtas to support the future of the Irish pension system over alternative strategies. 
8.1 Fiscal Surplus, the Demographic Time-Bomb, and the NPRF 
The concept of a dedicated savings fund emerged within the Ministries of 
Finance and Social and Family Affairs in the mid-1990s in reaction to two problems 
of uncertainty facing the Oireachtas. The first and more immediate concern arose 
from the accruement of a significant budgetary surplus between 1995 and 1999 during 
a period of rapid economic growth affectionately referred to as the 'Celtic Tiger'. 
Uncertainty in this regard derived from the fact that Ireland had no experience 
handling budgetary surpluses but a history of deficit-driven fiscal policies (Noonan, 
2000a: 83-86; see Figure 8). Indeed by the 1990's, both the domestic electorate and 
members of the Oireachtas had developed a deep-seated mistrust of the state in its 
management of public finances. The surplus of the late 1990s therefore represented a 
significant turn of events, but one that had to be carefully managed lest the Fianna 
Fail majority lose the popular support it had gained throughout the Celtic Tiger. 144 
Passing legislation that would force the government to save in times of surplus and 
reduce spending in times of deficit would therefore act as a counter-cyclical 
instrument of medium and long-term budgetary stability (c.f Noonan, 2000a: 83; 
McCreevy, 2000a: 916; Noonan and McCreevy in Standing Committee Hearings, 
2000). 
144 Between 1990 and 1999, Fianna Fail had reduced Ireland's crippling debt-GDP ratio by more than 
50 percent, as well as the high tax rates that stymied the flow of domestic and international investment 
throughout this period (Treacy, 2000: 1071; Bonner, 2000: 920-21; Noonan and McCreevy in Standing 
Committee Hearings, 2000). 
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Figure 8: National Debt and General Government Debt Ratios (1991-2008) 
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The second and more significant source of uncertainty concerned the future of 
the state's pay-as-you-go (PA YGO) pension system. Pensions are a property right in 
Ireland and protected under the constitution. Their continued provision is thus a 
primary task legitimating the Irish state's role as governors of domestic society. This 
has been since the government began increasing state-pension coverage in the late 
1980s (Coughlan, 2000: 193).145 However, the sustainability of P A YGO assumes that 
a certain number of workers will provide sufficient tax revenues to be distributed to 
pensioners on an annual basis . This sustainability was then cast in doubt by 
demographic trends published throughout the 1990s. Colloquially termed the 
'demographic time-bomb ', these trends predicted a higher number of dependants 
would emerge at the same time the labour force and tax-base would contract (see 
145 F 
. Or example, one of the government's key pri orities throughout the 1980s and 90s had been to 
Im prove old age pension provision, the demand for which had risen by 14% in rea l tem1S between 1997 
and 1999 alone (Collins, 2000: 1557). The goverrunent attempted to address various other problems 
related to priva te pensions schemes with the Pensions Act and establish ing the Pen ion Board in 1991 . 
number of problems with these pi eces of legislation noneth eless remained unresolved by the time the 
NPRF Act was being debated in 1999 (cf. Bonner, 2000: 920-92 1). 
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figure 9). As such, the future of public pension provision became a much publicized 
and hot button issue throughout the European Union at the time (cf. Cooper-Flynn, 
2000: 1559). Officials in the Ministries of Finance and Social and Family Affairs 
grew concerned for Ireland ' s own vulnerability to these trends, and commiss ioned 
three groups to write more detailed reports on the subject: the National Pensions 
Policy Initiative (NPPI), the Commission on Public Service Pensions (CPSP), and the 
Budget Strategy for Ageing Group (BSTAG) .146 The cumulative effect of these 
reports was that they made Irish state actors aware of a problem of great uncertainty 
they were expected to somehow address in the immediate term. 
% 
16 
14 
1? 
10 
8 
b 
4 
-,\- To .31 
2 
S cial 
N~lfs e 0 
Service 
Figure 9: The 'Demographic Time-Bomb' 
Expected Pension Expenditures (2006-2056) 
•.. ~ .... ~ •.. -.•....•. -.. 
2006 2016 2026 ·/'036 
Source: Pensions Board, Ireland (2006) 
-A 
.. -
_ .. ----------
2046 2056 
14~ The irish government 's initial assessment of the demographic ti me-bomb conc\ud d that Ireland had 
the lowest proportion of dependants to eli gible workers in the EU: approx imately 11 percent aged 65 
and over versus the EU's average of 16 percent. But while thi s proportion would remam constant 
between 2000 and 201 5, it was expected to rapidly increase to 15 percent by 2021. 19 percent by _O~ I. 
and 28 percent by 2056 (Coughlan, 2003: 176-7). 
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To this end, the NPPI and CPSP were specifically tasked to fmd short and 
medium-term means of increasing supplemental pension coverage. Of particular note 
for government was the NPPI's assertion that aggregate pension costs would double 
between 2000 and 2036, an increase of approximately 4.5 per cent of GNP. The 
BSTAG Report, on the other hand, was tasked to provide an immediately actionable 
plan that would ensure the long-term sustainability of the P A YGO pension system. It 
argued 3.5 per cent of GNP needed to be saved annually if the government was to 
meet its future pension liabilities, and that a 'major initial effort' should be made in 
light of the recently accrued fiscal surplus. This added extra urgency to their policy 
recommendations as a later start date would necessitate higher state provisions be 
made in the future (BSTAG, 1999). As the report argued: 
'Put another way, the increased costs associated with ageing are equivalent to a 
one-sixth increase in the level of taxation - for example, by more than doubling 
all excise duty rates - or a reduction in other Government non-pay expenditure by 
mid-century, from its current level of about 11 per cent of GNP to less than 5 per 
cent of GNP' -- BSTAG, 1999 
Hence born out of the principle of tax-smoothing, a dedicated savings vehicle such as 
the NPRF would spread these expected costs more evenly over time. Raising taxes - a 
politically disastrous move given Ireland's volatile fiscal history - could therefore be 
avoided while still preserving the economy's long-term competitiveness (BSTAG, 
1999).147 Mandatory Exchequer contributions thus represented the only means 
through which the government could adequately support P A YGO when framed as a 
strictly cost-savings problem. It was approximately one year later that the National 
Pension Reserve Fund Act was passed, which legislatively mandated the Oireachtas 
to make budgetary payments to an extra-budgetary account equal to one per cent of 
147 The BSTAG report in fact advocated for the creation of two separate funds: a Social Welfare 
Pensions Reserve Fund and a Public Service Pension Fund (BST AG, 1999: 2.1). 
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GNP each year until 2055 (NPRF Act, 2000: 18_2).148 The Act moreover stipulated 
management of these moneys would be placed at one remove of government auspices 
in a specially created NPRF Commission, and invested in a way that would secure 
'the optimal total fmancial return' (NPRF Act, 2000: Section 19-1). 
The NPRF was thus never recognized as a means to capitalise on rationally 
desirable fmancial opportunities to protect and enhance Ireland's sovereign wealth. 
Nor was it created for strictly macroeconomic purposes as would be argued by the 
dominant paradigm promoted by the SWF literature. There was in fact no short-term 
incentive for the government to build an SWF like the NPRF from the ground up. 
Instead, the NPRF has since its inception been framed as a significant yet necessary 
fmancial and political cost the state must incur. Indeed, the NPRF Act ensured that 
pensions would be the state's biggest fmancial liability for the next six decades. The 
NPRF and its SWF identity should therefore be conceptualised first and foremost as a 
strategy of domestic governance state actors utilized to address two problems of 
uncertainty that faced them: that of the PAYGO pension system's sustainability, and 
the accruement of an unprecedented budgetary surplus. Since its creation in 2001, the 
Oireachtas has consistently referenced the NPRF's ability to manage the long-term 
pension problem in the 'here and now', suggesting the government should feel secure 
in its domestic governance role no matter the size of expected liabilities or volatility 
of financial markets (c.f Coughlan, 2003: 170-3,193). Yet why did the government 
institutionalize the SWF policy path as the best means of saving given the uncertainty 
and risks associated therein? From where did these policy preferences derive their 
legitimacy, and how were objections and competing alternatives surmounted in the 
Oireachtas? These questions have yet to be addressed in the SWF literature by either 
148 It should be noted here that despite their almost revolutionary significance, neither Act generated 
mllch debate in government or media, and discussion in the public domain was virtually nonexistent 
(Maher, 2001: 14; Noonan, 20000: 83; Bonner, 2000: 920; Ross, 2000: 926). 
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scholars of IPE or fmancial economics. To fill this gap, the following section draws 
attention to the ideational foundations of the SWF policy path and how they were 
used to legitimate the NPRF throughout policymaking circles in the face of 
opposition. 
8.2 Financial Ideas, Institutional Change, and the NPRF Act 
The following discussion argues that the authoritative fmancial ideas 
substantiating the SWF policy path were crucial to the passing of the NPRF Act. In 
the face of political opposition, they were strategically drawn upon to enable the 
NPRF's supporters in the Ministry of Finance and Fianna Fail majority to sell the 
controversial savings concept to the rest of government. This is to once again draw 
attention to the importance of ideas as explanatory variables of institutional change as 
argued in the constructivist IPE literature (cf Blyth, 2002; Seabrooke, 2006; Kirshner, 
2003; Schmidt, 2010). To be sure, the problems of budgetary surplus and expected 
pension liabilities can explain why the idea for a savings account came to the fore of 
the policymaking agenda in the late 1990s. These structural developments can also 
explain why the concept of such a savings account was a desirable policy preference 
for government. What they cannot explain is how, upon its creation, the NPRF came 
to exhibit the three features of the SWF policy path over competing alternatives. 
Indeed, the Fund's primary purpose as a long-term savings vehicle was insufficient in 
itself to justify passing the NPRF Act. The NPRF's funding mechanism in no way 
met the interests of state actors given it would constrain future government's priorities 
and handicap annual budgets for at least six decades. 
Opponents vociferously argued the NPRF was not just a one-off fiscal or 
budgetary matter, but a highly debatable political issue that required a democratic 
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consensus that did not exist. The Fund's optimistic long-term perspective was 
erroneously supported by favourable short-term fiscal conditions that masked the 
extent to which a recession - or simply a budgetary deficit - would constrain state 
fiscal capacities (cf McDowell, 1999; 2000: 1549; Noonan, 2000a: 84; Noonan in 
Standing Committee Hearings, 2000; Ross, 2000: 926).149 These critics repeatedly 
demonized what they saw as the Minister of Finance's intent to 'tie the hands of his 
successors in a way that has never been attempted before' (Noonan, 2000a: 84; cf. 
McDowell, 2000: 1549-53). So while there would be no problem in 2001 to deduct 
£600 million from a budget surplus heading for £3 billion, a return to balanced 
budgets or economic contraction would produce serious politico-economic problems 
for government (McCreevy, Noonan, and McDowell in Dail Debates, 2000: 530-35; 
Noonan, 2000a: 1546; 2000b: 533; Ross, 2000: 926). They saw more immediate and 
tangible uses for this wealth, such as supporting Ireland's 'infrastructure deficit' 
which would fall outside the Fund's international investment focus. Health services, 
the transport system, and average wages were also cited as not benefiting from the 
booming economy whose profits were disproportionably isolated to a 'small coterie of 
people' (Costello, 2000: 935). If left unattended, the NPRF Act's opponents argued, 
the Irish state would be forced to address a variety of different problems than that 
posed by future pension liabilities. 150 
149 Additional objections to the NPRF Act concerned: (i) the uncertainty of the BSTAG's projections of 
the demographic 'time-bomb' (McDowell, 2000: 1552); (ii) that so much public capital would 'go 
towards fattening the already bloated profits of the international and domestic banks' (Higgins, 2000: 
1565); and (iii) other more immediate problems demanded attention such as investments in 
infrastructure that could boost economic growth and could thus also help meet future pensions costs 
(Costello, 2000: 935). 
150 In response to these proposals, McCreevy stated the NPRF's international focus wouldn't impact 
present generations who are taken care of by other policies such as 'substantial infrastructural and other 
capital investment under the national development plan. for continuing implementation of the 
Programme for Prosperity and Fairness, for further improvements in public services and for ongoing 
reduction in the national debt' (2000a: 91-+). 
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But even prior to parliamentary debates, the NPRF Act's authors were aware 
ofthe political vulnerability annual Exchequer contributions would subject them to in 
times of deficit. They consequently attempted to control for these anticipated 
obstacles by drawing upon the authoritative fmancial ideas detailed in Chapter Three 
that seek to render speculative fmance into a manageable and predictable exercise. In 
short, these ideas would be used to demonstrate the NPRF was not just desirable, but 
wholly necessary given PAYGO's expected unsustainability. NPRF opponents could 
thus be strategically framed as irrational and divorced from the material realties the 
Irish state was clearly facing. Such was its supporters' belief in the accuracy and 
altruistic worth of modern theories of investment, the NPRF's desirability as a 
strategy of governance never wavered in the face of opposition (cf. Treacy, 2000: 
1071; O'Toole, 2004: 1247). As commented by the Minister of Finance, Charlie 
McCreevy, in legislative debates: 
'There are 1,001 reasons Ministers for Finance should not do something like 
this. There are no votes in it for a start. If I thought of votes I would not be 
doing something like this. But in the long term I am of the view that ... someone 
might stand up and say "Who was the Minister for Finance who thought up 
this in the first place?" People will not even remember my name but they will 
say I must have had some vision for thefuture' - McCreevy, 1999: 1268 
From the very start of its debates in the legislature, the NPRF's supporters argued the 
NPRF's legitimacy hinged on two factors in particular: that the government's links 
with the Fund be absolutely minimized, and its managers should be exclusively 
focused on maximizing its principal. They thus turned to the idea of financial 
e_'pertise to achieve the former of these two goals, and to that offinancial profitability 
to achieve the latter. 
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8.2.1 The Idea of Financial Expertise and the NPRF Act 
Since the mid 1980s, the Oireachtas's approach to domestic governance has 
been rooted in public choice theory, which gives precedence to the market mechanism 
to organise and coordinate socioeconomic relations. This affmity towards market 
efficiency arose from the highly influential National Economic and Social Council's 
1986 Strategy Report (NESC), which committed the government to reducing its direct 
involvement with the domestic economy (NESC, 1986; cf Beary, 2007). The Celtic 
Tiger that soon followed was then seen as validation for this mistrust of government 
and was quickly applied to all matters of socioeconomic policy (Beary, 2007). To be 
sure, the Oireachtas's historical propensity to spend beyond its means regularly thrust 
fiscal policy and budgetary management into the national spotlight. Throughout the 
1970s and 80s, elections were won and lost on budgetary planning. Indeed, items 
costing the equivalent of just €100k to €200k were 'matters of great public and 
political consequence' (Noonan in Standing Committee Hearings, 2000). 
This modem po licy tradition greatly influenced McCreevy and his team within 
the Ministry of Finance when drafting the NPRF Act. After all, the NPRF's success 
would be determined by the government's ability to save into the long-term. Thus 
based on a mistrust of self-interested politicians and apathetic civil servants, the Act 
sought to ensure managerial authority would be placed as far from government as 
possible (c.f NPRF Act, 2000: Sections 5-17, 21, 25). Throughout parliamentary and 
committee deliberations, the legislation's purported 'cornerstone' was in fact to 
solidify the Fund's managerial independence so as to protect its state-funded 
principal. This was thought to ensure its integrity as a savings vehicle (McCreevy, 
2000b: 529, 535; McCreevy, 2003: 1008). The NPRF Commission - consisting of one 
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chairperson and six members appointed by the Minister of Finance - was created to 
h· 151 serve t IS purpose. 
While critics argued the selection process granted the Minister of Finance too 
much authority, neither the concept of the Commission nor the variegated and often 
non-fmancial expertise it would comprise were questioned (c.f Dail Debates, 2000: 
518; Seanad Debates, 2000: 1078-88; Ross, 2000: 927, 1094).152 In short, McCreevy 
was successful in presenting the Commission as an additional layer of bureaucracy 
separating the Oireachtas from NPRF assets; its primary remit would be to monitor 
rather than manage the Fund's investments no matter the official wording of the 
legislation (c.f NPRF Act, Section 6.5). To be sure, any references to the 
Commission's responsibilities in the NPRF Act are invariably followed by clauses 
that empower - and in some cases encourage - it to delegate these responsibilities to 
external experts (c.f NPRF Act, 2000: Sections 5-17, 21, 25). If criticizing the 
Commission, the NPRF's opponents would be referred to these clauses and reminded 
of the government's historical inability to save (cf McCreevy, 2000b: 529, 536; 
2000c: 1573; Seanad Debates, 2000: 911-1121; Treacy, 2000: 1101-2). Yet moving 
managerial responsibility away from government in this functional sense of authority 
only partially explains how the NPRF came to institutionalize the SWF policy path. 
That is, limiting the Oireachtas's involvement would not guarantee the NPRF be 
successful as a long-term savings account, and thus did not by itself legitimate the 
151 The NPRF Commission was officially tasked to 'control, manage and invest the assets of the Fund 
in accordance with the Fund investment policy' (NPRF Act, 2000: Section 6). 
1'2 Viable candidates for the NPRF Commission need only possess 'substantial expertise and 
~xpcrience at a senior level in any of a number of listed areas'. These include, but are not limited to: 
mvestment or business management, finance or economics, the law, actuarial practice, accountancy, 
civil service of government or the state, trade union representation, the pensions industry, or consumer 
protection (NPRF Act, 2000: Section 7.4). The Commission as an extra layer of bureaucracy was in 
t~lct questioned only once throughout the legislative process, and this to avoid overcomplicating the 
Fund's governance structure by having the NTMA assume the Commission's duties (Noonan, 2000a: 
87). 
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Fund as a strategy of governance. Additional ideas underpinning the concept of 
fmancial expertise had to be called on in this regard. 
The National Treasury Management Agency was thus delegated operational 
authority for managing the Fund's investments so as to fill the gaps left by the 
Commission's passive role as political buffer (NPRF Act, 2000: Section 6.5). It was, 
however, acknowledged that the NTMA 'may require some additional skills' and that 
'teething issues' must be considered (Treacy, 2000: 1114). But in any case, the 
NPRF's supporters argued the Agency was more ideologically predisposed to oversee 
the Fund's commercial mandate than the Commission alone. It was portrayed as 
possessing a business culture divorced from the clouding influence of politics due to 
its performance-orientated remuneration structure. It was therefore more 
'psychologically geared to doing things rather than agonising over how things should 
be done .. .largely because civil servants have no incentive to put their necks on the 
line' (Somers, 2006; cf McCreevy, 2000c: 1576-77; McCreevy in Standing 
Committee Hearings, 2000; Doyle, 2000: 1069).153 
That the NTMA lacked the specific expertise required to manage a diversified 
investment portfolio was thus framed as being of little consequence for the 
Oireachtas. This expertise could be either purchased or internally developed in the 
same way the NTMA had done in the past (cf Somers, 2003). It was the NTMA's 
business culture and history of public service that qualified them to operationalize the 
Fund's commercial mandate 'to secure the optimal total financial return ... provided 
the level of risk to the moneys held or invested is acceptable' (NPRF Act, 2000: 
Section 19-1). As such, McCreevy and his supporters argued that only the NTMA had 
I', Another reason the NTMA was selected was so the government could maintain some form of 
connection with the Fund's managers, whoever they may tum out to be. This is witnessed in the deeply 
embedded linkages connecting the Minister of Finance with senior staff at the NTMA, as \\"ell as the 
'.JTMA's CEO being made a permanent member of the NPRF Commission (cf McCreevy and 
\\cDowel\ in Standing Committee Hearings, 2000). 
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the capacity to translate the mandate's talk of risk management into prudent and 
legitimate action. In short, only an NTMA divorced from the clouding influence of 
politics and versed in the language of fmancial risk could determine what constituted 
legitimate fmancial action and what did not (McCreevy, 2000b: 529, 536; c.f 
McCreevy,2000c: 1573; Corrigan, 2000: 5; Seanad Debates, 2000: 911-1121). 
As a result of these authoritative ideas, any criticisms or amendments that 
sought to undermine either the Fund's commercial mandate or the role of its arms-
length managers in the Commission and NTMA were immediately discredited. They 
were framed as threatening both the Fund's ability to save and profitably invest. 154 
Thus by drawing from the ideas underpinning the concept of fmancial expertise to 
inform the government of their interests, not delegating managerial and operational 
authority to the Commission and NTMA was successfully equated with the failure of 
the PAYGO pension system. By extension, the failure of the SWF policy path was 
equated with the failure of the Irish welfare state in general (Corrigan, 2000: 15). In 
this way the NPRF came to exhibit the third distinguishing feature of SWFs: that the 
funds are deliberately placed at one remove from regulatory entities such as fmance 
ministries or central banks traditionally tasked with the management of sovereign 
capital. 
154 Amendment no. 25, for example, was adopted so as to increase the Commission's authority over the 
NTMA's CEO - a permanent member of the Commission - to demand accountability and information 
regarding NPRF performance (McCreevy, 2000b: 535). On the other hand, failed amendment no. 21 
sought to increase the powers of the legislature over investments that might affect the 'common good'. 
It was argued the NPRF Act divested both the Minister of Finance and the Oireachtas in general from 
the policymaking role, undermining their governing authority (McDowell, 2000: 529-30; cf. 
amendment no. 26 in Dail Debates, 2000: 535; amendment no. 3 in Seanad Debates, 2000: 1078-88). 
This proposed amendment and others like it were quickly rejected firstly on the grounds that neither the 
legislature nor Minister of Finance should 'have any right to give directions to the commissioners or set 
the criteria to which they must adhere'. This was meant to avoid 'politicizing' the fund, which would 
compromise its investment returns and role as a savings vehicle (McCreevy, 2000b: 529, 536; c.f. 
McCreevy, 2000a: 1573; Seanad Debates, 2000: 911-1121). More fundamentally, however, it was 
rejected on the ideational grounds that the NTMA and Commission would already be guided by a 
c~mmercial investment mandate to secure 'the optimum return over the long term, subject to prudent 
rIsk management'. No additional forms of governmental oversight or changes to the existing NPRF Act 
were therefore deemed necessary (McCreevy, 2000b: 529). 
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8.2.2 The Idea of Financial Profitability and the NPRF Act 
The legitimacy of the NPRF as a dedicated savings vehicle was successfully 
framed as depending on its managerial authority being delegated outside the auspices 
of the Oireachtas, and to fmancial experts in the NTMA. Yet considering the NPRF 
would be primarily funded by annual Exchequer contributions, why the emphasis on 
returns demanded of its commercial mandate? To this effect, recall that legislating for 
these mandatory budget allocations was not in the government's interests given the 
constraint they would impose in times of deficit or economic contraction. However, 
neither McCreevy nor his biggest supporters in Fianna Fail would shift their position 
in this regard, arguing that 'any short-term difficulties the payments may cause the 
Exchequer are more than offset by the long-term gain'. Any deviation, even if it 
necessitated increased borrowing, was framed as undermining the whole basis of the 
Fund (McCreevy, 2000c: 80). The NPRF's legitimacy thus also depended on the 
belief it could earn a higher rate of return than the interest paid to service the national 
debt. Anything less would merely shift these liabilities from one area of the 
government's balance sheet to another - from pension liabilities to debt liabilities -
rather than reduce them in real terms (Doyle, 2000: 919). Promoting the ideas 
underpinning the concept of fmancial profitability, specifically that of the equity-risk 
premium, proved critical to the NPRF's appeal. In short, these ideas' ability to create 
forward looking projections as to the long-term profitability of diversified fmance 
enabled the NPRF to be presented as a desirable, legitimate, and sustainable strategy 
of governance to a dubious Oireachtas. 
McCreevy and his supporters in Fianna Fail were thus proactive in legislative 
debates, vociferously arguing the national debt - which stood at 41.5 per cent of GDP 
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- could be paid down at the same time as pensions were being pre-funded through the 
NPRF's Exchequer contributions. This was because NPRF capital would be primarily 
invested over the long-term in riskier assets such as equities. Citing the unfailing 
presence of the ERP based on historical studies, it was asserted that such assets would 
pay a premium on top of the cost of debt servicing. This optimism of speculative 
[mance's long-term profitability was, interestingly, bellied by the massive short-term 
gains global investors were experiencing on the back of the Dot-Com bubble (Treacy, 
2000: 1072; McCreevy, 2000b: 942; McCreevy, 2000a: 935). Reinforcing the implicit 
nature of these assumptions throughout the Oireachtas, details on the quantitative side 
of these arguments were requested only once (McDowell, 2000: 1553). Indeed, more 
important were the qualitative assumption that speculative investment was an 
inherently profitable venture. No such official numbers were therefore provided, and 
it was generally assumed returns would average around 5.5 per cent annually - the 
interest charged on maintaining the national debt in 1999. 
So while agreeing with the principle of providing for pensions into the future, 
the opposition attempted to frame the practice of NPRF investment as being flawed. 
Senator Ross, a former institutional stockbroker, was particularly passionate in this 
regard: 
lVlr. McCreevy: Senators Costello and Doyle asked why not pay more off 
the national debt as against putting it into the fund. 
lVlr. J. Doyle: We will get a higher return on the investment fund. 
Mr. McCreevy: That is exactly the point. If the cost of the debt to the 
Exchequer is, say, 5% or thereabouts, the rate of return from pension 
investment funds would be considerably greater than that. 
lVlr. Ross: How does the Minister know it would be considerably greater 
than that? 
Mr. McCreevy: If one takes a survey published every quarter by the [Irish 
state] pension fund over the past three years one will see the annualised 
return on pension investments has been in double digits for the past ten 
years or more. 
Mr. Ross: It does not mean it will be so in the future ... If the Minister can 
point to any equity market in the world where the yield is more than 5.4% 
on average, I will take a punt at it. 
--Emphasis added, Seanad Debates, 2000: 42, 1073 
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Citing a lack of evidence showing investors could beat equity market indices over the 
long-term, Ross went so far as to call investment management a 'completely bogus 
science'. However, the notion that the NPRF's diversified investment strategy would 
payout some form of premium over the cost of debt servicing nonetheless remained 
implicit. It was that it would be managed by investment professionals external to the 
state 'at huge charges' that was contested (Ross, 2000: 931, 1134; Costello, 2000: 
1070; Higgins, 2000: 1565). 
Thus in the end, the NPRF's critics were overcome by the seemingly 
impenetrable legitimacy of the SWF policy path as promoted by its supporters in the 
Ministry of Finance and Fianna Fail majority. The notion of the ERP represented a 
failsafe against the possibility that the short-term costs of mandatory annual 
allocations would outweigh the long-term benefits of the NPRF's diversified 
portfolio. That the Fund would also be monitored by Commissioners divorced from 
the political arena and managed by fmancially prudent experts in the NTMA further 
buttressed the Oireachtas's confidence. They portrayed the NPRF as a seemingly 
bullet-proof means of ensuring balanced budgets and the sustainability of PAYGO. 
Hence the NPRF's depoliticized managerial structure and its strictly fmancial 
mandate did not just represent efforts to maximize national wealth as would be argued 
by mainstream SWF analysis. More importantly, these defming features of the SWF 
policy path and their underlying ideas are the pillars upon which the Fund's 
institutional legitimacy is based. That the first decade of NPRF inYestment would 
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actually see it generate negative returns of -2.2 percent was therefore of no 
consequence at the time its founding legislation was drafted (cf. NPRF Annual 
Report, 2009: 8). Indeed, the NPRF's supporters could have no way of knowing what 
the future would hold. They could only draw from the ideational tool-kit available -
as supplied by modern financial epistemology - to inform them of their interests and 
the best means to achieve them in the face of uncertainty. 
Conclusion of Part I 
Part I of this Chapter demonstrated how the NPRF was established to address 
two problems of uncertainty that faced the Irish state in the late 1990s. First was the 
problem posed by an unprecedented fiscal surplus, the potential uses for which were 
heavily scrutinized and debated throughout the Oireachtas and media. This debate 
followed from a deep-seated mistrust of the Oireachtas's ability to manage public 
moneys after the fiscal volatility experienced in the 1970s and 80s. Second was the 
problem posed by demographic trends which indicated the much relied upon state 
pension system was unsustainable. It was demonstrated how the SWF policy path was 
pursued so as to deal with these problems of uncertainty. It was not pursued so as to 
take advantage of rationally desirable opportunities afforded by fmancial speculation. 
The fact that the Fund was established as a tool of government is not, however, a 
surprising conclusion in itself. More interesting were the ideational mechanisms 
through which Ministry of Finance officials trumpeted the SWF policy path as the 
only way forward. To this end, two ideas that substantiate modern fmancial 
epistemology as detailed in Chapter Three were strategically drawn from to legitimate 
financial speculation as a strategy of governance. First, the idea of fmancial expertise 
was used to convince the Oireachtas they should place management at one remoye of 
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government auspices and closer to fmancial experts. Second, the idea of fmancial 
profitability was used to legitimate why the NPRF should be mandated to invest in 
speculative fmancial assets with debt-funded public capital. 
As a result, the SWF policy path served to fmancially depoliticize a 
systematically significant amount of Ireland's national wealth into the indefmite 
future. Conceptualizing the SWF policy path as financial depoliticization is necessary 
if a critical IPE analysis of the funds is to be had. Indeed, it allows us to examine how 
SWFs limit the way their respective state overseers can act in relation to 
systematically significant pools of public capital. This is not just by placing authority 
of SWF management at one remove of democratically elected officials. It is also in 
the way that SWFs' ideational foundations limit what state actors understand to be 
legitimate action vis-a.-vis the management of their public capital. That is, SWF 
managers - whether internal to government or externally hired - must act within the 
expectations of modem fmancial epistemology, continuously diversifying national 
wealth so as to control for high degrees of fmancial risk. Any form of government 
intervention or directed investment that falls outside the prescriptions of this 
interpretive framework are deemed irrational and normatively wrong. Indeed, once 
the NPRF was established, the Oireachtas, NPRF Commission and NTMA were all 
required to act within the bounds of legitimate action prescribed by this fmancial 
knowledge framework. The NPRF subsequently became a highly scrutinized feature 
of Ireland's politico-economic landscape. To this end, Part II examines how the 
NPRF's SWF identity constrained Irish state agency between 2001 and 2009. 
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Part II: The NPRF as a Constraint on State Agency 
Part I examined how and why the SWF policy path was institutionalized in 
Ireland through the government's adoption of the NPRF Act. Part II focuses on how 
this resulted in constraining Irish state agency in two ways between 2001 and 2009. 
First, a combination of volatile fmancial markets and poor returns propelled the NPRF 
to become a highly po liticized issue following its creation in 2001. This pressured the 
NPRF's managers in the NTMA and Commission to expand the Fund's investment 
universe - and thus exposure to systemic fmancial risk - to increase its expected 
returns. It also put increasing pressure on the Fianna Fail majority to promote the 
SWF policy path as a legitimate strategy of governance to the domestic electorate. 
This involved actively promoting and normalizing the speculative fmancial thought 
and practices that would defme the NPRF's institutional identity between 2001 and 
2009. Yet in so doing, members of the Oireachtas - especially the Fund's most vocal 
supporters in Fianna Fail - came to increasingly rely on the epistemological authority 
of financial experts external to state auspices to support their governance function. 
The second source of constraint the NPRF imposed on Irish state agency came from 
international fmancial markets. Indeed, the NPRF and its SWF identity became a 
strong signal of creditworthiness for the foreign investors the government heavily 
relied on to fmance Ireland's small open economy. As such, the NPRF and its 
financial profitability came to be a central feature of Irish fiscal policy between 2001 
and 2009. 
These two sources of constraint on state agency are significant as they limited 
the way in which the issues of budgetary management, as well as the future of 
Ireland's PA YGO pension system, could be conceived of and addressed. They 
ultimately rcconceptualise these problems of uncertainty as problems of fmancial risk 
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management only solvable by fmancial experts divorced from the democratic arena. 
As will be demonstrated, limiting the role of the state through such fmancial 
depoliticization is problematic in the face of recurrent fmancial crises, which require 
government intervention to correct. Indeed, these two sources of constraint shaped the 
Ministry of Finance's response to a domestic banking crisis that emerged in 2008. 
They resulted in the state's intervention into this crisis to take the form of a toothless 
NPRF investment rather than the regulatory overhaul called for by a number of state 
officials and everyday citizens. A more balanced approach to states' relationships 
with their SWFs must therefore be considered lest democratically elected 
governments become suppressed features of a crisis prone fmancial realm. 
8.3 The NPRF (2001-2009): 
The Oireachtas's Dependence on Financial Experts 
When passing the NPRF Act, the Oireachtas recognized they were committing 
the Irish state to embed public capital throughout the fmancial realm for at least six 
decades. However, it is unlikely they realised the extent to which they would come to 
depend on fmancial experts external to the auspices of the state to substantiate their 
political legitimacy (c.f. Perry, 2003). Indeed, their dependence on the NPRF 
Commission, NTMA, and externally-hired investment experts only began to emerge 
after the NPRF Act was passed. It began with the NTMA' s fIrst task as operationa I 
managers, which was to hire a consultancy fIrm - Mercer Consulting - to advise them 
and the Commission of an investment strategy that best met the NPRF's commercial 
mandate. ISS Using 'efficient frontier analysis' fIrst introduced by Markowitz in 1956, 
Mercer advocated the NPRF be constructed around a very-high risk profile of 80 
155 Recall that the AHF as well as GPFG also turned to Mercer to inform its managers in the Treasury 
and l'cntral bank respectively of an optimal investment strategy. 
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percent equities and 20 percent fIxed income. 1S6 While it was conceded the efficient 
frontier approach 'cannot, of course, foretell the future', it was nonetheless framed by 
Mercer as the only means through which the NTMA should approach NPRF 
management (Annual Report, 2001: 13). This was given the Fund's prescriptive 
commercial mandate, as well as the fact that this approach's underlying assumptions -
those of investor rationality and market effIciency in particular - were used to 
legitimate the NPRF Act in the fIrst place. 
Citing their lack of fmancial expertise required to operationalize Mercer's 
recommendations, the Commission and NTMA immediately agreed they should 
employ a 'buy-not-make' management approach. 1S7 This meant that authority for the 
NPRF's operational management would be entirely delegated to fmancial actors 
external to the Irish state and its domestic interests. Hence the NTMA was selected as 
operational managers because the Oireachtas thought they possessed the private 
market mentality deemed crucial for the NPRF's success. For the fmancial experts in 
Mercer, however, the NTMA could not be deemed 'prudent' to the extent called for 
by the Fund's commercial mandate. That is, only fmancial experts completely 
divorced from the political arena and in possession of investment skill - as derived 
from specialized risk management techniques and embedment in fmancial 
information networks - were judged capable of fmancially prudent action. 1S8 Whether 
156 This investment strategy was based on: the NPRF's long-term investment horizon, strong annual 
cash-flow from Exchequer contributions, the government's commitment to pre-funding pensions 
through the NPRF, and an assumed ERP of three percent (Annual Report, 2001: 7; 2002: 15). 
157 This was with exception to the NPRF's passive bond portfolio which would be managed by the 
NTMA. 
15~ The power of these ideas to guide the NPRF's institutional development is further witnessed in the 
:WRF's approach to passive versus riskier active investment strategies. In legislatiYe debaks, 
McCreevy stressed the Fund would pursue a passive investment strategy of tracking indexes. This was 
based on an NTMA study of risk and return that claimed it was too expensive to hire specialist 
managers capable of 'beating the market' through active management (McCreevey, 2000a: 15""0). 
However, the Fund immediately adopted a riskier strategy of almost 50 percent active management at 
the advice of Mercer. This further necessitated the NPRF Commission's adoption of the buy-not-make 
strategy and, by extension, the government's reliance on externally-sourced financial experts. 
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this argument would prove true or not was not known by the NTMA or Commission 
at the time. Rather, only the belie/that these ideas were true advised them that a 'buy-
not-make' management was appropriate given their uncertainty of how to 
speculatively invest NPRF assets. 
As a consequence of their belief in the necessity of fInancial expertise, the 
state was placed one step further from NPRF management than was originally 
expected in legislative debates. It is through this dependence on fmancial experts 
informed by modem fmancial epistemology that the NPRF came to constrain the Irish 
state in two ways in its approach to domestic governance. Section 8.4 examines the 
domestic source of this constraint, while Section 8.S examines the international source 
of this constraint. Section 8.6 then examines how these two sources of constraint 
influenced the Oireachtas's approach to the domestic banking crisis of 2008. Indeed, 
they constrained the form of the government's intervention to take the form of a 
toothless NPRF investment rather than conditional government bailout. This 
effectively reinforced the banks' reliance on the speculative and risky lending 
practices that led to the crisis in the fIrst place. 
8.4 The NPRF (2001-2009): 
Domestic Source of Constraint 
Despite its high-risk nature, Mercer's proposal to invest in 80 percent equities 
and 20 percent bonds greatly appealed to NPRF managers in the Commission and 
NTMA. Indeed, the Fund's institutional legitimacy was premised on the assumption 
its investments could earn returns above the cost of debt servicing in the long-term. 
Yet despite this focus on the long-term, the NPRF's legitimacy immediately became 
implicated with its ability to earn returns in the short-term. This was in the wake of its 
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failure to keep afloat of volatile fmancial markets still reeling from a burst Dot-Com 
bubble. Indeed, the Fund's average annual return in its fIrst three years was a 
depressing -2.2 percent. This led members of the Oireachtas to put increasing pressure 
on NPRF managers in the Commission and NTMA to produce positive returns in the 
short-term, as 'large paper losses might tend to undermine ... political and public 
confIdence [in the Fund]' (Mansergh, 2004: 56; Perry, 2003). The Commission was 
thus constrained to expand their investment universe through extensive diversifIcation 
as 'the biggest risk [ they] could run would be to take an overcautious investment 
approach and thus reduce the Fund's potential contribution to Ireland's increasing 
pensions costs' (Carty, 2005: 5). This is to highlight that under modern fmancial 
epistemology, the only means of improving the NPRF's risk-return profIle was 
through embedding its assets throughout an increasingly broad range of riskier asset 
classes and markets. This consequently increased the government's exposure to global 
fmancial volatility, and thus their vested interest in the future profItability and 
expansion of speculative capital markets. 159 Hence rather than increase the 
government's caution over fmancial speculation, the Dot-Com crisis led them to 
believe they should increase the NPRF's global fmancial embededness. Indeed, the 
crisis enabled the NPRF's managers in the Commission and NTMA to convince the 
Oireachtas that the Fund had yet to be diversifIed to the extent prescribed by modern 
investment strategies. This is despite the fact that diversifying the NPRF in this 
manner prior to the crisis would have in fact increased the losses accrued therein. 
159 . . I t) In 2003, the NPRF's investment universe was expanded to include small cap eqUItIes (~percen , 
corporate bonds (2 percent), property (4 percent), public-private partnerships (€200 million initially), 
and private equity (Annual Report, 2003 15). Then by 2008, the NPRF's benchmark portfolio consisted 
of large-cap equity (61,4 percent), small-cap equity (5 percent), emerging markets equity (4 percent), 
pri\'ate equity (3.3 percent), property (4.4 percent). commodities (1.5 percent), bonds (15.6 percent), 
and cash and currency (2.1 percent). See Annual Report, 2008: 4. 
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The NPRF thus unintentionally became a highly politicized and controversial 
issue shortly after its creation. Its fmancial successes and failures became regular and 
influential talking points for politicians throughout both the media and policymaking 
circles. 160 The opposition's political platform in the 2002 national election was in fact 
premised on the argument that the Fund's assets should be used to address Ireland's 
expansionary infrastructure deficit (Irish Times, 2003). As with their initial 
reservations about the NPRF, these critics in Fine Gael and Labour maintained annual 
Exchequer contributions were too rigid and that the government's 'rather conditional 
access to bond markets is not quite oil in the ground' (McCarthy, 2009). While they 
were convinced of the 'need to diversify risk' given the Fund's commercial mandate, 
they nonetheless argued 'it does not make sense to suggest that it is always better to 
invest a fund of this type abroad' (emphasis added, Ryan, 2004: 1251-2). Instead, they 
proposed infrastructural investments could help promote economic efficiency and 
growth, thereby increasing government tax revenues and their ability to fmance future 
pensions (c.f Bruton, 2004: 17, 23, 27). 
Despite their efforts, the opposition in Fine Gael and Labour were unable to 
convince either the Fianna Fail majority or the electorate that the SWF policy path 
was not in their best interests. This proved a major reason Fianna Fail retained their 
parliamentary majority in 2002 as 'raiding' the NPRF to invest in infrastructure was 
equated with an economic gamble and a fmancially insecure future (Leyden, 2004: 
1256; Mansergh, 2004: 55). Indeed, Fianna Fail's popularity became increasingly 
associated with their prudent and forward-looking approach to domestic governance 
following their spear-heading the NPRF's creation (Irish Times, 2003: Irish 
Independent, 2009; RTE News, 2009). As in Norway and Alberta, however, this 
160 Sec for example: Hughes, 2004; Geaney, 2003; Suiter, 2001; Howlin, 2001: written question '+0: 
Dail Debates, 2003: 1008; Penrose, 2003: 32; McGinley, 2003: written question 278; Ring, 2003: 
written question 238; Quinn, 2000: written question 58; Morgan, 2008: 130; O'Shea, 2008: l30. 
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support was not a natural by-product of inherently desirable legislation. Rather, it had 
to be actively pursued through their promotion of the SWF policy path and the 
modern fmancial epistemology upon which its legitimacy was based. 
To this effect, the dominant narrative espoused by the government with the 
support of the Commission and NTMA was as dire as it was convincing. It was 
argued time and again throughout the media, public speeches, and review committee 
hearings that if the fmanciallogic underpinning the NPRF's investment strategy was 
not sound, it would mean 'the failure of the free world model'. The government 
would therefore have much bigger problems to deal with (Geaney, 2004: 7: 2003: 11; 
cf. Annual Report, 2002: 7). This represented a marked departure from the optimistic 
message of fmancial speculation's inherent profitability promoted in earlier debates. 
In short, failure of the NPRF was equated with the failure of modem capitalism as 
'equities must outperform bonds because investors must be rewarded for buying 
riskier assets ... otherwise there are no incentives to invest in business'. The F ianna 
Fail government's commitment to these ideas was then cemented following the 
'virtually unprecedented three successive year decline' in global equity markets 
between 2001 and 2004 (Geaney, 2003). Indeed to withstand the resulting onslaught 
from the political opposition, the NPRF's supporters could only reemphasize the Fund 
had a long-term perspective, and argue these short-term losses would most likely 
never be realized (Dail Debates, 2003b: 357-8). At the same time, however, they 
could only do so with the support and epistemological authority of fmancial experts in 
the NTMA and externally hired consultants. Without this support, such arguments 
could be framed by the opposition as a political tactic by a fiscally irresponsible 
Fianna Fail majority. 
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The Oireachtas as a whole therefore conducted regular reVIews and 
presentations of the NPRF's investment strategy to inform them of what constituted 
rational action in the midst of fmancial crisis. Mercer, the consultancy fIrm 
incentivized to preserve the NPRF's lucrative SWF identity, was tasked to conduct 
two reviews of the Fund in 2002 and 2007. 161 Both reviews unsurprisingly concluded 
that the rationale for the NPRF's long-term diversifIed investment strategy was still 
valid, despite the abnormal volatility in fmancial markets. Mercer even went so far as 
to claim that 'the probability of equities outperforming bonds over a 20 year time 
horizon is 100 percent', and that there was a 60 percent chance of reaping an ERP of 
four percent over the next fIve years (Annual Report, 2002: 15). The second review 
reiterated these arguments to a dubious Oireachtas despite the 'abnormally low 
returns' of equities compared to safer assets like bonds and cash between 2001 and 
2007 (Annual Report, 2007: 13). 
The Commission and NTMA conducted three similar internal reviews, and 
argued the same conclusions as Mercer in mandatory presentations made to the 
Committee of Public Accounts - a fIscal watchdog committee. But again, these 
presentations were not meant to critically review the SWF policy path's underlying 
fmancial logic in the face of these problematic global crises. Instead they merely 
served to remind Fianna Fail, Fine Gael, and Labour offIcials of the legitimacy of the 
NPRF's underlying fmancial assumptions, and - by extension - the desirability of the 
speculative assets through which the Fund would pursue its commercial mandate (c. f 
Somers, 2003; 2008; 2009). They were symbolic acts through which the Oireachtas 
could demonstrate to itself as well as the public it was ensuring national wealth was 
being managed in accordance with contemporary fmancial best practice. 
1~1 Between 2001 and 2009, externally hired consultants such as Mercer were paid over 2.6 million ~o 
au\isc the :--JTMA on how to approach the NPRF's increasingly diversified inwstment portfolIo 
~:\nnual Reports, 2001-2009: Fees, Commissions and Other Expenses). 
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NPRF managers in the Commission and NTMA were also constrained to act 
within the same prescriptive assumptions about speculative fmance when approaching 
Fund management. After all, the whole basis for the NPRF would be undermined if 
they were to frame its SWF identity as erroneously informed by modern fmancial 
theory, and thus tantamount to gambling. As presented by the Chair of the NPRF 
Commission to the Committee of Public Accounts following the Dot-Com bubble 
burst: 
'It is hard to look back on 25 years of data and see that there is a large equity 
premium in the context of falling markets. Joe Kennedy Snr. sold his shares in 
1929 because the shoe shine boy told him to but if we said we were running 
the [NPRF] in that way, people would not be too happy. It would be all right if 
we did the right thing but let us suppose it was the other way around. We have 
done the best we can. ' -- Geaney, 2003 
Here, Geaney is ultimately saying the Commission can only act according to the 
financial assumptions underpinning the SWF policy path in informing them of how to 
approach NPRF management. To be able to predict the market is impossible, he says. 
The government must nonetheless maintain faith in the NPRF's capacity to harvest 
the ERP over time if it is to be considered a legitimate strategy of governance by the 
domestic electorate. As such, it was the authoritative ideas substantiating the NPRF' s 
speculative fmancial identity that prescribed how the government should approach 
Fund management between 2001 and 2009. It was not just the act of placing the 
political character of decision-making vis-a-vis Fund management at one remove of 
government as held in existing approaches to depoliticization (cf. Burnham 2001: 
128). 
The Oireachtas's acceptance and promotion of the SWF policy path as dogma 
between 2001 and 2009 therefore cemented the expectation of fmancial market 
\'o!atility into the NPRF's remit. To be sure, the NPRF's long-term diyersified 
inv~stment strategy amounted to a political buffer upon which the Oireachtas came to 
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increasingly rely in the fmancially volatile 2000s (cf. McCreevy, 2003: 1008; 2003b: 
1385-6; Coughlan, 2004: 921). In so doing, however, both opposition and majority 
politicians committed themselves and their successors to framing future pension 
provision and budgetary management as purely quantitative matters of fmancial risk 
management. The NPRF' s critics were either unable or unwilling to develop an 
equally desirable governance strategy than that advocated by the Fund's supporters in 
Fianna Fail, the NPRF Commission, the NTMA, and externally hired fmancial 
experts. Deviation from the SWF policy path - no matter how volatile fmancial 
markets became - was consequently perceived by a majority in the Oireachtas as 
tantamount to a failure of governance. That is, a failure to ensure both the 
sustainability of state-pension provision and balanced budgets. 
In this way the government came to develop a vested interest in preserving the 
legitimacy of the SWF policy path as a key element of their governance function 
between 2001 and 2009. As the preceding discussion demonstrated, they did so by 
reiterating and promoting the authoritative fmancial ideas upon which the SWF policy 
path is based. This was necessitated by several years of negative returns following the 
Dot Com crisis, which brought the NPRF to the fore of domestic political debate. 
These negative returns also pressured the Commission and NTMA to enhance the 
Fund's risk-return profile, resulting in them expanding its investment universe and 
hence the government's exposure to global fmancial volatility. As such, the Irish state 
was not just constrained by managerial authority being delegated to the NPRF 
Commission and NTMA. Instead, the government was also constrained by the 
ideational authority exerted by modern fmancial epistemology once institutionalized 
into the state apparatus. This was by its prescribing what they should consider a 
285 
legitimate versus illegitimate approach to NPRF management, and how this approach 
should be communicated to the Irish public. 
8.5 The NPRF (2001-2009): 
International Source of Constraint 
The constraint imposed by the NPRF and its speculative fmancial identity on 
Irish state agency also originated from international fmancial markets. This source of 
constraint became apparent to government in 2001 when Standard and Poor's 
upgraded Ireland's long-term sovereign debt rating to AAA. They cited that the 
creation of the NPRF and its long-term approach to diversified investment meant 
Ireland had more 'ample fiscal flexibility to meet the challenge of an ageing 
population ... than most ED members' (McCreevy, 2001: 508; cf. Cooling, 2002).162 
Ireland and its government bonds thus represented attractive investments for mobile 
finance capital compared to its competitors throughout continental Europe. Yet while 
this ratings boost was a bonus in 2001 when the budget was still in surplus, 
maintaining investor confidence in Irish bonds by promoting the NPRF became a 
dominant priority for the government from the mid-2000s onwards. This was due to 
Ireland's entering the ED single currency market in the early 2000s, as well as the re-
emergence of an expansionary national deficit from 2004 onwards. 
Indeed, the fact that all European government bonds would be denominated in 
the same multilaterally-governed currency meant Ireland no longer had 'a unique 
product to sell' on international debt markets. This was a significant development for 
Ireland given foreign investors owned 70 percent of government bonds in 2003 
(Somers, 2003). Ensuring that enough cash was available to meet the government's 
162 For a complete list of Standard and Poor's ratings of Irish bonds bet\\"een 2001 and 2009, visit: 
http: \\ww.ntma.ielPublications/pressReleaselntro.php 
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expenditure needs consequently became the NTMA's 'core business' and 'main 
element of concentration' (Somers, 2003). The NTMA was thus aggressively 
marketing Irish bonds with the NPRF being a central feature of their marketing 
strategy.163 As summarised by Somers, CEO of the NTMA and permanent member of 
the NPRF Commission: 
'One of the benefits of the National Pensions Reserve Fund, with its £20billion 
in assets, is that it contributes to the positive assessment by credit rating 
agencies and international investors of Ireland's credit worthiness. In debt to 
GDP terms, Ireland stands at close to 25%, but when the NPRF is taken into 
account ... the ratio drops to 14% of GDP' -- Somers, 2009 
Thus by 2009, the NPRF and its SWF identity had become central features of 
Irish fiscal policy. The NTMA's marketing campaign propelled the Fund to become 
widely viewed as a 'flagship project' upon which international investors and rating 
agencies positively assessed Ireland's credit worthiness. As a consequence, any 
change of direction from its diversified investment strategy or mandatory Exchequer 
contributions would be seen as 'prioritising short-term interests over the longer term 
sustainability of the public [mances'. This would lead fmancial markets to 'respond 
negatively to any such changes' and, by extension, hamper the government's ability 
to [mance the day-to-day functioning of the state (O'Connell, 2009). So while the 
NPRF was always meant to act as a counter-cyclical tool of budgetary stability, it 
unintentionally assumed a greater significance for the state in its approach to domestic 
governance. 164 Such a relationship between the state's governance function and the 
SWF policy path was most evident following the recent fmancial crisis. 
163 To be sure, the NPRF is linked to the NTMA in other ways than just being its operational managers. 
For example, the CEO of the NTMA is a permanent member of the NPRF Commission. Moreover, ~e 
Chair of the Commission between 2005 and 2009, Paul Carty, had been a high-ranking NTMA official 
between 1990 and 2005. 
164 The importance of the NPRF to Ireland's fiscal strategy was solidified following the release of the 
government-commissioned report of the 'Special Group on Public Service Numbers and Expenditure 
Programmes' (colloquially known as the 'Bord Snip Nua'). This group was tasked to find ways to 
reduce public spending following the surge in the national debt between 2006 and 2009. One of the, 
report's recommendations was that the national debt in the medium to long-tenns was unsustamabk 11 
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To this end, the NPRF was devalued by over 30 percent between 2007 and 
2008 - a loss of €6.7 billion, or more than 15 percent of national GNP in 2008 _ 
eliminating more than all the fmancial gains it had made since inception (Annual 
Report, 2008: 5, 39). As with preceding crises, the Commission unsurprisingly 
reminded a reeling Oireachtas of the NPRF's long-term perspective and warned of the 
'danger' of taking a short-term view. They claimed the Fund's performance was 
credible 'given the difficult and unusual decade ... similar to the 1930s when equities 
earned a negative return and bonds strongly outperformed' (Carty, 2010). Thus 
harking back to an earlier era of fmance capitalism, the Commission assured the 
government no one could be held accountable for the extreme abnormality that was 
the NPRF's performance in 2007 and 2008. Not even the market could be blamed for 
such a performance given the extent to which the crisis affected all types of 
previously uncorrelated asset classes and markets. 
Yet what distinguished the government's response to this crisis from that of 
the Dot-Com bubble was not just its being motivated by Fianna Fail's fear of losing 
face in domestic politics. Rather, both the Commission and NTMA stressed that a 
poorly performing NPRF was more significant for international fmancial markets. 
Indeed, the Minister of Finance of the time - Brian Lenihan - and his contacts in the 
NTMA vociferously argued in emergency presentations to the Oireachtas and media 
that tampering with the Fund's investment strategy in the face of the crisis was 
unthinkable. The massive losses incurred must be recouped as quickly as possible lest 
international confidence in Ireland as an investment destination be hurt. Maintaining 
the NPRF's high-risk profile in hopes market equilibrium and the ERP would prove 
the government were to continue its annual GNP allocations to the NPRF (Bord Snip Nua, Volume 1. 
2009: 66; Volume 2, 2009: 182). This advice was, however, ignored as these contributions had become 
fundamental to public spending - i.e. in their capacity to increase the attractiveness of Ireland's bonds 
on international debt markets (McCarthy, 2009). 
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resilient on the back of ad hoc government interventions in the US and UK was thus 
the only perceived means through which such a rapid turnaround could be achieved. It 
was therefore argued that any deviation from the SWF policy path would lead to 
'considerably difficult circumstances for the State' (Lenihan, 2009a: 9, 846-7; 
McDonagh, 2009; Cowen, 2008: 130-1; Mansergh, 2009: 429, 469). This politico-
economic environment produced by the fmancial crisis was, however, made all the 
more complicated by an emergent domestic banking crisis that hit two of Ireland's 
'Big Four' banks: Allied Irish Bank (AlB) and Bank of Ireland (BoI). Deconstructing 
the government's reaction to this crisis provides a specific case in which the 
ideational constraint exerted by the SWF policy path on Irish state agency can be 
witnessed. 
8.6 The NPRF as Constraint 
The Irish Banking Crisis of 2008 
The NPRF's speculative fmancia1 identity constrained the way in which the 
Ministry of Finance approached the Irish banking crisis of 2008. Indeed, it influenced 
their intervention to take the form of an investment rather than a conditional 
government bailout. This is more than a semantic distinction as the rescue package 
reduced the government's domestic regulatory capacity to a matter of ensuring the 
NPRF secured fmancial returns on these investments. In so doing, the Oireachtas in 
fact incentivized the banks to continue using the same aggressive lending practices 
that led to the crisis in the first place. The SWF policy path consequently prescribed 
the way in which Irish state actors should approach the banking crisis, and thus the 
impact their intervention had on rectifying its root causes. 
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To this effect, the collapse of the global interbank market following the credit-
crunch in 2007 resulted in AlB and BoI no longer being able to fund their day-to-day 
operations. While they held few of the asset-backed securities that had precipitated 
this collapse, each bank had nonetheless overstretched their lending capacities 
throughout the 2000s on the back of corporate tax cuts and an abundance of cheap 
credit. Their risky lending campaign subsequently inflated an Irish property bubble, 
leaving them exposed to collapsing housing prices when the domestic economy and 
international credit markets contracted in 2007 (Caolain, 2009: 900; Government 
Announcement, 2009). So while precipitated by international events, the domestic 
banking crisis demanded a strictly Irish solution. AlB and BoI consequently pressured 
the government to front them an interest-free loan so as to avoid bankruptcy. This was 
after failing to secure funding from private investors. The pressure tactics propelled 
the Oireachtas to pass the 'Investment of the National Pensions Reserve Fund and 
Miscellaneous Provisions Act' (INPRFMPA) in 2009, which allocated €3.5 billion of 
NPRF assets to each bank (INPRFMPA, 2009: Section 8).165 While this represented 
more than 40 per cent of the NPRF's underlying capital base in 2008, the government 
believed that leaving these banks to fail was tantamount to economic catastrophe 
(Lenihan, 2009a: 841; Lenihan, 2009b ).166 At fIrst glance, the Oireachtas's decision to 
intervene into the NPRF thus appears to contradict the argument that the SWF policy 
path constrains state agency. If it were truly a constraint then the government would 
not have endeavoured to use NPRF assets to recapitalise these failing banks. 
165 The Minister of Finance in fact announced the rescue package months before it was actually passed 
in the Oireachtas. This was after AlB and BoI held emergency meetings with the Minister of Finance, 
stressing how dire the banking crisis was and how domestically destabilizing their bankruptcy would 
he (Government Announcement, 2008). 
166 Opposition politicians in Fine Gael and Labour were not so kind, arguing that it. w~s because of th~ 
government's 'corrupt relationship [with] dodgy developers. the bankers, and speCIal mterests groups 
that it had become 'a prisoner of its own alliances' (Morgan, 2009: 898-9). 
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However, looking at the form of the rescue package reveals the extent of this 
. 167 
constramt. 
To reiterate arguments made in Sections 8.4 and 8.5, the NPRF's SWF 
identity became a substantive element of state fiscal policy between 2001 and 2009. 
Its long-term investment perspective and annual source of public funding enabled the 
NTMA to market Irish bonds as more attractive than its EO competitors. Yet in the 
midst of the banking crisis the NPRF represented the only readily available pot of 
public capital from which the Minister of Finance could conceivably draw (c.f Dail 
Debates, 2009: 846). This was given that year's budget was already in deficit and the 
national debt had steadily risen in each of the preceding three years (see Figure 9). An 
NPRF directed investment in fact meant that the rescue package would not be 
classified as spending under EO accounting rules, thus giving government fmances 
added breathing room (Bannon, 2009: 901). But if the government were to use the 
NPRF to recapitalise the banks, they had to do so in a way that 'the markets would 
believe in' (cf Dail Debates, 2009: 846-8). This constrained the state to act as an 
investor rather than regulator lest international investors lose confidence in Ireland as 
an investment destination. In short, an NPRF rescue package the markets would 
perceive as de facto nationalisation or outright political takeover was out of the 
question. Only one that fell within the NPRF's existing remit of pursuing optimal 
financial returns through limited political interference would be deemed acceptable by 
the market. 
167 Wh'l ' d .. th NPRF 1 e the domestic source of constraint did not hamper the government s eClSlOn to use e 
in this way, Fianna Fail was still scathed in domestic politics. Support for the Fianna Fail majority 
government fell by 50 percent following the announcement of the rescue package. Use of the NPRF to 
fund the bank recapitalization tarnished their image as forward-looking governors, an image largely 
supported by their creation of the NPRF in the first place (cf. RTE News, 2009). This highlights the 
domestic source of constraint exerted by the NPRF as the Fianna Fail majority have been deemed 
lmtrustworthy in governing the nation's finances like so many governments before them. They will 
therefore be hard-pressed to maintain their 20 year dominance of the Oireachtas in the 2012 general 
dection, which serves as a warning to the now popular Fine Gael and Labour parties to leave the :JPRF 
tmtouched (c.f. Irish Examiner, 2009). 
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The Governor of the Central Bank, the Financial Regulator, his fmancial 
advisors, and the National Treasury Management Agency all ratified this argument. 
The Minister of Finance was consequently led to believe that an NPRF investment 
overseen by the Commission and NTMA was 'crucial for [the banks] to be 
understood by worldwide markets as being subject to normal market disciplines and 
not political disciplines' (Lenihan, 2009b; cf. Lenihan, 2009a: 873, 846-7; Somers, 
2008). The recapitalisation package was therefore constructed around the notion that 
the NPRF would be investing in the banks, albeit in such a way that prevented the 
government from voting on its €7 billion ownership claim. This would ensure the 
NPRF's commercial mandate would remain intact - a positive signal for both foreign 
investors and the domestic electorate - while also providing the banks with a 
politically-minimalist public capital injection. 168 The importance of managing both 
the public and markets' perception of the NPRF's investment meant the state actors 
involved had to promote its desirability. They particularly stressed the NPRF would 
have invested this €7 billion for a return the package sought to 'guarantee' anyway 
(Government Announcement, 2009). 
Yet in so doing, the government's primary concern became guaranteeing it 
earned a return on these investments. Indeed, the package consisted of a hybrid 
investment vehicle, meaning it resembled an equity security but required the bank pay 
the government a fixed annual dividend of 8 percent. 169 While critics railed against 
the package's supporters for 'listening to the banks on each occasion in terms of what 
they need rather than what the country needs and where we need to get to', even they 
became overwhelmingly focused on ensuring that 'taxpayers' earn a return on these 
168 For example, the package empowered the Minister of Finance to appoint 25 percent of the banks' 
Boards, but at the same time the goverrunent would not hold ordinary shares and would possess no 
voting rights (Goverrunent Announcement, 2009). 
169 The package also included an option to purchase 25 percent of each bank in 2014 if the banks shares 
were still suffering (Goverrunent Announcement, 2009: Appendix 2). 
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investments lest they lose political capital (Mitchell, 2009: 851-2; cf. Burton, ~009: 
853-4). The government consequently directed little focus on attempting to prevent 
another such crisis from occurring after the deal was made. This was despite several 
proposals introduced by members of the Oireachtas, such as increasing the banks' 
capital requirements, their transparency and accountability, or the level of political 
oversight over the fragile fmancial sector (cf. Hearings of the Committee on Public 
Accounts, February 10 2010; May 14 2009; June 19 2008). In short, the NPRF's 
speculative investment package prevented the government from making any 
regulatory changes that may have threatened the intervention's fmancial profitability. 
The package in fact pressured both AlB and BoI to earn risk-based investment 
returns as quickly as possible. That is, the deal enabled the government to greatly 
enhance its ownership share of the banks if they were unable to either make their 
annual dividend payments or increase their share prices, (c.f. Government 
Announcement, 2009: Appendix 2; Somers, 2009; Carty, 2010). The government's 
rescue package thus in no way guaranteed that more credit would be made available 
to the small businesses and home-owners who were suffering the most. Instead, it 
represented a symbolic means of supporting the banks' attractiveness to the private 
investors who would hopefully provide the capital needed to rectify the crisis 
(O'Donnell, 2009: 849). Indeed, the conditions the package did demand of the banks 
were more a means to pacify the domestic electorate seething from what they saw as 
bankers' greed. 170 The government's intervention thus never sought to make any 
lasting regulatory changes lest these private sources of fmancial support lose 
confidence in Ireland as an investment destination. 
170 For example, the deal required the banks to increase their lending standard codes by 30 percent for 
small and medium sized enterprises and 10 percent for first-time home-buyers. Howeyer, this was only 
for 2009, and a year on the government reported that 'viable business propositions' continued to be 
refused loans (Government Announcement, 2009). Cuts in senior executiw and other directors' pay 
would also only apply to ~009 as a type of fine for taking excessi ve financial risks. 
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The Irish banking crisis therefore demonstrates that the state clearly benefits 
from the NPRF and its SWF identity, both as an attractive feature of its fmancial 
landscape as well as a pot of money available for use on a 'rainy day'. But at the same 
time, it has the capacity to constrain the state's agency when approaching problems of 
governance they are expected to resolve. Indeed, it encouraged the state's intervention 
into the Irish banking system to take the form of largely unconditional speculative 
investments. This ultimately reconceptualised the government as just another 
concerned shareho lder dependent on the banks' ability to earn returns and increase 
their share price. As a consequence, members of the Oireachtas never dwelled on the 
underlying causes of the crisis or how they could learn from them. They instead 
focused on how to ensure the NPRF profit from its investments lest they lose 
legitimacy as governors of Irish society. In short, the fmancial orientation of the 
package effectively neutered the Oireachtas in its ability to affect any regulatory 
changes in the risk-laden Irish banking sector (O'Shea, 2009: 92). It ultimately 
incentivized the two banks to resume their aggressive pursuit of fmancial returns by 
any means necessary. The NPRF's SWF identity thus led Irish state managers to 
increase their dependence on a speculative fmancial system, prone to bouts of panic 
and crash, in their approach to ensuring socioeconomic stability and growth. 
Conclusion 
Using Ireland's National Pension Reserve Fund as a case study, the preceding 
Chapter sought to demonstrate how the SWF policy path as a state-sponsored strategy 
of governance effectively replaced one type of uncertainty with another. The problem 
of how to meet expected pension liabilities that faced the Irish state in the late 1990s 
was replaced with the expectation that the NPRF will generate financial gains above 
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the cost of debt servicing. At the same time, the SWF policy path quickly became a 
substantial source of support for the state's governance function between 2001 and 
2009. This was in terms of supporting state fiscal policy and its perceived ability to 
ensure the sustainability of the PAYGO pension system - a major responsibility of the 
state. The chapter demonstrated how such constraint is the product of SWFs' 
ideational foundations and not just the functional effect of placing political authority 
at one remove of NPRF capital. It then suggested this constraint prevents alternative 
and equally plausible mechanisms for pre-funding future pension liabilities or 
balancing annual budgets from being seriously considered. 171 The NPRF' s 
expansionary remit is in fact gaining support on the back of the Fund's recent 20 
percent gains in 2009. To be sure, these gains and their validation of the SWF policy 
path resulted in the transfer of €880 million to the NPRF from 10 university and non-
commercial state body pension funds in December 2009 (Third Quarter Report, 2009: 
3). 
In the end, however, the NPRF's success as a strategy of governance is not so 
much dependant on its actual ability to pre-fund pensions. Rather, it is dependant on 
how successful the Irish state is in normalizing the contemporary fmancial 
epistemology, relations, and practices upon which its domestic and international 
legitimacy is based. It is moreover dependant on the ability of states in aggregate to 
maintain fmancial market equilibrium in the face of recurrent fmancial bubbles and 
crises. Indeed, the NPRF's recent 2009 gains would not have been possible without 
171 These alternatives presented to the Oireachtas between 2001 and 2009 included: investments in 
infrastructure to better long-term economic efficiency; investment in diversification projects to 
strengthen the resilience of the economy, to attract immigrant workers, and to keep young workers in 
Ireland; investments in education to develop a more skilled, higher paid, and thus taxable workforce: 
change the nature of indexed-pensions as public sector pensions are far more costly than those of the 
private sector; and addressing the problem of income-inequality of the female labour force so as to 
increase tax revenues. See, for example, NPRF Commission (2004) for an extensive debate between 
the Fund's managers and overseers in the 'Hearing of the Joint Committee on Finance and Public 
Service' on the subject of why the SWF policy path was preferred over infrastructural inwstments. Sec 
also ~oonan, 2000: 85; Dail Debates, 2003: 1008. 
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the stabilizing influence of ad hoc state interventions throughout the speculative 
fmancial realm. This suggests the modern fmancial epistemology legitimating the 
SWF policy path is inherently problematic: it demands the Irish government minimise 
its involvement with the NPRF, but at the same time support the fmancial system 
throughout which public wealth is increasingly embedded. This highlights the 
inherent contradictions of contemporary fmance capitalism's overly simplistic state-
market dualisms as presented to the Irish public. Analysing SWFs through this 
polemic relationship limits the ways states like Ireland can approach highly complex 
socioeconomic problems, such as how to ensure the sustainability of pension 
provision, how to most effectively manage national wealth, and how to conduct fiscal 
policy in general. A more integrated approach to SWF -states' relationship with 
fmancial markets must therefore be pursued lest the state always play catch-up to the 
ever-increasing demands of expansionary fmancial markets. Potential ways such an 
integrated approach can be realized will be expanded upon in the concluding Chapter. 
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Conclusion 
Summary of Arguments 
This dissertation's research objectives were two-fold. First was to provide an 
alternative explanation for the global diffusion of the sovereign wealth fund policy 
path than that currently offered in the SWF literature. Financial economists and 
OECD market regulators, wary of the funds' political origins, have dominated 
existing analyses. These scholars have been overwhelmingly concerned with 
questions of whether SWFs should be considered legitimate fmancial speculators, and 
thus in what asset classes and markets they should be allowed to invest (cf Monk, 
2009). Why so many variegated state actors of dynamic and competing policy 
preferences all chose to establish SWFs - and why they have maintained this policy 
path through time in the face of recurrent and destabilizing fmancial crises -
consequently remains an unsubstantiated assumption. Indeed, such analyses have left 
the funds' contested political origins unexamined. It is assumed a government would 
naturally want to maximize the return generated by public capital through fmancial 
speculation if capable of doing so. State actors are thus assumed to be forward-
looking and altruistic governors attempting to benefit both current and future 
generations of domestic society. As a consequence, increased fmancial risk is 
problematically rendered synonymous with reward such that speculation's negative 
connotations - those of uncertainty and loss - no longer defme its character. 
These commentators then somewhat contradict themselves by argumg 
governments cannot be trusted to manage their SWFs due to their being motivated 
largely by self-interest. They argue these tendencies would inevitably result in S\\'F 
297 
capital being abused, and the funds' strictly commercial orientations thrown into flux. 
How, then, can these governments be forward-looking and rational by establishing 
SWFs, while at the same time self-interested and prone to bouts of irrational 
behaviour? This gap in understanding represents an especially noteworthy puzzle 
given that SWFs severely limit a government's authority to use this public capital for 
any purposes other than fmancial speculation. SWFs thus remain anomalous black-
boxes in critical IPE scholarship: they have yet to be sufficiently examined from a 
perspective that keeps fmancial as well as political interests and ideas in mind. 
Indeed, it is not so much the emergence of SWFs in general that warrants 
criticism, but the discourses that surround this development. The global diffusion of 
the SWF policy path has thus far been portrayed as politically unproblematic, and 
capable of solving many of the ills that face developed and developing market 
economies alike. Scarce resources are consequently reallocated away from other 
development projects to fund fmancial speculation on agio bal and systematically 
significant scale. While the funds do provide immediate benefits for governments, 
corporations, and even 'everyday' people, they also change the parameters of 
economic policymaking within their respective states to favor more market-oriented 
forms of knowledge. The funds in tum challenge a government's policy autonomy, 
demonstrably constraining political actors to defer their interests to those of the 
speCUlative fmancial realm. The funds moreover create new vulnerabilities as 
governments become more directly exposed to volatile and crisis prone capital 
markets. These are necessary points for critical IPE scholarship to further examine if 
SWFs' rapid growth continues into the 21 st century. Indeed, a more balanced 
approach to the relationship binding SWFs, states, and global capital markets must be 
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considered lest democratically elected governments become increasingly suppressed 
features of an ever-expansionary fmancial realm. 
To this end, this dissertation has argued that SWFs were created only when 
they were perceived as benefiting state actors' short-term interests. While not a bold 
claim in itself, what is interesting is the process through which the SWF policy path 
was first championed, and then sustained through time, over competing alternative 
fiscal management strategies. This dissertation assumed that maintaining domestic 
political legitimacy is a primary short-term interest of government officials. It was 
moreover assumed that in their attempts to gain such legitimacy, governments 
strategically pursue policies they believe will engender perceptions of socioeconomic 
stability throughout domestic popUlations. This is to say that no matter the 
socioeconomic realities, what matters for state actors is the perception this reality is 
stable and non-threatening to domestic socioeconomic interests. It was then 
hypothesized that SWFs appeal as strategies of governance because they represent 
tools state officials can use to construct and reinforce such perceptions of 
socioeconomic stability. Indeed when faced with destabilizing problems of great 
uncertainty, states can rely on their SWFs to reconceptualise uncertain futures in the 
quantitative and communicable terms of fmancial risk. How a government is to 
manage the unexpected accruement of extra-budgetary foreign exchange reserves, or 
how to ensure the sustainability of a public pension system, are long-term problems 
that can be recast in terms of their SWFs' expected profitability. This has the effect of 
stabilizing these state actors' governance function in time. SWFs thus enable 
governments to defer the responsibility to actually solve these problems to speculative 
financial markets, as well as their political successors. 
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The dissertation's second research objective was to then draw attention to the 
implications SWFs posed for their states' approach to domestic governance. It was 
argued the funds constrain these governments capacity to seriously consider, let alone 
attempt to pursue, alternative and less risky approaches to public capital management. 
Simply put, SWFs constrain governments to defer their interests in regards to non-
fmancial industries in favour of their funds' speculative fmancial interests. However, 
this constraint is not just attributable to SWFs placing governments at one remove of 
public capital management in a functional - read: operational - sense of authority. 
Rather, SWF constraint is attributable to their being rooted in an authoritative array of 
fmancial ideas. These ideas compose an identifiable epistemology of speculative 
fmance, which prescribes to state actors what speculative fmancial market reality is, 
and how they should engage it. SWF constraint thus comes from the epistemological 
authority exerted by these ideas, which derives from their authority to be believed as 
well as followed. These ideas' underlying assumptions about the inherent rationality 
of investors and efficiency of markets are thus key mechanisms through which 
fmancial speculation is not just informed, but how it is constituted and legitimated on 
a daily basis (c£ de Goede, 2005: 7). 
This is to emphasize SWF-states are not only constrained by the material 
power of market forces, but also self-imposed ideational boundaries. These 
boundaries ultimately limit the range of actions state actors can not only pursue, but 
more importantly the range of potential actions they view as legitimate. To be sure, 
the power of fmance is derived from its capability to legitimize certain forms of 
know ledge and to delegitimize others, rather than from fmancial muscle alone. The 
constraints of policy autonomy placed on SWF governments are therefore as much 
ideational as they are material (Rethel, 20 I 0: 95). These ideational constraints were 
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categorized under the term 'fmancial depoliticization' in Chapter Three. As opposed 
to orthodox approaches to depoliticization, this term describes how modem fmancial 
epistemology constrains government actors' capacity to set, apply, and enforce the 
'rules of the game' vis-a-vis public capital management (Kjaer, 2004: 12). They are 
instead required to passively oversee their SWFs' frenetic pursuit of speculative - and 
thus imagined - fmancial gain. This dissertation has therefore sought to deconstruct 
and problematize this fmancial epistemology and its ideationally constraining 
influence on SWF-government agency by examining three case studies. The 
following now summarizes the core empirical fmdings of the thesis. 
In Norway, central bank officials successfully persuaded the Storting's 
Centre-Left majority coalition they would be incurring large opportunity-costs on 
their petroleum wealth if it were not exposed to higher degrees of fmancial risk. Yet 
this was only after these wealth reserves were projected to rapidly swell into the late 
1990s on the back of rising world energy prices. Indeed the central bank's arguments 
were only compelling when coupled with the Storting's desire to avoid re-living the 
economic turmoil their predecessors had instigated in the 1970s and 80s. The GPFG's 
transformation into an SWF in 1997 was then only made possible by central bank 
officials' strategically drawing from the epistemology of fmancial speculation - the 
idea of fmancial profitability in particular. This authoritative knowledge framework 
enabled these officials to construct and inform the Storting of their interests in the 
context of uncertainty they faced. The SWF policy path was thus pursued as a means 
to immediately reduce this uncertainty by reconceptualising it in the predictable and 
altogether manageable terms of fmancial risk and expected return. 
In so doing, the Storting was constrained to actively construct the legitimacy 
of the S\VF policy path throughout domestic society between 1997 and 2009. This 
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was to avoid being accused of taking unnecessary risks in their approach to petroleum 
wealth management when faced by three fmancial crises that greatly reduced the 
GPFG's value throughout this time. Thus rather than critically examine the fmancial 
volatility to which this wealth was increasingly exposed, the Storting limited their 
governance function to a matter of cheerleading the policy preferences recommended 
to them by more knowledgeable fmancial experts in Norges Bank Investment 
Management. The epistemological authority exerted by these experts thus constrained 
government agency to increase: (i) the extent to which Norway's petroleum wealth 
was embedded throughout speculative capital markets in both a spatial and functional 
sense of capital mobility; (ii) the level of fmancial risk to which this wealth was 
subsequently exposed; and (iii) their reliance on fallacious modem risk management 
technologies to support them in their governance of the petroleum-dependant welfare 
state. 
In Alberta, the conservative PC majority government opted to transform the 
Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund into an SWF so as to solve a politico-economic 
crisis that emerged in the early 1990s. The SWF policy path was thus perceived as a 
means to appease an Albertan public long since disillusioned with the government's 
confusing approach to petroleum wealth management. This would at the same time 
preserve the AHF as a source of provincial pride demarcating Alberta from the rest of 
federal Canada. Similar to Norway, the Albertan case study demonstrated the SWF 
policy path was only pursued after it was framed by Treasury officials as benefiting 
the government's short-term budgetary needs. Indeed, speculative investment had to 
be framed as capable of preserving the AHF's historical use as an extra-budgetary 
account before the government was willing to change its management mandate. 
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The Albertan provincial government was then exposed to a similar set of 
ideational constraints as was Norway between 1997 and 2009. First was MLAs' 
increased reliance on fmancial speculation as supporting feature of budgetary 
fmancing. Indeed, the AHF' s speculative returns immediately became a means to fill 
in budgetary shortfalls left by a dependence on volatile petroleum revenues. Similar to 
the Norwegian experience, this resulted in constraining MLAs to gradually increase 
the AHF's exposure to different forms and greater degrees of fmancial risk. Second, 
the desire to improve the AHF's fmancial returns led government to increase their 
dependence on fmancial experts in the specially created Alberta Investment 
Management Corporation. This further limited their capacity to determine how and to 
what end goals this prized pot of petroleum wealth would be managed. These effects 
of SWF constraint were then shown to be particularly problematic in the wake of the 
fmancial crisis that began in August 2007. Indeed, the Albertan government has yet to 
recover from the effects this crisis had on budgetary fmancing. This has increased 
their dependence on both volatile petroleum revenues as well as the AHF's 
speculative fmancial returns to fmance annual budgets. The SWF policy path as a 
governance strategy thus remains critically unengaged as everyday Albertans and 
non-fmancial industries continue to suffer from waning governmental support (cf. 
Stelmach, 2009). 
Finally in Ireland, the National Pension Reserve Fund was established as an 
SWF to address two problems of uncertainty the Oireachtas faced in the late 1990s. 
The first had to do with an unprecedented budgetary surplus the Ministry of Finance 
perceived as threatening to the small island economy. The second problem followed 
the emergence of alarming demographic figures, which projected the much relied-
Upon state pension system to be unsustainable over the next three decades. To address 
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these problems, the Oireachtas passed legislation that would force them to save this 
surplus as well as one percent of GNP annually in an extra-budgetary account until at 
least 2056. This account - the NPRF - was then to be speculatively invested so as to 
keep ahead of debt servicing costs. The SWF policy path was in any case initially 
resisted due to the constraints the NPRF's funding source would place on budgetary 
politics. As such, the NPRF's supporters in the Ministry of Finance and Fianna Fail 
heavily drew from the ideas substantiating modem fmancial epistemology to convince 
their colleagues of the NPRF's feasibility as a strategy of governance. They 
successfully argued the Fund could be expected to generate significant fmancial 
returns in the long run. This would reduce their need to devise alternative and 
politically damaging alternative strategies to support pension sustainability in the 
short run, such as raising taxes or cutting services. 
The Irish SWF nonetheless constrained the Oireachtas's approach to rectifying 
a domestic banking crisis that has since sent the economy into a deep recession. 
Rather than provide two failing Irish banks with a conditional bailout, the 
government's desire to preserve the NPRF's legitimacy as an SWF led them to invest 
€7 billion in the banks. The case study demonstrated how this limited government's 
capacity to affect any lasting regulatory change that would prevent another such crisis 
from being experienced in the future. The government was moreover constrained to 
maintain their support of the SWF policy path following the NPRF's devaluation by 
40 percent in 2008. This was due to their efforts to promote fmancial speculation's 
legitimacy as a strategy of governance throughout domestic society from 2001 
onwards. They consequently have yet to formulate - let alone seriously consider 
pursuing - alternative means to ensure the sustainability of the Irish pension system 
other than speculatively investing debt-funded NPRF contributions. 
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Caveats and Suggestions for Future Research 
Given its focus on only three of a possible 80 plus case studies, the 
generalizability of this dissertation's conclusions is limited. Further research is 
needed to chart how the SWF policy path materialized in more authoritarian and less 
transparent states such as those in Abu Dhabi, China and Singapore. Legitimacy 
construction for these governments is clearly not as important as in democracies, 
where the electorate arguably has a better capacity to hold politicians to account. 
What remains constant for all cases, however, is the role played by modern fmancial 
epistemology to provide an actionable blueprint for states wishing to establish an 
SWF. What remains unanswered is how these ideas were internalized by these more 
authoritarian state actors and to what ends. Considering that these more opaque forms 
of SWF constitute a majority of the funds, future research into their emergence and 
relationship shared with domestic constituents is required (see Appendix 1). Such 
case-by-case research is a necessary step towards developing an understanding of the 
funds' significance for SWF -state governance, as well as the nature of sovereign state 
authority in the global political economy in general. 
Research is also required to critically analyze the broader structural factors 
that have led to SWFs' global emergence, and not just the ideas that substantiate their 
speculative fmancial identities. While this dissertation has emphasized ideational 
sources of institutional change, structural factors have clearly played an equally 
significant role in SWFs' development. For example, what historical events, trends, 
processes, rules, and regulations led so many different governments to amass the 
extra-budgetary capital of which most SWFs are composed? What does this tell us of 
the sustainability of modem fmance capitalism when governments are in possession 
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of such 'unneeded' wealth? Clearly the US Federal Reserve has played an important 
role in providing the world with enough premier reserve currency to aid and abet 
SWF-states' burgeoning foreign exchange reserves (Clarida, 2007). But what 
strategies have SWF-states employed to attract such vast amounts of currency, and are 
these strategies in the best long-term interests of SWF-states? What role has 
'neoliberalism' and its loosely bounded collection of market-favouring policies 
played in SWFs emergence? How do the funds reinforce certain features of 
neoliberalism while disarm others? China, for example, has benefited from the West's 
dependence on cheaply manufactured goods by taking a hard-line approach to 
ensuring the stability of the Renminbi. This has led to the rapid growth of their US 
debt-derived foreign exchange reserves, which now fund the China Investment 
Corporation. Investigating the different ways in which these macroeconomic 
processes and domestic policies are generated and enacted by governments to affect 
the lives of everyday citizens is therefore a necessary task for future research. This is 
to criticize the IPE literature's lack of engagement with 'inside out' analyses, where 
fmancial policy preferences serve domestic interests and institutions first, and the 
structural demands of (neoliberal) fmance capitalism second. 
(Re)politicizing Sovereign Wealth Funds 
While SWFs and their import for modem fmance capitalism remain hotly 
debated in academic circles, both regulators and practitioners have generally accepted 
the funds as legitimate market participants (cf Gurria, 2008). This dissertation has 
sought to problematize this acceptance by critically engaging the speculative fmancial 
epistemology guiding SWF-states in their approach to public capital management. 
Indeed, the recurrent and globally destabilizing crises experienced over the past thee 
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decades have proven this interpretive knowledge framework to be fallacious when 
used as a blueprint for action. When it is institutionalized into an SWF, governments 
merely arena-shift problems of uncertainty from the responsibility of the politico-
economic to speculative fmancial realms. This dissertation has consequently sought to 
demonstrate speculative fmancial markets comprise individual investors and regional 
markets that are capable of producing efficient outcomes, but who are also prone to 
bouts of mania and panic, asset bubbles and bursts. These markets moreover comprise 
governments - as both regulators and participants through SWFs, central banks and 
public pension funds - who have been increasingly called upon to stabilize market 
equilibrium in the inevitable event of crisis. 
A fmal point to be made is that government actors should not be required to 
limit their SWFs to pursue strictly passive commercial mandates so as to appease 
neoliberal markets' fears of political interference. By doing so, SWFs lose the very 
feature that makes them unique and influential market participants. Indeed they are 
long-term and state-sponsored strategies of governance capable of affecting real 
change in both the regulatory and ideational frameworks that not only make fmancial 
speculation possible, but which ultimately shape this realm's daily constitution. In 
short, the funds have the potential to contest and change dominant fmancial 
orthodoxies. This is in a way that could limit the frequency of crises, or at least better 
bridge the gap separating the synchronic versus diachronic fmancial practices that 
underpin these crises (Sinclair, 2005: 58-59).172 This is to emphasize that institutional 
172 Norway's GPFG has been a forerunner in this regard, becoming an increasingly prominent player in 
promoting global corporate governance reform from 2003 onward (cf. Fini and Rethel, 2009). While 
these reforms have been focused on making corporate boards more accountable and transparent to 
shareholders, their intentions are ultimately normative. Indeed these aggressive reforms are meant to 
deter the GPFG's portfolio companies from engaging with, among other goals, e~vironmental.ly 
unsustainable practices and the use of child labour. This, argue GPFG managers ill ~IM,. Wl.ll 
improve the efficiency and thus sustainability of financial market growth and capitalistic enterpnse 10 
the long run (NBIM, 2007). 
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investors, like SWFs, contribute daily to the construction of fmancial reality by both 
generating and enacting the rules and procedures through which this reality is 
iteratively constructed (cf Deeg and O'Sullivan, 2009). SWFs as systematically 
significant actors are thus regulated by historically constituted fmancial ideas and 
discourses, but they also have the authority to delegitimize existing discourses and 
create new ones (de Goede, 2005: 10). So while SWFs may not be the sovereign 
originators of their actions, the speculative fmancial realm is dependant on their daily 
performances. As such, they have the capacity to 'reformulate, rearticulate, transform, 
and even fundamentally question' the synchronic fmancial orthodoxies that have 
proven so globally destabilizing in recent years (ibid: 13). If not proactive in this 
regard, SWFs and the governments to whom they are ultimately accountable become 
just another class of speculative rentier; either profiting or suffering from others' 
patchwork efforts to keep modem fmance capitalism afloat. 
Pursuing a goal of fmancial maximization through speculative investment 
should not therefore be considered a beneficial strategy of governance in itself, but a 
stall tactic. It is highly problematic given the vested interest these governments 
develop in international fmancia1 market versus domestic socioeconomic growth. To 
be sure, SWFs have the potential to be domestically beneficial in both the long and 
short-terms, no matter the fears of government inefficiencies in regards to public 
capital management. Despite the GPFG's massive size, for example, Norway will 
continue to remain overly dependant on the petroleum sector to ensure the future 
sustainability of the welfare state. When this petroleum-turned-fmancial wealth runs 
out in the next five decades, however, which underdeveloped economic sector will 
provide the necessary revenues to cover budgetary shortfalls? A similar problem 
presents itself in Alberta, where petroleum dependence has been as much a burden as 
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boon for the PC majority government since 1975. Belief in the profitability of the 
NPRF, moreover, has arguably fuelled Irish spending rather than contained it as 
initially intended. If the NPRF was to continue earning the double-digit returns of 
2009, for example, why should the Fianna Fail government feel the need to curtail 
that year's budget? Indeed, they can just borrow from debt markets as they had in the 
past in the belief next year's NPRF returns will cover the spread between short-term 
budgetary versus debt liabilities. 
In the end, however, such speculative approaches to public capital 
management may prove entirely justified. Indeed, the future of fmancial market 
development and growth is unknowable. This dissertation's three SWF case studies 
may prove highly profitable, and successive governments' use of their capital may 
affect real positive change in their respective territories. But is increasing these 
governments' reliance on synchronically minded and ideationally constrained 
fmancial experts worth the short-term risks (cf Harmes, 2001)? Does the theoretical 
proposition that, in the long run, riskier assets such as equities will earn a three to four 
percent higher return than bonds justify a state to expose their national wealth to 
destabilizing speculative asset bubbles (cf Kindleberger, 2005)? Should governments 
speculate in the same markets they are expected to bailout with public capital in the 
inevitable event of fmancial crisis (cf Wright, 201 O)? These are necessarily 
complicated questions with which SWF governments and the citizens to whom they 
are ultimately accountable have yet to critically engage. 
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Appendix 1: 
The World's SWFs 
Coutry JlDdNamf F olDded Assets ($bl) 
Urited Arab Enirates Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (AnIA) 1976 875 
NcxwaY Government Pension FlIKI- Global (GPFG) 1!m 322-373 
Singapore Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) 1981 200-330 
Saudi Arabia Saudi Anmia Monetary AuIhOIily (SAMA) 1952 327 
KuwaI Kuwait Investment Au1hority (KIA) 1960 213-264 
Clina China Investment Corporation (CIC) 2007 200 
Hong Kong Hong Kong Exchange Fund 1935 152-182 
Singapore Temasek Holdings 1974 131-161 
Russia ResefveFund 2007 141-157 
United Arab Enirales Invesbnent Corp of Duba 2006 82 
Austraia Queensland Investment Corpmtion (OIC) 1992 65 
Qatar Qa.lnvestment Authority (QIA) 2000 40-60 
Austraia Future F\Ild 2006 55-59 
France Pension Reserve Fund 2001 55-59 
Ubya Libyan Arab Forei~ Invesbnent CoI11l*lY (lAFICO) 1981 50-100 
Russia National Wealth FlIld 2007 49 
Algeria Foods de Regulation des Recettes de l'Algerie (FRR) 2000 44-47 
United States Alaska PefTTlftnt Reserve Fund 1976 37-40 
Auslraia Victorian Funds Management Corporatirl (VFMC) 1994 36 
Brunei Brunei Invesbnent Agency 1983 25-35 
Ireland National Pension Reserve Flild 2001 31 
Maaysia Khazanah Nasional BHD 1993 16-26 
Saudi Arabia K~m Hading CompalY 1980 25 
Kazakhstan Kazakhstan National Fund 2000 23-26 
Sooth Kcrea Korea Investment Caporation (KlC) 2006 20-30 
Venezuela National Development Fund (Fonden) 2005 15-21 
Cll*la Aberta Heritage FlIld 1976 17 
United sta1es New Mexico PemWlent Trust Funds 1958 15-16 
Chile Economic and Social Stabiisation Fmd (ESSF) 2007 17 
Talian National Stabiization Fund (NSF) 2000 15 
Saudi Arabia Public Investment Fund (PTF) 1973 10.0-15 
United Arab Enirales Dubai International Capital (DlC) 2004 13 
Nigeria Excess crude Fund 2004 13-17 
UriEd Arab Enirates 
NewZe8land 
fWdn 
Iran 
Urited Arab Enirates 
Iraq 
BdswanB 
Oman 
Uriled Arab Enirales 
SaIdi Arabia 
Urited S1a1es 
Mexico 
~an 
East Timor 
United States 
Norway 
Tritida:l and Tobago 
Colombia 
VIetnam 
Chile 
United Arab Enirates 
Venezuela 
Kiribati 
Cana:la 
Gabon 
Muitania 
Sudan 
Ar1Pa 
Abu Dhabi International Petroleum Investment COfT'4)alY 
New Zealn SupeRilnuation Fund 
Bahrail Mumtalakat HoIcflflg ComPfllY 
Oil Stabilizaoon Fund 
Mubadala 
Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) 
Pula Fund 
Stale General Reserve Fund 
lsti1hmar Watt 
Sanablal-SaOOia 
Permanent Wyomilg Mineral Trust Fund 
Oillnmme Stabilization Fund 
Stale 01 Fund of the Reptjllic of Azerba,an (SOFAZ) 
T IfOOr-Leste Petroleun Fund 
Alabama Trust Fund 
Government Peb'oleumlnsurance Fmd (GPIF) 
Herilage and Stabilization Flild 
Colormia 01 Stabilization Fund 
Vie1nam State Capital Investment Corporation 
Chile Pension Reserve Fund 
Ras AI Khaimah Investment Authority 
Investment Fund for Macroecooomic Stabilization 
Revenue E(JJ8lization Resmve Fund (RERF) 
Foods des Generations, Quebec 
Food for Future Generations 
National Fund for HydrocarOOn Reserves 
Oil Revenue stabilization Account 
Reserve Fund for O~ 
1984 
2001103 
2006 
2000 
2002 
2003 
1993 
1980 
2003 
2008 
1974 
2000 
1999 
2005 
1986 
1986 
2007 
1995 
2005 
2006 
2008 
1998 
1956 
2006 
1998 
2006 
2002 
2007 
Total 
310 
12 
10.0-11 
10 
10 
10 
8 
6-6.5 
6-82 
6-10.0 
6.5 
4 
2-5.0 
2-3.3 
2-3.0 
11 
2.9 
2 
2-2.1 
2-2.1 
1.4-2.4 
1.2 
0.8 
0.6 
0.6 
0.4-0.5 
0.3 
0.3 
02 
2,998,737 
Sources: Monitor Group, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Deutsche Bank Research, JP 
Morgan Research 
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Appendix 2: 
The Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund 
Transfers to and Withdrawals from the AHF (1976-2009) 
TRANSFERS TO THE FUND TRANSFERS (FROM! THE FUND 
NET Resource Advanced Education Section 8 (2) Capital 
FI§.CaI INCOME (lOSS) Revenue New Endowment Income TransMs Projl!Ct Fund Equity, 
Ys (a) ADocation Deposits (b) (c) ExpenditulM at cost 
197&-n $88 $2.120 {$38} 52172 
1977-11 194 931 ,:37) 3,210 
1971-79 294 1,059 (132) 4,431 
1979-10 343 1,332 1478: ,5',1325 
1980-81 n4 1,445 11"\'-';'\ 7 ;;"7,", \-....1 I ,\.1 ... 
1981-82 1,007 1.434 ::;.W ?,ee2 
1982-83 1,482 1.370 (OO7) :::::ge: 11,351 
1983-8,( 1,467 120 (1,469) (330) 11.739 
1984-85 1,575 736 (1,5i:'1 (228) 12247 
1985-86 1,667 685 (1,667) (240) 12,692 
198&-87 1,445 ".~ (1,445) r~"'" 12,682 .L !,' j
1981-88 1,353 \:,353) (129) 12,553 
1988-89 1152 (1152) (155) 12398 
1989-90 :,244 {: .2441 (134 : 12.264 
1990-91 1,337 (1,337) (150) 12114 
1991-92 1,382 (1,382) ,:84) 12,030 
1992-93 7~5 17551 (84) 11.946 
1993-94 1.103 (1,lOJ) (71) 11 87E 
1994-95 914 (914) (49) 11,826 
1995-S6Ie! 1,046 1
'
,(].461 11,826 
199,",7 932 \7561 (eI) 12..002 
1991-98 947 (922) (eI) 12,027 
1998-99 932 (932) 12027 
1999~O 1,169 (939) (eI) 12..257 
2OOO~1 706 (706) 12257 
2001~2 206 {206) 12257 
2OO2~3 (894) 11 363 
2003-04 . ,133 (1.133) 11,363 
2004~5 ;,092 ~ • ,O'~:2) 11,363 
2OO~6 1,3Q7 1,000 750 (' ,015) (eI) 13.495 
2OO~7 1,648 1,000 250 (1,365) (eI) 15,023 
2001~8 824 918 12-581 (d) 16.412 
2OO1~9 ':2~574) 13.838 
2009-10 2,006 (2,0(6) 13.838 
TOTAL $30,226 $12.1)49 $2.911 $1.GOO ($21.869) ($3.486) $13,838 
Source: Annual Report, 2009: 16 
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